The aim of this paper is to explore the conditions of our experiences in the media environment, and thus to shed new light on the functions of our body incorporated into image generation systems. To this end, this paper examines the generation of moving images in cinema, especially from the viewpoint of Henri Bergson, whose critical discussion about the mechanism of perception appears in Chapter 4 of （1907） ［1］.
Although Bergsonian philosophy has been influential in the fields of image theory, particularly since the publication of Gilles Deleuze s two-volume work regarding film （1983; 1985）, Bergson s own discussion about cinematography has not received favorably. Despite “the rather overhasty critique of the cinema that Bergson produced” （Deleuze 1996: 7/ preface）, Deleuze, Georges Didi-Huberman, and Mark B. N. Hansen, for example, attempted to reveal the nature of images in cinema （Deleuze）, in chronophotography （Didi-Huberman 2004） and in new media （Hansen 2006） with references to Bergsonian image theory ［2］. However, if Bergson s discussion about cinematography is read as a critical description of the mechanism of motion perception （not as film theory）, the essential features of image generation in cinema can be appreciated.
Generally, moving images in cinema are described as “apparent motion” or “illusion” on supposition that natural perception is “real” and perceives the movement “continuously”. When compared to such general views, however, Bergson s arguments in become clearer. According to him, natural perception tends to fix the movements “intermittently” and to recompose them artificially; in other words, because of the cinematographical
Cinema as Image Generation System: Bergson and
the Cinematographical Mechanism of Perception
mechanism of perception, we cannot perceive “real movement” in the first place. Examining Bergson s viewpoint in terms of psychology, physiology, and new media theories, we present the following perspective. Cinema as an image generation system is not a system that reconstitutes the movement with fixed images （photograms）, but it is a system that generates perceivable movements （e.g., the transition of an object） from unperceivable ones （e.g., the repetition of flickers）. The mechanism of natural perception that fails to capture the movement is, paradoxically, the very condition that generates the moving images in cinema.
The first chapter of this paper provides a short review of classical discussions about cinematic image generation, and second chapter examines the mechanism of perception that recomposes movement with fixed images. Finally, in the third chapter, we disclose the perception mechanism that appears to stabilize micro-movements ［3］.
1. Illusion or Reality?
“Updating” Bergson s image theory, Mark B. N. Hansen proposed calling the entire process by which information is made perceivable the “digital image” （Hansen 2006: 10）. Digital images are materially dynamic micro movements
and as such become images through the body. Yet, the body does participate not only in the generation of digital images but also in all kinds of image generation. So what about cinema? Indeed, since the prevalence of alternating current and cinema, much of the visual images that we come across in our daily lives are composed of the mechanical repetition of movements, even when perceived superficially as static images. Friedrich Kittler writes as follows: “The glow of light alternates fifty times per second in European lightbulbs, sixty times in American ones: the uncomplicated, and hence imperceptible, rhythm of our evenings and of an antenna called the body” （Kitller 1999: 187/ 122）.
error, even if they had little knowledge of the physiological mechanisms of the body. The inventors of cinematography were not the only ones who had “misconceptions” about the functions of the body. Even today, accurate physiological mechanisms that generate moving images have not yet been revealed （Nakajima 1996: 9）. We will begin this discussion with a short review of the background.
Traditionally, film theorists and historians have appealed to “persistence of vision” or “afterimage” as an explanation for the way how they generate images in cinema （cf. Doane 2002: 243）. Famous theorists such as Sergei M. Eisenstein, André Bazin, and Jean-Louis Comolli also employ this explanation. Theodore Rozak s novel clearly describes the circumstance:
Persistence of vision is the optical illusion that underlies motion pictures. Every film-studies textbook dutifully reviews this peculiar quirk of the human eye that allows moviemakers to mobilize photographs and so breathe life into still pictures （Rozak 2005: 292）.
If we focus on the epoch of Bergson, for example, Étienne-Jules Marey （physiologist, inventor of chronophotography, and also Bergson s colleague at Collège de France） and Louis Lumière （one of the inventors of cinematography） also explained the principle of generating moving pictures by referring to afterimages on the retina ［“la persistence des impressions lumineuses sur la rétine”］ （cf. Fihman 1997: 68; Marey 2002: 303-304; Lumière 1964: 113）. However, persistence of vision is considered an inadequate explanation today, since the afterimages produce only the fusion of objects, not the transition of objects.
In contrast, a report on a set of visual experiments by Max Wertheimer, the founder of Gestalt psychology, inspired another explanation, known as apparent movement （cf. Wertheimer 1912）. Although apparent movement can be
defined in various ways, particularly the “phi phenomenon,” the optical illusion of perceiving continuous motion between static objects showed rapidly in succession has been adapted to film theory. As early as 1916, Hugo Münsterberg, whose explanation was very removed from the concept of persistence of vision, wrote as follows:
There on the stage where actors move the eye really receives a continuous series ［ ］ The spectator receives everything from without and the whole movement which he sees is actually going on in the world of space without and, accordingly, in his eye. But if faces film world, the motion which he sees appears to be a true motion, and yet is created by his own mind. The afterimages of successive pictures are not sufficient to produce a substitute for the continuous outer simulation; essential condition is rather the inner mental activity which unites the separate phases in the idea of connected action （Münsterberg 2002: 77）.
Here, Münsterberg clearly explains that the afterimage is not adequate to explain the principle of moving pictures. It is said that “his explanation of motion perception by recourse to the phi phenomenon rather than to persistence of vision led him 50 years ahead of his successors” （Andrew 1989: 2）. However, as soon as film theorists employed the term “apparent movement,” one cannot help but think, whether consciously or unconsciously, that whereas motion perception in the natural world is “real,” motion perception in cinema is “apparent.” Münsterberg s discussion also supposes a difference between the perception of motion on stage and that on screen. The technical terms of psychology̶“apparent movement” and “real movement”̶would themselves lead us in such a direction.
Yet, some critics questioned the previous supposition. For example, as early as 1935, Shuichiro Yoshioka, who contributed to translating
into Japanese, criticized the term “apparent movement” in the work
entitled . “Although nothing lies between one frame
and another frame of the film, when we watch these frames successively, we see a unitary movement ［ ］ Traditional psychology calls it ‘apparent movement. Yet it is never ‘apparent. Since everyone inevitably perceives it as a similar movement, it is unquestionably a real fact” （translated from Yoshioka 1940: 151-152）.
Yoshioka clearly considered cinematographic movement “real.” Furthermore, according to Yoshioka, Wertheimer preferred the term “seeing of motion （
）”rather than“apparent motion （ ）.” If the significance of these theories were based on concrete experience, Yoshioka s perspective would be the rightful one. He argued that if we see movement and not just fixed images （photograms） on screen, then the movement is “real” ［4］. However, he also adds that this is “real” movement in a Bergsonian sense. While accepting Yoshioka s perspective based on experience, we should examine this latter point.
As Yoshioka pointed out, we surely perceive the movements on screen when we see films. This is indisputable. Yet firstly, we have to take into account the simple historical fact that “the motion pictures apparatus was constructed and modified by trial and error until it interfaced successfully with the human visual system” （Anderson 1996: 57）. As Bergson wrote, “
, the film ［ ］ could be run off any speed ［ ］ , this speed is fixed” （PM: 1262/ 20, author s emphases）.
For instance, when Edison attempted to film and project pictures in as slow a speed as possible, the resulting impression was “jerky and unnatural” （Dyer 1929: 538‒539）. Obviously when motion picture apparatus runs too slow, it results in the intermittent succession of images; when it runs too fast, it produces fusion of all the images. In fact, the projection speed was regulated because of conflicting perceptual, technical, and economic reasons ［5］. In short, although cinema immediately provides movement, as Yoshioka argues, it is only because
motion picture mechanisms were modified to correspond with human perceptual mechanisms in the first place.
Secondly, even if we perceive movement on the screen, it is not necessarily “real” movement in Bergson s sense. Yoshioka himself admitted that “perception itself consists of cinematic mechanisms, to some extent” （142）. Bergson, at least in the last chapter of , says that, in addition to intellect and language, perception consists of cinematographic mechanisms that fix movement intermittently like a film camera and recompose them artificially like a projector.
2. Cinematograph inside （ ）
Bergson describes two types of illusions in Chapter 4, “The cinematographical mechanism of thought and the mechanistic illusion” （296） in
（1907）. The first is to believe that “form” precedes “becoming,” and the second that “nought” precedes “being.” Although this study emphasizes the first illusion, both illusions have the same origin and structure because they both originate from our practical interest in daily living. Bergson asked the following question ［6］: “Action is discontinuous, like every pulsation of life; discontinuous, therefore, is knowledge. The mechanism of the faculty of knowing has been constructed on this plan. Essentially practical, can it be of use, such as it is, for speculation?” （EC: 754/ 333）.
Bergson indicated that because we act to benefit from our surroundings, we are exclusively interested in the result of an action, not in the process. The function of intellect is therefore to preside over action, and represents only “ends to attain, that is to say, points of rest” （748/ 325）. Therefore, the material world providing the framework for the ends to attain is also represented as unmovable. Because our actions may leap from one result to another, it is necessary to represent matter as if it passes from one stable state to another.
Bergson called this type of practical knowledge method the “cinematographical method” （754/ 333）. In addition, he pointed out that modern science as well as
ancient philosophy had developed by following this method. Ancient philosophy reconstituted movement through “privileged moments,” and modern science achieves the same by using “any moments whatever” （773- /357- ）. Bergson argues that modern science achieves a level of precision that ancient philosophy could not, but it can only retain “moments, that is to say, that which does not endure” （786/ 360）. He subsequently demonstrated the necessity for a novel metaphysics of duration to compliment modern science.
Bergson s suggestion that the theoretical illusion has its root not only in the mechanisms of intellect and language but also is critical.
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristics of the reality, we have only to string them on becoming abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge ［ ］ Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us ［ ］ the
（753/ 332）.
Cinematic moving images are typically described as “apparent motion” or “illusion” and are based on the supposition that natural perception is “real” and we
can perceive movement “continuously.” By contrast, Bergson, at least in
, emphasized that natural perception is a type of cinematographic mechanism with a tendency to fail at capturing “real” movement ［7］. As Deleuze pointed out,“［For Bergson］ if the cinema misconceives movement, it does so in the same way as natural perception” （Deluze 1996: 85/ 57）.
Bergson therefore argues that perception fixes “becoming” as a series of “snapshots” which we refer to as “qualities” or “forms.” However, if the act of perception is devoted to fixing “becoming” alone, we would never be able to recognize any movement. “［W］ith immobility set beside immobility, even endlessly,
we could never make movement” （753/ 331）. Bergson therefore supposed the act of a type of “cinematographic inside” （ ）. He explains that our perception extracts from concrete becomings a single abstract “becoming ” （“The trick ［ ］ of our perception”）. Once extracted, this “becoming in
general”, which always remains obscure or unconscious, appears to string a series of photographs together.
Bergson was of course unaware of a medical condition that was recently diagnosed as （selective disturbance of movement vision） at the time. It would have been interesting to know how this philosopher, who researched aphasia for five years to write （1896）, would have interpreted such a case. The following excerpt is from a report by Josef Zihl （1983）:
The visual disorder complained of by the patient was a loss of movement vision in all three dimensions. She had difficulty, for example, in pouring tea or coffee into a cup because the fluid appeared to be frozen, like a glacier. In addition, she could not stop pouring at the right time since she was unable to perceive the movement in the cup （or a pot） when the fluid rose ［ ］ She could not cross the street because of her inability to judge the speed of a car, but she could identify the car itself without difficulty. “When I m looking at the car first, it seems far away. But then, when I want to cross the road, suddenly the car is very near. （Zihl 1983: 315）
It appears that the patient described in the excerpt could perceive a series of “snapshots,” but was unable to recognize them together as a motion of the objects. The patient s ability to perceive apparent （ ） motion was also tested. But she could not recognize it as a movement, and always reported “two independent light spots” （330）.
Considering Bergson s perspective, it might therefore be possible to suppose that what was selectively malfunctioning in this instance was the mechanism that
composes movement using fixed sections instead of one that captures movement. The patient seems to be able to perceive fixed sections without difficulty. Bergson argued that this act is composed of specific and definite states （the concrete fixed images） and general and undefined change （abstract and uniform becoming）, and he referred to this process as the “cinematograph inside.” It is possible that this perceptual mechanism functions spontaneously, separate from our intentions, because the cinematographic method of knowledge could be considered the only practical method that adds value to our actions. The cinematographic method could therefore be described as an art that facilitates living, yet it is also an artifice, which prevents us from capturing becoming.
In , Bergson indicated three types of movement, namely qualitative movements （e.g. turning from yellow to green）, evolutionary movements （e.g. growing from flower to fruit）, and extensive movements （e.g. eating or drinking actions） （752/ 330）. In addition, we have the tendency to reconstitute all these movement types through the immobile. This becomes clearer if we consider quality changes （e.g. fading）; form changes （e.g. morphing）; and positional changes （e.g. actions performed by an individual in cinema）. When we watch films, we are not required to follow the entire movement process, in fact, even if we wanted to, it would usually be impossible. Film editors can easily change shots without the audience taking notice. An invisible cut is possible, because “from the mobility of the movement we turn away as much as possible” （751/ 329） and we are interested in only the “average image （ /
mean image）” （750/ 328） of things.
Bergson focused neither on the perceptions of film audiences nor did he materialize the cinematograph inside. He only theoretically suggested this type of mechanism in the perception process. However, if natural perception tends to first fix movement intermittently and to recompose it, it is possible to argue that continuous object movement is not a necessary condition to be able to recognize movement. Alternatives to traditional discussions on image
generation thus become possible. James J. Gibson, for instance, argued that: Since each successive “stimulus” ［of the stroboscope］ was motionless and the retina was thus never “stimulated” by motion, the motion perceived was said to be only “apparent”, not “real”. But this assertion is an example of the muddled thinking to which the theory of stimuli can lead. The stimulus information for motion is the change of pattern, and the information is the same for an intermittent change as for a continuous change. The stroboscope demonstrates only that the motion of an object in the world from one place to another does not have to be copied by a corresponding motion of an image on the retina from one point to another in order for the event to be perceived. But we should never have supposed in the first place that the motion did have to be copied on the retina. （Gibson 1985: 171）
Gibson considered it irrational to distinguish between “real” and “apparent” movement based on the stimulus on the retina. Bergson also criticized perspectives that understood perception based on the retina.
Physiological studies have determined that neurons in a particular area of monkeys brains demonstrated selective responses to movement perceptions, and it has been deduced that a similar area exist in the human brain （Visual area V5）, which is supported by akinetopsia. However, the neurons of monkeys respond to continuous movement （“real movement”） as well as to intermittent movement （“apparent movement”） （Mikami 1991: 80）. Joseph D. Anderson, a film theorist, developed his theory based on both physiological and psychological studies, which can be summarized as follows:
The psychophysical research, the clinical research, and the physiological research all lead to an understanding that not only is the traditional persistence of vision explanation of motion in the motion picture inadequate,
but that explanations associated with apparent movement such as Wertheimer s movement are also inadequate and misleading. It is more likely that motion in the motion picture is a result of the indistinguishability of the small frame to frame changes in a movie from the continuous changes that occur in real motion in nature, resulting in the former being processed by networks of the visual system as motion. （Anderson 1996: 61）
The fact that particular neurons indicate response to both continuous and intermittent movements may only demonstrate that continuous movement is not a necessary condition to ensure response from the neurons. However, mapping of the brain remains an ongoing challenge. The question about total correspondence between brain states and representations requires ongoing discussion.
In the light of discussion so far, we summarize here three main ideas regarding understandings of image generation in cinema: 1） natural perception is not pure knowledge but practical knowledge; 2） movements produced in cinema are not the transition of positions alone. Most discussions on cinematic image generation focus on experiments related to apparent movements, and thus tend to exclusively focus on transition. On the other hand, Bergson s classification of perceivable movements into three types of movements （quality, form, and position） encourages further research. We can, for example, attempt to determine whether perceptions of quality changes in cinema are the same as positional changes; 3） if natural perception tends to capture object movements intermittently, cinematic movement suggests an inherent act of natural perception ［8］. “［O］rdinary knowledge, by reason of the cinematographical mechanism to which it is subjected, forbears to follow becoming in so far as becoming is moving” （779/ 365）. Therefore, Bergson s perspective begs us to question the presuppositions of typical views and suggests that the “illusion” could be an example of this type of presupposition.
3. Contraction of Flicker
In , Bergson argues, “In vain ［ ］ shall we seek beneath the change the thing which changes: it is always provisionally, and in order to satisfy our imagination, that we attach the movement to mobile” （EC: 749/ 327）. In his 1911 lecture, “The Perception of Change,” he provides a formula: “
［ ］ ” （PM: 1381-82/
172）.
Yet even if the world consists of radical change as Bergson argues, we can only perceive relatively stable images. We cannot perceive the “oscillations” or pure movements themselves “underneath the change”. How, then, can we consider the relation of these two poles? Bergson supposes that perception fixes real movement as a relatively stable “quality” or “form,” like a “snapshot” （ ） （Precisely speaking, he sometimes uses the terms “quasi-instantaneous perception ［
］” or “quasi-instantaneous view ［ ］ ” to qualify that even the shortest perception occupies a certain duration. Any concrete perception cannot be “instantaneous” in a strict mathematical sense）.
Bergson writes, “The primal function of perception is precisely to grasp a series of elementary changes under the form of a quality or of a simple state, by a work of condensation” （EC: 749/ 327）. Without this condensation, for example, the color red as a perceptible quality spreads over a greater numbers of elementary movements and “would tend more and more toward that system of homogeneous vibrations of which realism tells us” （MM: 217/ 70）. In
this condensation is described as memory “contracting a number of external moments” （184/ 34） or “contracting ［ ］ a growing number of external moments in its present duration” （MM: 377/ 249） ［9］. According to Deleuze s definition, this is “contraction as the essence of duration and as operating on elementary material agitations in order to constitute the perceived quality” （Deleuze 2000: 98/ 313）.
In Chapter 1 of , Bergson describes the material world as a world of movements that mutually act and react. In order to prove that perception is part of this material world, he employs the term “pure perception” （218/ 71）. However, this is only perception in theory, lacking every form of memory encompassed by perception in fact, or “concrete perception” （185/ 34）. Bergson describes concrete perception as follows: “［n］ow, if every concrete perception, however short we suppose it, is already a synthesis, made by memory, of an infinity of ‘pure perceptions which succeed each other, must we not think that the heterogeneity of sensible qualities is due to their being contracted in our memory ［ ］?” （319/ 182-183）. Even in momentary concrete perception, “memory intervenes” （352/ 219）, contracting the infinity of “pure perception” to produce a sensible quality. In this respect “every perception is already memory” （291/ 50）.
For Bergson, movement is reality. In theory, we certainly perceive movement = matter as perception occupies a part of the material world （pure perception）. Yet in fact, we cannot recognize real movement = matter （“oscillation” as metaphor） as itself, since the primary function of perception is to contract movement = matter; this function is the condition that makes concrete perception possible. Therefore, we should define movement = matter as movement that is perceived but cannot be perceived as itself.
Taking the above discussion into consideration, we will examine image generation in cinema. If “［e］very film-studies textbook dutifully reviews ［a］ peculiar quirk of the human eye that allows moviemakers to mobilize photographs and so breathe life into still pictures” （Rozak 2005: 292）, we cannot help but suppose that motion pictures are generated from still images （photograms）. When we focus on projected images, meanwhile, they consist of mechanically-repeated flickers, and it is the role of perception to fix them as relatively stable images.
The intermittent projector mechanism repeatedly moves film into position behind the lens, holds a photogram steady for a moment, then moves the next
photogram into position. The early projectionist Sutter had only a slit. Therefore, at the time, images projected onto the screen generated a corresponding number of flickers. As Charles Moisson （one of the technical experts who worked with the Lumières） notes, “at the rate of sixteen frames per second, we could bear off flicker” （translated from Sadoul 1973: 423）. For
the pioneers of cinematography, generating = while
suppressing = was a serious problem. By the 1910s, many projectors began incorporating a double or triple-bladed shutter, which controlled flicker （cf. Talbot 1912: 95）. From then on, each photogram was projected at least twice. When the projection speed is twenty-four frames per second and the projector has a double-bladed shutter, the lens opens and closes ninety-six times per second, and images are projected forty-eight times per second. At this rate, the intermittent but rapid light stimulus appears to generate a steady image to most human observers, thereby eliminating flicker. How then can we understand this evolution of image generation from movement = flicker to a relatively stable image?
For instance, it is known that fluorescent light flickers at a particular rate, yet we perceive the light to be relatively stable as the flicker rate exceeds our ability to detect it. However, we can also understand this phenomenon from a different perspective: we perceive the light as relatively stable because the light flickers at a rate within the range of our ability to contract it. Bergson himself supposes that various species ability to act is proportional to their degree of perceptual contraction:
The greater the power of acting bestowed upon an animal species, the more numerous, probably, are the elementary changes that its faculty of perceiving concentrates into one of it instants. The progress must be continuous, in nature, from the beings that vibrate almost in unison with the oscillations of the ether, up to those that embrace trillions of these
oscillations in the shortest of their simple perception. （EC: 749/ 327） The thaumatrope, for example, suggests the degree of contraction of human perception, as it contracts multiple images in the shortest humanly perceptible moment. In other words, the thaumatrope is an image generation system that relies on the contraction of human perception.
Certainly, in the case of cinema, image contraction as with the thaumatrope tends to be obscured by moving objects. Today, it is believed that the problem of “critical fusion frequency” （CFF） with regard to the suppression of flicker （cf. Nichols 1980） has nothing to do with the mechanism to generate movement in cinema （perhaps inventors of cinematography considered these two problems as one, since they depended on the discourse of “persistence of vision”）. However, the simple fact that the flicker is successfully suppressed implies that two successive photograms, or the same photogram projected twice in the case of double-bladed shutter, contract the image in the shortest moment of human perception. This principle becomes clearer when we make a film in which each photogram has different characteristics. For example, filmmaker Rose Lowder performed the following experiments with frame modification:
I was interested in the fact that you can see on the screen things that aren t actually on film. A very simple way of demonstrating this is to make holes in the filmstrip with an office puncher. If you draw a line on a piece of transparent leader and then punch a hole every alternate frame, the line seems to go through the hole. But if you draw the same line and then punch holes in two successive frames out of every three, then the hole appears empty ［ ］ What s the point of all this? There s a lot of talk about the smallest unit of cinema being the frame, but in fact, that s not the case at all. As these experiments demonstrate, pieces from different frames can make up what you re seeing on the screen. In other words, you can
construct an image on screen with bits from different frames. （MacDonald 1997: 133-134）
Lowder s experiments demonstrate that, in the briefest perceptible moment, cinema, by way of the projection mechanism, contracts multiple photograms and flickers into “an image” ［10］. Essentially, in cinema, the contraction of perception conceals each photogram s differences; plural photograms penetrate each other and become a relatively stable “average image.” The primal function of perception in cinema is to contract and to fix the mechanical repetition of blinking. This is the only means possible to present a stable image. Predicating the discussion on the supposition that moving images are merely produced from still images （photograms） would ignore these important characteristics.
As flipbooks demonstrate, the contraction of flicker is certainly not a necessary prerequisite to generate a moving image. However, from the perspective of image generation in cinema, the contraction of flicker is an important issue. In theory, we certainly perceive each photogram or blinking = movement on some level, as Bergson argued regarding “pure perception.” If we concretely perceive each photogram or blink, on the other hand, we then perceive flicker. When flicker is suppressed, a photogram is no longer the smallest perceptible image on screen. Thus, a photogram is simultaneously perceived yet imperceptible.
Bergson echoes the conceptual framework for this mechanism of projection: “［i］n the smallest discernible fraction of a second, in the almost instantaneous perception of sensible quality, there may be trillions of oscillations which repeat themselves. The permanence of a sensible quality consists in this repetition of movements” （749/ 327）. In contrast, the use of “photogram-shot” （cf. Deleuze 1996: 85）, attempted by filmmakers such as Dziga Vertov, Fernand Léger, and various American experimental filmmakers, converts the act of contraction by bringing hidden background activity into the foreground, and converting it to
perceptible images.
Contraction, a kind of passive synthesis of memory that suppresses flicker and generates superimpositions （like the thaumatrope）, acts spontaneously. Therefore, we cannot break away from this contraction through force of will: we cannot perceive each flicker in its own right. According to Bergson, however, this contraction allows us to act freely by distancing us from the necessary repetition of action and reaction in the material world. Flicker s fusion might reflect the degree of contraction of memory that defines various species ability to act. The repetition of flicker or photogram in cinema can be defined as the movement that is both perceived and imperceptible. Thus, image generation in cinema demonstrates Bergson s thesis: “alleged movement of thing is in reality only a movement of movements” （PM: 1383/ 124）.
Conclusion
Generally, discussions regarding image generation in cinema has been based on the supposition that cinema produces moving image from still images. In contrast, this paper proposed an alternative perspective based on Bergson: cinema is a system that produces movements from unrecognizable movements, through cooperative work that occurs between body and machine.
Bergson describes the mechanism common to perception, intellection, and language as the “cinematographic mechanism” that 1） fixes movement and 2） recomposes it by the use of immobile sections. These double processes contribute to image generation in cinema. Each flicker or photogram is a “momentary mind ［ ］” that disappears, even as it occurs”. Our perception contracts the repetitive blinking that occurs in one moment. Our perception develops relatively stable “average images” and composes perceivable movements using those images. When we watch a film, we are not required to follow the entire movement process. In fact, even if we wanted to, in all likelihood, it would be impossible to do so. This tendency has been
reinforced by the intervention of recollections and language. If we could attain non-human eye recognizing micro-movements, the cinematographic images captured by this type of eye would be spread and diluted by mechanical repetitive blinking ［11］. Thus, these images would no longer function as cinematographic images in the usual sense. In short, the mechanism of natural perception that fails to capture movement is, paradoxically, the very condition that generates moving images in cinema.
Since the twentieth century, devices that display artificial images （e.g., televisions, computers, mobile phone, and so on） have successfully been developed. Because of the advancement of high-speed networks, a growing number of moving images can now overflow onto various types of interfaces. Thus, we can imagine a material world in which multiple mechanical repetitions will coexist （e.g., ninety-six blinks per second by a triple-shutter movie projector, fifty or ninety-sixty blinks per second by a television display, or blinks that occur at the refresh rate of a particular computer s display）. Our perception contracts these repetitions in one moment. Therefore, we always recognize only an “average image” on a screen or display, regardless of whether it appears as a moving or still image. With respect to the context of real time images, media theorist Lev Manovich states, “the image, in a traditional sense, no longer exists! ［ ］ It is only because scanning is fast enough and because, sometimes, the referent remains static, that we see what looks like a static image. Yet such an image is no longer the norm ［ ］ new kind of representation for which we do not yet have a term” （Manovich 2001: 100）.
Based on a term used by Bergson, we referred to the “average image （ ）” that approximately corresponds to a “new kind of representation for which we do not yet have a term,” a phrase that appears in the excerpt above （However, after cinema, photogram = movement can be segmentalized into scanning = movement）. The multiple rhythms of blinking employed in various media might represent almost a lack of awareness for humans today. How do these rhythms affect living matter? Ultimately, a “new reality” emerged along
with the birth of cinematography. This reality is based on equidistant instants. Our bodies make this new reality perfect. Hence, we are incorporated into image generation systems as component pieces. We become image processors, well before we become spectators or observers.
Notes
［1］ Hereafter, I use the page numbers of the original texts and the corresponding page numbers of the English translation.
［2］ However, in an interview, Bergson, contrary to expectations, had made a favorable comment about projected images in cinema, although his comment on snapshots was not necessarily favorable: “［c］inematography taught the painter that the photography was wrong” （translated from Georges-Michel 1914）.
［3］ Deleuze makes a distinction between “image in movement （ ）” and “movement-image （ ）” in . At a practical level of the discussion, while “image in movement” refers to the movement of objects, “movement-image” refers to the movement of the entire field （ ）. In theory, all cinematographic images have both these aspects. In fact, the latter would become increasingly apparent through the mobility of camera and montage. While this paper mainly focuses on “image in movement”, Deleuze s perspective is quite valuable for examining the nature of cinematographic movement.
［4］ It appears that Yoshioka s viewpoint is similar to Deleuze s viewpoint in Chapter 1 of . However, with regard to the “movement of object,” Deleuze inherits Bergson s viewpoint （Deleuze 1996: 32/ 19）.
［5］ As is generally believed, the speed of silent-film was not fixed at the rate of sixteen frames per second, cf. Card 1979.
［6］ Bergson uses the term “snapshot” or “cinematography” as a metaphor but we should not misunderstand his intention. Bergson s viewpoint is that natural perception is “practical knowledge” reflecting “possible action” or “virtual action” （that is, from things to us and from us to things）. Thus, his viewpoint and traditional understanding
of perception （“sequential causal model” and “representationalism”） are quite different. ［7］ In this respect, the author agrees largely with the following view of Martin Jay: “［i］n
later work ［after ］ such as , he ［Bergson］
continued to invoke heard melodies as examples of nonspatial perception, which in no way could be construed as comparable to cinema. The one sense that cannot avoid being cinematographic is vision” （Jay 1994: 199）. For Bergson s description of the perception of visual motion prior to , see MM: 325/ 188-189.
［8］ Regarding time-sampling of perception in recent discussions on psychology, see Yohimura 2005: 41-43.
［9］ Bergson employs the term “contraction” with reference to memory, in at least three contexts: 1） contraction of actual external moments; 2） contraction of a virtual sheet of the past; and, 3） contraction in the process of actualizing the past. Regarding “recollection-memory”, see MM: 184/ 34; 377/ 249.
［10］ The result of the visual experience varies depending on the projection speed.
［11］ From Leibnitz s text Deleuze quotes an idea that is similar to Bergson s “contraction-memory” and points out that “Bergson will rediscover this ［Leibnitz s］ idea of resemblance through the quality of perceived consciousness and tiny movements ‘contracted by a receptive organ” （Deleuze 2005: 73/ 182）. For insights on “the
non-human eye,” “the genetic element of all possible perception” and “the differential of perception,” see Deleuze 1996: 120/ 83.
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This paper is based on my article pubished in Japanese in （
