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I. Introduction

This short note is a part of my research that

focuses on three interrelated issues: land tenure (changes and continuities), land disputes and

A Note on the Interaction between Formal and Indigenous Institutions for

Land Disputes Settlement: The Case of Arsii Oromo, Southern Ethiopia

M

AMO

Hebo* 

Abstract

Dispute over land is one of the major problems people in the study area are currently facing. In this note I will briefl y discuss mechanisms of land dispute resolutions among the Arsii Oromo people of Kokossa district. When disputes over land occur, there are two settings for land dispute settlement. One is the formal (state) structure for dispute settlement while the other is the informal1) (indigenous) institution for dispute settlement. This note focuses

on describing and analyzing these two settings for dispute settlement. First, I briefl y discuss how the two settings for dispute settlement deal with land disputes. Then I make an attempt to illustrate how they interact and what the interaction means to the disputants. I also present a summary of an actual case of land dispute to illustrate how the two settings for dispute settlement work and interact. Finally, I discuss the practice of case ‘borrowing,’ which is one facet of their interaction.

* Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University

1) Throughout this note, informal institutions are interchangeably used with indigenous institutions.

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mechanisms of land dispute resolution. I have been conducting fi eldwork on these issues among the Arsii Oromo people in Kokossa district, southern Ethiopia, since 1999.

The Arsii Oromo follow a patrilineal descent system and a patrilocal settlement pattern. They practice mixed agriculture. The landscape of the district is dominated by grazing land dotted by enset (Ensete ventricosum) fi elds. But one can easily observe variations in the land use patterns between the southern and northern parts of the district. The southern part of the district predominantly relies on livestock raising and cultivation of enset plant with little involvement in the production of cereal and other crops. The northern part of the district, on the other hand, combines livestock raising and enset cultivation with signifi cant production of crops such as barley, wheat, maize and potatoes. The difference in land use pattern has mainly emerged from

the differences in the agro-ecological settings by which the respective sections of the district have been infl uenced. The southern part of the district has been infl uenced by the enset cultivating Sidama ethnic group while the northern part is more infl uenced by the cereal crops producing Arsii Oromo communities. The information employed in this note has been gathered mainly through ethnographic methods: informal interviews, participant observation and extensive case studies. I kept the use of formal interviews and questionnaires to less sensitive issues after I found out that people were very reluctant to provide information on land tenure and related issues or they just provided ambivalent responses. This is because of the fact that land rights are very contentious political issues in Ethiopia. As a result I have chosen to focus on informal interviews and studies of actual cases of land disputes. I have managed

2) Photo 2 above, shows land use patterns in Kokossa district. The photo on the left hand side shows land use pattern in the northern section of the district with enset crop on the top followed by maize fi eld, then by intentionally enclosed strip of grazing land in the middle and a wheat/barely fi eld at the bottom. The other photo (right) shows the typical land use pattern in the southern part of the district where enset is the main staple and grazing land marks the outskirt of enset fi eld.

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to establish a rapport with the local people employing the advantage of being a native speaker of the local language, Afaan Oromo (Oromo language).

II. Categories of Dispute3) Settlement:

The Formal Structures and the Informal Institutions

First a few words on the term ņdisputeʼn as it is being employed among Arsii Oromo. The term

waldhabbii4) is a combination of an adjective wal

(each other) and a verb dhabuu, which means, to miss something, to be unable to fi nd something after some attempts have been made to search for it. Thus, waldabbii can literally be translated as ņto miss one anotherʼn or ņto misunderstand one another.ʼn I couldn’t fi nd any word other than

waldhabbii that could stand for the term ņdisputeʼn

in Afaan Oromo. Consequently, in the subsequent sections when I discuss disputes, I am dealing with what Arsii Oromo farmers express as

waldhabbii in general and waldhabbii lafa (land

dispute), in particular. Thus, if waldhabbii stands for a dispute, the role of dispute settlement institutions is to clear up misunderstandings between the disputants or to let the disputants ņfi nd one another.ʼn

When land disputes between individuals or groups of various sizes occur, it has to be resolved either by the formal structures5) or the

informal institutions for dispute settlement. These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive. Interaction, and sometimes overlaps, is visible between the two settings in the process of dispute settlement. Each of these dispute settlement settings again can be divided into

3) Throughout this note, dispute is interchangeably used with land disputes, while mechanisms of dispute settlement is interchangeably used with mechanisms for land disputes settlement.

4) Waldhabbii should be distinguished from a rather related term wal-loluu, which literally means to fi ght with each other.

Wal-loluu is a combination of wal (each other) and loluu (to fi ght). Its noun form is lola, which means fi ght or war. While wal-loluu implies physical violence, waldhabbii does not necessarily imply so. In short, all wal-loluu are consequences of waldhabbii but not all waldhabbii lead to wal-loluu.

5) Formal structures throughout this note mainly refer to the district administration and peasantsʼn association administration. Fig. 1. Process of dispute settlement

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different levels.

Figure 1 depicts how disputes appear before different levels of dispute settlement institutions. Arrows that originate from the land dispute show that one of the disputants takes his/her case either to the formal structures or to the informal institutions. Cases may also go back and forth between the formal and informal structures as the double pointed arrow indicates. The arrow with broken line indicates instances of ņcase borrowingʼn (which will be explained in detail later) by informal institutions from the formal ones.

The Formal Dispute Settlement Settings To begin with the formal level, disputes over land rights can be dealt with either by the chairman of the peasantsʼn association (PA hereinafter) or go up to the offi ce of the district administrator. In fact, land disputes can potentially climb up through all the administrative hierarchy shown in fi gure 2. However, land dispute cases rarely go above the

district level, as it is costly to do so, both in terms of money and time. Even when land dispute cases reach the zonal administration or regional state levels, such cases are frequently sent back to the district administration. Consequently, most of the land related disputes that reach the formal structures are dealt with at PA and the district administration levels in that order.

However, neither the PA nor the district administration are judicial structures. They are rather administration structures. The judicial institution at the district level is Mana Murttii

Aana’a (the district court). At the PA level, it is

the Koree Hawaasummaa Seera Murttii Gandaa literally ņThe Village (PA) Social Affairs Courtʼn (it used to be called fi rd shangoo [tribunal council] under the Derg) that deals with civil cases. But disputes over land rights never appear before these conventional judicial structures.

Such a scenario begs for some attention. Why do disputes over land rights fail to appear before the PA social affairs court and the district

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court? This has to do with the current status of land in Ethiopia. As stipulated initially in Ethiopia’s land reform of 1975 and reaffi rmed in the constitution of 1994 and then by the Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation of 1997, land is public property (or state property). By extension, it is the state, not the actual users, the peasants, who have the ultimate legal ownership over the land. Thus, land disputes and issues related to land tenure are currently treated as administrative issues not as legal ones.

The Informal Dispute Settlement Settings At informal level, land disputes can be dealt with by jaarsa biyyaa,6) which literally means

ņelders of the country.ʼn The elders are not a fi xed group of people, as they can be composed of any member of the community. Nor are they necessarily of old age. The term jaarsa, which literally means ņelderly,’ is used more as a symbol here. Among the Oromo, elderly members of the

community are respected for their knowledge of customary laws and are perceived as symbols of wisdom, peace and reconciliation. It is because of this symbolic signifi cance of the elderly that any person who is involved in dispute settlement and reconciliation process is called jaarsa regardless of his actual age.

The jaarsa biyyaa are also of two sorts. One category is what I would like to call volunteer

jaarsa. This kind of jaarsa biyyaa settles

disputes between individuals or groups through its own initiatives. It intervenes either on the spot when and where a dispute occurs or takes the matter up afterwards. The other category is what I call solicited jaarsa. As the name implies, this is jaarsa biyyaa that either of the disputants approaches and solicits to get help to settle the dispute. However, the two categories of jaarsa

biyyaa are not mutually exclusive. Volunteer jaarsa frequently joins dispute settlement

settings of the solicited jaarsa. And also solicited

6) Local people use the term jaarsa and jaarsa biyyaa interchangeably. I also use these terms interchangeably throughout this note.

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jaarsa may be invited to join dispute settlement

settings already initiated by volunteer jaarsa. With the above brief overview of the formal and informal settings for land dispute settlements, now let’s consider how these settings for land dispute settlements interact.

III. Dubbii Nutti Kennaa, ȦPlease Lend Us the Case’: The Practice of Case ȦBorrowing’7)

The jaarsa biyyaa (both volunteer and solicited) frequently ņborrowʼn land dispute cases from the formal structures for dispute settlement. This can be done under the following circumstances: (1) when a defendant solicits the jaarsa biyyaa to ņborrowʼn the case from a formal structure; (2)

when the jaarsa biyyaa takes the initiative (without being invited by either of the disputants) to reconcile the disputants by taking the case back from a formal structure and (3) when a formal structure invites (solicits) the jaarsa biyyaa to ņborrowʼn the case and settle it outside the formal

settings.

Now let’s look at each of these circumstances. First, why does a defendant solicit the jaarsa to ņborrowʼn the case from the formal structure so that it could be settled through customary mechanisms? People usually seek the help of jaarsa when they fi nd themselves in an unfavorable position if the case is to be dealt

with by a formal structure. A farmer, who was seeking the intervention of solicited jaarsa in a case already presented to the PA’s chairman, put the rationale for his action as follows.

These days, you can win any case if you go to government offi ces. But you need to have one thing, that is, money. With money you can buy two things that you need to win a case. You either buy [bribe] the daanyaa [an offi cer or a judge] or you can buy [hire] abaayii [those who give false testimony in exchange for money]. When you consider this, it is cheaper to buy land than to go to litigation over land (Name withheld, Haroshifa PA, January 2003).

The interview note above and other similar cases from the fi eld study demonstrate that pursuing a land dispute case through formal means is costly. This is due particularly to the widespread practice of abaayii, we may call them ņprofessionalliarsʼn and that of rampant bribery. In a setting for dispute settlement dominated by bribery and false testimony (abaayii), people could easily be punished for the wrong they never committed or could be deprived of their own property. As one elderly farmer in Bokore PA puts it, “As long as abaayii [false testimony] and

gubboo (bribery) exist, truth will never prevail

in offi ces.” That is why people tend to prefer

7)The word ņborrowingʼn here is not used in the strict sense of the term since cases taken from formal structures may not be returned back to the concerned offi ce if the jaarsa biyyaa manages to settle them.

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indigenous institutions for dispute settlement to formal ones.

But why do some people take their cases to formal structure for dispute settlement while others prefer to go to indigenous settings? First, let’s distinguish two ways through which land disputes could appear before the formal setting: (1) a disputant may take his/her case directly to the formal setting (usually fi rst to the PA and then to the district administration); (2) a disputant may take his/her case fi rst to jaarsa biyyaa and then to the formal setting.

Discussions with informants generally indicate that it is individuals with weak grounds for their cases that usually prefer formal settings for dispute settlement to the indigenous ones. These people tend, as one informant puts it, to “buy truth with money.” As a result they directly present their case to the formal setting bypassing the informal ones. This implies the rampancy of abaayii and gubboo in the offi ces that deal with land disputes. Informants are also of the opinion that those individuals who acquired the disputed land through land distribution by formal state structure (usually conducted by PA administration) tend to take their case to the formal dispute settlement mechanisms. This implies also that when the disputants claim customary rights over a plot of land, which in turn implies relatively comparable rights to the land, they tend to take their case to the customary dispute settlement settings. Thus, the discrepancy in the means of land acquisitions is

also one of the factors that infl uence individualsʼn decisions to take their case before either of the dispute settlement settings. That is, there exist plural means of land acquisition, which in turn naturally gives rise to the plurality in mechanisms for land dispute settlement.

Some individuals, however, take their cases directly before the formal structures with a different implicit objective, that is, to “give weight to the matter” as one informant put it. This sort of individual actually hopes that the case will be withdrawn by jaarsa to be settled outside the formal structure. But the fact that the case has already been registered at the formal offi ce allows the plaintiff to put pressure on the defendant. Thus, formal dispute settlement structures are implicitly used as sources of intimidation. The second procedure is to take a land dispute case fi rst before the informal institutions, and if that attempt fails, then to the formal structures. The land dispute that occurred on 23 October 2001 while I was in the study fi eld provides important information in this regard. An informant (who was the plaintiff in this case) put the situation as follows.

I fi rst presented my case to jaarsa biyyaa who were on the spot when the dispute took place. The jaarsa asked both of us [the disputants] to sit down and tell them our problem. I promptly agreed. My opponent [the defendant] was reluctant to positively communicate with jaarsa. He denied that he

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sold the grass [grazing rights] on his land to me. Some of the jaarsa were angry since they already knew the source of our problem. In the meantime he [the defendant] walked away leaving all of us where we sat. I was angry and so were the jaarsa who were helping us settle the dispute. The jaarsa ņblessedʼn me for my patience and allowed me to pursue my case in any way I found appropriate [implying the go-ahead given to him to take his case to the formal structure]. On the same day, I presented my case to the PA’s chairman [Bokore PA]. Within hours he [the defendant] begged for the help of the same jaarsa whom he had embarrassed earlier in the day, so that they would take the case out of the PA’s administrative offi ce. The jaarsa begged me to let them take the case from the chairman’s [of the PA] offi ce [the jaarsa needs the consent of the plaintiff in order to be able to ņborrowʼn cases from formal structures]. I did not resist

jaarsa’s request, since my intention from the

beginning was not to pursue the case through formal structure but to force my opponent to accept jaarsa’s effort (Habtuu Worquu, informant, Bokore PA, 2001).

This case is especially important since it reveals several elements that usually manifest in the land dispute settlement processes. We see in this single case an instance of the involvement of both volunteer jaarsa and the solicited ones. Initially, the volunteer jaarsa attempted

to settle the dispute on the spot. The plaintiff instantly agreed to the request of jaarsa, since, he is by custom required to present his case fi rst to the indigenous dispute settlement setting before approaching the formal structure. The defendant, however, made a mistake and failed to take advantage of getting the dispute settled through the informal institution. This happened because he had misjudged the move of the plaintiff in that he did not think that the plaintiff would take the case so soon to the formal setting. When that was not the case, the defendant rushed to beg the help of jaarsa biyyaa, this time the solicited jaarsa. We also observe the implicit objective of the plaintiff to present his case to the formal setting, that is, to scare the defendant and thereby to speed up the settlement of the case. Now let us look at the situations under which the formal structures solicit the informal institutions to take the land dispute case from the formal setting and settle it outside the formal structures. This happens particularly when the formal structures have neither the means to solve the dispute nor the capacity to enforce their decision. This in turn arises from the nature of some land disputes. Sometimes a dispute ceases to be a matter between a few individuals but develops into a dispute between groups.

Good examples are two land disputes cases I witnessed. One was the dispute between two lineages that took place in July 2001 in the then Tulu Gaduuda PA (currently Hebano PA). The other was the land dispute between two “big

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men” in February 2003 in Haroshifa PA, which later on culminated in a dispute between a large number of people on each side. Under such circumstances there was a multitude of ņplaintiffsʼn and ņdefendants.ʼn When this is the case, the help of local dispute settlers is indispensable. Thus, in both cases mentioned above, the jaarsa biyyaa from neutral gosa (clans) were invited to help in solving the problem, which they did.

Conclusion/Summary

Land disputes can be settled either through formal (state) structures or through informal (indigenous) institutions. Land dispute cases can also go back and forth between the formal and informal settings. More interestingly, many of the disputes that happen to reach the formal dispute settlement levels come back to the indigenous dispute settlement institutions through the practice of ņcase borrowing.ʼn The fact that there are two settings for land dispute resolution could tell us not only the phenomenon of ņlegal pluralismʼn but also plurality of the means of land acquisition.

The decision on the part of disputants to present their cases to either of the settings for dispute settlement could be based on the advantages or disadvantages they anticipate. But the indigenous institutions seem to counter the unfair advantage that the people who prefer to take their case to the state structures foresee. They do this in two ways: (1) by custom it is

wrong for an Arsii Oromo to take his case to a government offi ce before fi rst presenting his case to jaarsa biyyaa. The indigenous dispute settlers thus make the fi rst attempt to settle the dispute. (2) The indigenous dispute settlement institutions can also take the land dispute cases back from the formal settings through the practice of ņcase borrowing.ʼn

In customary dispute settlement settings, the conventional procedure is (1) dubbii dubachuu (to talk [discuss] about the matter), (2) dubbii fi xuu (to settle the dispute/matter) and (3) araarsuu (to reconcile the disputants). The third component of this procedure is the most important aspect of indigenous settings for dispute settlements. It is one of the major merits of informal dispute settlement settings over the formal ones. But this important component of indigenous settings is totally missing in the formal ones. This renders land disputes settled by formal structures incomplete. When reconciliation of the disputants is not a component of the dispute settlement process, land disputes can only be partially settled. Indeed, several of my case studies suggest that when a land dispute is settled by the formal structures, the loser of the case considers that he just lost a ņbattleʼn not the ņwar’. Such dispute will soon be activated when

the ņright daysʼn come, as local people say. The two settings for dispute settlement interact sometimes positively, at other times negatively. Positive interaction occurs when each seeks the help of the other in order to settle disputes,

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while negative interaction is visible when the dispute settled by one setting is reversed by the other, which is particularly the case in the formal structure. This negative interaction not only undermines the role of indigenous institutions for dispute settlements, but also duplicates the dispute settlement process. Thus, it would be advantageous both to the formal structures (which are usually too stretched to deal with all their

ǵ2002 ॷ 9 ೐ȴʰ⏋ኜៜѹ᧑Цȵ᧊ۊɐʳ ˵Ͳ͹ˡͦ͡˽߂࡝ɴ᎛ˁȲȷ⏋̸́⏃̲˵ ͓ܩ౅⏋̶ˑ̴͠Ͳ⏆ɴȲȿʳ20 γᏛմץ ɹзࡨল፷ˁ቉ድɌɩȦʳ⏏ೣዣɫɻ⏋˪͠ ˽͇˽մɹ̸́॑ɹ෵ࡎˁ⏋ࡱఠ᝔ϟˁ៎ဣ ɴɌɩݬٚɌɛȦ⏏៨ᦚɻ 2002 ॷೢɹᐁᱻ ɴݜɧȦɩȦʳ⏏ ǵ12 ೐ 1 ౗ȴʰ⏋ᅘμɴȋ̸́ɹ˪͠˽͇ ˽ Pasko sa SugboȍɭȦȩܽʶ८ʦ⏋˪͠˽ ͇˽ខᰴȵވȭɻɍʠɛ⏏̸́ɹᮚຩБɻ ᲞȦɹɞȵ⏋˽˪ˠ̒̊ͻ⏃έ໬࣎зᓔ⏆ɹ ᢩɌȦࢃǾʢΥಓμ̦ˠͲˁɦȿɩȦʳ⏏Υ ౅⏋߂ᦲʱɹጓ༐ɲڧঊʦͤ˽̜͞Ͳɻ⏋ᚱ ʦೠՖʶ⏋̸͠˥ᒊɫᓩࢃ౏Ӊˁсʱ⏋̢̒

areas of responsibility) and to the disputants, if the decisions related to land disputes by the indigenous institutions are fully recognized and respected. Recognizing and strengthening the power of indigenous institutions for dispute settlement would also help alleviate the problems of bribery and false testimony that characterize the formal settings.

˪͠˽͇˽ɹ̶ˑ̴͠Ͳɫࡱఠˁᓒȭʳ

࣢ǵؤǵ࿀ǵࡎ*

̮͓˹ɹ࣒൓ˁȴȿɩȦʳ⏏॑ɹςҼɐʳᓩ ࢃ౏Ӊ˱Ͳ̘˽̜ɹɛʠɞ⏏ተȴɴ˓˛˽ɻ ᢩɌȦᱛࢸ࣒ɫᅊʚʶɛɹɞȴʰ⏋ഞೠʦዷ ȷᄹɫᓩ޿ˁԗჼɌɩʢȦȦɞʸȩ⏏ ǵɌȴɌ⏋ᇿᶧɹɲȦӉɻᚱϺ০ˁਲ਼ʼɓ⏋ ఠЦմɹᓩࢃ౏Ӊɴປʏʳɭ⏋ឿ֔ʱɐʳɄ ɭɻوʠɲȦ⏏Ʉɹ 2-3 ॷ⏋̲˵͓ᡉऄɫఠ ЦɹᓩӉ໵එȵވȭɩȦʳɄɭˁؙ౱ɌɩȦ ʳɹɞʸȩȴ⏏ೠɫɫȷɛᓩӉɹкʦ᝟೓ˁ ๿Ɍ⏋ᢒႋɹᰑʦᕀɞȿȵʢȹ؜ʰʶɛԠሎ ȵ⏋ᰈᑢɴృᓬɴᥔɤɩȦʳ⏏໵එᏼᑩȵܩ ӯɹࢹॷɛɠɴᇴʛˁӈȴɓ⏋༠޺ɹᲓᙃڃ ॑ݭɴࢌᥥɐʳɹɞ⏏ɞȵ⏋໵එʢѵਂɹɻ ɑ⏏ʚɇɴኜˁʢੇʶɵ᝔֪ɫȡʳ⏏ɭʢȴ * ੩ㇺᄢቇᄢቇ㒮ࠕࠫࠕ࡮ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞ࿾ၞ⎇ⓥ⎇ⓥ⑼

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ȼ⏋߂ᦲʱɹˠͻˤ̢̒˪Ϻ০ȵ឴ʼʶʳخ ᔨਸɻෑʠɩжȦ⏏ ǵɇɩ⏋ȋਃ෌ڊ˪͠˽͇˽͹̮ͻ̘ˑɹɛ ʠХ෌ȍɹ৓ʱᏨȵވȭ⏋̮ͻ̘ˑᅎɹ̺ ͤ̄Ͳ̜ˁଝɴɌɛϺǾȵ᝔ȷϯȦ⏋ᠨʢ ȵ˪͠˽͇˽͹̅Ͳ˫ˁ๣ȩɲȴ⏋ዺး⏋ˏ ͦ͜߂ᐏ᯿ȵȋ12 ೐ 6 ౗⏃ᩆ⏆ɻ࡝ോХ౗ ɴȍɭࡺៜɌɛ⏏˓˽͞ͻ͌ɹుᰩ೐⏋͇͞ ̋Ͳȵᏺʼʳ౗ɫȡʳ⏏͌˽͌͠ɹుᰩɻ⏋ ၈ੱɴ༑ɇʶɲȦઝਚˁ᰸Ȧ⏋Ꮔኜɹ༒׋ˁ ɻȴʳɄɭˁᇿᇕɭɌɩȦʳ⏏ʚɛ⏋ుᰩɭ ȦȩԊؾкᱻˁɭȲɌ⏋ѵਂɹᦹय़ઢˁᲞʠ ʳ৲ւʢȡʳ⏏ుᰩˁᐚȿɛ̶ˑ̴͠Ͳ׫ᨆ ɹ͌˽͌͠ɴదઝˁᝠɌ⏋˥͠˽̜ఠਂʢھ ʃˁՕȴɠغȩኛ౗ɴɌʭȩɭȦȩɹɞ⏏˓ ˽͞ͻ͌ɹ̯˻͖͞ಪɻ 1 ॷ 354 ౗ɫ⏋߄᭞ ಪɭɹᬠѥɫɻຘॷ 2 ᦼᬚʓɰմɴᦽʞɛ ʠ⏋2002 ॷɹ͇̋͞Ͳ౩ȿɻ 12 ೐ 6 ౗ɭɲ ʱ⏋˪͠˽͇˽͹̮ͻ̘ˑɹވȭʳಁೝɭᩂ ɲɤɛ⏏ ǵ˵Ͳ͹ˡͦ͡˽߂࡝ɻჼܧʢኜ࡝ോȵςк ɫȡʳ⏏߂࡝ఠڊɴʢኜၼʦኜ࡝ᅊȵ޽ȼ⏋ ̠́͊ͻմɴɻȋԃɩˁኜɹਉଝɴʪɞɷʚ ɐ⏏ᠡɤɛᐄഗˁᅊʛՏɌʚɓ˃ʭȩȲࢷȷ άɇȦȍɲɰɭᇖɫናʱˁ஄Ɂʳ⏏ଘܧܩɹ ̸́ɻ̶ˑ̴͠Ͳʍɹ˥͠˽̜ఠШഀɹܩɫ ȡʱ⏋ჼܧʢˡ̜̒͠˪ȵ߂޽ధˁװʠʳ⏏ Ʉɹʭȩɴˡ̜̒͠˪ᖬ࿣Ȧ˵Ͳ͹ˡͦ͡˽ ߂࡝ɫ⏋ȋჿᅓȵ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠɲʰȍɭ̯˻͖ ͞ಪȵ؝ȿԂʶʰʶɩԃ࡝Хᡙɴɲʳɹɻɲ ɕɞʸȩȴ⏏ ǵ̸́ȵܩჿᇕɴʢ኏Цᇕɴʢ⏋̢͇͞ʭʱ ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠɴᦏȦȴʰɫɻɲȦȴɭᓒȭʰʶ ৢ૯ 1ȁμΏ͈࿐͈ئ́ͼ΀Α͈ࣛ౪ͬਿ̠ 3 ૽ ͈ฎআ̹̻ ৢ૯ 2 ऒ̥ͣȄπΓέȄͼ΀Αͬ༴̩ζςͺȄ ρΛΩͬ଑̩ഛঀ ৢ૯ 3ȁΩͼ΢Λίσͅս̹ͦ͘ঞୋ͈୉ز௼

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ʳ⏏ɭɻȦɤɩʢ⏋ؗ߫ᇕɲᬠѥȵѳ୫ɇʶ ɩȷɛʼȿɫɻɲȦ⏏ȋ͌˽͌͠ɹܤܩˁ˥ ͠˽̜ఠਂȵѢᅭɌɛȍɭȦȩឿ౅ʢ౗ೣɫ ɻᓬȼ⏏ল፷ᠭീɫᓬ؜ʱˁɐʳɭȋ͊Ͳ̋ ̠ˠʦ˽ͻ͡ͻɹ͌˽͌͠ɴʭʳఓ௖ Moro Raids ɫᅘȵঘʶɛȍɭᅵؤؾᯭɹፐȭȵ ᦐɤɩȼʳ⏏ʦɻʱ̸́Ϻɴɭɤɩɻȋ͌˽ ͌͠ɹఓ௖ȍɭɌɩ᠝ʱᐙȵʶɩȦʳɹɫȡ ʳ⏏ɄȩȦɤɛ๴رᇕᔘಕɴ⏋ᦏॷɹ͌˽͠ ͌⏎˪͠˽̍͑Ͳ଻ϝȵ֓ʼɤɩ⏋̸́Ϻɻ ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠɴ޽ࢹɲʱɭʢ׶᭝ɲ˓͍ͻ˻ˁ ୃȦɩȦʳ⏏ ǵɌȴɌ⏋ࡸ᭬ɴɻຘ౗޽ȼɹϺȵ̸́Ņ ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠᬚˁ᝔ȷഀɌɩȦʳ⏏͊Ͳ̠̋ ˠɻ᤹ᦏɲऄɲɹɞ⏏̲˻̦˽ᅠɫɻȋ́ ̸ɭ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠȍȋ̲˵͓ᡉऄɭ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠȍ ɻ̜́̒ɫȡʳ⏏͇˪̝̠̝͡ˁԻȽ̫ͻ ˤͻ̍˙ͻͲɫȡʳ˻͚̲͠ͻ⏋˵Ͳ͊˰ ͡͹̲ͻ͡⏋ృᓬ኏⏋͞˻ˠ࣌⏋ᖛЦ኏ɲɰ ɻȋ̲˵͓ᡉऄɭ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠȍךɹೣᨆˁ́ ̸॑ɴȲȼ⏏ʚɛ⏋ᢌȴɲྫݭɭᦅܟˁ୫ɦ ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠȴʰ⏋̸́ɴᅊ᳞ᰩڃȵ࣑ȿʰʶ ʳ⏏ఠᔒᯆɫʢ⏋̸́॑ɻ̲˵͓ᡉऄɭ͊Ͳ ̠̋ˠɹᗐᓔɛɠˁᮃʠʳ߂࡝ɹ᝘ɫȡʱ⏋ ɗɹר෌ᅊɹ޽ȼɻ̸́ɴɭɰʚʳ⏏New People’s Army⏃Ԋᅋςᒶɹؙకঌᮃ܎⏆ɻ๯ ۬ʦᶁᚫˁ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠȴʰʚɑ̸́ऄ׫ᨆɹ ྫ೴ɴࢌᥥɐʳ⏏Ʉɹʭȩɴ⏋޽෵ɲϺʦʢ ɹȵ̸́Ņ͊Ͳ̠̋ˠᬚˁ᝔ȷϯɤɩȦʳ⏏ ǵɌɛȵɤɩ⏋̸́॑᝘ɴеᒞɐʳኜៜѹ ᧑Цɴɭɤɩʢ⏋͌˽͌͠͹͊Ͳ̠̋ˠɹ᝔ ϟɻ⏋ໆɌɩɻʳȴ᧙ȼɹᅵఠਂɹә኎ɫɻ ɲȦ⏋ɭȦȩʼȿɞ⏏̸́॑ɹ׫ᨆɴɻ͐˽ ˪ʢȡʱ⏋ࢸៀฐɲȵʰ͌˽͌͠͹˱̢͖͊ ̘ˑͻȵࡔܧɐʳ⏏ˏͦ͜߂ᐏ᯿ɴᐚȷ⏋ˠ ˽͍ͻ̢͑॑ᬏʢȋኛ͇̋͞Ͳ౩ȿȍɹ͍̒ ́ͻ˻ˁ߂Ǿᇕɴˏ̴ͻ͡Ɍ⏋॑Ԓɹॶٮˁ ᐣ୫Ɍʭȩɭ֗֐ɌɩȦʳ⏏ɭɻȦȭ⏋˪͠ ˽͇˽˹ͻ̀ͲɹЦᰩɭɲʶɽ߂ᩄɹ͚ͤ̍ Ͳ͹̫̓˓⏃ᢑɹπ္ȷ⏆ȵ͍˓Ͳ⏏Ԋɴᰩ ʏɩɄɗଁʱጓɦ኏Цᅊ༎⏋Ɍȴʢ˥͠˽̜ ఠਂɹᰩయ׋ɹμɫ⏋͌˽͌͠ɴ͇̋͞Ͳˁ ణ᝔ɇɓɩȦʳɄɭɴɲʳ⏏ ǵຘ౗⏋άࢆɹմɹዷȷܩɫʢ⏋ᅊǾɌȦ ᇐᢑȵᶅᩆᖬɹ͚ͤ̍Ͳɴ္ȷȡɁʰʶɩ Ȧȼ⏏ɗɹᢔਢɲᰟಕˁሖʠɲȵʰ⏋͇̋͞ Ͳμɹ͌˽͌͠ɹ៨ϟˁᠧ˃ɫȦʳɭ⏋׬Ꮴ ɲᆄکȵʼȦɛ⏏ɲɕ˥͠˽̜ఠਂɛɠɻᢩ ࢏ˁکʼɑ 12 ೐՟౜ȴʰ߂ᰩɌɩȦʳɹȴ⏏ ˪͠˽͇˽ɞȴʰয়းɫɌʬȩ⏋ɭȦȩፐȭ ȵᦐɤɩȼʳ⏏ȋਜɌȼɩʢ⏋˪͠˽͇˽ɻ Υ౏ʛ˃ɲɫኛȩȍȋᢩɌȦȿʶɰ⏋ံჿɌ ɩɫʢኛȩȍ⏋ተȴɴਕཧʚʳ᠌ɞ⏏ ǵɗʶɴ⏋̶ˑ̴͠Ͳɹ˪͠˽͇˽˹ͻ̀ Ͳɻ 9 ೐ȴʰ 2 ೐ʚɫ⏏ఠЦɻ౛ȼȴʰ༝ȷ ᣸ጓɦϺǾˁȦɇʠʭȩɭɌɩȦʳȵ⏋֟ ৢ૯ 4ȁΩȜΞͻ͉ͅຈଌ͈τΙοϋȆΨδͼ Ȫග͈܃ઘ̧ȫ

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ഗɻɲȼ⏋ϺǾɻ 9 ೐Ϋ౜ȴʰˠ̶ˑ˽ʦڧ ঊɹޖɴȋ˪͠˽͇˽ʚɫȡɭ 100 ౗ȍɲɰ ɭ౗ʠȼʱˡͤͲ̋ͻˁȴȿ⏋˪͠˽͇˽ྈ ҺˁࠃʠɩɌʚȩ⏏2 ೐ 2 ౗ɴˡͲ̚͞͠ˏ (Candelaria) ɭ٧ɽʶʳ͊˵ȵ᝔ʼʶ⏋ఠЦ ȵ๭িɴ˪͠˽͇˽˹ͻ̀ͲɹᏺᐄˁٚɁʳ ʰɌȦ⏏ɦʚʱ⏋ɄɹᬏȦ˪͠˽͇˽ೝᬚˁ ᓒȭʶɽ⏋12 ೐՟౜ȴʰ̮ͻ̘ˑȵވȭʳ ɹɻ߹য়ɲɹɞ⏏ ǵɞȵ⏋лȴᔽɴᘺɠɲȦ⏏̶ˑ̴͠Ͳɹ ̶˝ͻ˪͹ˡ̜͠˹̀͌ᠶɫਖɑȡɁʰʶʳ ȋᝐˁ༑Ɍ⏋໴ȷتʃɲȵʰ຦ᝓȵΥк׋ɐ ʳ܋౜፲ȍɭሺሄɌɩȦʳȴʰɞ⏏̶ˑ̴͠ Ͳɹ܋౜፲⏃਋༎ኢմɹ 4 ᦼᬚ⏆ɴɻ⏋ȋ຦ ᝓ׋Ɍɛˡ̜͠˹̀͌ȍˁБᝠɐʳ᝔ϟȵ ᐚȼ⏏Ёɻ˓˛˽ɹᭇ᠚ˁ৺ɦ 4 ᦼᬚ⏋৺ᭇ ፲ɫȡʳ⏏ʠɫɛȦ౳ɹ਋༎ኢմɴᗑɌʛɹ ܋౜፲ȵȡʳɹɭؾ෵⏋˪͠˽͇˽ɹմɴɻ ᕶըɹ৺ᭇ፲ȵȡʳ⏏ᣛ໘ˁடȭ⏋႞႓ˁଡ Ȧ⏋ਕᯁȴɴናʳಁೝɞ⏏܋౜፲ɴɗʶʓɰ ɹઝᒶˁឿՏɐϺǾɴ⏋৺ᭇ፲ɻࡔܧɌɲȦ ɹɞʸȩȴ⏏๙೚ˁᐓɦɄɭɴʭɤɩਕˁན ʠʭȩɭɐʳ͇̋͞Ͳμɹ͌˽͌͠ȵ᤹ᦏɴ Ȧɲȵʰ⏋˥͠˽̜ఠਂɻʼȵ᤹ˁ୷ʱᦐʳ Ʉɭɲȼ⏋лɹ፲ըʢɌɲȦɹɞʸȩȴ⏏ ǵ̶ˑ̴͠ͲϺȴʰɌɽɌɽȋ౗ೣϺɹˡ̜ ̒͠˪ఠਂɻଘ᠊⏋০ɞȿ⏏ኽ᧒ɴɭɤɩѵ Жɭɻᅊ༎ɫȡʱ⏋ᕶՕɗɹʢɹɲɹɞȍɭ ᡃɇʶʳ⏏ተȴɴ⏋೛ಓȲናʱˁɌɩ⏋౗಻ ౗ɴ͊˵ɴ᝔ȼɭȦȩȋ০ȍˁɄɲɓɽ⏋ɗ ʶɲʱɹྃ᣸ઢˁ਄ɩȦʳኽɫȡʳ⏏ؾ෵ ɴ⏋ȋлʢɌɲȦȍɭȦȩ০ʢ߂Ֆɞɭਲ਼ɤ ɩȦʳ⏏৺ᭇ፲ɻਕˁᘺɠመȿʳɛʠɹ⏋Ȧ ʼɽᕶᎴ˹ͻ̀Ͳɞ⏏౗ೣɹˡ̜̒͠˪ఠ ਂɹᬚɫɻ⏋ࢸ࡝ᅊɫʢȲʦɦʦ˰ͻ͌ˁଂ િɌ⏋ɗɹȲᩆʦಁᬚˁኜɴɇɇɁʳ⏏߂Ϻ ʢϳූˁ᧫ȿʳ⏏ȵ⏋ఠЦˁΥ๰Տʶɽ⏋౗ ೣ኏Цɻॷ೎߂ɹᰰʛЦᐚȷ⏏͇˓̨̘͠ˑ ɭɌɩȋᕶᎴȍణ᝔ɻȴɲʱᮑɌȦɞȿɴ⏋ ȋ৺ᭇ፲ȍɻȦɦʢઝᡫɴȡʳ⏏ ǵʢɠʸ˃⏋̶ˑ̴͠Ͳɴɞȿ৺ᭇ፲ɲɌ ɴᭇ᠚ኢȵʦɤɩȼʳʼȿɫɻɲȦ⏏̸́ ɫʢ⏋৺ᭇ፲ɹ 4 ᦼᬚ⏋1 ೣɑɦတˁɭʢɐ 4 ೣᏼɹͦ˗̅˪ɻȡɠɄɠɫʛȴȿʳ⏏͊ ˵ɫɻಁೝᇕɴᠧʞʏȷᓩೆɹ፝ଘȵᠧʚʶ ɩȦʳ⏏ȵ⏋ɗʶɞȿɫȡʳ⏏ɄɄɫɻȋံ ဤȍɻံઝ٢ɲɹȴʢɌʶɲȦ⏋ɭᓒȭɩʛ ɛʱʢɐʳ⏏ ǵ৺ᭇ፲ɹ᝔ϟɫɻɲȦȵ⏋ࡱఠᇕɲ˪͠ ˽͇˽ྈҺɻȡʳ⏏˽̿˓Ͳ᠝ɫ͊˵͹̚͹ ˤͻ͚͠ (Misa de Gallo) ɭ٧ɽʶʳȋΥᅱᵋ ɹ͊˵ȍɞ⏏12 ೐ 16 ౗ȴʰ˪͠˽͇˽ʚɫ ɹ 9 ౗ᬚ⏋೛ 4 ಁץȴʰ 5 ಁץɹᬚ͊˵ȵ᝔ ʼʶ⏋9 ౗ᬚᇖֵɌɛѵਂɻᰔȦϟȵʁɭɦ ȴɲȭʰʶʳ⏋ɭȦȩીᓃɫȡʳ⏏ʢɭʢ ɭ⏋౗μɹ͊˵ɴ᯺ȴʶɲȦᦅ຦ʦྫ຦ɹɛ ʠɴࠃʠʰʶɛʢɹɫ⏋ˡ̜̒͠˪ɹఠᒶɴ يʚʶɲȦ˪͠˽͇˽ྈҺɫȡʱ⏋̫̍ˡͲ ɻ̶ˑ̴͠Ͳɞȿɴ᠗ʠɩȦʳɭȦȩ⏏ ǵΥγБմɴɻɰɹࢃ౏ʢԃڊɫؒ՞Ɍɛ ȵ⏋Ёɻȋˤͻ͚͠ɴ᝔ȼϺȍȵ᠌ᰍɴɹ ʖʳʓɰ⏋ѵਕཉȦϺɹ᝔ϟɫȡʳ⏏ɭȦɤ ɩʢ⏋ˤͻ͚͠ɹफ़؜ʱᱺ֪ɫ࿾๷ɹȿȵϺ ȵՏʳʓɰ⏋ఠЦɻྃڊɴɲʳʰɌȦ⏏ؒ֓ ϺధȵཝɤɩȦʳɻɑɹˤͻ͚͠ɫʢᓩݟȵ ྃڊɴɲʳɹɻ⏋ᦼధמ܌ˁᣳɐ͊˵ɴᮃʚ

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ʳॅ߂ɲఠךѵᓔధɴࢪɌ⏋ɗʶəʶॷ 1 ܌ ɞȿɹ౛೛͊˵ɞɭᓒȭʶɽ⏋έਲ਼ᡴɫɻɲ Ȧ⏏ᇖሾɤɩɻȦʳȵ⏋ؒ֓ᓔɹࢹɲȦ˪͠ ˽͇˽ྈҺɭȦȭʳɞʸȩ⏏ ǵлȴ৺ᭇ፲ʰɌȦ႞႓ɻଡʼɲȦɹȴɭᓬ ȼɭ⏋Ʉɹ 4 ಁץɹ͊˵ɴ᝔ȼɞȿɫʢ႞႓ ɍʤɲȦȴ⏋ɭȦȩፐȭʢᓬȦɛ⏏ተȴɴ⏋ ჼБᨊ॑ɹֵʠϺɴɭɤɩɻᗑᆟȴʢɌʶɲ Ȧȵ⏋೛݀֝ӈᓔɹᦅ຦ɴɭɤɩʢؾ෵ɞʸ ȩȴ⏏ɗʢɗʢ⏋͊˵ɴήȴʳɹɻȲਜ਼ʛɫ ȡɤɩ႞႓ɫɻɲȦ⏏ɭɴȴȼ⏋ˤͻ͚͠ɴ ᝔ȼ͹᝔ȴɲȦɴȴȴʼʰɑ⏋ᅊ༎ɻಔຍʭ ʱʢھʃɭූɌʛɴྃɠɩȦʳ⏏̮ͻ̘ˑˁ Ɍʭȩ⏋˥͑ͦ͡ˁᓬȷɴ᝔Ʉȩ⏋˹̴͚̒ Ͳ˫ɴʢ̴˪̢̒˪ɴʢ᝔Ʉȩ⏋ɭʱȡȭɑ ̲ͻ̍ɫᱺɅȩ⏋ᖛɫࢸో᝔ɴՏʭȩŔ˪͠ ˽͇˽ɞȴʰ⏏ ǵ࡫ሁɴȋ̶ˑ̴͠Ͳ׋⏒ჼБ׋⏒ڧ෌׋Ɍ ɛˡ̜͠˹̀͌ȍɭʚɭʠɩɌʚȦɛȼʢɲ ʳ⏏ɌȴɌ⏋ɗʶɻ̫̍ˡͲɹҹάɴ̶ˑ͠ ̴Ͳˁеᒞɧȿɛឿ౅ɞ⏏лʭʱʢʚɑ⏋́ ̸ɫɻᕶՕɹ౅ȵᅵϺɲɹɫȡʳ⏏ȋʍȭ⏋ ౗ೣϺˡ̜̒͠˪ɫʢͦ˸͠ˠ⏃ᓩ͇͠ˏ ɴ஄Ɂʳናʱˁధȭʳధჳɹʭȩɲʢɹ⏆ˁ ሾɤɩȦʳɹ⏱ȍɭѹ᧑ߨɴᲊȴʶ⏋Ʉɠ ʰȵᲊȦɛ⏏˥̨͐ɤɩሾɤɩʳ⏱ɭ౗Ꮩ ˏ͍͠ˡϺɴᓬȼʭȩɲʢɹɞ⏏౗ೣɹࡎњ ɫʢ⏋ఠЦɴ᝔ɤɩȦʶɽͦ˸͠ˠȽʰȦʛ ʳ⏏ɌȴɌ⏋̶ˑ̴͠ͲϺȴʰʛʳɭ౗ೣϺ ˡ̜̒͠˪ɲɰлʢሾʰɲȦృؒᓔɴɐȹɲ Ȧɹɞ⏏ ǵࡱఠɴɦȦɩᓒȭɇɓʰʶɛʱ⏋ᕶՕˁʛ ɦʠɛʱɐʳลЦɻ޽Ȧȵ⏋ៜᘽʦ᝔֪ɹ៎ ࢘ˁɭȲɌɩ⏋ኽȵ̶ˑ̴͠ͲϺˡ̜̒͠˪ ɹࡱఠ៎ˁ஠Ɍᩄʳɹɻܐᮑɫȡʳ⏏ࡱఠɻ ᇿɴʛȭʳʢɹɫɻɲȦȴʰɞ⏏ᇿɴʛȭ⏋ ᔂɴઢɍʳࡱఠ༎֪ˁᦠɤɩʢ⏋ɗʶʰɹ ؅֪֐ɫȡʳ҅Ϻɭኜɭɹ᏾ɻʛȭʭȩȵɲ Ȧ⏏ɗɹ᏾ˁՕȴʰɑɌɩ⏋ៜ֪ɞȿɹՕഓ ˁɌɩʢዷᛕɫȡʳ⏏ ǵኽᕶ᤹⏋ఠЦɫן๳ᰱˁʢʰȦ⏋଼ʱᏨɫ ͇͠ˏ෵ɭןᒽᵒˁ଼ʱ⏋౗಻࡝ോɹؗ᧒ɭ ޺ܕϺѹ᧑ަȵሏʳఠЦއܩɫᔈɞʠɌˁɌ ɛ⏏ɗʶˁʛɛ๘ᎦϺȵȋॾӻༀ኎ˁ؝ȿɛ ౗ೣϺˡ̜̒͠˪ȍˁлȴɌʰɹങɴ໤ȩʭ ȩɴکȦɛɞɌ⏋ྃ᣸ઢˁ਄ʭȩɌɩȦʳɹ ȵ⏋έਢɲɞȿɫɲȼέخៗɫȡɤɛ⏏ෑጩ ɲៜȦ౅ˁɐʶɽ⏋៎࢘ɇʶʳხߏɲᅊ႒ɫ ȡʳɹȵέਢɫȡɤɛ⏏ʚɛ⏋ኽɴɭɤɩл ȴȵ᧓ȩ⏋ɭਲ਼ȭʳᐄᠶȵ⏋کᰍɭʢɇʶɑ ɴᦲʳȋ৳ʰɹγᅠȍȵࡔܧɐʳɭȦȩɄɭ ᕶкȵέخៗɫȡɤɛ⏏ ǵ౗ೣɴзʛ⏋౗ೣ᠝ˁ༑಩ɴ᠌Ɍ⏋౗ೣϺ ɹѵᓔɴཌྷɍɤɩ౗ೣ᠝ɹ͊˵ˁ؝ȿɩȦɛ ɭɌɩʢ⏋౗ೣϺ˥͠˽̜ఠਂɴɦȦɩ⏋৳ ʰɻȋ˗̅ɫɻɲȦȵ⏋́Ͳ̜ɫʢɲȦȍᐄ ᠶɴ᧒ɌɩɌʚȩɹɞ⏏ȋᡒʠȦɛ౗ೣϺɹ ̶˝ͻ˪͹ˡ̜͠˹̀͌ȍˁິʠʳȵʪȭ ɴ⏋έਲ਼ᡴɇˁឿՏɓʳ—ȡʳȦɻсʱՏɓ ʳ⏏ȋ৳ʰɹγᅠȍɫ༥ᢹɐʳɞȿɲʰȦȦ ɹȴʢɌʶɲȦȵ⏋ჼࡸɹ᝵៎࢘ᓔɻ⏋Υ҅ ɹᔀкɴࢆʳΥ҅ɹᏄኜɭɌɩ࡭ᐄɌɩȦʳ ɹɫȡʳ⏏ ǵল፷ʢɗȩɞ⏏ȡʳ 1 ᥇ɹࢃȵ࡭ଁɌ⏋ 100 ॷᬚзʛᐙȵʶɩȷɛɹɻ⏋Ϻ͹๴ر͹ య׋͹ଯ᝗͹লೳ͹ᕶးᄩޅ⏋ɗȩȦɤɛ޺

(15)

ᇕɲ৯ᯱГ޺ɴ⏋ࢃᕶ᤹ɹ֐ɹʭȩɲʢɹȵ сᅎɌɩȦʳɹɫɻɲȦȴ⏋ɭਲ਼ȭʳݭغȵ ȡʳ⏏޺ᇕɲឹ܍ȵࢃˁсʱՏɌɛɹɞȵ⏋ ল႒ᕶ᤹ɴлȴ֐ȵӈȷɻɍʠʳɹɫȡʳ⏏ ɗʶɻ⏋100 ɹ discipline ɹޖˁ؜ʱޙɓɽՕ ȴʳɭȦȩᰖɹ֐ɫɻɲȦ⏏Ʉʶȴʰ̶ˑ͠ ̴Ͳɹ๴رᇕɲзࡨল፷ˁயȼɴȡɛɤɩ⏋ ԃкˁʚɭʠɩȦʳлȴɹ֐ȵȡʳȴʢɌʶ ɲȦɭȦȩخᔨਸˁᰄɴȲȷ⏋ɗʶˁៜᘽɫ ஁ʰȭʳɄɭȵέخᔨɞɭɌɩʢ⏋ɗɹԒү ɹ֐ȴʰʛɩ೎ʢ࡫ࡴɐʳ፝ଘȴʰԃкˁʛ ʳɄɭȵɫȷʶɽ⏋ɭਲ਼ȩ⏏ ǵ͇̋͞Ͳ౩ȿɹ̢͖ͻ˽ȵعᏨˁᣇʼɓ ɛ৿⏋12 ೐ʢ৿ץɴԂʳɭ⏋ኛኢ͐ͻ̝ɻ ɇʰɴၖˁވɐ⏏˪͠˽͇˽մɹᖂߧɭȦȩ ჿᅓɫ⏋ዻᇴ⏋ᇍቐϟИʦϯᦲϟఖȵਸ਼ވɐ ʳ⏏Ϝ᝔ྲᓃɹᖽတʦၱጭȵᴡʱᯱȼ⏏˪͠ ˽͇˽͹̮ͻ̘ˑɴ๕ȴɓɲȦ̶͡ͻ̓˭ͻ ˥⏋ᅆȦ̩͌ɹݳ⏋̓ͻ͡Ⴅɹ̍ͻ̀ (queso de bola) ȵঊᰄɴ࣢ዩʛɇʶɻɍʠʳ⏏ᔂˁ ᭯Ɍɛ͌˽͌͠ߨਸɛɠȵ⏋˹̴͚̒Ͳ˫͹ ͐ͻ͡ɹ˪͠˽͇˽͹́ͻ͡ɴȼʱՏɐ⏏ɲ ˃ɭ⏋μܕᏙɹࢩɫʢ॑᢫ɹ˪͠˽͇˽͹̚ ˱ͤͻ˹͚Ͳȵ᥇Ӵˁᑉ؜ɤɩȦʳ⏏ ǵ̮ͻ̘ˑˁςҼɐʳʼȿɫʢɲȦኽɻ⏋ಔ ຍɭ޴ʼʰɲȦ፯ɹʭȩɲάࢆɴಬʰɐ⏏̓ ͠ͻʢ̦ˠͲʢ˛Ͳ̝ͤ˽͹˽̘ͤˠʢံ Ȧ⏏ȴʼȦɗȩɴਲ਼ɤɛɹȴ⏋߂ࢃɇ˃ȵኽ ɹ̝ˏɹմɴʢ̦ˠͲɹ౰ˁɛȼɇ˃ؼʳɌ ɩȼʶɛ⏏޿ɴɻዿȴʰᣧȦӵȵྯʶԂʱ⏋ лȴᘺɠመȴɲȦ⏏̸͞˗̢ͻɭ̓ͦ͡ͅͲ ⏃polvoron⏋Ꭼᰖˁܔʠɛ˽̿˓Ͳᘘࡎ⏆ɹ ߂፯ʢᨗɤɩȼʶɛ⏏лɹᕶըʢɓɑ⏋ᖬɭ ʱɰʱɹ̩́ͦͲˁɻȵɌɩᰩʏɩʛʳ⏏ʦ ɻʱлȴࡀɌȦ⏏ʚɞʚɞ৺ᭇ፲ɲɹɴ⏋ɭ ʢਲ਼ȩ⏏ȵ⏋ɄɄɴȦʳᭉʱ⏋ᰳᰩɹኛኢᐚ ȷɫʢȦȦɹɫȡʳ⏏Ʉʶȵተȴɴ̶ˑ̴͠ Ͳ⏋̸́ɫɹ 12 ೐ɲɹɞ⏏ ଎ 1 ȁਗ಩ৡ߃̩͈ಎ࣭ࠏ͈঳ 12 ೐ɴԂʳɭˠͻ̠͍Ͳ̜ɫᰴʰʶʳ⏏ ଎ 2 ࿻૽఺́ࢭ႕͈ȶ΍ϋΗད̥̹ͬ͐̽ήΛΘȷ μܕᖬɹ࿣Ȧ̸́ɫɻ⏋ȋ̸̒̋ȍӉʦ᧑ఠɹ᫦ɭ ᓩࢃ౏Ӊˁιʏʳࢃʢȡʳ⏏

(16)

ǵɄɄɻ⏋͞ˠ˽μᨆ˵ͩͲ̠˭ͻ̜ላɹε ᭙Ϋɹᦅ೴ɫȡʳ⏏ɰɄʚɫʢᐚȼ໳Ⴅɹε ɴɻ⏋߃ອᅒ႕೑ɹȵɤɌʱɌɛᅮȵ⏋ܩᯆ ɴᐨᇿฐ෵ˁխ˃ɫȦʳ⏏4 ೐ೢ⏋ᮘᴡȵɭ ɰʸȦɩϗ࡚ɹᏺʼʱˁٚɁʳ᯴⏋ϗȷȷɤ ɛ߂ܩɻ࿅Ȧ⏋ᅊȷ႒ɛɠɻ༎ຩˁ؜ʱଖ ɐ⏏ɗɌɩϺǾʢᦅᬘೝˁᏺȭ⏋ɠʰʓʰɭ ᅒ˃ʖɴᰑˁՏɐʭȩɴɲʳ⏏ɄɹӴᏝ 6 Ͷ ೐ɴʢؖʉ⏋߂Їϟɹࠃʚʱɞ⏏ ǵϺǾɻɄɹಁೝ⏋ᅒ˃ʖɹᅮˁឿ܌ʱ⏋ᅒ ᯆɴᇿˁӵʰɓ⏋ʼɑȴɲອʢံᱢɴɌɲȦ ʭȩຩˁᨗʳ⏏ɗɌɩ᧟঎ɴອɹྊʚɤɛፆ ȴʰ᯶ɴ⏋ᓚᣱɌɩʪȼ⏏ᮒ࡚ɹ՟ʠɴᭇʳ ᮒȵ⏋ɗɹॷɹЇϟԃкˁृزɐʳɹɞ⏏ᰩ ʏɩ࢖ʳɄɭɞȿȵ؜നɹອႌɛɠʢ⏋Ʉɹ

͞ˠ˽ᦅ೴ɹອᅒɭॺɹధǾ

ࢸǵܮǵঔǵψ*

ಁɽȴʱɻӈȴɷɽɲʰɲȦ⏏Ȧɦʢɹʭȩ ɴȽɑȽɑ࢖ɩȦʳɭ⏋Ϻᬚ෵ɴȲࣇˁʁɤ ɿɛȴʶʳ⏏ ǵʚɑᅒඨȭմɴ⏋ႚ (thai) ˁ 2 ܌⏋ɗɹ৿ ʚȽʼ (khaat) ˁ 1 ܌ȴȿʳ⏏1 ܌ᇿɹႚȵȿ ɻ̊˓͹̶̜̒ (thai hut)⏋2 ܌ᇿɻ̊˓͹̋ ͌ (thai dam) ɭ٧ɽʶʳ⏏ႚȵȿɴɻᅒɹμ ߈ȴʰ޺үɴكȴȩ౅໬ɭ⏋ᅒɹ޺үȴʰμ ߈ɴكȴȩ౅໬ȵȡʳȵ⏋̊˓͹̶̜̒ɭ̊ ˓͹̋͌ɭʢɴ⏋ɰɠʰɹ౅໬ˁᅎȦɩʢᖪ Ȧ⏏ʚȽʼɻ⏋ອᅒɹᑖɭดɹ౅كɴ 1 ܌ɑ ɦȴȿʳ⏏ʚɛɗɹᬚɴ⏋ᅮݸʱˁ᝔ȩ⏏ᔋ షɴɻ⏋ݡᔋ (fun) ɭ׋࡝ᔋష (pui) ɹθ౅ȵ ᅎȦʰʶʳ⏏ݡᔋɻ⏋ອႌʦႌɹᏎȴʰɦȼ ʰʶʳ⏏ᮒɹᭇʱࠃʠʳմɴᅒԒɫഞೠʦᎨ * ϴᨊ߂࡝߂࡝᭏ˏ˻ˏ͹ˏ̶͠ˡܩݖ቉ድ቉ድዀ ৢ૯ 1ȁᜂ̦̫ ࢸɇȦࡎњɫʢ⏋ອႌɹ଩ȦɴીʶɩȦʳ⏏

(17)

ຐˁၚʦɌ⏋ᔋషɭɐʳɄɭʢȡʳ⏏5 ೐᯴ ɴອᅒԒɹᗈБɴ௢ዛɌɛ৿⏋15 ౗ȴʰ 20 ధ౗ɫ⏋ᅒඨȭȵɫȷʳዐ঎ɴᗈȵᅊᬏɐ ʳ⏏Υᖔɴ⏋ᓚᣱɻᅖਸ⏋ᗈ؜ʱɻߨਸ⏋ᅒ ඨȭɻᅖߨɹךաɲɌɴ᝔ʼʶʳɄɭȵ޽Ȧ ʭȩɞ⏏ ǵᮒȵמՕɴᭇʱ⏋Პʛɹᅒ˃ʖʚɫံϟɴ ᅒඨȭȵɫȷʶɽ⏋ʁɭʚɑ࡫ਕɫȡʳ⏏ອ έ᣸ʦᗈɹഞ๷ɴʭɤɩᅒඨȭˁఔඉɌɲ ȿʶɽɲʰɲȦɄɭʢȡʳȴʰɞ⏏1 ॷᬚɹ Їϟˁʼɑȴ 1 Ͷ೐᣸ʰɑɫᏺȭɛອႌɛɠ ɻ⏋ອྊʱɴ࢖ɗʏʱץᇿˁᬖȿɲȵʰ⏋ʦ ʶʦʶɭȡȼʃˁɌɩȦʳ⏏ȋᨙʢɛɽɄʢ ʦʰɑɴɛɞᶏǾɭЇϟˁɄɲɐͩ̊˹̊̍ ɻ⏋Ϻᬚɛɠɭປʏɩɲ˃ɩ̩̊͞˥̨͐ɲ ɹɞʸȩȍ⏋ɭɫʢȦȦɛɁɫȡʳ⏏ ǵᅒඨȭ৿ɹ፬ჿɻȦɛɤɩ˹Ͳ̺͡ɞ⏏ᮊ ᗳȵᑢᗛɌɛಁɴᭉʱ⏋Ϻଝɴʭʳ᭑ᗳˁ᝔ ȩ⏏ϗ࡚ɴʢсЊȿɇʶʳဌྰᅒ (naa seng) ɭɻᅵɲʱ⏋ε᭙Ϋɹ߃ອᅒ (naa noon) ɴɻ ᮊᗳʦࢀᛚȵࢹɲȦɛʠ⏋᭑ᗳջʦຏᛚջɻ ᅎȦʰʶɲȦ⏏ᅒඨȭሁ৿ɴˡ̢ɴʭʳࢀȵ ৢ૯ 2ȁ̪̥̫ͩ͘Ȫ਀ஜȫ͂ຠ৾ͤȪ؈ȫ ᗈБс෌ɭೣᅒྈҺɻι᝔Ɍɩ᝔ʼʶʳ⏏ ৢ૯ 3ȁന૒̢͈໓ࠊ ອᅒԒɴɻ⏋̶̫̊ˤ˥ዀˁɻɍʠɭɐʳɇʚɊʚɲปೠȵ๿ɇʶɩȦʳ⏏

(18)

ʁɰȦݭغɴᦅᚫˁьȩɄɭʢȡʳȽʰȦɞ ɭȦȩ⏏̦̀͊ɴʭʳᰩࢀᬿ๬ɴɻ⏋̦̀͊ ஁ʱɹᒘˁᅎȦʳ⏏ ǵ11 ೐⏋೛ಓȵ༳Ɍȼɲʱ⏋ᮒ࡚ɹؿ๿ɹ ࢸᮒȵɿʰɦȼ᯴⏋͞ˠ˽ɫɻࡸʱɹ࡚፲ ˁᦎȭʳ⏏ዝൎɹؚዲɻ⏋ܩΫ 30 cm ȴʰ 50 cm ዐ঎ɹᨆՕˁ᫐ɫ՗ʱ؜ʳ⏏ॶܯᇕɲ ؚᩄɻ⏋ϗၥᎨᩂɫ 0.8 t/ha ȴʰ 2 t/ha ɫȡʳ ȵ⏋ɽʰɦȷȵ߂ȷȦ⏏Υᖔɴ⏋ໜा໤Ȧɹ жܩᅒ (naa thaam) ɫɻ 3 t/ha ʓɰɭʶʳȵ⏋ ε᭙ΫɹᅒɹؚᩄɻжȦ⏏՗ɤɛዝɻ೺ɷʰ ʶ⏋ᅒμɹ՗ൎɹΫɫॵɇʶʳ⏏

ǵᔵዤɴɻ⏋͇˓͹˱Ͳ̶ˎ̜̒ˡˠ (mai

khong fat khao) ɭ٧ɽʶʳᦅԍˁᅎȦʳ⏏Ʉ

ʶ ɻ⏋50 cm ȴ ʰ 60 cm ɴ Ֆ ʰ ʶ ɛ⏋ ሁ ৹ 3 cm ዐ঎ɹᏳȦጭඑ⏃mai bong ɫсʰʶʳ⏆ ˁ 2 ೣ⏋Ꮳɫɦɲȹغʼɓɛʢɹɫȡʳ⏏Ʉ ɹᏣˁዝ೺ɴॎȷɦȿ⏋θଝɫጭඑˁ୫ɠ⏋ ዝዥˁܩᯆɴبȷɦȿɩᔵዤɐʳ⏏ᔵዤ৿⏋ ๿ɤɛͩ͞ɻອႌʦႌɹ᰹ɭɇʶʳ⏏ ǵᔵዤɇʶɛዝᎨɻ⏋ᰟ᧧৿⏋عࢃɹዝᎨᢱ ᚁࢸ࣒ (lao khao) ɴᢱᚁɇʶʳ⏏Гմɻᕼɭ ഉɫعᕶᏄᎦɌɩȦɛȵ⏋೎ᦏɻԊؾɹᏄ Ꭶଘˁ୫ɦ೴ȵ޽Ȧ⏏೴Ϻɻਖឹɴਝɍɩ ዝᎨˁ୫ɠࢊʱ⏋߂݀ɹᎨ௕ʱᏄᎦลɫᏄ Ꭶɐʳ⏏ᏄᎦɹ᭬ɴՏɇʶʳʈɐʚɻ⏋̢ ̜ͩ͠⏋ˏ̯͡⏋̸̊⏋᳋ɹ᰹ɭɌɩգᅎ ɇʶʳ⏏ɲȲ⏋೴ɫᅊᅋɇʶʳᎦɹ߂ץɻ ᕶᐌᅎɞȵ⏋᢫ެɐʳݭغɹѝൔɻ⏋͐̍ Ꭶ 1,600-1,700 ˥ͻ̺/kg⏋˗̍͡Ꭶ 2,000 ˥ͻ ̺/kg ɫȡʳ⏃2001 ॷ 9 ೐ჼܧ⏋1 Ꭶ̝͡⏮ 9,215 ˥ͻ̺⏆⏏͞ˠ˽ɹࢃ঑ɫɻຘ౗⏋ອˁ ৓ɤɛཉȦࢭᅎ᫂ (moo neung khao) ɴԓ᪫০ ɹ˸͡ (houat) ˁɹɓɩ͐̍Ꭶˁᙜɐ⏏ɗɌ ɩᙜɌɛɩɹ͐̍ᎦˁጭនɹᎢ (tip khao) ɴ ࣢ᇵʱɴ᠋ʠ⏋୭Ӵɫɗɹɵȼʢʱˁઢɍɲ ȵʰʓȲɽʳ⏏ʼɑȴɲᅆʛɭ᱗ʱ⏋֐৔Ȧ ๲Ʌɛȭɻ⏋͞ˠ˽షჿɲʰɫɻɹූɌʛɫ ȡʳ⏏ ǵᶅᩆᖬɴɛɲʃȼዝዥˁ৺ɦᬚɴʢ⏋ᅒ ˃ʖɻɇʚɊʚɲਜ਼ʛˁήȭɩȼʶʳ⏏ʚ ɑᅒԒɴ޽ȼ๿ʳጓೠɻ⏋ᅎೳʦᚩသೳ⏋ป ᔩ஛؜ೠɭɌɩգᅎɇʶʳʓȴ⏋ᰩᅎʦᚫᅎ ɭɲʳʢɹȵ߂ץɫȡʳ⏏ϗၥ̶̫̊ˤ˥ക ৢ૯ 4ȁ౎࣮ 2 ೣɹጭඑɹᬚɴዝ೺ˁɻɇʛ⏋ܩᯆɴبȷɦȿʳ⏏

(19)

ˁୖȦɛɽȴʱɹృᅒɴɻ⏋Dipterocarpus ࣚ ɭ Shorea ࣚɹ̶̫̊ˤ˥ዀɹปೠȵ⏋ᅒᯆ⏋ ᅮΫˁکʼɑ๿ɇʶɩȦʳ⏏Ʉʶʰɹೠɻ⏋ ሎሁɫάഘɹࢹɲȦปॻˁʢɦɛʠ⏋ᅎೳɭ ɌɩɹգᅎѝғȵᲞȦ⏏ʚɛ⏋Dipterocarpus ࣚɹปॻȴʰ஛؜ɇʶʳปᔩɻ̠Ͳ͇Ͳ͹ ̢͑ͻͲ (namman nyang) ɭ٧ɽʶ⏋ςɴഌ ౩ɹ؅షɭɲʱ⏋Shorea ࣚɹปॻȴʰ஛؜ɇ ʶʳปᔩɻ˥ͻ˹ͻ (khi sii) ɭ٧ɽʶ⏋ςɴ ᖛঈɹອྯʶᬿ๬ջɭɇʶ⏋ɭʢɴ߂Ֆɲჼ ᩆؚԂ྇ɫȡʳ⏏ᬖᅒ৿ 50 ॷГΫᐁɛʭȩ ɲإȦອᅒɴɻ⏋Streblus asper⏋Tamarindus indica⏋Azadirachta indica ɲɰȵᅮΫɴʛʰʶ ʳ⏏Ʉʶʰɹμжೠɻ⏋ᚩသೳʦࢃᅨɹᰲ ష⏋ᰩᅎɭɌɩգᅎɇʶʳ⏏ླྀອೝɹᅒԒɴ ᅊȭʳ Marsilea crenata, Limnophila geoffrayi⏋ ᅮΫɹ Kaempferia sp. ɲɰɹᩃᗳɻ⏋Υᖔᇕ ɲᩃᘛ⏋᱗᥹షɭɲʳ⏏

ǵᅒ˃ʖɹٞʱɫკʶʳ᳋ɻ⏋౗Ǿɹᰩᅊ ༎ɴ๕ȴɓɲȦ⏏ε᭙Ϋɴঃȵʳঃ߂ɲ߃ອ ᅒ ɻ⏋Esomus metallicus, Anabas testudineus,

Channa striata, Clarias batrachus ɲɰ⏋Υಁᇕ

ອݖʦ⏋຾ʦ໡ȴʰ᧚ΫɌɩȼʳ᳋ɛɠɴ⏋ ៊ɹзʞଘɞȿɫɲȼᅋ׺͹ᔒଁݭଘʚɫʢ ரњɌɩȦʳ␩߂ីʓȴ 2001␭⏏ϺǾɻ⏋᳋ ᰖɹᅊ༎رɴࢪਝɌɛ޽෵ɲྫԍྫ໬ˁᅎȦ ɩ⏋ᰈᑢɴྫ֝༎֪ˁ᝔ȩ⏏ɄɹʭȩɴɌɩ კʶɛ᳋ɻ⏋္Ȧɛʱ⏋ᙜɌɛʱ⏋˽ͻ̺ɴ Ԃʶɛʱ⏋ᇍᨥɇɓɩᨧ٢ˁɦȿɛʱ⏋ȡʳ Ȧɻ̮ͻ͹̚ͻ˪ (paa deek) ɭ٧ɽʶʳݾ᥹ сʱɴᅎȦʰʶʳ⏏̮ͻ͹̚ͻ˪ɻ͞ˠ˽ష ჿɴ೎ʢ߂Ֆɲᠭ٢షɫȡʱ⏋ɗɹೳషɹݾ ɴɻ⏋ϗ࡚ɹອᅒٞᦇɹܤȴʰɭʶɛʢɹȵ ߫˃ɫᅎȦʰʶʳ⏏ ǵʚɛᅒ˃ʖʦɗɹٞʱɴȦʳ̜ˡ˰⏋̼ ̲⏋ˡ˛͡⏋˗̀͞⏋́͊⏋˱ˠͦ˧⏋͇̊ ͌˹⏋̓͌˧ˏ͠ɲɰɹ֪႒ʢᢵᩂɲ̊Ͳ̮ ˪྇ɞ⏏̜ˡ˰஁ʱɴɻඑɹӴɴɦȿɛᥢɫ ᱔ˁɌʠʳЇ஘ȿ⏋̼̲஁ʱɴɻ̮̍Ͳ˱⏋ ˡ˛͡஗ʱɴɻᬏനɹࢸɇɲ˽˱̺̒⏋˗̀ ͞஁ʱɴɻࢭᅎɹЇ஘ȿᐨȵᅎȦʰʶʳ⏏კ ႒஁ʱɫɻ⏋ࡎњɛɠɞɤɩ߂Ϻɴᢦȿɩɻ ȦɲȦ⏏ᆌʶሾʰɑɹ৳ʰɻ⏋ថ᣸ɫᣬʱ܌ ʱɲȵʰ⏋ᧉʃɹμɫݛɤɛଯˁɦȹɦȹɭ ৢ૯ 5ȁന͖͈ͭಎ͈́೦ͤ Paa kho ⏃͞˓˧͚ɹЗᬚ⏆ɲɰˁႰȩ⏏

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ୁᮮɌɩȼʶʳ⏏̜͐̍͠ˁɦȿɛඑɫɹ́ ͊஁ʱ⏋ᬏനɹ˽˱̺̒ˁьɤɛ˱ˠͦ˧஗ ʱ⏋ปॻˁبȼ͇̊͌˹஁ʱ⏋ปΫɹ̓͌˧ ˏ͠ɹु஁ʱɲɰɫȡʳ⏏ ǵࡎњɛɠȵ⏋Їᅥʠɛკ႒ˁ਄ઝɁɴȴ ȴɁ⏋ອႌɹᔘɴώɤɩॠ᦭ɴɦȼ᯴⏋ࢃ ɫɻທ៊ȵ̊˭̨˱˽ͻ̺ (keng noomai) ɹ ྈҺˁɌɩȦʳ⏏ʚɑ͓ͻ̠Ͳ⏃yaa nang; Tiliacora triandra⏆ɹᗡᘽˁɐʱ࿊Ɍɩຳˁᐈ ʱ⏋᳋ɹݾ᥹ʦ̜˗ˤ͞˹ɫ٢ˁᠭȭ⏋᱗ ʱ ɦ ȿ ɹ ̮ ̒ ˪͹ ˡ ̢ ˙ Ͳ⏃phak kanyeng; Limnophila geoffrayi⏆ˁ֓ȭʳ⏏ɗɌɩ஛ʶɛ ɩ˹͑˥˹͑˥ɹ̊˭̨˱ɭ⏋ʓ˃ɹʱᅆȦ ˡ̓̍͑⏋̜ˡ̝̼͇̍ɹࡸɭᗐᗂˁɛɤʋ ʱԂʶʳ⏏Ʉʶʰɹೳషɻʛɲ⏋ᅒ˃ʖʦɗ ɹٞʱɹക⏋ᘛܟɫ஛ɤɩȷɛʢɹɫȡʳ⏏ ǵᦏॷ⏋Ʉɹʭȩɲ͞ˠ˽ɹȡʱʈʶɛᰟ ಕɹμɴʢ⏋ɇʚɊʚɲ޴׋ȵʛʰʶʳʭ ȩɴɲɤɛ⏏ʚɑɻ⏋̜͞˪̊ͻ (lot toktok, lot thai) ɹࢷԂɫȡʳ⏏ᮒ࡚ɹ՟ʠɻᓚᓜล⏋ ɗʶГ޺ɹಁೝɴɻᕶࢃᅎ᥂⏋ಁɴɻᇍᮚล ɹ֪֐྇ɭɲʱ⏋̜̒˪̜̒˪̜̒˪ɭ౗޿ ɗɹ˛Ͳ˻Ͳɹਢᯭˁᯱȴɓʳ⏏႕ɴ⏋̜͞ ˪̊ͻɹ৿ʸɴᗼ᥂ˁɦȿɛώʱ႒ɻ⏋ᮒ৿ ɹੲᤉˁᣬቑɐʳڞΥɹϯᦲଝຍɫȡʳ⏏ɗ Ɍɩ⏋߂ៀฐဌྰే៯ɹࢷԂɴʭʳ৯ᯱʢ߂ ȷȦ⏏߂ȷɲໜा໤Ȧɹжܩɹ೴ɴᭉʰʶʳ ȵ⏋ɄʶɴʭʱອዝϠೝсɭؙؚɹވ֓ȵࡸ ჼɇʶɛ⏏ɌȴɌ⏋ਖɑɌʢᖪȦɄɭɽȴʱ ɫɻɲȦʰɌȦ⏏Ϡೝсˁࠃʠɩȴʰ⏋ˡ͍ ͌˹ɲɰɹࢀᛚȵਸ਼ވɌɛɭȦȩުʢȡʳ⏏ ဌྰᅎອɹգᅎషᩆȵᲞɐȹɩଡȭɑ⏋ਃഀ ɰȲʱᮒ࡚сɹʛɴਃϟɐʳγय़ʢ޽Ȧ⏏ʚ ɛϗ࡚ɹᬚʢዝȵсЊȿɇʶʳɛʠ⏋ອႌʦ ႌɛɠȵ՗؜ʱ৿ɹᅒ˃ʖˁఔ႑ܩɭɌɩգ ᅎɫȷɲȼɲɤɛ⏏ᅒ˃ʖɴԂʰɲȦʭȩᰲ ȦςɴᏣɫɦɲȵʶ⏋ႷȦᅮɫкˁʢɩȡʚ Ɍɲȵʰᗳˁᰩʞອႌɛɠȴʰɻ⏋Ȧʸ˃ɲ έॶέྃȵᓬɄȭɩȷɗȩɫȡʳ⏏ȋͩ̊˹ ̊̍ɻ⏋ࢹǾ֪ȷɻɹʸȦȵ⏋ɲȴɲȴᐁཕ ֟რɹᖪȦ֪֐ɫȡʱ⏋ȴɦᢧᅋɫȡʳ⏏Ɍ ȴʢᏎɻᔋషɭɲʳɌ⏋ᔀɻᰩᅎɴʢɲʳɹ ɞ⏏ȡʚʱᎲೢɴ଩ʼɲȦɫȼʶȍ⏏ᅒ˃ʖ ɹಕ៎ȵ⏋ᎦɞȿɫɲȼɇʚɊʚɲᕶးɹਜ਼ ৢ૯ 6ȁକݱͅ઺̹̽ઁා

(21)

ʛˁɻȽȼʞݭɫȡʱᐚȿʳᭉʱ⏋̊˭̨˱ ˽ͻ̺ɹʭȩɲ͞ˠ˽ˁБᝠɐʳࢃ঑ɹ٢ʢ ؝ȿᐙȵʶɩȦȼɄɭɞʸȩɭȦɤɛɭɄʸ ȴ⏏ ֨ȁဥȁ໲ȁࡃ ̸ˏͤͻ̜͹̺̍͑͞˓͜ͻ⏏1997⏏ȋᅋᎦകɭ ອᅒȍإाχᮁ៱⏏ϴᨊ߂࡝ആ׫ˏ˻ˏ቉ ድ ́ Ͳ ̊ ͻ ᑂȏ ϟ Ԏ ആ ׫ ˏ ˻ ˏ ȑ ে య ݟ⏋ 400-401⏏ ࣬ᅒ౩χ⏏2002⏏ȋ͞ˠ˽ᦅ຦ɹܧഀሾᡫŅ˵̫̠ ˭̜̒ላɹ̠͇̀ྫŅȍȏၖय़ᦅ෌ȑ46 Extra issue 1: 83-84⏏ ߂ីѵে͹࣬ᅒ౩χ͹ೠؤᅓ᱗͹˽̒˪˱Ͳ́Ͳ ˵˓̠ͤ˗˽͹˵˓̺̚͞ͻ˽ ̢͖͇̍͞ͻ⏏ 2001⏏ȋ͞ˠ˽ɹ߃ອᅒɹྫ֝ɭ᳋ᰖɹᅊ༎رȍ ȏၖय़ᦅ෌ȑ45 Extra issue 2: 33-34⏏

Tanaka, K⏏1993. Farmersʼn Perceptions of Rice-Growing Techniques in Laos: “Primitive” or “Thammasat”? Southeast Asian Studies 31(2): 132-140⏏

Fig. 1.  Process of dispute settlement
Fig. 2.  Ethiopian administration structure

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