21
■ Article ■
The Origin
of "National"
Labour
Policy
in India:
Labour
Policy
of the Bombay
Congress
Government
●
Norimichi Narita
Introduction
On 7 November 1938, around the compound of the Elphinstone Mills in Bombay, a party of police shot at a group of textile workers. Two workers were injured and one of them died. Firing at workers by police was not so unusual in the history of the labour movement in colonial India. In this case, however, the government controlling the police was in the hands of the Indian National Congress (hereafter referred to as the Congress), a leading nationalist party waging independence struggle against the British colonial government.
The Congress provincial governments under the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereafter referred to as the 1935 Act), the last of colonial India, were the first at-tempt of the Congress to form governments and carry out administration. Although the Congress Governments only lasted for 28 months, they introduced a number of new policies in various fields of administration and some of them became the origins of the policies of the Congress Governments after independence. The same applies to their labour policy.1) At the same time, India was still under the British colonial rule and the Congress was waging the independence struggle. The Congress Governments under the 1935 Act represented a transition of the Congress from an independence movement to a state. How did this transitional character of the Congress Governments affect the formation of their labour policy?
成田 範道 Norimichi Narita
Author: Lecturer (part-time), Kokushikan University Subject: Modern History of India
Articles: "The Enactment of Indian Trade Disputes Act (1929) (in Japanese)", Asia Keizai, 36-1, January 1995.
"Labour and Legislation in India 1937-39: A Comparative Study of Bombay and Bengal" , PhD thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2001.
Little attempts have been made to examine the labour policy of the Congress Gov-ernments under the 1935 Act. It has only been dealt with as a part of general political or labour history. Such studies take simplistic views on the character of the Congress Governments and their labour policy. For labour historians with leftist orientations , the labour policy of the Congress Governments was predetermined according to their "class character" and could not be
pro-labour. Sukomal Sen writes: "The attitude of the Congress and the non-Congress provincial ministries towards the rising working-class struggles was quite in conformity with their working-class compositions" [Sen 1997: 321]. In this view, there is no consideration of the fact that the Congress was still a nationalist party leading an independence movement.
On the other hand, some historians place too much emphasis on the liberal charac-ter of the Congress Governments. Bipan Chandra writes: "The Congress Ministries adopted, in general, a pro-labour stance" [Chandra, et al . 1989: 331]. This view pays little attention to the difficulty that the Congress Governments were faced with in re-gard to labour problems. Either view of existing studies is not enough to explain the labour policy of the Congress Governments, which were obliged to work under com-plicated political situations under the 1935 Act. The Congress Governments involved a contradiction on account of their transitional character from an independence move-ment to a state. Their labour policy reflected the contradiction and contained several labour measures of contradictory characters.
In this study, we will examine the labour policy of the Congress Governments un-der the 1935 Act in a wiun-der political context of state formation. The next two sec-tions will discuss the character of the Bombay Congress Government and its effect on their labour policy. In the final section, we will examine the Bombay Anti-Indus-trial Disputes Act Strike (1938) as an expression of the contradictory characters of their labour policy.
1. The Congress Governments under the Government of India Act, 1935
The 1935 Act was passed in the British Parliament in August 1935 after years of controversy since the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission in 1927. The Act introduced the ruling system based on provincial autonomy, under which elected ministries were responsible for all provincial administration. At first, the Congress expressed its opposition to the Act. However, at the Congress Faizpur Session in April 1936 and Lucknow Session in December 1936, the Congress decided to participate in the election, reserving the decision on the acceptance of office . In the election of the provincial legislatures held in February 1937, the Congress commanded a major-ity in six provinces.2) After prolonged controversy over the acceptance of office , the Congress Governments were formed in July 1937 [Sarkar 1983: 336-351] . In
The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 23 Bombay, the Congress Government was inaugurated under the premiership of B. G. Kher.
1.1 Congress Government as a National Government
The formation of the Congress Governments might have been encouraged by vari-ous local interests expecting benefits from the Congress in office [Tomlinson 1976: 89]. However, it is also true that there was an intention of the Congress to make the Congress Governments an opportunity for attaining its goal of independence. This constituted one character of the Congress Governments. The Congress tried to char-acterize the Congress Governments as popular and national governments in order to fight against the colonial rule and mobilize the people in the independence movement. To be popular and national governments, the Congress Governments had to dem-onstrate that they were different from the colonial government in their policies. The Congress projected the Congress Governments as an opportunity for realizing the so-cial and economic programme it had suggested in the process of the independence movement. The Congress Election Manifesto for the election of provincial assem-blies was meant "to place its general programme before the people of India." The Manifesto promised "a reform of the system of tenure and revenue and rent and an equitable adjustment of the burden on agricultural land, giving immediate relief to the smaller peasantry by a substantial reduction of agricultural rent and revenue now paid by them and exempting uneconomic holding from payment of rent and the rev-enue ..." for peasants, and, as we will discuss later, "a decent standard of living" and other social welfare measures for industrial workers [SWJN, vol.7: 459-464]. As stated in the Manifesto, its contents were already announced in the Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Social and Economic Programme adopted at the Congress Karachi Session in 1931. The Congress associated the Congress Governments with its traditional social and economic programme and, by that, with the independence movement.
In order to distinguish themselves from the colonial government, the Congress Governments attached importance to the question of civil liberties such as freedom of expression, meeting and association. Civil liberties had always been the sphere of conflict between the colonial authority and the Congress in the independence move-ment. In the Civil Disobedience Movement, the colonial government systematically suppressed civil liberties such as freedom of speech, association, and right to proper-ties. Non-payment of revenue was met by confiscation of properties and lands. Even after the conclusion of the Movement, problem of civil liberties, such as political pris-oners and repressive laws, remained. The Resolution on Suppression of Civil Liber-ties was adopted at the Congress Lucknow Session. It called the colonial government an "Ordinance regime" and stated "at no period since the great Revolt of 1857 has the suppression of civil and personal liberties and the repression of the Indian people,
which is the normal feature of British administration in India today, been so great as it is now" [Zaidi and Zaidi (eds.), vol.11: 113-115].
It is natural that the Congress Governments claiming to be different from the colo-nial government actively took up the question of civil liberties, which had been a symbol of the independence movement. The Congress Governments adopted mea-sures for the defence and extension of civil liberties. As we discuss in detail later, the bans on illegal political associations were withdrawn. The Congress Governments de-manded the release of political prisoners from the colonial government. The confron-tation between the Congress Government and the colonial authority developed to the point that in February 1938 the U.P. and Bihar Congress Governments gave in their resignations.3) In the Bombay Legislative Assembly , an official resolution was adopted for repurchasing the land and other properties confiscated in the Civil Dis-obedience Movement at the cost of the government. The restoration of the lands was realized after one year.4) To top it all, in April 1938, the Bombay Congress Govern-ment repealed the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, 1932, the representa-tive repressive law of the colonial government [NAI/HP, 13/2/38].
1.2 Congress Government as a State
The Congress Governments under the 1935 Act had another character, too. The acceptance of office by the Congress meant that it took on the state functions the co-lonial government had so far been fulfilling. As a state, they had to carry out the pro-vincial administration smoothly. It is well known that the British colonial rule in India was based on the premise that the Indians could not rule themselves. Even in the last phase of colonial rule, this was used as a pretext for rejecting demands from the na-tional movement and prolonging the British rule in India. When Vallabhbhai Patel, a prominent leader of the Congress, addressed on the duty of the Congress Govern-ments, he mentioned the attitude of colonial officials:
When we went to the Round Table Conference, the person conducting affairs of the empire were of the view that Congress will not be able to run the govern-ment. ... They thought we could go to jails, we could do picketing, we could suffer lathi-blows but Congress could not run the Government. Congressmen fight with each other [CWVP, vol. 7: 156].
Thus it was the duty of the Congress Governments to prove their ability to rule and challenge the claim of British colonial officials by carrying out good administra-tion.
What, then, did good administration mean? In colonial India, the maintenance of law and order had been regarded as one of important marks of good administration. The colonial officials claimed that law and order was what the colonial rule had brought into India. The question of law and order affected the formation of the
Con-The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 25 gress Governments under the 1935 Act, too. After the election, the Congress refused to accept office on the ground of the special powers of the Governors, which were provided for on account of the concern of the colonial government for "grave danger to the peace and tranquility of a Province" [Low 1999: 269]. From the point of view of the Congress, the colonial government retained the ultimate powers on the pretext of uncertainty as to the maintenance of law and order under Indian governments. The worsening of law and order situations under the Congress Governments would not only justify the special powers of the Governors but also prove the inability of the Indians to rule.
The Congress was concerned with the question of law and order from the begin-ning of the Congress Governments. The Congress Working Committee allowed the Congress Governments to use Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of the maintenance of law and order [Zaidi and Zaidi (eds.) vol. 11: 306-307]. The Home Minister of the Bombay Congress Government held a meeting with the Inspector-General of Police and the Commissioner of Police on the attitude of the police towards a general strike [MSA/HS, 543 (84)A].
The Congress Governments under the 1935 Act took on contradictory tasks. Their policy as a national government of defending and extending civil liberties inevitably came into conflict with the policy of maintaining law and order, which was required for their character as a state. While the Bombay Congress Government repealed re-pressive laws such as the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, the Congress
admitted the use of Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The withdrawal of bans on illegal organizations might worsen the law and order situation. Any excess in their action for maintaining law and order might vitiate their image of popular and national governments. The Congress Governments were in a dilemma. The dilemma was most serious in their labour policy, as it involved both questions of civil liberty and law and order.
2. Labour Policy of the Bombay Congress Government
In this section, we will examine the labour policy of the Bombay Congress Gov-ernment. We choose Bombay as the object of analysis because it was the most indus-trialized province and the centre of Indian labour movement at that time, and the labour policy of the Bombay Congress Government was a model for the Congress Governments in other provinces.
2.1 Civil Liberties and Pro-Labour Measures
A new approach of the Congress Governments to labour was already shown in the Congress Election Manifesto issued for the election of the provincial assemblies un-der the 1935 Act. It stated:
... In regard to industrial workers the policy of the Congress is to secure for them a decent standard of living, hours of work and conditions of labour in confor-mity, as far as the economic conditions in the country permit, with international standards, suitable machinery for the settlement of disputes between employers and the workmen, protection against the economic consequences of old age , sickness and unemployment and the right of workers to form unions and to strive for the protection of their interests [SWJN, vol. 7: 459-464].
On 17 August 1937, the Bombay Congress Government issued a press communi-que on its labour policy. Following the Congress Election Manifesto, it announced a comprehensive labour policy of the Government. It stated in the beginning: the "Gov-ernment are [sic] aware that they are in a special sense responsible for the welfare of the industrial workers." The Government, it continued, "accepted it as its duty to en-deavour to work out" the programme stated in the Congress Election Manifesto "us-ing all the means at its disposal." The communique promised a liv"us-ing wage to workers and "exhaustive enquiries" on wages to provide it. It also revealed the plan of "the development of a comprehensive system of social insurance" and the extension of Factories Act [MSA/HS, 550-H].
The extension of civil liberties, one of the policies of the Congress Governments as national governments, was applied to communist labour organization and labour leaders. The Communist Party of India and related organizations had been put under ban since 1934. When the Bombay Congress Government started functioning, 5 or-ganizations including the Girni Kamgar Union (Red Flag), the largest trade union in Bombay led by the communists, and 27 individuals in the labour movement were il-legal under Section 16 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 for the former , and Section 4 of the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, 1932 for the latter . The Bombay Congress Government lifted all the bans between August and October 1937 [MSA/HS, 550(25)III-A]. Although the ban on the Communist Party of India could not be lifted because it was imposed by the central government, it was believed that the communists could act almost freely under the Congress Governments.
The Bombay Congress Government promised in the communique on its labour policy "exhaustive enquiries" on wage levels in the province. On 13 October 1937, the Government appointed the Textile Labour Inquiry Committee on the resolution of the Political and Reform Department. The purpose of the appointment was, ac-cording to the resolution, "to investigate into the question of the adequacy of wages and kindred matters in connection with the textile industry in this Province." The Committee consisted of four members with Jairamdas Doulatram, a Congressman and a member of the Congress Labour Sub-Committee, as the chairman. Three of four members of the Committee were Congressmen. The terms of reference were: 1) to examine the wages of workers in the textile industry in the province and to make
rec-The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 27
ommendations regarding the establishment of a minimum wage, the measures to crease the wage level, standardization of wages, and other things; 2) to make an in-terim report on the necessity of an immediate increase in wages pending the
conclusion of the work of the Committee. The Committee was requested to submit the report to the Government "as soon as possible" [TLIC: 1-2].
The Committee submitted its interim report to the Government on 11 February 1938. It stated that the Committee in the course of inquiry tried to sketch the "present condition" of the textile industry. The Committee made inquiries into the wage posi-tions, trends in productive activities, financial positions of the cotton textile industry in several centres in the Province and the price of raw cotton, yarn and cloths, using the statistics supplied by several organizations. The report pointed out that the financial position of the industry had greatly improved in recent years. The problem of overcapitalization, which the Indian Tariff Board had warned, was gradually re-solved. The industry also benefited from the decline in interest rate. The report rec-ommended an increase in wages by maximum "3 Annas in the Rupee" (18.7 per cent) for all the workers except those earning more than Rs. 75 [TLIC: 92-94].
The Bombay Congress Government immediately accepted the report of the Com-mittee. On 14 February 1938, the Government passed a resolution, which announced that the Government would
accept the recommendations of the Committee, and recommend to the Millowners that the proposed increase shall be introduced with effect on the wages due for the month of February or for the last pay period of the month of February. The conclusions and recommendations of the Committee have been made after a searching enquiry, and in the view of Government are entitled to the weight and authority which should be attached to the award of an Industrial Court or a Court of Arbitration. Government are therefore of opinion that the recommendations as they stand should be carried out and accepted both by em-ployers and labour [MSA/HS, 550(2)].
Labour leaders seemed to welcome the report. It was said in an official correspon-dence that the report had been "generally well received by labour interests." Even the communists, who basically opposed the government, could not help accepting it. The Girni Kamgar Union (Red Flag) held a public meeting on 16 February and advised the workers to accept the recommendations [MSA/HS, 550(22)]. Another Girni Kamgar Union, led by A. A. Alve and G. L. Kandalkar group, announced on the same day that they accepted the report [TI, 16 February 1938]. The ATLA (Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association) passed a resolution expressing its satisfaction at the rec-ommendations of the Committee [MSA/HS, 550(22)].
The capitalists in Bombay opposed the report. On 2 March, the Indian Merchants' Chamber sent a letter to the Labour Commissioner of Bombay and criticised the
Gov-ernment and the Committee. The Committee, they pointed out, "somehow or other felt that the mill industry was prospering and an increase in the wages should be at once given to the labourers and every chapter is intended to prove this prosperity." They concluded: "In every view of the case, my Committee are definitely of the opin-ion that the recommendatopin-ions of the Textile Labour Enquiry Committee [sic] are not justifiable and will react adversely on the position of the industry."5)
The reaction of the BMOA (Bombay Millowners' Association), the organization of textile mill owners of Bombay city, was more complicated. The Association is-sued a statement on the recommendations of the Committee on 7 March 1938. In this statement, they opposed the evaluation made by the Committee about the condition of the industry and the methods they used, for the same reasons as suggested by the Indian Merchants' Chamber. With regard to the acceptance of the recommendations, however, they came to a different conclusion:
Nevertheless, in view of Government's resolution, the Association recommended that the wage increases specified in the interim report should be accepted for the time being by members of the Association in Bombay Presidency and be given effect to from the date specified in the Government resolution [TI, 8 March
1938].
This attitude of the Bombay mill owners has to be understood in the light of the relationship between the Indian capitalists and the Congress in this period. From the middle of the 1930s, there was a process of gradual rapprochement between the In-dian capitalists and the Congress [Markovits 1985: 101-149]. Although a section of Indian capitalists still had a fear of the Congress and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru, most of them found it possible and necessary to come to terms with the Congress. It is well known that G. D. Birla acted as a mediator between the Congress and the colonial government in the negotiation for office acceptance [Birla 1953: 169-197, 205-229]. The labour policy of the Congress Governments was just one of the fac-tors that prescribed this "de facto alliance" [Markovits 1985: 180]. The Indian capi-talists had to handle it in consideration of other issues such as the Indo-British trade negotiation and national planning.6) In addition, they expected the Congress Govern-ments to use their influence over the workers to bring about industrial peace. The In-dian capitalists could not afford to jeopardize their relations with the Congress by rejecting the labour policy of the Congress Governments outright.
As the result of the recommendations, the increase in wages was carried out, prob-ably with some exceptions.7 As the statement of the BMOA clearly shows, the influence of the Congress Government forced them to accept the wage raise. The ap-pointment of the TLIC was important because it was the first instance in which a gov-ernment seriously intervened in the question of wages and brought about wage increase. It was not altogether without reason that Vallabhbhai Patel proudly stated
The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 29 that the appointment of the TLIC was "a proof of the attitude of the Congress which laments the problem of the labourers" [CWVP, vol.7: 155] and the Bombay Congress Government "at one stroke increased their wages by twelve per cent" [CWVP, vol.7: 229].
The liberal and pro-labour policy of the Bombay Congress Government reflected the character of the Congress Government as an independence movement and its claim to be a national government. As a popular and national government, it was im-perative that they should be different from the colonial government, which, they had claimed, had no interests in economic conditions of industrial workers and repressed labour movement. It seemed that this requirement for pro-labour policy was substan-tial because all the measures were taken in spite of the risks involved: the removal of bans on communist organizations could destabilize the law and order situation, and wage increase could alienate the capitalists on whom they had to depend.
2.2 Law and Order Problem and "National" Labour Policy
The first two years of the 1935 Act witnessed an upsurge of the Indian labour movement. The number of registered trade unions increased from 271 in 1936-37 to 420 in 1937-38 and their membership from 261,047 to 390,112. The number of labour disputes increased from 157 to 379, and their participants from 169,000 to 648,000 in the same period. As a result, 8,982,000 man-days were lost in 1937-38, compared to 5,358,000 man-days lost in 1936-37 [Sen 1997: 315]. As we discussed above, the maintenance of law and order was a great concern for the Congress Gov-ernments. This growth of the labour movement inevitably became a threat to the Con-gress Governments.
The legalization of communist organizations by the Congress Governments pro-moted the growth of the labour movement. The inauguration of the Congress Gov-ernments stimulated the activities of the communists even before the bans were removed. On 15 August 1937, the BPTUC (Bombay Provincial Trade Union Con-gress), the Bombay branch of the AITUC (All India Trade Union ConCon-gress), which was by then controlled by the communists, and other organizations held a joint dem-onstration for early removal of the bans on illegal associations. When the bans were removed, the "Communists were not slow in taking advantage of this situation," and started to call for a general strike of the textile industry in Bombay city [MSA/HS, 550(25)III-A].
Another reason for the growth of the labour movement in this period was the ex-pectation of the workers for the newly-elected Congress Governments. Jawaharlal Nehru described the exhilarated atmosphere of the people that the election campaign and the acceptance of office brought as "a release of long-suppressed mass energy" [Nehru 1981: 369-70]. This expectation of the people for the Congress Governments took a form most Congress leaders probably never expected. The Bombay police
re-ported on the atmosphere among the workers in Bombay city around that time: "the workers were apparently led to believe that the Present Govt. would support any de-mand, reasonable or otherwise" [MSA/HS, 550(25)III-A].
The growth of the labour movement inevitably affected the relationship between the Congress and Indian capitalists. With labour unrest continuing even after the con-cession to the Congress Governments on labour welfare, the Indian capitalists began to complain about it, and some of them suggested the shift of their activities to the Indian states where wages were low and labour legislation was less strict or non-ex-istent [Markovits 1985: 164-165]. The already shaky finance of the Congress Gov-ernments would worsen without their economic activities. Furthermore, the Congress required the participation of Indian capitalists in the independence movement and the building of independent India. The Congress Governments needed to take measures to cope with labour unrest.
The Congress established the HMSS (Hindustan Mazdoor Sevak Sangh), the first Congress labour organization, and started direct mobilization of industrial workers. In March 1938, at the conference of the Gandhi Seva Sangh, its Labour Sub-Com-mittee recommended the establishment of a trade union on the lines of the ATLA [Karnik 1978: 167-168]. The ATLA was established in Ahmedabad in 1918, with the help of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, and collaborative labour-capital relations had been developed around the system of arbitration [Patel 1987]. The HMSS was estab-lished on recommendation under the chairmanship of Vallabhbhai Patel with Jairamdas Doulatram and Gulzarilal Nanda as the secretaries. Its functions were:
(a) To assist in the formation of the trade unions and in securing their recogni-tion by employers; (b) To train workers for the work of organizarecogni-tion and admin-istration of the unions; (c) To guide the members of the Sangh with regard to their work in the labour movement; (d) To establish welfare activities for the uplift of the working class and the development of its internal strength; (e) To make efforts to get suitable legislative enactment for ameliorating the working and living conditions of labour; (f) To propagate the principles of Truth and Non-violence in relation to the labour movement and to spread enlightenment regard-ing their value and efficacy [Ramanujan 1967: 47-48].
To be precise, the HMSS, formed by the Gandhi Sevak Sangh, was not a measure of the Bombay Congress Government. However, considering the complementary re-lationship between the Congress and the Government, it is not inappropriate to in-clude the HMSS in the labour policy of the Government.
It is clear that the HMSS and its policy of class collaboration had the purpose of curbing the influence of the communists and their idea of class war in the labour movement. Naturally, the communists were hostile to the HMSS. The communists maintained, as per an official report, that the establishment of the HMSS was "a
The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 31 definite attempt on the part of the Congress to destroy the unity of the workers at present maintained by the Girni Kamgar Unions" [MSA/HS, 543(13)B(1)].
The Congress foresaw that the HMSS would be in direct confrontation with the communist trade unions. Vallabhbhai Patel, in a statement on the establishment of the HMSS, mentioned that the basic policy of the AITUC was class war, while that of the HMSS would be "on the lines of the Ahmedabad Labour Association in which the idea of a class was excluded and emphasis laid on truth and non-violence" [TI, 31 March 1938]. With the establishment of the HMSS, the Congress expressed its determination to break with the communists, at least as far as trade union movement was concerned. The activity of the HMSS was limited in this period. Later, in May 1947, the INTUC (Indian National Trade Union Congress), the Congress all-India trade union organization, was born from the HMSS.
The enactment of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938 was the realization of "suitable machinery for the settlement of disputes between employers and the work-men" in the Congress Election Manifesto and "legislation aiming at the prevention of strikes and lockouts as far as possible" in the communique. It is quite likely that the preparation of the bill started just after the inauguration of the Government. The draft of the bill was ready as early as in the first half of February 1938, and circu-lated for opinions on 19 February 1938 [MSA/HS, 950(25)III-A].
The bill was voluminous, consisting of 84 sections and 2 schedules. The bill can be divided into three parts: a) registration of trade unions; b) conciliation, arbitration, and Industrial Court, and c) illegal strike and lockout. The contents can be summa-rized as follows:8)
a) Registration of trade unions: the Registrar, appointed by the provincial govern-ment, may register trade unions on application. Different conditions are provided for the registration of Recognized Unions, "those which have been recognized by the employers," and Unrecognized Unions, those which have not: the former requires the membership of more than 5 per cent of the industry or occupation which the union belongs to for past six months and the latter requires the membership of more than 50 per cent. The Registrar may not register more than one union in an industry or occupation. If there are more than one union fulfilling the condition, the union which has more membership should be registered. If a registered union exists in an industry or occupation, no other union can be registered in the industry except when the union has the membership of more than 50 per cent of the industry or occupation. The
Reg-istered Union with membership of more than 20 per cent of the industry or occupa-tion may become the Representative Union and can represent the industry or occupation in conciliation and arbitration proceedings.
b) Conciliation, Arbitration, and Industrial Court: Compulsory conciliation was in-troduced for the first time, as compared to voluntary conciliation in the Trade Dis-putes Act, 1929 and Bombay Trade DisDis-putes Conciliation Act, 1934. Whenever
employees have an objection to any change of working conditions provided in the schedules, the matter should be referred to conciliation proceedings, first by a Con-ciliator and, if an agreement is not reached, by a Board of Conciliation. Employers and employees may, by agreement, refer any present or future disputes to an Arbitra-tor. The decision of Arbitrator on disputes binds both the parties. The government may establish the Industrial Court, which works as the court for labour matters and whose decision binds the parties.
c) Illegal strike and lockout: a strike or lockout started before or during the con-ciliation proceedings is illegal and rigorous imprisonment of not exceeding six months or fine or both are provided for the participants. The same penalty is pro-vided for those who instigate someone to participate in illegal strikes or those who add to the furtherance of illegal strikes.
The bill was introduced in the Bombay Legislative Assembly on 2 September 1938. B. G. Kher, the Premier and Labour Minister, explained that the bill was "introduced to implement that part of Government's policy in the matter of Labour, announced as far back as the 17th of August 1937" and the reasons for submitting the bill were: (1) the existence of labour unrest in the province and (2) the lack of adequate provision for ensuring industrial peace in the textile industry [BLAD, vol. 4: 817-824].
In the debate of the bill, the members representing labour interests opposed most provisions of the bill. On the provisions of trade unions, they asserted that the differ-ent conditions for registration between Recognized Unions and Unrecognized Unions would give unjust advantages to company unions. On the provisions of compulsory conciliation, R. A. Khedgikar stated that they "must try for a conciliation not by force but by voluntary conciliatory methods." The labour members maintained that the compulsory conciliation of the Bill was more reactionary than the voluntary concili-ation of the Trade Disputes Act, 1929 and the. Bombay Trade Disputes Conciliconcili-ation Act, 1934, enacted by the colonial government [BLAD, vol. 8: 836]. The labour members vehemently opposed the provisions of illegal strike. They claimed that the government was attempting to deprive the workers of their right to strike. S. H. Jhabvala held that the purpose of the provisions of penalty for the instigation of ille-gal strikes was the suppression of labour leaders [BLAD, vol. 4: 3398-3399]. The debate lasted long—nearly 150 hours going over 33 days [Revri 1972: 2261]-how-ever, as the Congress held a majority of the assembly, all the amendments from the labour members were rejected. The Bill was passed in the Assembly on 4 November 1938. The Act was enforced on 1 April 1939.
The Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was later succeeded by the Bombay Indus-trial Relations Act, 1946 and the IndusIndus-trial Disputes Act, 1947. The former inherited most of the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, and the latter extended its scope to the whole of India. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, along with the INTUC, played the central role in the labour policy of the Congress Governments in
The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 33 independent India.
The Bombay Congress Government was subject to restriction in resorting to mea-sures such as the use of police force or the issue of restrictive orders in coping with strikes. The Government, instead, set out to organize industrial workers along the line of its ideal labour-capital relations by taking advantage of the reputation of the Con-gress in the independence movement and, now, its position as government. The pur-pose of this organizational action by the Government was to realize the labour-capital relations based on class collaboration with active state intervention. The establish-ment of the HMSS and the enactestablish-ment of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act were part of this, so to speak, "national" labour policy.
The Bombay Congress Government utilized the labour-capital relations practiced in Ahmedabad and, through it, Gandhi's ideas on labour, as an ideological back-ground of the "national" labour policy. As we have seen, the HMSS was established by the Gandhi Seva Sangh, a Gandhian social organization, "on the lines of the Ahmedabad Labour Association" and Gulzarilal Nanda, a long-time secretary of the ATLA, became the secretary. Nanda, as the secretary to the Bombay Congress Gov-ernment, was also the architect of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act. The Act, it was claimed, featured the practices in Ahmedabad, such as a system of arbitration and occupational trade unions. The Government presented the Act not as another one of the series of industrial relations acts enacted by the colonial government but as its own product. For the Bombay Congress Government, it was essential to place the Act in the "national" labour policy, which was supposed to be different from that of the colonial government, by associating the Act with Ahmedabad.
The "national" labour policy of the Bombay Congress Government and the class collaborationist labour-capital relations it aimed to realize, were intended to offer an ideological countercheck to the communists' idea of class war. This is clear from the denial by the Government of the trade unions ruled by the communists. Kher stated in the debates of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act: "There was a complete ab-sence of organisztion so far as the Bombay City was concerned amongst the textile workers" [BLAD, vol. 4: 817-824].
The actual working of the "national" labour policy of the Congress Governments, however, either as means for realizing class collaboration or countercheck to the com-munists, had to be supported by the use of force, as the provisions of illegal strikes of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act showed. This gave rise to a contradiction within the character of the Congress Governments as an independence movement and their labour policy of extending the rights of industrial workers. The contradiction was shortly revealed in the Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes Act One-Day Strike, the largest strike during the tenure of the Bombay Congress Government.
3. Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes Act One-Day Strike 3.1 Preparations for the Strike
As the Bombay Industrial Disputes Bill was introduced in the Bombay Legislative Assembly in September 1938, a plan for one-day strike to protest against the bill be-gan to take shape. The plan was first suggested by the ILP (Independent Labour Party), an organization that B. R. Ambedkar founded for Mahar workers. On 8 Sep-tember 1938, S. V. Parulekar, a member of the party suggested in a press interview that a one-day strike should be organized to protest against the Industrial Disputes Bill. Later, Ambedkar himself stated that they had a plan for such a strike as a part of campaign against the bill [BDEC: 5].
The communists followed. At the meeting held on 24 September, the BPTUC de-cided to participate in the strike in cooperation with the ILP. The Council of Action consisting of the leaders of the ILP and the BPTUC was formed at the meeting [BDEC: 6]. From then on, the communists started intensive propaganda for the strike. From 24 September to 6 November, about 40 meetings of workers were held, apart from small meetings held at the corners of mill areas. The members of the Council of Action delivered speeches at the meetings, explaining the importance of the strike and the programme of the strike day. During the same period, articles in communist bulletins such as the Kranti and the National Front gave instructions for the actions to be taken or the methods to be resorted to by workers in the strike. In these speeches and articles, the communists severely criticised the Bombay Congress Government [BDEC: 6]. It is interesting to examine the propaganda of the communists against the Bombay Congress Government, because, though it was sectarian, it reveals the con-tradictory characters of the Government and its labour policy from the opposite side. The propaganda of the communists for the strike had the features as follows. First, it assumed strong revolutionary and provocative tones. The communists denied the authority of the Congress Government. They told the workers that they should dis-obey the authority of the Government by any means and that the ultimate purpose of the strike was the establishment of "the Workers' Raj" on the day. The editorial of the Kranti on 2 November 1938 stated: "If prohibitory orders are issued, they should not be obeyed" [BDEC: 10]. B. T. Ranadive told the workers at a meeting on 4 No-vember: "On the 7th9) there will not be the rule of Congress Ministries. On the 7th there will be workers' Raj-he Lal Bavta's [Red Flag] Raj" [BDEC: 10]. An article in the Kranti on 5 November stated: "The workers have on several occasions faced the police lathis and guns. Even today, if necessary, they will do the same" [BDEC: 12]. The language of the propaganda was violent enough to make the Government feel a threat to law and order.
Second, they emphasized the reactionary character of the Bombay Congress Gov-ernment. For this purpose, in the articles, they made K. M. Munshi, the Home
Minis-The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 35
ter, a symbol of the reactionary character of the Government and predicted that he would suppress the strike by force. An article in the National Front on 2 October stated: "The thunderous challenge of the proletariat will be delivered on the 17th (Oc-tober). Munshi's Government may try to stop it with bullets, but the challenge will be delivered" [BDEC: 7]. In an article in the Kranti on 8 October, it was stated:
As at the time of the Assembly elections the Congress showed its power by de-feating Comrade Joglekar with the help of goondas, Mr. Munshi threatened to show the Congress strength at this time. The Ministries who broke the strike of Bradley Mills by a lathi charge will resort to firing at the time of general strike, break up meeting with the help of badmashes, and carry false propaganda [BDEC: 8].
As we stated, the Congress Governments claimed that they were popular and national governments and stressed their difference from the colonial government. The labour leaders challenged such claims. The communists tried to impress on the workers that the Bombay Congress Government was as reactionary as the colonial government and would resort to police force, lathi-charge, and even firing.
The contradictory characters of the Bombay Congress Government were expressed in its preparation for the strike. On the one hand, the Government stressed that its commitment to the freedom of expression would not change in the strike. On 4 No-vember, Munshi issued a statement on the policy of the Government on demonstra-tions. He declared that the Government would allow any demonstration, "however hostile it may be," if it would be "peaceful and disciplined." At the same time, he stated: "those who do not wish to participate in the demonstration and desire to at-tend to their normal work are given due protection against coercion or intimidation." He also asked the labour leaders "to ensure that their followers conduct themselves peacefully and within the law" [BDEC: 27]. The Commissioner of Police gave an instruction that the police should "leave alone the strikers and their leaders and per-mit them to do what they liked, unless and until they found any attempt at breach of the peace or noticed any act of violence" [BDEC: 26].
On the other hand, the Government was preparing to deal with the strike by force. On the same day as Munshi issued the statement, the Commissioner of Police had issued an order under the Bombay City Police Act "prohibiting the public within cer-tain areas from carrying any lethal weapon or lathi or stick or from collecting or car-rying stones or other missiles or instruments or means of casting or impelling the same." The police force in the working class areas was reinforced. Still, orders under the Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code were not issued in spite of the re-quest from the BMOA [BDEC: 27]. The Bombay Congress Government was ambiva-lent towards the strike.
3.2 The Day of the Strike
On the morning of 7 November 1938, the proposed day of the strike, "everything was fairly normal." According to the information supplied by the BMOA to the Bombay Disturbances Enquiry Committee, out of 116,000 day shift workers, 62,000 workers attended the mills as usual, though this figure might be exaggerated. There were several pickets near the mill gates by the workers of the Girni Kamgar Union (Red Flag) and the ILP, persuading the workers not to go to work [BDEC: 17-18].
After 8:30 a.m., stone-throwing by the strikers began in several mills. The strikers attempted to stop the traffic. As a result, there was a delay in the tramway and "con-siderable trouble was experienced" in the bus service. Furthermore, attempts were made to close the shops that were open. Stones were thrown at the shops and when the shopkeepers refused to close, "articles from their shops were thrown on the road"
[BDEC: 19].
After the recess for lunch, the attack on the workers who attended the mills intensified. The strikers assaulted the workers going home for lunch and 59 workers were injured during the recess. Still, about 51,000 workers continued to work after the recess. The attack was escalated in the evening when the workers who finished the day's work were going home. According to a witness for the Enquiry Committee, at the closing time, the volunteers were moving in batches and beating people who had cotton fibres on them-indicating that they had gone to work. 258 workers were injured from three to six in the afternoon.
In the course of the strike, there were two cases of firing at the strikers by police officers. One case occurred at the Elphinstone Mills. From 8:00 a.m., about 500 per-sons gathering near the mills threw stones at the mills and tried to break into the mill compound. By around 10:00 a.m., the crowd increased to 2,000. The Deputy Com-missioner of Police with his men tried to stop the crowd from advancing. When he "found that their way had been cut off
," he ordered his men to fire at the crowd. By this firing, two persons were injured by bullets and one of them died [BDEC: 21].
The second case of firing occurred at the Spring Mills. The mill closed around 6:00 p.m. after working with full complement the whole day. When the workers escorted by the clerks were going outside the mill compound, they were faced with a crowd of strikers and stoned. The Police Sergeant ordered to fire to make their way back to the mill compound. Then, another party of police was surrounded by the crowd on the way to the mills. The Sub-Inspector who headed the party fired four rounds at the crowd and he fired again to rescue the constables and persons from the crowd. At 7:00 p.m., "a large crowd" came towards the police party stationed near the mill gate. The Police Sergeant first fired several rounds with no effect and at last resorted to the firing, which "lasted for about two minutes." One person died in this incident [BDEC: 37-41].
The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 37 Maidan from 17:30 to 20:00 and attended by 15,000 to 40,000 workers. After the meeting, the workers dispersed without causing trouble in the neighbourhood [BDEC:
21].
3.3 Strike and After
It is not easy to judge whether the Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes One-Day Strike was successful or not. The strike was carried out as planned by the labour lead-ers and, even by modest estimate, about 65,000 worklead-ers participated. The police opened fire at the workers in the strike, as the labour leaders had predicted.
The incidents of firing at the workers could have been a serious blow to the Con-gress, as it could have meant the breakdown of its claim that the Congress Govern-ments were popular and national governGovern-ments. After the strike, the Congress and the Bombay Congress Government tried to justify the incidents. The Congress denounced the strike, describing it as the result of propaganda or even coercion by the labour leaders, not of the genuine discontent of the workers. Vallabhbhai Patel issued a state-ment just after the strike, maintaining that in the strike "organized coercion, terror-ism and violence were freely used in the name of legitimate demonstrations" [CWVP, vol. 7: 196].
The Bombay Congress Government appointed the Bombay Disturbances Enquiry Committee to investigate the strike. The name of the Committee indicates that the Government had an intention to portray the strike as "disturbances" and justify the firing. The report of the Committee concluded that the strike was due to the political motives of the labour leaders. For the communists, the report explained, the strike was for "regaining their power over workers," which was lost "by reason of the ac-tivities of the present Ministry, coupled with the actual work done by workers' orga-nization started and controlled by the Congress." For Ambedkar, it was due to the conflict of interests between his party and the Congress [BDEC: 16]. In the face of the disturbances, the report observed, the police "acted with considerable restraint and forbearance and resorted to firing only when there was no other way to meet the ugly situation" and the "firing was due entirely to the defiant mood of the crowd" [BDEC: 43].
For the communists and other labour leaders, the firing could have been a good opportunity for attacking the Government. In their propaganda for the strike, they challenged the claim of the Congress Governments to be popular and national gov-ernments and predicted the repression and even firing by the Government. The pre-diction was realized in the strike. However, the communists failed to convert the incidents into a lasting opposition movement against the Act or undermine the popu-larity of the Bombay Congress Government. A meeting held on 28 January 1939 to protest against the Industrial Disputes Act "was attended by only some 300 persons"
There were reasons for the failure of the communists to take advantage of the strike. First, the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act provided for massive and compli-cated institutions and was yet to be enforced at the point of the strike. It was difficult for the communists to make ordinary workers understand its effect and gather the con-tinuous support for their opposition to the Act. Second, the activities of rival unions reduced the influence of the communists over the workers. The Girni Kamgar Union led by A. A. Alve and G. L. Kandalkar held meetings to advise the workers "not to be misled by the attempts of members of the Red Flag Union to bring about strike." The Bombay Kamgar Sangh, founded by Keshav Borkar , a dada" of the mill areas, held meetings for the same purpose [MSA/HS, 543(13)B2]. Third , the labour and other measures of the Bombay Congress Government as a national government worked to some extent. The wage raise of the textile workers by the Bombay Textile Inquiry Committee seemed "to have cut the ground from under the feet of the Com-munists" [MSA/HS, 543(13)B(1)]. The Bombay Congress Government could mobi-lize the workers through nationalist measures such as prohibition." Although these measures might not have helped to restrain the growing labour movement, as we men-tioned, they could have prevented the workers from becoming hostile to the Govern-ment.
The Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes Act One-Day Strike showed that the parting of the Congress and the communists was unavoidable. In the framework of the inde-pendence movement before the acceptance of office by the Congress, the Congress and the communists could co-exist despite their ideological differences. Many com-munists were also members of the Congress and some of them held executive posi-tions in it. The communist policy of united front with the Congress, which was the result of a shift in the strategy of international communist movement directed by the Comintern in 1935, encouraged the communist activities in the Congress [NAT/HP, 7/3/39]. However, this relationship changed when the Congress came into office. The communists made uncompromising attacks on the Congress Governments, as they did on the colonial government, and the Congress Governments responded to them with force, as the colonial government did. This picture of confrontation was decid-edly manifest in the Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes Act One-Day Strike. On 23 November 1938, the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee "decided to take disci-plinary action" against 15 communist members "for participating in anti-Congress activities in connection with" the strike and prohibited them from holding any execu-tive position in the Congress organization [MSA/HS, 950A(II)] . This was a precur-sor of the purge of the communists from the Congress in the future .
Although the Bombay Congress Government survived the Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes Act One-Day Strike, it did not mean that the contradiction of the Congress being in office disappeared. The mass energy the Congress Governments releazed was beyond the expectation of the leaders. The class collaboration expected by the
Con-The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 39
gress was not realized, and the Congress Governments had to resort to the same re-pressive measures as the colonial government used for the maintenance of law and order. It was no longer possible "for the Congress to prove conclusively that it can rule without the aid of the military and with the least possible assistance of the po-lice," as Gandhi had expected [CWMG, vol. 66: 63]. In addition, other problems such as the deterred progress of agrarian reforms and the growing internal strife in the Con-gress organization were bothering them. All these problems were serious enough to make the Congress leaders doubt about the benefit of maintaining the Governments. Even Vallabhbhai Patel, the main prop of the Congress Governments, stated at the All India Congress Committee in July 1939: "After all the Congress Ministries are more in the nature of an experiment than anything else" [CWVP, vol. 7: 116], sug-gesting a possibility of giving them up. When the world war broke out in Europe in September 1939 and the Governor-General declared India as belligerent without con-sulting the Congress and the Congress Governments, it was not a difficult decision for the Congress Ministries to resign.
Conclusion
The transition of the Congress from an independence movement to a state began with the formation of the Congress Governments under the 1935 Act. A number of administrative policies of the Congress started in this period. This meant that ideals in the independence movement were tested by the realities of state formation. In the first few years of the Congress Governments, however, momentum of the indepen-dence movement still remained strong. This unique historical condition resulted in the contradictory characters of the Congress Governments: one as an independence movement and the other as a state.
The labour policy of the Bombay Congress Government reflected this contradic-tion. It swung between the extension of civil and economic rights of industrial work-ers on the one hand, and the restriction and control of them for "good governance" or maintenance of law and order on the other hand. Its "national" labour policy, whose purpose was to create labour-capital relations based on class collaboration by taking advantage of the political resources of the Congress acquired in the independence movement, had to depend on the use of state power and, therefore, could not over-come this contradiction. The Bombay Anti-Industrial Disputes Act Strike in 1938 was the culmination of the contradiction. At the same time, the firing in the strike fore-told the future course of the labour policy and, in a sense, the resolution of the con-tradiction. The state formation by the Congress gradually progressed thereafter, though its character as an independence movement remained significant.
The contradiction for the Congress Governments under the 1935 Act was mostly resolved by the attainment of independence about a decade later. For the Congress, it
meant the completion of its transition to a state, though the process of state forma-tion continued after independence. For industrial workers, however , it meant the loss of ideals of the independence movement. Under the Congress Governments in inde-pendent India, firing at workers became such usual occurrences that the Governments seemed not to feel the dilemma, as the Congress Governments under the 1935 Act had experienced.12) Although the Congress might have established its "national" labour policy at independence, the problems for Indian industrial workers remained unresolved.
Notes
1) A detailed study has been made on the labour laws that regulated the labour relations in independent India [Kagawa 1986]. For methodological reasons , it is not easy to organi-cally combine this kind of legal study with historical analysis we intend in this study. In this study, we will make a historical study on the background of the origin of the labour policy in independent India, which was not wholly reflected in the sentences of the law. 2) The Congress commanded a majority in Madras, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces and
United Provinces. In Bombay, a majority was attained by including independent members. 3) The Governments resumed ten days later when the Viceroy hinted at a concession [AICC
papers, C-3/1938].
4) "The Bombay Government and its Work: Review of Past Six Months (1938)," AICC Pa-pers, C-2/1938.
5) Indian Merchants' Chamber to Commissioner of Labour, Bombay, 2 March 1938, in N. M. Joshi Papers, No.86. Later, they officially expressed their opposition to the report [Bombay Chronicle, 5 March 1938].
6) For the Indo-British Trade Negotiation, see [Chatterji 1981] and for the National Planning Committee, see [Nakazato 2001].
7) The Girni Kamgar Union (Red Flag), in a letter to the Premier dated 13 March 1938, com-plained that mill owners were not carrying out recommendations. Bombay Sentinel, 17 March 1938, in [MSA/HS, 550(22)].
8) We reproduced the bill from the passed Act contained in [BLAD, vol.4: 4514-4550] . 9) The strike was originally planned on 7 November 1938.
10) The word dada, literally "elder brother," is used to mean a local strongman. For the activi-ties of Keshav Borkar, see [Chandavarkar 1994: 204-211] .
11) On 24 July 1939, the Prohibition Day, about 50,000 people participated in the celebration [Bombay Chronicle, 25 July 1939].
12) See the reactions of the Bombay Congress Government towards the Samyukta Maharashtra (United Maharashtra) Movement and the general strike in the textile industry in 1982, for example.
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The Origin of "National" Labour Policy in India 41
PRIVATE AND INSTITUTIONAL PAPERS
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Government of Bombay, 1939, Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates (BLAD), vol.4, Bombay. Government of Bombay, 1939, Report of the Bombay Disturbances Enquiry Committee
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