＜論 文＞
Expanding to Dominate: Thai Military s
Encroachment to Domestic Security Realm
Adhi PRIAMARIZKI *
Existing literatures on Thai military in politics mainly focused either on the relationship between the monarchy and the military or transformation of the armed forces in the country s political process. These studies, however, overlooked the impacts of domestic security role of the military towards its political influence. By analysing the impacts, this study attempts to advance our understanding on Thai military in politics. This article argues that Thai military s domestic security role has been always politically oriented and granted a massive advantage for the military to sustain its political involvement. Thus, the domestic security role should be understood as a significant multiplier of military elites political involvement and superiority vis-à-vis the civilian political elite. Elucidating this politico-security nexus is crucial to understand Thai military s sustained involvement in non-military affairs throughout the history. In developing the argument, this study examines the case of Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) and the role of the military in pacifying Southern Thailand insurgencies.
Keywords：Thai Politics, Thai Military, ISOC, Southern Insurgency, Military in Politics
1. Introduction
When the people uprising erupted in May 1992, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon,１） Thai military responded brutally to the protesters. The bloodshed, called as the Black May incident and caused 52 deaths and dozens of injured ＊ Adhi Priamarizki is PhD Student at Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University Kyoto and Research Assistant at Asia-Japan Research Institute – Ritsumeikan University. His research interests are civil-military relations in Southeast Asia, Indonesian politics, Indonesia s defence policy, Indonesian military history, and Myanmar politics. Email: [email protected]
casualties, overthrew military reign in the country and it became a momentum for democratization. The subsequent decade of democratization was coloured by the rise of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), through democratic elections in 2001. His populist politics antagonized the monarchy and the military, and finally ignited military coups in 2006 and 2014 to overthrow Thaksin-led governments. The military since then re-gained its prominence and controlled Thai politics, particularly following the 2014 coup.
Existing studies on Thai military in politics after the 1992 political change can be broadly divided into two categories, though the discussion between them often overlaps. The first group of literatures focused on the interplay between the military and monarchy in dominating Thai politics. Duncan McCargo s (2005) work on network monarchy described the transformation of contemporary relations between the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy, that was formerly interpreted by Fred Riggs (1966) as bureaucratic polity２）. The relation between the two institutions̶the monarchy and the military̶transformed Thai armed forces into a monarchized military whereby it acted as the monarchy s junior partner in hijacking Thai democracy (Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2016).３） Chambers and Waitoolkiat (2017) meanwhile explored the politico-economic activities of Thai military since its inception, which involved the monarchy, particularly following the 1957 coup. ４）
The second category of Thai military literatures centred its analysis on the transformation and political involvement of Thai military. These studies mainly attempted to capture the trend of the military in Thai politics in a certain period of time. Chai-anan Samudavanija (1997), for example, discussed Thai military s political involvement following the 1992 political change. James Ockey (2001), who complemented Chai-anan s analysis in elaborating the period after 1992, displayed an optimistic trend of withdrawal of the military from political stage. Pavin Chachavalpongpun (2011) analysed key factors leading to military s return in politics and the 2006 coup that ended Thaksin s reign, while Ockey (2014) elaborated the cohesiveness of the Thai armed forces after the coup. The military did another coup in 2014 and started a new military regime which still persists until today. Kitti Prasirtsuk (2015) and Chris Baker (2016) explored events and roots of political frictions leading to the 2014 coup, which displayed the significant contribution of the collaboration between the military and the monarchy to the putsch. In addition to these studies, Deniz Kocak and Johannes Kode (2014) examined potential challenges for security sector reform of Thai security apparatus.
Both of the studies in the two categories did not elaborate the Thai military s domestic security role extensively. The existing studies perceived Thai military internal security role
primarily as a product of military engagement in politics. The analysis therefore did not continue to dissect the impacts of military participation in domestic security sphere to the civil-military relations dynamics, particularly military political involvement. This article on the other hand aims to fill such gap by looking at the influence of Thai military internal security role towards its adventure at the country s political stage. There is a work of Puangthong Pawakapan, which analysed the current development of Thailand s Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), an organization that oversees internal security operations (Pawakapan P. R., 2017), but the work puts little attention to Thai military s domestic security role s impacts towards military political involvement. Here we see the need for advancing our understanding of Thai military in politics by examining how domestic security role galvanizes the military s political involvement and superiority vis-a-vis the civilian. In order to do so, this article analyses Thai military s gains in doing such role. What are the benefits of doing domestic security role for Thai military? How has the role influenced Thai military s political involvement? These are the main questions in this article.
To develop our arguments, we examine the case of ISOC and the role of the military in pacifying Southern Thailand insurgencies. The discussion on the two cases seeks to answer the first research question. Below, we first discuss the way the military involves in domestic security realm in the country and benefits of doing such role. ISOC plays a crucial role in orchestrating military domestic security role since the counterinsurgency era against the communist. Second, we will look at the Southern Thai brouhaha which showcases the most protracted conflict in the country. After identifying the benefits of doing domestic security role based on the two cases, this paper continues with an elaboration how the gains contribute to Thai military s encroachment to political realm. Throughout the observation, I would argue that Thai military s domestic security role has been always politically oriented and granted a massive advantage for the military to sustain its political involvement.
2. ISOC and Thai Military s Domestic Security Role
Back in 1965, the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) was formed and led by an army general, Gen. Praphat Charusathein until 1973. The formation of CSOC aimed to coordinate counter-insurgency activities against the communist５） under one agency, and it was based on the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) s advice. The CIA
also supported the organization with funding as well as training. Later in June 1975, CSOC was renamed into ISOC in order to make it sound less suppressive and more concerned with socio-economic issues rather than oppression (Saiyud, 1986, pp. 14-15). The organization gained its prominence not only by supressing communist insurgency, but also through coordinating paramilitary groups for various purposes, including silencing opposition movements (Ball & Mathieson, 2007, pp. 33-35). Since its inception, the army has been dominating the total number of ISOC s membership. The Army Commander had been always Director of ISOC, though, later in 1987, prime minister became ISOC director and Army Commander held deputy director position (Pawakapan P. R., 2017, p. 8).
The demise of communist threat, particularly following the declaration of a total victory of the military over the communist in 1983, produced a massive setback for ISOC s centrality and power. Nevertheless, ISOC s role has been expanded to civil affairs when Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) signed Order 83/2526 in the same year, which allowed ISOC to control all mass organizations involved in combating communism, and Order 47/2529 in 1986, that delegated all government agencies for participating in building democracy in Thailand (Pawakapan P. R., 2017, pp. 18-19). The period of democratization after the bloody incident of Black May 1992 also did not automatically erase the existence of ISOC. The organization received a windfall when Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001) adopted a supportive approach towards military participation in economic development, public health provision, disaster relief operations, protection of natural resources, and environmental conservation. The revocation of the Anti-Communist Act on 1 April 2000 did not end the lifespan of ISOC as it found a new role in coordinating counter-narcotics operations (Ball & Mathieson, 2007, p. 101; Pawakapan P. R., 2017, p. 20).
The rise of Thaksin was a turning point in Thai s democratic politics. As a successful businessman, he invested his capital to develop a political base outside of the monarchy and the military. He put ISOC under his office s command directly and filled the agency with military man, such as Army Commander as Secretary General, Military Supreme Commander as one of its deputy directors, and commanders from army, navy, and air force as three out of five Assistant Directors (Pawakapan P. R., 2017, p. 21).
Importantly, however, ISOC gained greater power when the military kicked out Thaksin government in 2006. His successor, Prime Minister Surayud, aspired ISOC becoming a forefront in combating terrorism, new security challenges (such as cyber threats), and insurgency in the South as well as unifying the security bureaucracy and taking the lead role for subduing remnants of the runaway power of any rogue government (The Nation,
2006). After his appointment as Army Commander in 2007, Gen. Anupong Paochinda (2007-2009) increased the number of military personnel under ISOC into about 60,000 soldiers (Srisompob & McCargo, 2010). The 2008 Internal Security Act (ISA), proposed by the junta in 2008, became a cornerstone for such empowerment.６） The ISA does not clearly define the security threat and allows ISOC for not answerable to the parliament (Chambers, 2010a). In addition, the ISA has allowed ISOC to exercise its powers without declaration of state of emergency .７） It thus paved way for the country becoming a military state (Chambers, 2010b, p. 205).
The enormous power of ISOC made it possible to serve as the military s political tool in supressing the red shirt movement and pro-Thaksin political groups.８） This use of supressing political opponents has been intensified in the aftermath of 2014 coup which put the coup leader Gen. Prayuth Chan-o-cha９） as Prime Minister. Based on the 2008 ISA, Prayuth became Director of ISOC with Army Commander as Deputy Director and Army Chief of Staff as Secretary General. Interestingly, ISOC is now involved in securing the junta s interests on natural resources through the promulgation of NCPO Order No. 64 / 2014 on prevention of encroachment on and the destruction of forest resources. Based on the order, ISOC works together with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to handle the matter. In Ban Province, the junta, through the military and the police, helped the activity of Apiko Limited Company in doing petroleum-drilling survey in the area by guarding and facilitating the company s transport of drilling equipment. Meanwhile, the military forbade any protests from local people towards the activity of gold mining at Wang Sapung district in Loei Province (Puangthong Pawakapan, 2015).
The comeback of the military has also toughened the implementation of lese-majeste law, which restricts defamation or insults against the king, the queen, the heir-apparent or the regent . The post-2014 coup Thailand has not only experienced political suppression in the real world, but also in the cyber realm. The junta has been attempting to curb opposition movement and consolidate its power through the cyber world by implementing cyber surveillance and surveillance by the mass. The latter approach mirrors ISOC s methods in undermining communists and political oppositions by empowering pro-government pressure groups or paramilitary groups during the anti-communist era. The current modus operandi in the cyber stage utilizes ultra-royalist groups in which some of their leaders are affiliated with the military. One of the notorious examples is the Garbage Collecting Organization (GCO), led by Maj. Gen. Rientong Nan-nah, director and owner of Mongkutwattana General Hospital in Bangkok and a former officer at Army Medical
Department. The GCO monitors and hunts individuals who allegedly insult the monarchy and/or the government (Laungaramsri, 2016; Taylor, 2016). This new role of ISOC to control the cyberspace has greatly strengthened the military control over politics consequently.
3. Southern Thai Insurgency
Thai military involvement in domestic security realm is also apparent significantly in the case of Southern Thai conflict. The skirmish mainly covers the three provinces in the most southern part of Thailand: Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. The uprising in the area appeared as early as 1903 when Tengku Abdul Kadir, the last sultan of Pattani, directed resistance towards the government. Furthermore, the implementation of the 1921 Compulsory Primary Education Act, obligating all children to attend state primary schools for four years of Thai language studies, was perceived by the Muslim population there as Siami-zation of the southern population and eradication of Muslim culture (Yegar, 2002, pp. 87-89).
Since then, the conflict in the three provinces emerged and it was primarily triggered by harsh assimilation policies that neglected Malay-Muslim identities and aspirations. The combination of security and development approaches has reduced insurgent activities over the 1980s and early 1990s. Nonetheless, emergence of splinters and radicalisation re-appeared in the Southern provinces in the early 2000s (ICG, 2005). Thai government has maintained its attitude of rejecting autonomy for the southern provinces, though cultural-religious concessions, educational, social and economic concessions were offered. These concessions nonetheless were insufficient in altering the negative perception of the Malay-Muslim communities in the South towards the Thai authority.10）
In November 2017, more than a decade after re-escalation of the conflict in the South, the military junta leader, General Prayuth received an unwelcoming gesture from the southerners when he visited Pattani and Songkla provinces. Instead of boosting his popularity in the provinces, the visit became an arena for those people to abuse him verbally (The Strait Times, 2017). The saga signed that the uproar in the South is still not yet solved. Some security analysts (Gunaratna, Acharya, & Chua, 2006; Abuza, 2009) attempted to link the 21st century Southern Thai brawl with the rise of global or regional terrorist movements, particularly Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah. Such works unfortunately seemingly neglected the already embedded problems in the Malay-speaking provinces since the rise of modern Thai state.11） Furthermore, the brouhaha kept occurring
despite the weakening of global and regional terrorist networks.12）
Importantly, the Southern Thai itself is a place for illicit and illegal activities, particularly drug trafficking and arms smuggling, in which the military and police are regularly involved. Corrupt officials have exacerbated the situation by benefiting from these criminal doings. Identifying the perpetrators of the violent attacks, let alone the objectives, in the southern provinces has often turned out to be a difficult task due to the convoluted nature of the situation, involving not only separatists, but also criminals and rogue officials. The number of officials with rent-seeking mentality in the South is also significant. Being a security officer in the South can get a lot of financial gains due to rampant illegal activities in the area, particularly through security money.13） The issue of Thai southern area became crucial as the violent conflict fuelled in the erosion of liberal democracy in Thailand due to human rights and political rights abuse in the name of extinguishing separatism.
Explaining the comeback of Southern Thai conflict in the 2000s is a complex task, albeit some dominant factors are apparent. The first is the failure of central government development projects in boosting the living quality of general Malay-Muslim population, in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. Although this factor is arbitrary, the notion has been a widespread perception amongst the population in the three provinces. The grievance is also accompanied by antagonism towards Buddhist and secular values of Thai governance in which the majority of Malay-Muslim communities feel uncomfortable with.14）
The other dominant cause is the misstep of Thaksin administration in managing the Southern issue. Thaksin perceived the South as an arena that he needed to conquer in order to galvanize his political domination in the country.15） Therefore, his policies towards the Southern issue were determined heavily by political ambitions rather than the willingness to solve the problem. Let us examine these problems below.
Thaksin s political party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT),16） won a landslide victory in 2001 General Election. Nonetheless, TRT failed to win the majority of the seats in the southern provinces. The rising violence in 2001 gave Thaksin a justification to enter the South. Thaksin in April 2002 dissolved the Southern Border Province Administrative Center (SBPAC) and Civil-Police-Military Command-43 (CPM-43) as his administration felt the two entities did not have significance in tackling the uprising.17） Speculation of the abolition aiming to undermine Democrat party in the South soon emerged as the two agencies had been long associated with some figures from the party (Moore, 2013, p. 232). 18） Multiple attacks against the police checkpoints and several bombings aroused between
March to November 2002 after the annulment. The closure of the SBPAC terminated the informal communication channel for soldiers, police, Muslim leaders and religious teachers, and local officials to meet and exchange views of each other.
In addition, Thaksin s war on drugs allowed many extrajudicial killings19） of drug dealers in the South who were mostly informants for the SBPAC and military intelligence (McCargo, 2008, p. 9). In effect, the war on drugs helped Thaksin crippling military network in the South. SBPAC itself was not merely a governmental institution, but also a tool to encourage participation of local Muslims to enter politics, for example contesting parliamentary seats and gaining ministerial posts. Besides that, Thaksin also authorized the police as the primary force in quelling the issue and it further alienated the military and the royalist from the South. His decision had started greater rivalry between the police and the military in the South as the two of them often colliding over control of security business.20）
Moreover, Thaksin broke the tradition in the Fourth Army Region21） by assigning Major General Songkitti Chakkabhatra, his classmate in the cadet school, as deputy commander of the Fourth Army in October 2001 and later Fourth Army Commander in April 2003.22） Although Thai army conducts rotation for its senior positions, the Fourth Army has been notoriously known for excluding outsiders to join its leadership. It believed that only those officers who spent their entire careers in the South can be deemed suitable to lead the Fourth Army Region. This belief made the Fourth Army becoming an untouchable enclave within the already highly privileged military institution according to McCargo. Any disturbance in the southern provinces will certainly benefit the command, ranging from increasing its budget, providing special allowances, giving control over development projects, and strengthening jurisdiction over the border (McCargo, 2007, p. 42).
The military in general has enjoyed unwavering support for increasing its military budget by citing the Southern Thai conflict. The situation emerged as insecurity industry whereby no one dare to question military spending as enquiring in the midst of conflict will be deemed as unpatriotic (Satha-Anand, 2009, p. 102). The military itself requested 17.6 billion baht for counterinsurgency efforts in the south for 2007-2011 in which sixty percent from the number had been spent for soldiers salaries and welfare (Charoensin-o-larn, 2009, pp. 71-72).
The royalist camp soon reacted by criticizing the way that the Thaksin administration handled the South. The late King Bhumibol in 2004 summoned Thaksin twice (24 February and 1 November) to the palace urging for a better approach from the government in
dealing with the southern border provinces. Clearly, the continued brouhaha and the brutal security operations under Thaksin s command provided a justification for the royalist group for lambasting Thaksin. Despite Thaksin s efforts to gain influence in the southern border provinces, his TRT failed to win in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces in the 2005 General Elections. TRT s overwhelming victory at the national level did not produce the same result in the three provinces. Instead, Democrat party won about 70 percent from the total votes in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat (Ukrist, 2007, p. 83).
Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (2005-2007) in early September 2006, who later launched a coup against Thaksin on 19 September 2006, openly criticized Thaksin s harsh policy for Southern provinces and called for a more lenient policy to tackle the issue. The criticism was perceived as closely linked with the coup, though the South issue was not surfaced clearly in justifying the 2006 coup.23） The coup practically reclaimed military dominance over the southern operations. Sonthi, the coup leader himself was an ardent follower of the Cold War counterinsurgency doctrine, emphasizing on separating the fish from the water and winning hearts and minds of the people.24）
Separating the insurgents from the population was translated into attracting the sympathy of the locals through economic development. This strategy was also in line with King Bhumibol s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP)25） The military soon engaged in development projects to interpret such doctrine, particularly through the Army Civil Affairs. Such projects are usually small in scale, but with immediate impact to the villagers. Each battalion under the Fourth Army Region has at least 20 personnel involving in Civil Affairs. These personnel will be ready at any time to give advices and supports from day-to-day living, construction, to fruit and vegetable farming (Moore, 2013, pp. 348-349).
Besides the military, the monarchy is another institution that involved in development projects in the South. The royalist projects in the provinces were mainly led by Queen Mother Sirikit. One of the projects was Kampung Janda or Widow Village Programme, for women whose husbands were killed in the insurgency, located in Narathiwat provinces. The programme equipped those women with certain skills, such as pottery and farming, to do their own living (Moore, 2013, pp. 350-351). This kind of project certainly ensured the regular appearance of the monarchy in the region which in return helped its prominence. The royal family since 1973 has been frequently visiting the southern provinces, often spending several weeks at their Taksin Rachaniwes Palace in Narathiwat (McCargo, 2007, p. 56).
Instead of reducing the military engagement in development works, the comeback of civilian governments, particularly under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), did little to alter the situation. ISOC was the main actor in orchestrating the military involvement in various development projects. Those engagements ranged from giving education on farming to anti-drug education. This action aimed to show the military domination and expertise vis-à-vis the civilian as well as to galvanize the Thai Army as
development soldier .26）
The instability in the South added a strong justification for the military to do procurement for supporting its operation there in which one of the cases caused a controversy. A controversy emerged in 2010 when Thai Army s device (ADE-651) for detecting bombs in the southern provinces was deemed ineffective. The government wanted to stop the acquisition of the device (worth 1.4 million Baht) which was rejected harshly by the military. This saga produced questions over the efficacy of excessive military expenditure as well as the military s method in detaining those suspected of carrying bombs and in preventing bomb attacks. The critics towards the device were soon demised by themselves and the Thai army kept using it (Askew, 2010, pp. 262-263).
The rise of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014), Thaksin s younger sister and his political surrogate, in 2011 initially provided a hazy prospect for the situation in the South, though later her administration gave a glimpse of hope to solve the issue. Yingluck replaced the martial law, which was put in place by her brother in 2004, with the implementation of ISA in the southern provinces. Although the ISA is perceived as less draconian than martial law, the act grants the government arrest and detention powers. Yingluck administration was also overwhelmed by national politics contestation, particularly after she introduced her plan to grant amnesty for Thaksin. Nevertheless, her government made a breakthrough for the South in February 2013 through initiating formal peace talks with the National Revolutionary Front (BRN)27） that was also attended by a representative from Malaysia as a mediator.
However, the negotiation found a deadlock as Yingluck did not obtain full support from the military. The military on the other hand claimed her government did not inform the military about the talk until a few days before the launch (Pathan, 2017). This chaos in the government side is understandable as the Thai state was very fractured at that time, distrust amongst politicians and competition amongst bureaucrats, and there were a lot of competing agencies that worked on the southern provinces issue, such as SBPAC and ISOC. The peace negotiation was in jeopardy when the military took over the government
in 2014, though the junta leadership pledged to continue peace process with the BRN and promised to accomplish it within one year. The peace process was finally crumbled in April 2017 as the BRN withdrew from the negotiation table. The BRN perceived the military government is unwilling to give any concessions, for example amnesties, prisoners releases, or linguistic reforms. Moreover, Prayuth administration kept the usage of the army in handling the South. The junta leader in March 2016 even asked the army to increase its presence there following gun and bomb attacks in Narathiwat earlier, though the number of attacks was declining (Reuters, 2016).28）
4. Domestic Security Role and Military Political Encroachment
Based on the discussion on the two case studies, we can at least identify five dimensions of Thai military s domestic security role that have aided its political involvement. First, Thai military s domestic security role attributes not only security reason, but also political reason. The case of ISOC shows how the military entrenching its domestic security role through civilian s accommodation. Instead of reforming the military for its back-to-barracks , the democratization of Thailand has intensified negotiations between civilian politicians and the military to benefit each other. The civilian side adopted a supportive approach towards the military by including them in many sectors, including internal security. The authority has deliberately expanded the jurisdiction of internal security role of the military through the utilisation of ISOC. The accommodative approach towards the military was displayed in the inclusion of ISOC in coordinating counter-narcotics operations following the revocation of the Anti-Communist Act on 1 April 2000.
Second, domestic security role has opened an access to fulfil military economic interests. The expansion of ISOC to handle the prevention of encroachment on and the destruction of forest resources (NCPO Order No. 64 / 2014) gave chance to the emergence of cooperation between security forces and private companies in benefiting from the country s natural resources. Meanwhile, the instability in the southern part of Thailand has provided the military another source of shady business. The military handles various development projects in the area through its Army Civil Affairs. In addition, individual officers became entangled with illicit and illegal activities, particularly security money. The worsened security situation in the South has made the security force a wide room to establish its authority without supervision from outside parties.
budget. As discussed above, the re-definition of ISOC s role and the counterinsurgency operations in the South turned into a strong mantra for gaining budgetary increment. Moreover, military procurement found menial challenges by citing the need to support domestic security campaigns and maintenance of stability in the conflict area. The widening internal security role of the military is likely followed by the expansion of military budget to support the operations.
Fourth, the military expansion to domestic security role has contributed to the sustainability of the current military junta s power. The expansion of ISOC s authority to many realms, including cyber world, has significantly supported the current junta administration in sustaining its domination in the country. The role came handy when the military government requires a help to silence protests against it. The junta also often cited the threat to the monarchy to justify detainment of the protesters. Domestic security role of the military therefore has been an integral instrument in upholding the dance between the monarchy and the military. Nonetheless, the nature of the relations between the monarchy and the military might change in the future with the decease of King Bhumibol on 13 October 2016.
Fifth, domestic security role reflects Thai military autonomy and unwillingness to have outside interventions. The protracted conflict in the South has emerged into a playground for the military as discussed above. The military even has its own tradition in the South that can fuel a resentment when an outside party intervened as shown in the case of Thaksin s interference. This situation indicates a worsened symptom of the already atrocious civil-military relations in Thailand as civilian supremacy is practically difficult to impose.
Following democratization, embracing separation between internal and security role is a necessary perquisite for a sustainable democratic system. The military should only focus on external defence matters while leaving the internal security role to the civilian institutions, particularly the police (OECD, 2007, p. 124). Alfred Stepan s studies (1973; 1978) on the military in Brazil and Peru argued internal roles, such as counterinsurgency and economic development, have contributed significantly to the politicization of the military which certainly threatens democracy and produce greater resistance against civilian control over the armed forces. In addition, giving too much role of domestic security to the military could result in the expansion of political influence of the armed forces (Hunter 1996; Croissant, et al. 2013; Hachemer 2017). It is imperative for the military to withdraw from politics for democracy to endure. Therefore, forgoing domestic security duties of the
military significantly sustains democracy (Hernandez, 1996, p. 66). On the other hand, maintaining military participation in domestic security territory leads to eroding military s professional ethos and deteriorating accountability as well as subordination to elected civilian authorities as appeared in the case of Latin America in the 1990s (Rial, 1996, p. 56).
Besides strengthening studies from Stepan (1973, 1978), Hunter (1996), Croissant, et al. (2013), and Hachemer (2017), this study has also revealed that political dimension playing a crucial part in determining military participation in internal security territory. As also mentioned above, the arrival of democratization following the 1992 uprising did not completely force the military to forgo its internal security role. As argued by Tamada (2008), the period after the 1992 Black May incident only concentrated to oust the military from politics but failed to reform the military according to democratic principles. The involvement in domestic security sphere consequently was left untouched by democratization. As a result, military domination in domestic security role persists.
The abovementioned five dimensions have shown how domestic security role benefits the military and sustains its political involvement. On the one hand, military participation in internal security realm expands the armed forces political involvement. On the other hand, political elites may also hijack the role to fulfil their interests. The first scenario however appeared dominantly in the case of Thailand as military figures actively sought for power. For example, ISOC s increasing authority galvanized military political power as the empowerment gave them the ability to undermine Thaksin and Yingluck supporters. Therefore, the prescription that mandated the military to relinquish its participation in domestic security realm has to be achieved. Stepan (1973) s argument of new professionalism noted military expansion to internal warfare occurred due to the incapability of civilian institution in taming the domestic threats. The political nature of Thai military internal security role otherwise displayed that military expansion to domestic warfare was not necessarily triggered by the incapability of civilian institutions.
5. Conclusion
As we have examined above, Thai military has conducted various types of domestic security missions until today. We have learned that Thai military s domestic security role has been always politically oriented based on the five dimensions that embedded within the act. The role has granted a massive advantage for the military to sustain its political involvement. In this context, we can at least identify five dimensions of Thai military s
domestic security role that have aided its political involvement.
The politically oriented internal security participation of Thai military reflected the murky situation of civil-military relations in the country. The failure of democratization to reform the military exponentially and the persistence involvement of the military in domestic warfare highlighted such complicated dynamics. With internal security role feeding the military s political appetite, abolishing military involvement would be elusive as the duty closely related to the armed forces corporate interests. Unlike the case of Brazilian and Peruvian military that was studied by Stepan (1973), Thai military s expansion to internal warfare was not solely due to the incapability of civilian institutions.
The case of Thailand also displayed the failure of reforming the military following democratization contained inherent risk of military intervention and lack of civilian control over the armed forces in the following years after political change. The discussion on the five dimensions furthermore reflected how Thai military participation in domestic security sphere has galvanized its political influence. The examination also provided an understanding of how the involvement in internal warfare fulfils the corporate interests of Thai military. In this way, elucidating five dimensions above helps us to decode the missing link between internal security and political involvement in Thai military s behavioural patterns. They advance our understanding about the politico-security nexus of the Thai military. It is these perspectives that could provide a new insight in the scholarship of military politics in Thailand. This article in addition notes that there are other contributing factors to the expansion of the military to internal security than solely due to the incapability of civilian institutions. **
Notes
１）General Suchinda in 1991 led a mutiny against Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991) and installed a new government with Anand Panyarachun as Prime Minister (1991-1992). But Suchinda took over the post in April 1992 despite his earlier promise of not doing so.
２）The concept noted the military, the monarchy, and the bureaucrats forming a pact that controlled the country.
３）See also Chambers (2013) for discussion on history of Thai military and police involvement in Thai politics.
４）Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat led a mutiny on 13 September 1957 and established a military government in aftermath. Sarit revived the monarchy s political engagement in exchange for providing him the necessary justification for his rule.
５）The Thai monarchy felt threatened with the rise of Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The image of Bolshevik Revolution (1917) that overthrew the Russian monarchy by the communist movement in the country fuelled the Thai monarchy s antagonism towards the CPT. Thailand s US alignment also contributed to the government s hostility against the movement and the party. For
further discussion on the history of CPT, see Beer (1978).
６）2008 ISA reinstated the role and authority of ISOC in managing internal security realm in the country. The act also gave immunity for ISOC members in doing their duties.
７）See 2008 Internal Security Act, Chapter 2 Section 15.
８）After the 2006 military coup, Thaksin supporters formed the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) and identified themselves with wearing red shirt in demonstrating against the coup supporters. On the other side, the coup supporters used yellow shirt as their identity and named their movement as People s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).
９）Gen. Prayuth was Army Commander (2010-2014) and a former member of the Queen s Guards or the 21st Infantry Regiment that is responsible of guarding the Queen and has a close connection with the palace.
10）The use of Malay language was still prohibited and only allowed in 2016.
11）Regarding the conflict in the South, there are already many works from different perspectives. For example, see McCargo (2008) for discussion of the origin of the Southern Thai conflict. Michael K. Connors, a Thai politics scholar, criticizes the negligence of terrorism experts in understanding the nature of the conflict and their overreliance on self-proclaimed intelligence data (Connors, 2007). Furthermore, a study by Marc Askew and Sascha Helbardt found mixed reasons of individuals from the Southern provinces in engaging violent revolt, rather than solely religious logic (Askew & Helbardt, 2012). The insurgency itself has a stronger ethno-nationalism element rather than religious one (Cline, 2007; Srisompob & McCargo, 2010). National level political contestation also played a crucial role rather than international and local politics (McCargo, 2007).
12）Until March 2018, the latest attack erupted on 22 January 2018 when a motorcycle bomb killed three civilians and wounded 22 others in Yala s town market (CNA, 2018). The southern issue also does not show any clear sign of connection with the Islamic State (ISIS). See ICG (2017).
13）Author s interview with Ekraj Imran Sabur, a civil society activist working on Southern Thai issue, Kyoto 15 January 2018.
14）Additionally, the country s decision to support the United States in the Global War on Terror campaign added this antagonism.
15）The area has been a backyard of General Prem who was originated from Songkla province, though he had never been posted there. Until 2001, Prem had been always determining who will be provincial governors, senior military commanders, and other key administrative posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat (McCargo, 2007, p. 40).
16）TRT was established on 14 July 1998 by Thaksin. The party was later dissolved in May 2007 by the Constitutional Tribunal due to election law violation.
17）SBPAC was formed on 20 January 1981 during Prem s premiership under Prime Minister Order 8/1981. Improving and coordinating civilian administration in far south region were the agency s main task. SBPAC also cooperated with the CPM-43 to improve governance and curb armed separatism. For further discussion on SBPAC and CPM-43 see Wheeler (2010). SBPAC and CPM were later reinstated by Surayud in 2006.
18）Bangkok and the southern part of Thailand are strongholds of Democrat party while the northern part of Thailand consists many of Thaksin s supporters. Marc Askew (2008) revealed that the Democrat Party has established a strong network in the south through performing bonds with various groups (phuak) and adopting local values and identities which gave the party the image of southerners party.
19）There was also an allegation that the killings had been started in 2001, prior to the war on drugs campaign. See Moore (2013, p. 227).
20）Author s interview with Ekraj Imran Sabur. 21）Regional army covering the southern provinces.
22）The appointment was largely politically motivated as Thaksin put many of his classmates in various military and posts.
23）However, there is an account arguing that the problem of southern provinces only had a minimum contribution to the triggering of the 2006 coup (Askew, 2014, p. 220).
24）For study on classic counterinsurgency doctrine see Galula (1964).
25）The programme was firstly introduced by the King in 1974. It aimed to alleviate poverty through development and became prominence after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. SEP did not aspire self-sufficiency, but rather a certain degree of sufficiency. See MFA of Thailand (2017).
26）This notion as development soldier was used extensively during Prem s administration in the 1980s and the war against the communist to justify the expansion of the military to civilian realms.
27）BRN is a leading rebel group in the southern provinces of Thailand, formed on 13 March 1963 by Haji Abdul Karim Hassan, striving for an independent Pattani.
28）There were 341 attacks in 2014 and 246 attacks in 2015, compared to 456 attacks in 2013. The number was increased to 307 in 2016 (Abuza, 2017).
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Laws
