Japan, China and Korea
著者(英) Hiroshi Watanabe
journal or
publication title
Senri Ethnological Studies
volume 28
page range 13‑30
year 1990‑12‑28
URL http://doi.org/10.15021/00003160
SENRI ETHNOLOGICAL STUDIES 28 1990
Jusha, China
Literati and Yangban: Confucianists and Korea
in Japan,
HIROSHI WATANABE
71he Uhivensity of Tt)kLyo
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i 1. Introduction s. confucianism and Japanese l
l2. "Literati"‑InChina Samurai i
l' 3. yangban‑InKorea 6. Jusha(confucianist) l
{ 4. PluralismofCulture‑Japanin
7. ConfucianismintheTokugawa i '
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The main theme of this paper is the social existence of the "jusha," or' the Con‑
fucianist, as an example of Japanese intellectual in the Tokugawa era. The
"literati" of China and the "yangban" of Korea during the same period are discuss‑
ed first for comparjson. These three groups were the bearers of Confucian culture, and shaped the development of Confucianism in their respective countries.
2. "LITERATI"‑INCHINA
After the establishment of the Qing dynasty in China, which paralleled the Tokugawa era of Japan for a long period of time, there was an age when Chinese Confucian "intellectuals" or "literati" were dominant socially and politically. They had prominent social prestige as a symbol of the culture. There was a deep‑rooted belief that they alone were capable of performing the duties required of the bearers and leaders of the moral principles of this world. It was said that the common peo‑
ple, while subject to the same principles, could not become literati "only because their circumstance did not permit them to acquire adequate c,ulture to do so" (Ko‑
jiro Yoshikawa).i) In the biographies of leading merchants that appeared in local gazetteers Shere are found such Chinese phrases as "Qiru‑jiushang" or "Qiru‑
jingshang," which mean "he gave up pursuing the rank of scholar, and instead engaged in commerce."2) This is in striking contrast to Japanese merchants, who, even while proud of their ancestors being samurai (warriors), used to urge their sons to work for the "family business" or "family trade" nevertheless.3) The literati were supposed to form the government in accordance with the Confucian teachings of
"governing the people by self‑ cultivation." They became government officials
13
through a state examination system, which was formally open to almost all classes of people, and they participated directly in government affairs.
Some degrees in the examination system (the lowest of which was "shengyuan"), however, could be bought with money. Besides government oMcials with the highest degree "jinshi," there were a great many people, including the "shengyuan,"
who were aspiring to obtain degrees and assume high governmental posts. As Wu Jingzi (author of "Rulin Waishi"), Li Baojia (author of "GUanchang Xianxingji") and others depicted, there were many government othcials who were extremely vulgar. In these senses, the literati were not always government o'Mcials, nor were government oMcials always high‑minded Confucianists. However, both the princi‑
ple and the system of selecting government othcials from among the literati were
firmlyestablished. .‑ . ‑
Literati, once promoted to government oMcial rank, became "xiangshen" (gen‑
try) when at home.4) They were local leaders or bosses, who assisted, used, or 'resisted local government oMcials.5) Also, they usually were landowners. In and after the 3rd year of the'Yongzheng era (1725), nonpayment of farm rent to the lan‑
downer was punished.6) It was common that when a member of a family or a kin was a jinshi, some other members were shengyuan, and it was also common that a certain generation of a family or kin belonged to the jinshi rank, while another generation of the same family belonged to the shengyuan rank (Hiroshi Okusaki).7) However, a family line which experienced a much more dramatic change in its social status was not uncommon.8) Supporting the emperor, the literati always formed the upper social classes throughout the country. They were connected through a network of associations including kinship relations, while being exposed to cons‑
tant changes in the "membership" of their class. They were different in their form of social existence from the jusha and samurai of Tokugawa Japan, most of whom were separated from the land.
The doctrines of Confucianism were well‑suited to the above‑mentioned social structure, where the literati combined their culture as individuals with their standing as government oMcials and local leaders under the rule of the emperor, who, acting under a "mandate from heaven" issued decrees one after another from far above.
These situations certainly gave plausibility to the teachings of "the Great= Learning, "
which urges scholars first to cultivate their own innate nature and then to regulate their families, order well their state and make all under heaven tranquil and happy.
Also, they provided persuasive power to' the doctrines of Neo‑Confucianism, the standard doctrines for the civil examination, which stated that the people could be duly governed and the world could be kept at peace by clarifying the "principles" of things and simultaneously awakening one's inmost human nature. Meanwhile, the doctrines of Neo‑Confucianism were conspicuously advocated by the Qing govern‑
ment, probably because it was the government of the non‑Chinese "barbarians,"
and hence, it needed powerful ideological legitimation. There was･ so wide a
discrepancy between such highly‑admired orthodox thought and political realities
that the former seemed liable to bring distrust upon itself. Such was the case with
Jusha, Literati and Yangban 15
the examination system. At its outset, the examination system was presumably in‑
tended to assess fairly the depth of Confucian culture or self‑cultivation, and find persons of high virtue. In reality, however, the examination system ushered in a fierce competition for success with innumerable "commoners" vying for the luck of obtaining wealth and social status.9) The scene was almost like a parody full of ill will, with laughter directed at Confucianism.
During and after the Song dynasty era, when the examination system was established, it has been said that even Confucius would have had to take the ex‑
amination to become a government oMcial.iO) Meanwhile "juye," study for the ex‑
amination, was often lopked at with contemPtuous and skeptical eyes.ii) Ji Yun (famous for his compilation of the "Siku Quanshu") wrote in his "Yueweicaotang‑
biji," Vol. 1 that a ghost saw a beautiful beam of light emanate from the memory of books cherished in the mind of a man when he was sleeping, while also seeing a cloud of black smoke rise from the memory of books hung over the roof of a house where an old student, who had been working hard only for juye, was sleeping. An emperor of the Qing dynasty, therefore, deploring the people as deeply tainted by the tradition of seeking fame and wealth through the examination system, once gave an admonitory instruction urging scholars to return to "learning for self‑improve‑
ment" as he believed it should be, quoting froM Zhu Xi, who had established Neo‑
Confucianism.i2) His instruction was probably a matter of course, when judged from his position as emperor, but such brazen preaching by him, a conqueror sup‑
ported by violence and by the manipulation of people's desire for fame and wealth, seemed to ridicule the very learning he proposed, albeit unconsciously.
Generally speaking (even today), it seems that a system of culture or philosophy, after gaining social prestige and uniting with the political establish‑
ment, is obliged to pay continuously heavy prices for that prestige and stature.i3) This is because realities are always far inferior to ideals, and therefore doctrines are always betrayed and considered skeptically. Faith in doctrines is often utilized as a means to pursue power and wealth, and as such the doctrines are liable to lose their vitality in the minds of the people. When the prevailing political a"thority haughti‑
ly persists in promulgating a principle of culture or philosophy that widely disregards reality, bad faith can arise with respect to the‑ culture or philosophy itself. Similar circumstances led to the･rise of Wang Yangming, who criticized Neo‑Confucianism in the Ming era. It was only too natural that,'when the doc‑
trines of Wang Yangming could not save the Ming dynasty from ruin and when the authority of Neo‑Confucianism was, quite ironically, mightily upheld by the power of the "barbarians," ideological groping or escape in a diffk)rent direction occurr‑
ed. Qian Mu is persuasive in noting that the hatred of Neo‑Confucianism, which had become the subject of the vulgar examination system, caused the rise of the ex‑
egetical study of Chinese classics, a study which "attacked (Neo‑Confucian) ̀com‑
mentaries with (their) commentaries."i4)
Furthermore, the divergences among the literati in the Qing era were wider
than those in the Song and Ming eras. This was probably due to economic develop‑
ment. Yu Yamanoi writes:
In the Qing era, .mapy large‑scale book‑compilation projects were carried out by the Court, and many local gazetteers' and other documents were published by local governments and influential persons. There was good demand for private tutors. Scholars were able to live only by learning, if not as govern‑
ment oMcials. Scholars in the Song and the Ming eras had stations in life other than learning, while some scholars in the Qing era had no life other than that of learning, and, therefore, they learned for the sake' of learning."i5)
In fact,'none of the typical exegetical scholars of Chinese classics, such as Yan Ruoqu, Dai Zhen or Duan Yuzai,' were jinshi. There were some in government ser‑
vice who sp.‑ught fame. a‑s.pqtJronS. Qf sgholars inst.ead pf.pursuing.1.e.arning.
themselves.i6) A social foundation had been established on which learning could be pursued independent of the government. As Yamanoi points out, many scholars in the Qing era, while majntaining Zhu Xi Neo‑Confucianism as the moral code in dai‑
ly life, engaged in exegetical studies of Confucian classics.i7)
It was diMcult for the literati in the Qing era to directly deny the orthodox thought of the Establishment because of their social position. However, they did not want to entirely identify themselves with it. Between these opposite mentalities was established a foundation on which specialized scholars could compete with one another in areas of talent and knowledge, keeping away from any direct commit‑
ment to politics.i8) These circumstances should be taken into consideration as a background of the history of Confucianism in the Qing era.
3. YANGBAN‑INKOREA
Rule by the Confucian intellectuals was established in Korea during the Yi dynasty, 1392‑1910. Confucian culture had overwhelming social prestige in com‑
bination with the structure of the government, and in principle the people who had acquired such culture were selected through the civil examination system based on Neo‑Confucianism to entet government service. ‑These cultured people were similar to. those of China in that they formed upper social classes, and typically were land‑owners and local leaders. However, in other respects, they were different from their Chinese countetparts.
First of all, they had a deep‑rooted sense of heredity in their status in Korea･
Persons considered as Confucian intellectuals were called "yangban," and below the yangban followed the "chung'in" (middle people), "sangmin," "yang'in" (com‑
mon people) and "nobi" (slaves). Distinction in social rank and class was strictly observed. This was in striking contrast to China where there was no distinction of social status by birth, as a matter of common sense.i9) Accordingly, the examina‑
tion system was, in form, open not only to yangban but also to others,20) but, in fact, was generally limited to yangban.2i) Almost all government posts were oc‑
cupied by yangban by birth. In fact, the Saganwon (the.ministry for,advising the
Jusha, Literati and Yangban 17
king) said in 1417, "The standards of our examination system are not only to test capability, but also to identify family line," and the minister of Saganwon and others said in 1431, "It is the traditional way of selecting a person for employment to consider his family line and birth, not to judge him only by his capability."22) Whether a person was yangban or not was, therefore, a question of family line more than that of the person himself. Only the households of Confucian intellec‑
tuals, which had turned out, and would continue to turn out, government officials, were entitled to yangban status.23) Marriage within the same status was a princip‑
le. "The descendants of a yangban, who formally married a widow or a daughter of a peasant, were destined to lose almost all the privileges of yangban status, and be shut out of the government service" (Charles Dallet).24) Great importance thus came to be attached to the family line. It was said to be required of a yangban to have at least one high government oMcial among his "four ancestors" (his father, grandfather, and great‑grandfather and the father of his mother).25) Yangban status, however, was not automatically given to those who had high government oM‑
cials among their ancestors. Descendants of famous Neo‑Confucian scholars, who were not high government oMcials for several generations, could be recognized as yangban, and, to the contrary, even descendants of high government othcials were in danger of being deprived of yangban status if they lost the culture required of yangban. "He who was born of a yangban family, but who had not been in govern‑
ment service for a long time, was deprived of the title of yangban, and the law court also denied him his privileges as a yangban" (C. Dallet).26) The status of a yangban was judged by his family line, inheritance of learning, success or failure in the ex‑
amination and eligibility for government service, marital relations, circle of acquam‑
tances, etc..27) "Position within yangban status was determined by the number of successful examinees (especially for civil, not military service) and high government oMcials whom the family line had produced (Yi Song‑mu)."28)
As mentioned above, although yangban status was hereditary, maintaining yangban .status nevertheless depended greatly on the achievements of each genera‑
tion of the family and on mutual social recognition among yangbans. Different from the samurai in Tokugawa Japan, whose family status, stipend and post were automatically balanced, yangban status was structurally instable. A yangban could maintain his status only by constantly demonstrating and making people recogmze his suitability to the status of yangban. This could result in a significant difference between a self‑styled yangban and a generally‑accepted one. This is why some peo‑
ple say the yangban represented 3% of the whole population and others say 30%.29) lt is said, for instance, that in Taegu‑bu (present‑day Taegu City, Kyongsang‑
pukdo, and its surroundings) the number of yangban households represented 9.2%
of the total number in the census register in 1690, increased to 18.7% around 1730,
to 37.5% in the 1780's, and as high as 70.3% in 1858.30) Thus, by 1858, the census
register indicated that the majority of the population had risen to the privileged
status. These circumstances resulted in an increased necessity among yangban to
demonstrate that they were authentic yangban. Failure by a yangban in such
efforts would be a blow not only to himself, but also to his ancestors and descen‑
dants, and, therefore, a yangban was urged to make efforts to become 100%
yangban if others were 90% yangban, and 120% yangban if others were 100%
yangban, in order to secure his yangban status.
Furthermore, an authentic yangban was not supposed to engage in labor. The State prohibited yangban from engaging in "menial occupations" (farming, manufacturing and commerce).
Yangban who engage in farming, manufactUring or commercial occupations will surely encounter dithculties with acquaintances, marria' ge and entrance in‑
to government service. People will first say that the yangban has been reduced to a commoner, and then will despise him and sever acquaintance with him because they are afraid their own prestige will be damaged‑("Samin‑chongron"
in U‑so, Vol. 1' by Yu Su‑won).3i)
In actuality, however, it seems that lower‑class yangban engaged in farming out of sheer necessity; however, commerce and manufacturing were probably out of the question for yangban.32) Yangban who intended to remain authentic would not engage in any "menial occupation," even ifthey starved. Unlike in China, it was or‑
dinarily impossible for brothers to be government oMcials and merchants, or for the son of a merchant to become a high government oMcial. It could very well br‑
ing about the ruin of a family for a family member to give up pursuing the rank of scholar, and instead engage in commerce.
Furthermore, the authentic yangban had to demonstrate his suitability to the status in his manner and lifestyle.33) The nucleus ofthis demonstration was to prac‑
tice proper manners and rituals in accordance with the Confucian classics. With regard to the increasing influence of the "Wengong Jiali" (Household Rituals of Zhu Xi; said to have been written by Zhu Xi) in and after the early days of the Yi dynasty, Hideki Kajimura writes, "It had come to be considered as a demonstration of the suitability to the yangban status ̀to perform a funeral service in accordance with "Jiali. "' And there had come to appear those who performed funeral services in accordance with "Jiali" in order to acquire a reputation as authentic yangbans, thus mistaking the means for the end."34) Ceremonial occasions came to be utilized as opportunities ,to demonstrate a family's suitability to the yangban status.
This situation of yangban status made it more diflicult than in China to distance oneself from Zhu Xi Neo‑Confucianism, which was the learning for the government and the yangban classes. Furthermore, in the Yi dynasty, during which Zhu Xi Neo‑Confucianism had been held in high esteem since its foundation,
"sarim" scholars (yangbans out of oMce), proud to have been the orthodox school of Neo‑Confucianism, challenged the privileged yangbans in power ("hun'gu") at the end of the 15th century and were victorious in the 16th century.35) In the 17th century, when the Manchurians, or "northern barbarians," invaded Korea and then ruled over the Chinese mainland, there arose and became established a self‑con‑
sciousness of being the sole people in whom the orthodox Chinese civilization was
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