Management for Nuclear Safety
Risk and Safety Culture
-For PSAM Panel Discussion
April 15, 2013
Akihide Kugo
Profile
• Education
– B.E.（1978, Mechanical Engineering, Tokyo Univ.) – M.A.(2002, International Study, Leeds Univ.)
– Ph.D.(2006, Risk Communication, Kyoto Univ.)
• Research interests
– Risk Communication, Safety Culture, Ethics,
• Professional Careers
– Chief Nuclear Reactor Engineer (Ohi #1,2 Plants) – General Manager, Preparatory Office for JANSI
Definition and Context of Risk
“Using the word “Risk” without identifying its accurate context would leave a sense of ambiguity.”
For example
“Uncertainty” , “Instability”, “Suspicion”
（Negative context）
“Calculated decision-making”, “Decision based on probability”
（Positive context）
The word “Risk” has double faces.
Professor Tatiana Bouzdine-Chameeva
Risk should be shared
Risk Information Risk Management
・Frequency (probability)
・Scale (anticipated damage)
・Safe to avert the risk?
・Management to reduce risk? ・Acceptable if risk is managed? Whom is it the risk for? Why do we try to take the risk?
Risk should be shared
“Confidence" and “Benefit” are prerequisite
Risk Management Risk Information
Personal View on Nuclear Power Technology
based on the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
Poor Risk Management • Poor recognition to external events
• Dilution of hazard awareness, essentially for nuclear energy, due to misunderstanding of mission completed • Luck of risk sharing in area of nuclear safety related
technology
• The philosophy of “defense-in-depth” has not been utilized in the design and the operation.
• If “defense-in-depth” is utilized, serious consequences could be avoided.
Roles of Nuclear Experts
“Experts must have the ability of self reflection, asking themselves whether their actions are consistent with intentions and achievements in light of objectives in various phases to assume responsibility”
“
responsibility
”
of
nuclear experts
“Special risks”
in
nuclear powers
• Potential damage over public health and property, and environment through wide area
• Framing effect leading to psychological damage in society
• Unsettled obligation for the accident liability
• Vague brake-even point for safety
• Big innercia to keep operation to save investment cost
• Cross-border impact
• Incomplete social consensus
• Instability due to external factors
• Self regulation
“Special Risk”
for Nuclear Power Operators?
Had it occurred, a considerable large scale of the everyday life and the social economy would
Dr. Claude Fischler
Research director for the French National Centre for Scientific Research, School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences
“
Science is not necessarily universal truth.
”
“
Culture has a greater influence than science does.
”
My conclusion
・ Establishing safety as culture requires powerful leadership within the organization in nuclear power in accordance with the “special risk” .
・Experts must recognize the “special risk” of nuclear power and question their responsibility with modesty.
