• 検索結果がありません。

Exchange Rate Pass Through in Japanese

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

シェア "Exchange Rate Pass Through in Japanese"

Copied!
12
0
0

読み込み中.... (全文を見る)

全文

(1)

Exchange Rate Pass Through in Japanese

Automobile Trade―Empirical Analysis based on the Interviews with Japanese Automobile

Companies

著者 SASAKI Yuri

journal or

publication title

明治学院大学産業経済研究所研究所年報 = The Bulletin of Institute for Research in Business and Economics Meiji Gakuin University

volume 33

page range 91‑101

year 2016‑12‑25

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10723/2969

(2)

91 Exchange Rate Pass Through in Japanese Automobile Trade

共同研究 8  日本の自動車の輸出価格分析

Exchange Rate Pass Through in Japanese Automobile Trade

̶Empirical Analysis based on the Interviews with Japanese Automobile Companies

Yuri Sasaki

1 .Introduction

This  paper  examines  exchange  rate  pass  through  in  Japanese  Automobile  Trade.  The  feature  of  this  paper  is  that  we  develop  a  model  of  export  company  and  examine  some  hypotheses on exchange rate pass through based on the interviews with Japanese Automobile  Companies which we reported in Ito et al. (2008). 

The  interviews  with  automobile  companies  were  conducted  by  the  members  of  RIETI  (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry) Asian Currency project. The report  of the interviews shows that the key elements for determining pass through of exchange  rates are, market share of a good, degree of differentiation, menu cost, trade partners, and  production costs. When a companyʼs market share is small, the company canʼt reflect exchange  rate change to export prices. If a car is well differentiated with other companiesʼ cars, a  company can change its price easily. When menu cost is expensive, price canʼt be changed so  often. Pass-through also depends on whether a company exports automobiles to its affiliated  companies or armʼs length companies. When a company exports to its overseas affiliated  companies, the company tends not to change prices when exchange rate changes because the  company in home country doesnʼt want to put exchange rate risks to its overseas affiliations. 

Also, degree of pass through depends on which currency production costs are denominated. 

If the company imports many intermediate goods in foreign currency, its production costs are  partly denominated in the foreign currency and exchange rate risks are partly offset.  

Based on the key points from the interview, we set a model of exchange pass through. We  overview the pass through models developed so far, and pick up some models and modify  them to test the hypotheses based on the interviews. 

(3)

研 究 所 年 報 92

2 .The interview with Japanese Automobile companies

2 . 1 .The background and the summary of the interviews

The interviews were conducted in 2007 and 2008 in one of the studies of the RIETI project. 

The report of the interviews is included in the discussion paper, Ito et al. (2008). The paper,  through interviews with 12 major Japanese firms, has revealed new “stylized facts” of the  Japanese  firmsʼ  strategy  of  currency  invoicing,  foreign  exchange  risk  managements,  and  price-setting in recent years. The main findings of the paper are summarized in five points. 

First,  the  amendment  of  Foreign  Exchange  and  Foreign  Trade  Control  Law  in  1998  had  significant impact on the foreign exchange risk management of Japanese firms. Electronics  and automobile companies pursue the most efficient settlements of trade transactions under  the amended law, and currency invoicing is one of the most important strategic variables to  optimize their foreign exchange risk managements. 

Second,  as  intra-firm  trade  has  been  increasingly  a  major  part  of  their  external  trade,  Japanese  electronics  and  automobile  companies  have  a  strong  tendency  to  choose  local  currency invoicing in exports to advanced countries, while U.S. dollar invoicing has been  increasing  when  exporting  to  East  Asian  countries.  Such  an  invoicing  strategy  aims  at  stabilizing the local currency (or U.S. dollar) price of their exports in local markets, which  conforms to the pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior discussed in the literature. 

Third, the recent increase in U.S. dollar invoicing in East Asia can be attributed to (i) U.S. 

dollarʼs dominant role of world financial and foreign exchange transactions, (ii) the importance  of the U.S. markets as a final export destination, and (iii) the increasing intra-firm transactions  as Japanese firms has established regional production networks. Fourth, the currency invoicing  and price-setting strategies are affected by competitors in global markets where it is hard to  pass-through exchange rate risks to importers due to the strong market competition. Since  U.S. dollar invoicing is now dominant in the East Asian markets, not only Japanese parent  companies but also local affiliates in East Asia will take exchange rate risks against the U.S. 

dollar  if  the  dollar  fluctuates  unstably.  As  the  intra-regional  trade  keeps  growing,  it  will  become more important for East Asian countries including Japan to stabilize the exchange  rate not vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar but between the regional currencies. This aspect will have  important implications for new strategy of optimal exchange rate risk management and, hence,  establishing regional currency arrangements such as a common currency basket in East Asia.

Figure 1〜3 show the amounts of Japanese automobile exports by the size of the cars and  by destinated country.

(4)

93 Exchange Rate Pass Through in Japanese Automobile Trade

2 . 2  Pass-through

Among several points of the paper, this paper especially focuses on exchange rate pass  through.

We found a couple of important points in the interviews about pass-through of exchange  rates. We asked if they change car prices when exchange rates changes. What they answered  first was, it depends on “market power.” If they have market power in the market, they alter  prices of their products flexible when the exchange rate changes, while they canʼt change  their prices by themselves if they donʼt have market power. This is one of the factors which  pass-through papers have discussed so far. The term “market power” is usually defined as  the power which can change the prices. The automobile companies said that they think the  sources of the market power are market share of the company, quality of the products, and  competitiveness of the company.

3 .Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market. Suppose a  Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to  the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is  assumed to be as follows.

3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

USExpit

 

WJP MJP

JAit US US

it t itYen Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









 (Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

USLocalit

 

WUS MUS

USit US US

it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

itYen Localit

US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US

Export US

US d d

d

 (Eq.3-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export companyʼs profit,  3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

  

JP MJP

it W Exp it US JA US US

it t Yen it Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









 (Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US US

it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

Yen it Localit US Yen it it

LocalP GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

  denotes export price in terms of yen, 

3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

  

JP MJP

it W Exp it US JA US US

it t Yen it Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









(Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US US it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

itYen Localit US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

 denotes demand for the good i, 

3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

  

JP MJP

it W Exp it US JA US US

it t Yen it Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









 (Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US US

it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

itYen Localit US Yen it it

LocalP GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

 denotes the price of  competing companies, 

3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

  

JP MJP

it W Exp it US JA US US

it t Yen it Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









(Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US US it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

itYen Localit US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

 denotes wage price,  3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

  

JP MJP

it W Exp it US JA US US

it t Yen it Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









(Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US US it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

itYen Localit US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

 denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive  goods,

3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

  

JP MJP

it W Exp it US JA US US

it t Yen it Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









 (Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US US

it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

itYen Localit US Yen it it

LocalP GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and 3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

USExpit

 

WJP MJP

JAit US US

it t itYen

Expit US Yen it it

Export GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









(Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US itUS

it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

US it

Yen it Localit US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US Export US

US d d

d

denotes production costs.

3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

USExpit

 

WJP MJP

JAit US US

it t itYen Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









 (Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

USLocalit

 

WUS MUS

USit US US

it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

itUS itYen Localit

US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US

Export US

US d d

d

Where  3. Model

We start with the basic monopolistic competition model of pricing to market.

Suppose a Japanese monopolistic firm in the i-th industry sells in US markets. Later, it will extend to the model of the company exporting into multiple countries. The profit function of the firm is assumed to be as follows.

USExpit

 

WJP MJP

JAit US US

it t itYen Expit US itYen

Exportit GDP C d P P

P P s d

P , , ,

1









 (Eq.4-1)

Where letter i denotes good i and letter t denotes time t. π denotes export company’s profit, PExpJA denotes export price in terms of yen, dUS denotes demand for the good i, P denotes the price of competing companies, P denotes wage price, P denotes price of intermediate goods and primitive goods, s denotes exchange rates in terms of Japanese Yen, and cJA denotes production costs.

USLocalit

 

WUS MUS

USit US US

it it it Local it US

LocalPit GDP C d P P

P d P

P$ $ ,  , ,



 

Where it PitYen P$S1

  

US MUS

it W Local it US US US

itUS itYen Localit

US itYen

LocalPit GDP S C d S P S P

P SP d

P

S     









, , ,

1

Localit it US

Export US

US d d

d

Figure 1. Japanese automobile exports – Small Car
Figure 2. Japanese automobile exports – Medium Car
Figure  3 . Japanese automobile exports  ‒  Large Car

参照

関連したドキュメント

As stated above, information entropy maximization implies negative exponential distribution of urban population density, and the exponential distribution denotes spectral exponent β

For arbitrary 1 < p < ∞ , but again in the starlike case, we obtain a global convergence proof for a particular analytical trial free boundary method for the

If ζ is grounded over all of Spec(R) we will simply say it is grounded. We recall that A ic denotes the class of integrally closed domains, and K ic denotes its limit closure.

Next, we prove bounds for the dimensions of p-adic MLV-spaces in Section 3, assuming results in Section 4, and make a conjecture about a special element in the motivic Galois group

Maria Cecilia Zanardi, São Paulo State University (UNESP), Guaratinguetá, 12516-410 São Paulo,

Then it follows immediately from a suitable version of “Hensel’s Lemma” [cf., e.g., the argument of [4], Lemma 2.1] that S may be obtained, as the notation suggests, as the m A

We will give a different proof of a slightly weaker result, and then prove Theorem 7.3 below, which sharpens both results considerably; in both cases f denotes the canonical

Figure 5.2. This map is shown in Figure 5.3, where boundary edges are identified in pairs as indicated by the labelling of the vertices. Just as P D and P I are related by duality, P