Disorder
著者 PASHA, Mustapha Kamal journal or
publication title
PRIME = プライム
volume 39
page range 33‑44
year 2016‑03‑31
その他のタイトル 帰って来た冷戦? ―ウクライナと新世界無秩序
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10723/2746
以下に掲げる論文「帰って来た冷戦 ? ウクライナと新世界無秩序」は、本研究所の研究員ムスタファ・
カマル・パシャ教授が昨年7月、PRIME 主催研究会「ウクライナと第三次冷戦」でおこなった報告内 容の一部を敷衍したものである。
7月の報告でパシャ教授は、2014年以来のウクライナ騒乱を、近年の西アジアにみられる暴力の蔓延 と結びつけてとらえ、世界秩序の大きな変動という視座から論じた。本論文では、あらためてウクライ ナ情勢に焦点をあて、これを今日の多くの評者がするように「冷戦の復活」という側面からのみ論じる べきではないと強調し、旧社会主義圏の諸国が世界資本主義に組み込まれていく過程で、国家権力がど のような役割を果たしながら生き残ろうとしており、体制としてどのような特徴がそこに見られるのか、
という観点を押し出している。
すなわちパシャ教授によれば、グローバル資本主義が諸国をますます平板化させるなかで、自立性を 保てる領域を守ることが国家権力の役割となっており、その課題を権威主義体制が担うという状況が事 態を複雑にしている。そして、冷戦期の思考枠組みの惰性にとらわれすぎぬよう注意を払いつつ、危機 の進行を理解する上でパシャ教授が重視するのは、国際政治システムが前提とするルールに対する違反 であり、それへの認識のズレである。一方で、拒否権を有する安保理常任理事国の一つが明白な軍事介 入を隣国に対しておこなうということの重大性を、ロシア側が十分に認識しているように思われないと いう点を教授は指摘する。他方で、NATO の東への拡大は、冷戦終結前後のゴルバチョフ外交に対する 西側諸国による裏切りだとロシアが見なしており、ウクライナ危機がロシア側から圧倒的にその文脈で とらえられていることが忘れられがちである。これは、とみに西側の一員であることを強調するように なった日本外交にとっても重要な視点だと思われる。
パシャ教授は現在、ウエールズの名門アベリストウイス大学で教鞭を執っており、2005年度に明治学 院大学国際学部客員教授として来日して以来、本研究所と知的交流を続けてこられた。寄稿に感謝したい。
（高原孝生）
Introduction
The worsening relations between Russia and the West centring on Ukraine have been usually
Cold War Redux?
―Ukraine and the New World Disorder
Mustapha Kamal Pasha
（PRIME Research Fellow）
特集 1：「国家」、「民族」の諸問題と国際秩序の将来
seen by observers as the arrival of a new Cold War. Whilst this easy perception is difficult to resist especially in view of several rhetorical similarities between characterizations of the old and the new era, the resurgence of mistrust and realpolitik in Western capitals and Moscow or the assumed struggle for ‘spheres of influence’, the present constellation reflects more the pathology of a new world disorder than the return of the old with its attendant replay of the Cold War. Recent characterization of Russia demonstrates the ‘inability of commentators to loosen the Cold War’s lingering hold on their thinking’ （Holmes 2012）.
The principal aim of this paper is largely interpretive: to situate the discussion on the ‘New Cold War’ within the wider context of world politics, including attempts by ‘authoritarian capitalism’ to seek relative autonomy as an alternative political formation. Operating within a largely capitalist world order, these attempts are fraught with ambivalences and contradictions, shaping and reshaping the idiom of international relations. Eschewing an account of the evolution of Russo-Ukrainian relations or a neat focus on domestic political developments within either Russia or Ukraine in the post-socialist period, the paper suggests a counterpoint to mainstream analysis. The language of the ‘new cold war’, it is suggested, conceals the crystallization of a globalized capitalist order and the recognizable importance of different political forms within that order, notably the rise and consolidation of an authoritarian variant in the former socialist bloc.
In clear breach of international law, Russia’s annexation of Crimea signals Moscow’s willingness to defend what it recognizes at its vital interests （Grant 2015）. The precursor to the annexation was the seizure by armed men of the building of Crimea’s Supreme Council on February 27, 2014 with no intention of negotiating with the authorities except to allow Crimean MPs to vote on the referendum favouring ‘reunification with Russia’. The referendum was passed without a quorum and no representatives from the media were there to witness the façade. Subsequently, Putin admitted that the men in fatigues belonged to the regular marine soldiers of the Russian Federation.
For both domestic and international reasons, the annexation was given a dubious legal cover, allowing the Russian Federation to annex a large Ukrainian territory by a municipal act of March 21, 2014. The legal cover could not conceal the illegitimacy of the annexation that had followed a snap referendum and a declaration of independence in Crimea. Whilst annexations are not entirely unique, as Watkins （2014） informs, the use of force by a permanent United Nations Security Council member, establishes a precedent that may have far-reaching political implications for the international community. The annexation of Crimea, unlike invasions, presents new challenges to the Westphalian order. Crimea’s incorporation into Russia on the basis of a referendum and a treaty between two sovereign countries has the potential for legitimating scores of secessionist claims with force. Putin’s justification to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea and subsequently in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, has a familiar ring to it. It is not uncommon in history to witness similar alibis.
The Ukraine crisis which ultimately produced the dramatic events in 2014 emanated from the political paralysis following the end of Leonid Kuchma’s tenure in 2004 as president and onset of the
so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ fully backed by Western powers. The installation of a potentially hostile regime in Kiev after a fierce political tussle between rival Ukrainian oligarchs seemed to have forced Putin’s hand. As several notable Western commentators have proposed, the crisis is largely the result of Western assertiveness on Russia’s borderlands, which changed the tacit settlement respecting Russia’s ‘special interests’ on its immediate borders （Mearsheimer 2014）.
Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia is undeniable, underscored in the latter’s shared 2200 km border with Ukraine. As Götz （2015:3） notes, ‘Ukraine is less than 300 miles （480 km） from Moscow and in close proximity to the Volga region, which is the industrial and political heartland of the Russian Federation’. With a population of over slightly over 45 million, Ukraine has abundant natural resources, especially iron ore, which has been the bedrock of its steel industry. Although Ukraine’s GDP per capita is about $4000, （according to World Bank figures）, considerably less than other European Union （EU） countries in the West, it has a formidable agricultural sector. Ukraine lacks oil and gas, but its strategic importance also arises from the fact that it is the gateway for 75% of Russian gas to the EU. Russia’s emotional ties to Ukraine are also deep, stretching back to several centuries, but particularly grew stronger during the two world wars. The presence of a sizeable Russian- speaking population in the East is also a living reminder of historical contiguity and continuity.
The overwhelming sentiment in extant mainstream interpretations of the Ukraine crisis rests on a clear link between the ‘new’ Cold War and the character of the Putin regime, but also Russian ressentiment. In all these instances, however, analysts diverge on the question of whether the Kremlin is to be regarded as yet another corrupt and repressive regime running an inherently anti-Western
‘neo-authoritarian state’ camouflaged by legality, or in Sakwa’s （2011） term, a ‘dual state’ combining
‘a legal-constitutional order and a discretionary-administrative system, held in tension with each other by Putin’s centrism’. Putin can be regarded as a ‘personalized embodiment of the dual state’ （Anderson 2015:15）. Despite Putin’s assurance in the early days of his rule that Russia belonged to the European home, including the surprising announcement that he might join NATO, the domestic character of his regime never placed Russia squarely into the Western set （Remnick 2014）. The insistence that Russia shared an identity with its West European counterparts, was never taken at face value in Western capitals. In the subsequent years of the Putin era, the emphasis on Russia’s cultural affinity with Western civilization has been a regular staple of pronouncements emerging from the Kremlin.
Needless to say, the controversy over what constitutes Western values has been consequential in these declarations. Russia’s charge that the West has basically abandoned the religious （read Orthodox Christian） character of its own civilization and ‘traditional’ values, especially regarding the
（patriarchal） family, summarizes major sources of divergence. Western Cold Warriors like Edward Lucas （2008） offer an unambiguous picture of the Putin regime as a kleptocracy or in Luke Harding’s
（2011） words a ‘mafia state’. Alternatively, the regime merely displays ‘fragments of a defunct state’
（Holmes 2012）. Rather than strength, weakness is its principal feature.
The domestic character of both Russia and Ukraine is obviously important. In Ukraine’s case, the
seen by observers as the arrival of a new Cold War. Whilst this easy perception is difficult to resist especially in view of several rhetorical similarities between characterizations of the old and the new era, the resurgence of mistrust and realpolitik in Western capitals and Moscow or the assumed struggle for ‘spheres of influence’, the present constellation reflects more the pathology of a new world disorder than the return of the old with its attendant replay of the Cold War. Recent characterization of Russia demonstrates the ‘inability of commentators to loosen the Cold War’s lingering hold on their thinking’ （Holmes 2012）.
The principal aim of this paper is largely interpretive: to situate the discussion on the ‘New Cold War’ within the wider context of world politics, including attempts by ‘authoritarian capitalism’ to seek relative autonomy as an alternative political formation. Operating within a largely capitalist world order, these attempts are fraught with ambivalences and contradictions, shaping and reshaping the idiom of international relations. Eschewing an account of the evolution of Russo-Ukrainian relations or a neat focus on domestic political developments within either Russia or Ukraine in the post-socialist period, the paper suggests a counterpoint to mainstream analysis. The language of the ‘new cold war’, it is suggested, conceals the crystallization of a globalized capitalist order and the recognizable importance of different political forms within that order, notably the rise and consolidation of an authoritarian variant in the former socialist bloc.
In clear breach of international law, Russia’s annexation of Crimea signals Moscow’s willingness to defend what it recognizes at its vital interests （Grant 2015）. The precursor to the annexation was the seizure by armed men of the building of Crimea’s Supreme Council on February 27, 2014 with no intention of negotiating with the authorities except to allow Crimean MPs to vote on the referendum favouring ‘reunification with Russia’. The referendum was passed without a quorum and no representatives from the media were there to witness the façade. Subsequently, Putin admitted that the men in fatigues belonged to the regular marine soldiers of the Russian Federation.
For both domestic and international reasons, the annexation was given a dubious legal cover, allowing the Russian Federation to annex a large Ukrainian territory by a municipal act of March 21, 2014. The legal cover could not conceal the illegitimacy of the annexation that had followed a snap referendum and a declaration of independence in Crimea. Whilst annexations are not entirely unique, as Watkins （2014） informs, the use of force by a permanent United Nations Security Council member, establishes a precedent that may have far-reaching political implications for the international community. The annexation of Crimea, unlike invasions, presents new challenges to the Westphalian order. Crimea’s incorporation into Russia on the basis of a referendum and a treaty between two sovereign countries has the potential for legitimating scores of secessionist claims with force. Putin’s justification to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea and subsequently in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, has a familiar ring to it. It is not uncommon in history to witness similar alibis.
The Ukraine crisis which ultimately produced the dramatic events in 2014 emanated from the political paralysis following the end of Leonid Kuchma’s tenure in 2004 as president and onset of the
so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ fully backed by Western powers. The installation of a potentially hostile regime in Kiev after a fierce political tussle between rival Ukrainian oligarchs seemed to have forced Putin’s hand. As several notable Western commentators have proposed, the crisis is largely the result of Western assertiveness on Russia’s borderlands, which changed the tacit settlement respecting Russia’s ‘special interests’ on its immediate borders （Mearsheimer 2014）.
Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia is undeniable, underscored in the latter’s shared 2200 km border with Ukraine. As Götz （2015:3） notes, ‘Ukraine is less than 300 miles （480 km） from Moscow and in close proximity to the Volga region, which is the industrial and political heartland of the Russian Federation’. With a population of over slightly over 45 million, Ukraine has abundant natural resources, especially iron ore, which has been the bedrock of its steel industry. Although Ukraine’s GDP per capita is about $4000, （according to World Bank figures）, considerably less than other European Union （EU） countries in the West, it has a formidable agricultural sector. Ukraine lacks oil and gas, but its strategic importance also arises from the fact that it is the gateway for 75% of Russian gas to the EU. Russia’s emotional ties to Ukraine are also deep, stretching back to several centuries, but particularly grew stronger during the two world wars. The presence of a sizeable Russian- speaking population in the East is also a living reminder of historical contiguity and continuity.
The overwhelming sentiment in extant mainstream interpretations of the Ukraine crisis rests on a clear link between the ‘new’ Cold War and the character of the Putin regime, but also Russian ressentiment. In all these instances, however, analysts diverge on the question of whether the Kremlin is to be regarded as yet another corrupt and repressive regime running an inherently anti-Western
‘neo-authoritarian state’ camouflaged by legality, or in Sakwa’s （2011） term, a ‘dual state’ combining
‘a legal-constitutional order and a discretionary-administrative system, held in tension with each other by Putin’s centrism’. Putin can be regarded as a ‘personalized embodiment of the dual state’ （Anderson 2015:15）. Despite Putin’s assurance in the early days of his rule that Russia belonged to the European home, including the surprising announcement that he might join NATO, the domestic character of his regime never placed Russia squarely into the Western set （Remnick 2014）. The insistence that Russia shared an identity with its West European counterparts, was never taken at face value in Western capitals. In the subsequent years of the Putin era, the emphasis on Russia’s cultural affinity with Western civilization has been a regular staple of pronouncements emerging from the Kremlin.
Needless to say, the controversy over what constitutes Western values has been consequential in these declarations. Russia’s charge that the West has basically abandoned the religious （read Orthodox Christian） character of its own civilization and ‘traditional’ values, especially regarding the
（patriarchal） family, summarizes major sources of divergence. Western Cold Warriors like Edward Lucas （2008） offer an unambiguous picture of the Putin regime as a kleptocracy or in Luke Harding’s
（2011） words a ‘mafia state’. Alternatively, the regime merely displays ‘fragments of a defunct state’
（Holmes 2012）. Rather than strength, weakness is its principal feature.
The domestic character of both Russia and Ukraine is obviously important. In Ukraine’s case, the
actions of rival oligarchs to monopolize economic and political power, even at the expense of inviting big power rivalry at the country’s doors, is crucial. In turn, Russia’s post-Soviet bureaucratic order, fluctuating between neopatrimonialism and prebendalism （allowing state officials to enjoy a share of the country’s revenues）, has allowed not only the institutionalization of corruption, but made corruption the ethos of the state. The haemorrhaging of the state treasury with illicit transfer of Russia’s wealth into foreign bank accounts is only a small part of the big picture. Intra-factional bureaucratic squabbles, the absence of the rule of law, a dysfunctional legal framework, and declining belief in a commonweal uniting the country, has solidified those political forces in Russia with the most predatory instincts. As a consequence, Russia has witnessed an unprecedented and growing gap between the haves and the have-nots, in a country that only a quarter century ago was the leader of the socialist world.
Another set of explanations links the sour relations between Russia and Ukraine to ‘national’
differences. The basis of the nation, it is argued, lies in language. This simple line of argument, however, fails to recognize the virtual inseparability of Russians and Ukrainians, not merely linguistically, but in other domains of social and political existence. Ukraine has remained a pluralistic society since its independence in 1991. Not only did Ukraine grant citizenship to all ‘permanent residents’, it did not shun its status as a dual-language state in which both Ukrainian and Russian have been accorded co-existence. Despite the official status granted to Ukrainian, Russian has been the hegemonic language in all walks of life, including business, politics, the media and communications.
Ukraine’s pluralistic character was a key factor in preventing inter-ethnic conflict in the post- Soviet era. Since the lines between Ukrainian and Russians were blurred, it was difficult to create political divisions based merely on ethnicity. A major effect of deteriorating relations between Russia and Ukraine has been the sharpening of inter-ethnic divisions within Ukraine. Contrary to tired explanations by Western Cold Warriors that rely on stereotypical views of fixed Russian and Ukrainian identity, the sources of conflict principally lie less in ethnicity than in the uncertain international climate produced by Western encroachments into the territories of the former socialist bloc and Russia’s nearly paranoid response to those encroachments. As later discussion will show, these explanations are also partial; the sources run deeper.
To be certain, in extant readings of the Putin Regime, Western ill-will towards Russia disguises larger questions about the transformed and transforming nature of the world order in which ideological commitments appear not as significant as the unmaking of the post-Westphalian world, not only in parts of Eastern and Central Europe, but in the Middle East and Africa. China’s assertion of its prowess in East Asia, for example, fits into this broader pattern in which elastic notions of territoriality and security linked to nationalist passion have enormous potential to reshape international politics. On this view, the Crimean crisis merely reflects a more blatant attempt by Russia to recalibrate territoriality in the face of real and perceived threats from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） and the EU. In this context, the expansion of the EU and NATO are
inextricably tied to the ‘standard Western package’ （Sakwa 2011） stressing the rule of law, procedural democracy, and the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. The unrelenting drive to incorporate the former socialist countries linked to their commitment to the ‘standard package’ has been accompanied by an acquiescence to Western norms of international conduct. Inevitably, adherence to these norms would mean an erosion of effective economic sovereignty under the aegis of West-dominated supranational organizations. The question of sovereignty is inextricably tied to the political form of the former socialist countries within the capitalist order.
Russia’s response to Western advances has been mixed. Whilst it has no illusions to cultivate a socialist alternative to neoliberal global capitalism, it has striven to create a zone of relative autonomy within that system. The latter is reflected in Putin’s ‘Millennium Message on the eve of his presidency
（29 December 2012） underlining the pivotal role of the Russian state ‘and its institutions and structures’ that historically ‘always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and the people’. Putin insisted that ‘for Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to fight against.
Quite the contrary, it is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any change’ （cited in Anderson [1990:12-13]）. The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ captures the essence of Putin’s unwillingness to compromise on the question of sovereignty, yet observing nominal commitment to the principle of ‘democracy’ in order for Russia to be seen as an integral member of the Western club. The euphemistic character of ‘sovereign democracy’ hides the nature of the
（alternative） political form that has emerged and continues to evolve in the ex-communist countries.
In practice, ‘sovereign democracy’ has only produced multiple layers of corruption, preventing either productive use of massive profits from the energy sector or opening up of the political system to dissenting voices （Sakwa 2011; Remnick 2014; Holmes 2012）. The oligarchs have been reluctant to utilize capital to build the domestic economy. Their principal obsession has been to buy high-class real estate or to acquire financial assets overseas. With declining energy prices, the system has been plagued by economic and political problems. Putin’s response to these developments have been to unleash the nationalist genie. The annexation of Crimea is directly linked to both the distortions of
‘sovereign democracy’ in an increasingly hostile environment. But these steps underscore the fragility of ‘national’ sovereignty in the face of an apparently unstoppable march of a West-dominated capitalist order demanding compliance, not resistance.
Until the annexation of Crimea, Russia clearly demonstrated its willingness to comply with the wishes of the Western powers, notably the United States. On a variety of issues, including sale of S- 300 missiles to Iran, or more generally in its support for US-led economic sanctions against Tehran, Russia sided with the West. A stark example of Russian cooperation was its supply of a transport platform on Russian soil for NATO military strikes in Afghanistan （Anderson 2015: 18）. In other instances, including the bombing of Libya, Russia stood shoulder to shoulder with the West. However, Russia’s compliance has had its limits, especially with regard to its ‘Near Abroad’, lands in the Trans- Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine that were once not only a part of the Soviet Union but of the Tsarist
actions of rival oligarchs to monopolize economic and political power, even at the expense of inviting big power rivalry at the country’s doors, is crucial. In turn, Russia’s post-Soviet bureaucratic order, fluctuating between neopatrimonialism and prebendalism （allowing state officials to enjoy a share of the country’s revenues）, has allowed not only the institutionalization of corruption, but made corruption the ethos of the state. The haemorrhaging of the state treasury with illicit transfer of Russia’s wealth into foreign bank accounts is only a small part of the big picture. Intra-factional bureaucratic squabbles, the absence of the rule of law, a dysfunctional legal framework, and declining belief in a commonweal uniting the country, has solidified those political forces in Russia with the most predatory instincts. As a consequence, Russia has witnessed an unprecedented and growing gap between the haves and the have-nots, in a country that only a quarter century ago was the leader of the socialist world.
Another set of explanations links the sour relations between Russia and Ukraine to ‘national’
differences. The basis of the nation, it is argued, lies in language. This simple line of argument, however, fails to recognize the virtual inseparability of Russians and Ukrainians, not merely linguistically, but in other domains of social and political existence. Ukraine has remained a pluralistic society since its independence in 1991. Not only did Ukraine grant citizenship to all ‘permanent residents’, it did not shun its status as a dual-language state in which both Ukrainian and Russian have been accorded co-existence. Despite the official status granted to Ukrainian, Russian has been the hegemonic language in all walks of life, including business, politics, the media and communications.
Ukraine’s pluralistic character was a key factor in preventing inter-ethnic conflict in the post- Soviet era. Since the lines between Ukrainian and Russians were blurred, it was difficult to create political divisions based merely on ethnicity. A major effect of deteriorating relations between Russia and Ukraine has been the sharpening of inter-ethnic divisions within Ukraine. Contrary to tired explanations by Western Cold Warriors that rely on stereotypical views of fixed Russian and Ukrainian identity, the sources of conflict principally lie less in ethnicity than in the uncertain international climate produced by Western encroachments into the territories of the former socialist bloc and Russia’s nearly paranoid response to those encroachments. As later discussion will show, these explanations are also partial; the sources run deeper.
To be certain, in extant readings of the Putin Regime, Western ill-will towards Russia disguises larger questions about the transformed and transforming nature of the world order in which ideological commitments appear not as significant as the unmaking of the post-Westphalian world, not only in parts of Eastern and Central Europe, but in the Middle East and Africa. China’s assertion of its prowess in East Asia, for example, fits into this broader pattern in which elastic notions of territoriality and security linked to nationalist passion have enormous potential to reshape international politics. On this view, the Crimean crisis merely reflects a more blatant attempt by Russia to recalibrate territoriality in the face of real and perceived threats from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） and the EU. In this context, the expansion of the EU and NATO are
inextricably tied to the ‘standard Western package’ （Sakwa 2011） stressing the rule of law, procedural democracy, and the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. The unrelenting drive to incorporate the former socialist countries linked to their commitment to the ‘standard package’ has been accompanied by an acquiescence to Western norms of international conduct. Inevitably, adherence to these norms would mean an erosion of effective economic sovereignty under the aegis of West-dominated supranational organizations. The question of sovereignty is inextricably tied to the political form of the former socialist countries within the capitalist order.
Russia’s response to Western advances has been mixed. Whilst it has no illusions to cultivate a socialist alternative to neoliberal global capitalism, it has striven to create a zone of relative autonomy within that system. The latter is reflected in Putin’s ‘Millennium Message on the eve of his presidency
（29 December 2012） underlining the pivotal role of the Russian state ‘and its institutions and structures’ that historically ‘always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and the people’. Putin insisted that ‘for Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to fight against.
Quite the contrary, it is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any change’ （cited in Anderson [1990:12-13]）. The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ captures the essence of Putin’s unwillingness to compromise on the question of sovereignty, yet observing nominal commitment to the principle of ‘democracy’ in order for Russia to be seen as an integral member of the Western club. The euphemistic character of ‘sovereign democracy’ hides the nature of the
（alternative） political form that has emerged and continues to evolve in the ex-communist countries.
In practice, ‘sovereign democracy’ has only produced multiple layers of corruption, preventing either productive use of massive profits from the energy sector or opening up of the political system to dissenting voices （Sakwa 2011; Remnick 2014; Holmes 2012）. The oligarchs have been reluctant to utilize capital to build the domestic economy. Their principal obsession has been to buy high-class real estate or to acquire financial assets overseas. With declining energy prices, the system has been plagued by economic and political problems. Putin’s response to these developments have been to unleash the nationalist genie. The annexation of Crimea is directly linked to both the distortions of
‘sovereign democracy’ in an increasingly hostile environment. But these steps underscore the fragility of ‘national’ sovereignty in the face of an apparently unstoppable march of a West-dominated capitalist order demanding compliance, not resistance.
Until the annexation of Crimea, Russia clearly demonstrated its willingness to comply with the wishes of the Western powers, notably the United States. On a variety of issues, including sale of S- 300 missiles to Iran, or more generally in its support for US-led economic sanctions against Tehran, Russia sided with the West. A stark example of Russian cooperation was its supply of a transport platform on Russian soil for NATO military strikes in Afghanistan （Anderson 2015: 18）. In other instances, including the bombing of Libya, Russia stood shoulder to shoulder with the West. However, Russia’s compliance has had its limits, especially with regard to its ‘Near Abroad’, lands in the Trans- Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine that were once not only a part of the Soviet Union but of the Tsarist
imperium. Containment by NATO has been a genuine Russian worry since any encroachments into the ‘Near Abroad’ presents a security threat to the country itself. （Mearsheimer 2014）. In this connection, the salience of Ukraine to Russia cannot be overstated. Ukraine has been interwoven into the fabric of Russian history. More specifically, Crimea has been more than just a territorial part of Russia; the collective cultural memory produced in war and great modern Russian literature is inseparable from Crimea.
Cold War Redux?
To what extent is the Ukraine crisis a confirmation of the return of the Cold War? The Cold War was marked by an ideological conflict seeking to design and realize two rival worlds. It was also driven by rivalry between two military-political blocs, expenditure of insurmountable material and symbolic energy to defeat the enemy on a world scale, with the Third World serving as a perpetual battlefield for hot wars. Elements of the Ukraine crisis mirror the hostility and suspicion on both the Russian and Western side. It is, however, prudent not to stretch the analogy between the pre- 1989 world and the one that is materializing in the opening decades of the 21st Century. The absence of a bipolar world, the reassertion of unrivalled US hegemony, the disappearance of the Soviet Union alongside the demise of the socialist alternative to neoliberal capitalism presents a totally new configuration in global affairs. The naive label of ‘the new Cold War’ is both misplaced and misleading.
Fred Halliday has offered four broad explanations of the nature of the Cold War: （1） conventional
‘realist’ and strategic thinking in which East-West rivalry has been seen ‘but another version of traditional great power conflict’; （2） analysis that has located the Cold War ‘at the level of policy mistakes, missed opportunities and misperceptions on both sides’; （3） explanations that have ‘stressed the extent to which political factors within the USA and USSR, and the uncontrolled dynamic of the arms race itself, caused this more recent [in the late 1970s] confrontation to mature’; and （4） the inter- systemic character of the East-West relations marked by rivalry ‘of two different social, economic and political systems’ （Halliday 1990:7）. According to Halliday, ‘each hoped to prevail on a world scale, to produce a homogenous order within states, and each denied the legitimacy of the other, even as they were compelled to enter into diplomatic and other relations, not least because of the threat of nuclear weapons’ （1990:6-7）. Whilst the rivalry between the two superpowers spared Europe from becoming a military theatre, this was not the case with other regions of the world. During the Cold War period, scores of military conflicts were a regular feature of international relations. Conditioned by varied
‘anti-colonial, inter-state, class and ethnic’ factors, these conflicts raged principally in the Third World with massive human and material loss. Fought in virtually all zones of the Third World （especially Indo-China, the Middle East and Cuba） the Cold War again heated up in the 1980s in several regional theatres, including Afghanistan and Central America. As Halliday （1990:6） notes, ‘the casualty figures speak for themselves. Over twenty million people are believed to have died in these conflicts’.
It is difficult to find ideological parallels between the ‘old’ Cold War and the new. There are no exclamations of burying the other side. Although geopolitics （Götz 2015） cannot be conveniently shelved both at the level of proxy wars and clandestine support for rival factions within Ukraine, there are no tall Russian claims of building socialism in one country or many. Socialist ‘solidarity’ has been replaced by appeals to ethnicity and national kinship. Conversely, Russia’s integration into the capitalist world order is an indisputable fact, both explaining the windfall fortune of the oligarchs as well as revealing Russia’s vulnerability to the international energy markets. The West triumphalist posture following the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union does not match the growing fissures within the EU. The practical necessity of cooperation with Russia over Syria and terrorism may constrain ambitions to unsettle Western strategy in Ukraine, but the strategic aim of weakening its adversary is unlikely to fade.
Ressentiment and Authoritarian Capitalism
Excessive focus on military and political aspects of the Ukraine crisis has prevented adequate analysis of historically driven ressentiment in the aftermath of the fall of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union. These transformative events are not some distant memory for those wielding power in Moscow. Ressentiment is also fuelled by overly zealous Western countries to wean the former republics away from Moscow, evidenced by the expansion of both the EU and NATO.
Crucially important here is the breach of trust following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite verbal EU and NATO promises to honour Russian sovereignty and but also tacitly recognize its legitimate interests in the former Soviet republics, the speed and scale of expansion could only evoke anxiety, but especially ressentiment. As mentioned, the West’s unwillingness to recognize emotional and psychic ties between Russia and Ukraine may have forced Moscow’s hand.
A close scrutiny of Putin’s 18 March speech offers a solid summation of the reasons for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In an unabashed attack of Western policy, Putin saw the annexation as a defensive move. The contours of the crisis, however, also lie in competing perceptions. As Shelest
（2015） notes, ‘the paradox that exists here is that the West still prefers viewing the crisis as a purely Russian-Ukrainian conflict, while Russia sees it as Russian-West one’. From the Russian perspective, the West was again waging a Cold War against a shrinking Russian sphere of influence.
The inducement to bestow membership to 10 former communist Central East European countries via a democracy promotion strategy by the EU was not viewed favourably by Russia. Although membership to Ukraine was not on offer, EUs eastern neighbourhood policy （ENP） and the Eastern Partnership （EaP） were clearly aggressive steps. Similarly, NATO’s expansion presented Putin with a direct threat, especially against the backdrop of its military and strategic interests in the Black Sea.
Anderson’s summation of the Ukraine crisis appears convincing:
In Ukraine, a weak and divided state covering a large expanse of territory offered a classic
imperium. Containment by NATO has been a genuine Russian worry since any encroachments into the ‘Near Abroad’ presents a security threat to the country itself. （Mearsheimer 2014）. In this connection, the salience of Ukraine to Russia cannot be overstated. Ukraine has been interwoven into the fabric of Russian history. More specifically, Crimea has been more than just a territorial part of Russia; the collective cultural memory produced in war and great modern Russian literature is inseparable from Crimea.
Cold War Redux?
To what extent is the Ukraine crisis a confirmation of the return of the Cold War? The Cold War was marked by an ideological conflict seeking to design and realize two rival worlds. It was also driven by rivalry between two military-political blocs, expenditure of insurmountable material and symbolic energy to defeat the enemy on a world scale, with the Third World serving as a perpetual battlefield for hot wars. Elements of the Ukraine crisis mirror the hostility and suspicion on both the Russian and Western side. It is, however, prudent not to stretch the analogy between the pre- 1989 world and the one that is materializing in the opening decades of the 21st Century. The absence of a bipolar world, the reassertion of unrivalled US hegemony, the disappearance of the Soviet Union alongside the demise of the socialist alternative to neoliberal capitalism presents a totally new configuration in global affairs. The naive label of ‘the new Cold War’ is both misplaced and misleading.
Fred Halliday has offered four broad explanations of the nature of the Cold War: （1） conventional
‘realist’ and strategic thinking in which East-West rivalry has been seen ‘but another version of traditional great power conflict’; （2） analysis that has located the Cold War ‘at the level of policy mistakes, missed opportunities and misperceptions on both sides’; （3） explanations that have ‘stressed the extent to which political factors within the USA and USSR, and the uncontrolled dynamic of the arms race itself, caused this more recent [in the late 1970s] confrontation to mature’; and （4） the inter- systemic character of the East-West relations marked by rivalry ‘of two different social, economic and political systems’ （Halliday 1990:7）. According to Halliday, ‘each hoped to prevail on a world scale, to produce a homogenous order within states, and each denied the legitimacy of the other, even as they were compelled to enter into diplomatic and other relations, not least because of the threat of nuclear weapons’ （1990:6-7）. Whilst the rivalry between the two superpowers spared Europe from becoming a military theatre, this was not the case with other regions of the world. During the Cold War period, scores of military conflicts were a regular feature of international relations. Conditioned by varied
‘anti-colonial, inter-state, class and ethnic’ factors, these conflicts raged principally in the Third World with massive human and material loss. Fought in virtually all zones of the Third World （especially Indo-China, the Middle East and Cuba） the Cold War again heated up in the 1980s in several regional theatres, including Afghanistan and Central America. As Halliday （1990:6） notes, ‘the casualty figures speak for themselves. Over twenty million people are believed to have died in these conflicts’.
It is difficult to find ideological parallels between the ‘old’ Cold War and the new. There are no exclamations of burying the other side. Although geopolitics （Götz 2015） cannot be conveniently shelved both at the level of proxy wars and clandestine support for rival factions within Ukraine, there are no tall Russian claims of building socialism in one country or many. Socialist ‘solidarity’ has been replaced by appeals to ethnicity and national kinship. Conversely, Russia’s integration into the capitalist world order is an indisputable fact, both explaining the windfall fortune of the oligarchs as well as revealing Russia’s vulnerability to the international energy markets. The West triumphalist posture following the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union does not match the growing fissures within the EU. The practical necessity of cooperation with Russia over Syria and terrorism may constrain ambitions to unsettle Western strategy in Ukraine, but the strategic aim of weakening its adversary is unlikely to fade.
Ressentiment and Authoritarian Capitalism
Excessive focus on military and political aspects of the Ukraine crisis has prevented adequate analysis of historically driven ressentiment in the aftermath of the fall of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union. These transformative events are not some distant memory for those wielding power in Moscow. Ressentiment is also fuelled by overly zealous Western countries to wean the former republics away from Moscow, evidenced by the expansion of both the EU and NATO.
Crucially important here is the breach of trust following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite verbal EU and NATO promises to honour Russian sovereignty and but also tacitly recognize its legitimate interests in the former Soviet republics, the speed and scale of expansion could only evoke anxiety, but especially ressentiment. As mentioned, the West’s unwillingness to recognize emotional and psychic ties between Russia and Ukraine may have forced Moscow’s hand.
A close scrutiny of Putin’s 18 March speech offers a solid summation of the reasons for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In an unabashed attack of Western policy, Putin saw the annexation as a defensive move. The contours of the crisis, however, also lie in competing perceptions. As Shelest
（2015） notes, ‘the paradox that exists here is that the West still prefers viewing the crisis as a purely Russian-Ukrainian conflict, while Russia sees it as Russian-West one’. From the Russian perspective, the West was again waging a Cold War against a shrinking Russian sphere of influence.
The inducement to bestow membership to 10 former communist Central East European countries via a democracy promotion strategy by the EU was not viewed favourably by Russia. Although membership to Ukraine was not on offer, EUs eastern neighbourhood policy （ENP） and the Eastern Partnership （EaP） were clearly aggressive steps. Similarly, NATO’s expansion presented Putin with a direct threat, especially against the backdrop of its military and strategic interests in the Black Sea.
Anderson’s summation of the Ukraine crisis appears convincing:
In Ukraine, a weak and divided state covering a large expanse of territory offered a classic
example of a power vacuum, where contending outside forces of superior strength are drawn into a struggle for mastery. For Russia, Ukraine mattered much more, for both historical and strategic reasons. It was less significant for the West. The expansion of the EU and NATO to incorporate Ukraine, extending the post-Cold War encirclement of Russia to the south, was bound to provoke a defensive reflex in Moscow （2015: 26-27）.
Moving beyond the horizon afforded by geopolitical considerations, however, the emotional dimension in international relations has received greater attention in recent years （Korostelina 2014）.
Imagined or real, this dimension can be garnered in Putin’s account of what Russia regards as the core of the West’s designs:
Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun ... They act as they please:
here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle
“if you are not with us, you are against us”. To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall. This happened in Yugoslavia ... And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.
Clearly, the theme of ressentiment is not too hard to detect in the above statement. Implicit in Putin’s speech was an attack on Western duplicity over Crimea. Both the EU and NATO expanded despite clear assurances to Gorbachev to the contrary. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO, following earlier membership to the club in 1999 to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Yet, the deeper sources of conflict cannot be reduced to ressentiment. As Russia’s invocation of ‘sovereign democracy’ shows, the resistance on the part of some former socialist countries （notably China and Russia） to an increasingly homogenizing global capitalist order is reflected in the imperatives of the political form that has emerged and is now being consolidated in those countries. From a strictly nationalist perspective, the contours of that political form can be made to look desirable to a population reduced to imagining the good life to consumption, not active political deliberation. There are no obvious guarantees that the Faustian pact with material enrichment alone can nourish a stable social and political order, but for those exercising power it is better than the brutality of neoliberal capitalism.
To contextualize, the end of communism made it virtually impossible for the former socialist countries to mount a viable or sustainable alternative to capitalism. The pathway to a post-communist society, however, was not uniform. Domestic political compulsions ultimately dictated the ‘variety of capitalism’ embraced by each formerly socialist country. As a notable Hungarian scholar explains:
In the first decade of the transition to market capitalism, [however], the former communist countries followed different courses. During this early stage of transition, we may distinguish
three distinct post-communist orders. The first is ‘capitalism from the outside’, the experience of Central Europe, which might also be described as the liberal or neo-liberal model. The second,
‘capitalism from above’, is to be found in Eastern Europe, Russia and the former Central Asian soviet republics. The third is the Chinese ‘capitalism from below’, which flourished from 1978 until the mid-1980s, the closest to the classical type of original accumulation of capital （2015: 39）.
For Szelényi, since Putin’s ascent to power, the Russian model of authoritarian capitalism has emerged as the prototype for other ex-socialist countries, including China. The emphasis on a strong state dictating the market appears to be the order of things. In the Russian case, however, even the pretense of building socialism with indigenous characteristics （as in China） has been repudiated.
The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ is Putin’s answer to engagement with the capitalist order. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent collapse in energy prices globally, it is obvious that sovereignty is difficult to realize. As Anderson notes, Putin’s conviction of building Russian capitalism without exposing his country to the vagaries of global political economy was an illusion （2015: 27）.
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of the collapse of the socialist alternative and the emergence and consolidation of global capitalism, Putin has tried to build a Russian version of the political form to simultaneously engage and resist the structural compulsions of capitalism. The crystallization of ‘authoritarian capitalism’ in the former communist bloc may be regarded as one of the more salient features of the global （dis）order, not only in Russia but also in China and other countries with a socialist past.
The new configuration underscores the pangs of a new world disorder, not in the neo-medieval sense nor the arrival of a purely anarchic world, but the concatenation of two contradictory processes:
the forced incorporation of the former socialist world into the capitalist vortex presided over by the US and its Western allies and the unequal playing field for this process of incorporation.
The Ukraine crisis is a part of a wider context in which old rules are experiencing mutation in the wake of globalizing processes but new rules have not fully evolved. Three aspects are particularly salient here: the emergence of alternative political model of capitalist organization; the exhaustion of the liberal-democratic model, especially its incapacity to attend to uneven and unequal development within Western countries; and the uncertain location of regions formerly part of imperial configurations.
It is important to stress that the authoritarian capitalist model is not new but has clear antecedents in the East Asian miracle economies, notably Singapore. Stressing a disconnect between capitalism and democracy, the aspiration to engineer rapid economic growth under the aegis of a strong state remained an essential ingredient of Lee Kuan Yew’s thinking, now embraced by Beijing. Russia under Putin also tends to emulate aspects of this model, but with more dependence on the extractive industries. The latter also limits Russia’s options, unlike China. The weakening of the world order is
example of a power vacuum, where contending outside forces of superior strength are drawn into a struggle for mastery. For Russia, Ukraine mattered much more, for both historical and strategic reasons. It was less significant for the West. The expansion of the EU and NATO to incorporate Ukraine, extending the post-Cold War encirclement of Russia to the south, was bound to provoke a defensive reflex in Moscow （2015: 26-27）.
Moving beyond the horizon afforded by geopolitical considerations, however, the emotional dimension in international relations has received greater attention in recent years （Korostelina 2014）.
Imagined or real, this dimension can be garnered in Putin’s account of what Russia regards as the core of the West’s designs:
Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun ... They act as they please:
here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle
“if you are not with us, you are against us”. To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall. This happened in Yugoslavia ... And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.
Clearly, the theme of ressentiment is not too hard to detect in the above statement. Implicit in Putin’s speech was an attack on Western duplicity over Crimea. Both the EU and NATO expanded despite clear assurances to Gorbachev to the contrary. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO, following earlier membership to the club in 1999 to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Yet, the deeper sources of conflict cannot be reduced to ressentiment. As Russia’s invocation of ‘sovereign democracy’ shows, the resistance on the part of some former socialist countries （notably China and Russia） to an increasingly homogenizing global capitalist order is reflected in the imperatives of the political form that has emerged and is now being consolidated in those countries. From a strictly nationalist perspective, the contours of that political form can be made to look desirable to a population reduced to imagining the good life to consumption, not active political deliberation. There are no obvious guarantees that the Faustian pact with material enrichment alone can nourish a stable social and political order, but for those exercising power it is better than the brutality of neoliberal capitalism.
To contextualize, the end of communism made it virtually impossible for the former socialist countries to mount a viable or sustainable alternative to capitalism. The pathway to a post-communist society, however, was not uniform. Domestic political compulsions ultimately dictated the ‘variety of capitalism’ embraced by each formerly socialist country. As a notable Hungarian scholar explains:
In the first decade of the transition to market capitalism, [however], the former communist countries followed different courses. During this early stage of transition, we may distinguish
three distinct post-communist orders. The first is ‘capitalism from the outside’, the experience of Central Europe, which might also be described as the liberal or neo-liberal model. The second,
‘capitalism from above’, is to be found in Eastern Europe, Russia and the former Central Asian soviet republics. The third is the Chinese ‘capitalism from below’, which flourished from 1978 until the mid-1980s, the closest to the classical type of original accumulation of capital （2015: 39）.
For Szelényi, since Putin’s ascent to power, the Russian model of authoritarian capitalism has emerged as the prototype for other ex-socialist countries, including China. The emphasis on a strong state dictating the market appears to be the order of things. In the Russian case, however, even the pretense of building socialism with indigenous characteristics （as in China） has been repudiated.
The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ is Putin’s answer to engagement with the capitalist order. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent collapse in energy prices globally, it is obvious that sovereignty is difficult to realize. As Anderson notes, Putin’s conviction of building Russian capitalism without exposing his country to the vagaries of global political economy was an illusion （2015: 27）.
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of the collapse of the socialist alternative and the emergence and consolidation of global capitalism, Putin has tried to build a Russian version of the political form to simultaneously engage and resist the structural compulsions of capitalism. The crystallization of ‘authoritarian capitalism’ in the former communist bloc may be regarded as one of the more salient features of the global （dis）order, not only in Russia but also in China and other countries with a socialist past.
The new configuration underscores the pangs of a new world disorder, not in the neo-medieval sense nor the arrival of a purely anarchic world, but the concatenation of two contradictory processes:
the forced incorporation of the former socialist world into the capitalist vortex presided over by the US and its Western allies and the unequal playing field for this process of incorporation.
The Ukraine crisis is a part of a wider context in which old rules are experiencing mutation in the wake of globalizing processes but new rules have not fully evolved. Three aspects are particularly salient here: the emergence of alternative political model of capitalist organization; the exhaustion of the liberal-democratic model, especially its incapacity to attend to uneven and unequal development within Western countries; and the uncertain location of regions formerly part of imperial configurations.
It is important to stress that the authoritarian capitalist model is not new but has clear antecedents in the East Asian miracle economies, notably Singapore. Stressing a disconnect between capitalism and democracy, the aspiration to engineer rapid economic growth under the aegis of a strong state remained an essential ingredient of Lee Kuan Yew’s thinking, now embraced by Beijing. Russia under Putin also tends to emulate aspects of this model, but with more dependence on the extractive industries. The latter also limits Russia’s options, unlike China. The weakening of the world order is
not removed from the twin crisis of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the West and the virtual disappearance of robust opposition to neoliberal tendencies, especially with the near-collapse of Keynesianism. Finally, the promise of joining the Western alliance has been enfeebled by factors internal to the former Soviet republics, mainly corruption and political mismanagement but also the inability of the West to integrate those republics economically except through aid packages.
The Ukraine crisis and emergent forms of conflicts in other geographical zones reflect the palpable absence of any assumed elective affinity between capitalism and （Western-style） democracy.
Capitalism is quite compatible with alternative political dispensations. Globalized capitalism, in particular, is well-matched with more undemocratic political forms. In the so-called democratic world itself, capitalism increasingly assumes less transparent and more unaccountable features, effectively impervious to public opinion, and especially unresponsive to calls for producing more equitable societies. Doubtless, authoritarian capitalism appears less legitimate in the eyes of the ‘international community’ which is principally defined within a Western normative framework. At the domestic level, as noted, this model is inherently unstable. To the degree that its fortunes rely mainly on a regime’s capacities to placate the populace economically （and more narrowly in the realm of consumption）, the rhythms of the global capitalist system ultimately can dictate the stability of the political order. As recent events have shown, there is no insurance that provides cover against uncertainty, neither to those that govern the system nor to those who wish to build protective ‘national’
shells against forces that know no boundaries.
References
（ 1 ）Alexandrova-Arbatova, Nadia （2015） Security relations in the Black Sea region: Russia and the West after the Ukrainian crisis, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15:2, 129-139, DOI:
10.1080/14683857.2015.1060015.
（ 2 ）Anderson, Perry （2015） Incommensurate Russia. New Left Review 94, July-August, pp. 5-43.
（ 3 ）Brubaker, Roger and Frederick Cooper （2000） “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29, no. 1
（February 2000）: 1-47.
（ 4 ）Engelbrekt, Kjell and Bertil Nygren, eds. （2010） Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.
（ 5 ）Gerasimov, Ilya and Marina Mogilner （2015） Deconstructing Integration: Ukraine's Postcolonial Subjectivity, Slavic Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 （Winter）, pp. 715-722.
（ 6 ）Gleason, Philip （1983） Identifying Identity: A Semantic History, Journal of American History 69, no. 4 （March）: 910-31.
（ 7 ）Götz, Elias （2015） It's geopolitics, stupid: explaining Russia's Ukraine policy, Global Affairs, 1:1, 3-10, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2015.960184.
（ 8 ）Grant, Thomas D （2015） Annexation of Crimea, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 109, No. 1 （January）, pp. 68-95.
（ 9 ）Halliday, Fred （1990） The End of Cold War, New Left Review 180 （March-April）: 5-23.
（10）Harding, Luke （2011） Mafia State: How One Reporter Became an Enemy of the Brutal New Russia. Guardian.
（11）Holmes, Stephen （2012） Fragments of a Defunct State. London Review of Books, 5 January.
（12）Ignatieff, Michael （2015） The New World Disorder. The New York Review of Books, September 25.
（13）http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/sp/25/new-world-disorder/?pagination=false&printpage
=true
（14）Korostelina, Karina V. （2014） Political Insults: How Offences Escalate Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
（15）Kropatcheva, Elena （2015） The Evolution of Russia's OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23:1, 6-24, DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2014.1001823.
（16）Lucas, Edward （2008） The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West. London: Bloomsbury.
（17）Mearsheimer, John J. （2014） Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs 93（5）:1-12.
（18）Portnov, Andrii （2015） Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies, Slavic Review, Vol.
74, No. 4 （Winter）, pp. 723-731.
（19）Remnick, David （2014） Watching the Eclipse. The New Yorker. August 11.
（20）Rieff, David （2014）. Obama’s Liberal Imperialism. The National Interest. 11 February. http://
nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/obamas-liberal-imper
（21）Rogers, Douglas （2014） Petrobarter: Oil, Inequality, and the Political Imagination in and after the Cold War Author, Current Anthropology, Vol. 55, No. 2 （April）, pp. 131-153.
（22）Sakwa, Richard （2011） The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession. Cambridge.
（23）Shelest, Hanna （2015） After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia? Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15:2, 191-201, DOI: 1080/14683857.2015.1060019.
（24）Shevtsova, Lilia （2014） Crowning a Winner in the Post-Crimea World. The American Interest.
June 16.
（25）Smith, Nicholas Ross （2015） The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine:
assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the Ukraine crisis, European Security, 24:4, pp. 525-540, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2015.1027768.
（26）Snyder, Timothy （2014） Putin’s New Nostalgia. http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/11/10/
putin-nostalgia-stalin-hi...
（27）Snyder, Timothy （2015） Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World, Slavic Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 （Winter）, pp. 695-707.
not removed from the twin crisis of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the West and the virtual disappearance of robust opposition to neoliberal tendencies, especially with the near-collapse of Keynesianism. Finally, the promise of joining the Western alliance has been enfeebled by factors internal to the former Soviet republics, mainly corruption and political mismanagement but also the inability of the West to integrate those republics economically except through aid packages.
The Ukraine crisis and emergent forms of conflicts in other geographical zones reflect the palpable absence of any assumed elective affinity between capitalism and （Western-style） democracy.
Capitalism is quite compatible with alternative political dispensations. Globalized capitalism, in particular, is well-matched with more undemocratic political forms. In the so-called democratic world itself, capitalism increasingly assumes less transparent and more unaccountable features, effectively impervious to public opinion, and especially unresponsive to calls for producing more equitable societies. Doubtless, authoritarian capitalism appears less legitimate in the eyes of the ‘international community’ which is principally defined within a Western normative framework. At the domestic level, as noted, this model is inherently unstable. To the degree that its fortunes rely mainly on a regime’s capacities to placate the populace economically （and more narrowly in the realm of consumption）, the rhythms of the global capitalist system ultimately can dictate the stability of the political order. As recent events have shown, there is no insurance that provides cover against uncertainty, neither to those that govern the system nor to those who wish to build protective ‘national’
shells against forces that know no boundaries.
References
（ 1 ）Alexandrova-Arbatova, Nadia （2015） Security relations in the Black Sea region: Russia and the West after the Ukrainian crisis, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15:2, 129-139, DOI:
10.1080/14683857.2015.1060015.
（ 2 ）Anderson, Perry （2015） Incommensurate Russia. New Left Review 94, July-August, pp. 5-43.
（ 3 ）Brubaker, Roger and Frederick Cooper （2000） “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29, no. 1
（February 2000）: 1-47.
（ 4 ）Engelbrekt, Kjell and Bertil Nygren, eds. （2010） Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.
（ 5 ）Gerasimov, Ilya and Marina Mogilner （2015） Deconstructing Integration: Ukraine's Postcolonial Subjectivity, Slavic Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 （Winter）, pp. 715-722.
（ 6 ）Gleason, Philip （1983） Identifying Identity: A Semantic History, Journal of American History 69, no. 4 （March）: 910-31.
（ 7 ）Götz, Elias （2015） It's geopolitics, stupid: explaining Russia's Ukraine policy, Global Affairs, 1:1, 3-10, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2015.960184.
（ 8 ）Grant, Thomas D （2015） Annexation of Crimea, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 109, No. 1 （January）, pp. 68-95.
（ 9 ）Halliday, Fred （1990） The End of Cold War, New Left Review 180 （March-April）: 5-23.
（10）Harding, Luke （2011） Mafia State: How One Reporter Became an Enemy of the Brutal New Russia. Guardian.
（11）Holmes, Stephen （2012） Fragments of a Defunct State. London Review of Books, 5 January.
（12）Ignatieff, Michael （2015） The New World Disorder. The New York Review of Books, September 25.
（13）http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/sp/25/new-world-disorder/?pagination=false&printpage
=true
（14）Korostelina, Karina V. （2014） Political Insults: How Offences Escalate Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
（15）Kropatcheva, Elena （2015） The Evolution of Russia's OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23:1, 6-24, DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2014.1001823.
（16）Lucas, Edward （2008） The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West. London: Bloomsbury.
（17）Mearsheimer, John J. （2014） Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs 93（5）:1-12.
（18）Portnov, Andrii （2015） Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies, Slavic Review, Vol.
74, No. 4 （Winter）, pp. 723-731.
（19）Remnick, David （2014） Watching the Eclipse. The New Yorker. August 11.
（20）Rieff, David （2014）. Obama’s Liberal Imperialism. The National Interest. 11 February. http://
nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/obamas-liberal-imper
（21）Rogers, Douglas （2014） Petrobarter: Oil, Inequality, and the Political Imagination in and after the Cold War Author, Current Anthropology, Vol. 55, No. 2 （April）, pp. 131-153.
（22）Sakwa, Richard （2011） The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession. Cambridge.
（23）Shelest, Hanna （2015） After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia? Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15:2, 191-201, DOI: 1080/14683857.2015.1060019.
（24）Shevtsova, Lilia （2014） Crowning a Winner in the Post-Crimea World. The American Interest.
June 16.
（25）Smith, Nicholas Ross （2015） The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine:
assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the Ukraine crisis, European Security, 24:4, pp. 525-540, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2015.1027768.
（26）Snyder, Timothy （2014） Putin’s New Nostalgia. http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/11/10/
putin-nostalgia-stalin-hi...
（27）Snyder, Timothy （2015） Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World, Slavic Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 （Winter）, pp. 695-707.
