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Vol.35 , No.2(1987)116Michiko Ishitobi 「The Argument for the Existence of God in Nyaya」

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The

Argument

for the Existence

of God in Nyaya

Michiko

Ishitobi

It has been tried to prove the existence of God not only in Europe but also in India. In Europe, the argument for the existence of God, whether teleological or cosmological, is formed by analogy, being an inductive inference. In India, it was mainly the Naiyayika-s who developed such arguments. They proved the existence of God (i vara) by a five-membered syllogism' (pancavayava), which is a deductive inference. The form of such arguments looks to be quite different from that in Europe.

Commentators on Nyayasutra have endeavored to establish God not to con-tradict the system of Nyaya philosophy. For this purpose, they actually intended to prove with the form of a five-membered syllogism' that God is the efficient cause of the world. It is, so to speak, the cosmological argument.

As far as we know at present, it was Aviddhakarna who made this kind of argument first. His work has almost all been lost and only his two arguments

remain with us1). We can point out that the both of them are influenced by the thought of Samkhya. In his first argument, sanni vega-vi. ista which was often used in the definition of the effect (karya) in Samkhya, was also used as the word explaining the variety of the world. Moreover, Aviddhakarna used buddhimat in place of cetana, which was used in Samkhya, to prevent his argument from

being misunderstood as the argument for the existence of purusa in Samkhya. His second argument was based on the cosmology of Nyaya, i. e. arambha-vada. He maintained that material causes bring forth their effects by themselves, when being directed by God. As its reason (hetu), he described having color and so on' (rupadimat), based on asatkarya-vada. This is considered as the syn-omym of 'being-an-effect'. As has been pointed out in another place2), it is not the basis for the existence of God, because we cannot find any vyapti there. It

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1001-(21) The Argument for the Existence of God in Nyaya (M. Ishitobi)

seems in his argument that it is not God but the atoms that bring about their effects directly. On the other hand, considering his reason, it seems that he wanted to prove God the creator of the universe. We think that he has not yet decided which way to choose, cosmological or teleological. However we should conclude that his arguments are, in fact, included in teleological arguments which postulate the Supreme intelligence who lets the world be as it is. In his argu-ments, God doesn't create but only directs the world like purusa in Samkhya. Uddyotakara argued basically in the same way as Aviddhakarna. In his com-mentary on Nyaya-sutra, he intended to prove God the efficient cause. But, he couldn't succeed in completing his cosmological argument.

His arguments are chiefly classified into two types. We may say that the one is the acetana-type of argument which has the word material cause' in paksa, for the word acetana or a phrase expressing it is used in its reason. And, the other will be the karya-type of argument because it has the word 'effect' (karya) in paksa and because there is the word 'karya' or a phrase expressing it in its reason. It is clear that he inherited the karya-type of argument from Aviddha-karna and tried to develop it. However, he failed to perfect this type of argu-ment after all, for we cannot find any reason to prove the existence of God in his arguments.

He may have realized that it was impossible to prove the existence of God, as long as the argument was built on the arambha- vada. He established the ex-istence of God by the acetana-type of argument. It runs3):"Primordial matter, atom and karma act only when they are directed by an intelligent cause because they are non-spiritual. Just as an axe acts only when it is directed by an intel-ligent wood-cutter, in the same manner primordial matter, atom and karma, being non-spiritual, act only when they are directed by an intelligent cause. " This is the teleological argument. The basis of this argument is as follows: what-ever non-spiritual things (acetana) do, they are all directed by a spiritual being (cetana). It purely shows the relation between purusa and prakrti in the Sam-khya system. We can see that, at any rate, Uddyotakara proved formally the existence of God by his ingenious arguments. In this sense, we must estimate his contribution to the Nyaya theory of God.

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These arguments were severely criticized by the Mimamsaka-s and the Bud-dhists. As a result, Vacaspatimisra entirely converted from the teleological argu-ment to the cosmological one in order to respond to them. Even so he didn't build up proof for himself at all. It looks that he gathered the fragments from his predecessors' arguments to prove the existence of God. His argument is as follows4): "Trees, mountains and so on which are in question, have an agent who knows their material causes well. Because they have originated or because their material causes are non-spiritual, just as palaces and so on have an agent who knows their material causes well, because they have originated or because their material causes are non-spiritual. " It is mentioned that the state-ment to be proved (pratijna) is under the influence of Aviddhakarna's argustate-ment and Prasastamati's. We can point out that in this case, the word agent' (kartr) charcaterizes God as the cause of the creation of the universe. Moreover, God is defined to be the Omniscient by the expression 'knowing-the-material-causes-well' (upadanabhijna). And based on it, he refused the objection that his argu-ment would have the fault of proving what is already proved as it meant the proof of the existence of karma or ksetrajna. The expression in the first reason was used in the arguments of Narasimha and Trilocana. The second one was derived from Uddyotakara. Vacaspatimisra established the cosmological argu-ment in the Nyaya theory of God at first. Therefore, although his arguargu-ment was not original, we cannot but acknowledge that he is very important for the Nyaya theism.

As we inquired above, all these arguments in Nyaya are in the form of 'a five-membered syllogism'. They are formulated as deduction, however, in fact, they are the inductive inference that is called analogy just as the arguments for the existence of God in Europe.

Uddyotakara induced with the analogy of an axe or a wood-cutter that the material causes act only when they are superintended by God who is an intelli-gent being. There is the teleological argument with an analogy of clocks well-known in Europe. That is to say, the Supreme intelligence is postulated as the planner of nature which consists of such a complex mechanism as that of clocks. On the other hand, Vacaspatimisra induced with the analogy of palaces

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999-(23) The Argument for the Existence of God in Nyaya (M. Ishitobi)

that the universe is caused by God being the agent who knows the material causes. In Europe, the cosmological argument of Thomas Aquinas is well-known.

The other schools attacked these arguments of Nyaya. First, regarding them as deductive inferences, the opponents exposed their logical defects. It was Dharmakirti who at first argued against the Naiyayika from this viewpoint. Though, subsequently, many fallacies were pointed out, they were logically identical to his. Next, the opponents attacked the potency of analogy, admit-ting them as inductive inferences.

In the former case, Dharmakirti discussed as follows5); If you want to prove one eternal and omniscient being as the cause of the world, your argument will be fallacious on account of the non-existence of sadhya in the example (drstanta), for, in the example, it is not one eternal and omniscient God but only a non-eternal wood-cutter who directs the axe. Therefore, there isn't God to be proved in the example. It means that a wood-cutter is implied in the premise, that is, all non-spiritual things act only when they are directed by a spiritual being, but God isn't. In the deduction, it is impossible to deduce things which are not im-plied to the premise, as the consequence. Therefore, the arguments are falla-cious.

In the latter case, Santaraksita argued against Prasastamati's Theory of God as follows6); Even though we recognize an agent as the cause of everything, we do not need to accept that the agent is only one. This is similar to Hume's criti-cism in Europe.

Thus we know that the argument for the existence of God remains unfinished in India.

1) Tattvasaiigraha 47-9.

2) Michiko Ishitobi, "The Nyaya Theory of isvara," Journal of Religious Studies, No. 269, 1986, pp. 1-24.

3) Nyayavarttika (Nyayadarsanam, Vol. II, Rinsen Skt. Text Series, 1-2), p. 945. 4) Nyayavarttika-tatparya-tikes (Nyayadarganam), p. 953.

5) Pramanavarttika, pramanasiddhi 12. 6) Tattvasangraha 92-3.

(Lecturer, Hokkaido Komazawa University)

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