International Inoue Enryo Research 7 (2019): 1–31
© 2019 International Association for Inoue Enryo Research ISSN 2187-7459
I
NOUE
E
NRYO
, K
IYOZAWA
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ANSHI
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THEIR
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HEORY
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Bernat M
ARTI-O
ROVAL0
It is well known that INOUE Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919) and KIYOZAWA Manshi 清沢満 之 (1863–1903) were contemporaries, both members of the Ōtani Denomination of Shinshū Buddhism, graduated from the University of Tokyo's Department of Philoso-phy, and produced novel philosophical interpretations of Buddhism. While the com-monalities in their thought have been previously investigated, there is still a lot of room for research in their relationship. Hence, in this paper I will take up the issue of their theories of the immortality of the soul. As I explain below, when considered within a wider framework, these ideas on the immortality of the soul in fact constitute a re-sponse to anti-religious and scientific perspectives which arose during the course of modernization.
0 Bernat MARTI-OROVAL, Associate Professor, Sophia University. Translated by Nathanial GALLANT, University of Michigan.
1. Nineteenth Century European Materialism and the Negation of the Soul
Entering into the 19th century, the "conflict between faith and reason" which began in early modern Europe, that is, the tension between a traditional worldview based in Christianity and the worldview described by science, only deepened; and not just Christianity but religion itself came to be negated in its entirety by materialism. The debate between materialism and anti-materialism at the time took on a central role in Germany (then the Kingdom of Prussia).1
In short, the Weltanschauung proposed by materialism asserted that only matter exists in the universe (we can call this 'material monism'), and that the mental dimen-sion, the mind and soul, has no substantial existence being nothing more than an epiphenomenon of the body. In addition, as the influence of Romanticism, German Ide-alism and religious worldviews (in particular, pantheism) waned in the post-1840's German-speaking world, a variety of different philosophical interpretations and per-spectives emerged. At that time, the definition of philosophy, as well as its relationship to the scientific worldview and materialism, and the limitations of the scientific stand-point were widely debated. There was thus a significant advance in secularization and anti-Christian perspectives in the Prussian intellectual world. This was not limited to the philosophical context, however, and Prussia as well lead the way in the world of theology, where biblical textual criticism flowered out of the 1830's in whichthe Bible was treated merely as an historical text, and its creators, the period of its composition, and its structure all became the object of scholarly research.2
Then, during the 1850's some physiologists, psychologists, and chemists, among others, in strict intellectual adherence to the principles of scientific research, put for-ward the theory of materialism. That is to say, they attempted to reduce all mental ac-tivity to its chemical, physical and biological components. In this sense, if we accept their theories, then we would have to conclude that the concepts of free will, God, the soul and so on would be, objectively, no more than mere superstitions.
Among the proponents of this theory is notably the chemist Karl VOGT (1817–
1895), who debated the issue of materialism with the famed anatomist and physiolo-gists Rudolf WAGNER (1805–1864), that aroused great interest in this topic among in-1 For more about materialism and anti-materialism in Prussia, see Frederick C. BEISER. After Hegel:
German Philosophy, 1840–1900 (Princeton University Press, 2014); Frederick C. BEISER. Late
Ger-man idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze (Oxford University Press, 2014).
2 For the development of biblical textual criticism in Germany, in particular the Tübingen School, see Horton HARRIS. The Tubingen School: Historical and Theological Investigation of the School of F.C. Baur (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
tellectuals. Wagner proposed that it was possible to reconcile the results of scientific research on the origin of humanity and the teachings of the Bible. Further, he advanced a dualist theory of mind and matter, warning that a materialist theory of the immortality of the soul would destroy the foundations of moral and political structures. In response, Vogt rejected the biblical narrative of humanity's origin (as starting from Adam and Eve), proposing that "the relationship between thought and the brain is equivalent to that of bile and the liver, or urine and the liver," and thus the mind is no more than a physical activity of the brain, and the immortality of the soul no more than a mere reli-gious superstition.3
Other notable materialists included physician and physiologist Ludwig BÜCHNER
(1824–1899), who authored Force and Matter (Germ. Kraft und Stoff), a famous work presenting scientific materialism which critiqued teleological thinking, interpreted the mind as a mere secretory function, and called for a philosophy of atheism. The main goal of this work was to refute the Christian worldview, in addition to claiming that, provided that the soul was no more than an aggregate of materials, free-will was incon-ceivable, much less the immortality of the soul. These theories of materialism quickly lead to the acceptance of the theory of evolution, which had then only recently been in-troduced into Prussia.4
However, there were some notable thinkers in Prussia who, unlike Wagner, did not confront materialism from a Christian perspective. For example, Adolf TRENDELENBERG (1802–1872), Hermann LOTZE (1816–1881), and Eduard von
HARTMANN (1842–1906) opposed the increasingly popular theories of materialism and
Darwinism, proposing a novel version of idealism based in new scientific discoveries. In other words, a perspective which is simultaneously metaphysical, vitalist, and tries to be scientific in its view of the universe. This position can be called "scientific ideal-ism." While these three thinkers have been largely forgotten today, they were widely read in Europe and the United States at the time and considered major philosophers.
3 Cited in ŌHASHI Ichirō大橋容一郎.「反哲学と世紀末」[Anti-philosophy and the end of the century], chapter in『哲学の歴史』[The history of philosophy], vol. 9, ed. by SUDŌ Norihide須藤訓任 (Tokyo: 中 央公論新社, 2007), 388.
4 In England as well, anti-religious theories related to the advance of scientific research developed around the secret dining club known as the "X Club," formed by nine scholars. The club's founder, the physiologist Thomas Henry HUXLEY (1825–1895) proposed the theory of epiphenomenalism, saying that all spiritual matters were epiphenomena of the brain. On the relationship between Enryō and the X Club and its members, particularly Herbert SPENCER, see HASEGAWA Takuya長谷川琢哉 「スペンサーと円了」[Spencer and Enryō], International Inoue Enryo Research 3 (2015): 152–63; and HASEGAWA Takuya 長谷川琢哉.「ヴィクトリア時代英国における不可知論と井上円了」[Enryō and the theory of the Unknowable in Victorian era England], Annual Report of the Inoue Enryo Center 25 (2017): 43–69.
Further, as I will show below, the influence of their thought extended to the philosophi-cal world in Japan.
The intellectual trends of Europe during late 19th and early 20th centuries, that is, the above-mentioned materialist and atheist perspectives (the anti-religious world-view), together with the scientific idealism, were all simultaneously introduced to Japan. On the other hand, thinkers who supported Christianity as well as thinkers with pantheistic perspectives critical of Christianity left their mark on the Japanese intellec-tual world of the time, contributing to the formation of the unique intellecintellec-tual milieu of Meiji Japan. Among the intellectuals known as the "Meiji Six Society" 明六社 for in-stance, TSUDA Mamichi 津 田 真 道 (1829–1903), FUKUZAWA Yukichi 福 沢 諭 吉 (1835– 1901), TOYAMA Masakazu 外山正一 (1848–1900), and KATŌ Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 (1838– 1916) all took positions that were closely associated with materialism. Further, beyond the Meiji Six Society, MOTORA Yūjirō 元良勇次郎 (1858–1912) and NAKAE Chōmin 中江 兆民 (1847–1901) were thinkers with a particular interest in materialism.5 Accordingly,
in 1898, as Enryō laments in Refuting Materialism『破唯物論』, materialism was a sig-nificant trend in the Meiji period: "lately, those who are considered the great men of Meiji have been in large part swept up in this wave, and the flag of materialism has been more and more unfurling among my great, middling and lesser predecessors. This trend is like the saying 'if one dog barks at nothing, a thousand others will raise the alarm' [a single lie can easily spread and become an accepted truth], and when these voices of blind repetition have finally become a chorus, it is no longer possible for me to continue sitting and watching in silence" (IS 23: 523).6 Thus, as I will expand on
be-low, for Enryō and Manshi refuting materialism and proving the existence of the soul became an essential task.
From a contemporary perspective, materialism's firm rootedness within science might lead us to the hasty conclusion that the religious thought of Enryō and Manshi was no more than a reactionary response to the anti-religious scientific world-view
5 For the history of materialism in Japan, see NAGATA Hiroshi 永田広志.『日本唯物論史』[The history of materialism in Japan] (Tokyo: 新日本出版社, 1983); Gerard Clinton GODART. " 'Philosophy' or 'Reli-gion'? The Confrontation with Foreign Categories in Late Nineteenth-Century Japan," Journal of the History of Ideas 69.1 (2008): 71–91.
6 While there were those among the Japanese intellectual elite, particularly around the Meiji Six Soci-ety, who were materialists and proposed that there was no real basis behind religion, as a matter of fact most of them still acknowledged the moral function of religion and thus its necessity for main -taining social order. For details see KOIZUMI Takashi 小泉仰.「啓蒙思想家の宗教観」[The religious views of Enlightenment thinkers], in『明治思想家の宗教観』[Religious perspectives of Meiji thinkers], ed. by Society for Research on the History of Comparative Thought 比 較 思 想 史 研 究 会 (Tokyo: 大 蔵 出 版, 1975), 53–114.
dominant of their time. However, analyzing the content of their education at the Uni-versity of Tokyo, we discover that the influence of thinkers who were anti-materialists or advocated the reconciliation of modern science and religion cannot be overesti-mated. It is also worth noting that Enryō and Manshi, both Buddhist intellectuals, took many ideas from that context in their attempt to respond to the perspectives of modern-ization and modern science. In the following section, I will examine these aspects of their education.
2. Anti-Materialism in the University of Tokyo Curriculum
In 1878, Enryō traveled to the capital and enrolled in the Preparatory School of the University of Tokyo 東京大学予備門. Upon graduation in 1881, he enrolled in the Univer-sity of Tokyo's Department of Philosophy as a student of this newly established depart-ment. From their time in preparatory school, Enryō and Manshi were trained in the lat-est intellectual trends of the time under both Japanese and newly recruited foreign fac-ulty members. Among them, their encounter with Ernest FENOLLOSA (1853–1908)
proved to be fundamental for both. A year after graduating from Harvard in 1878, Ernest Fenollosa was hired as a foreign faculty member at the University of Tokyo. While he later focused his work on the history of Japanese art, at that time he lectured not only on philosophy, but economics and politics, among other topics. Strictly speak-ing, he was not a specialist in philosophy, but a recently graduated scholar who lec-tured on philosophical texts either originally written in or that had been translated into English. Concretely he used the English translations of Friedrich UEBERWEG's (1826–
1871) Sketch of the History of Philosophy,7 Albert SCHWEGLER'S (1819–1857) History
of Philosophy, and Francis BOWEN'S (1811–1890) Modern Philosophy: From
Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann as handbooks for his lectures.8 Enryō and
Manshi were deeply influenced by these writings not only during their university edu-cations, but we can see that they relied on them as reference material in their later works.
7 In UEBERWEG's History of Philosophy the debates between materialism and scientific idealism dur-ing the Prussian Empire are introduced in the chapter "The Present State of Philosophy in Germany." See Friedrich UEBERWEG. History of Philosophy: from Thales to the Present Time, vol. 2 (New York:
Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1873), 292–337.
8 BOWEN's 1884 work was partially translated (the first 12 of the complete 24 chapters) into Japanese by ARIGA Nagao 有 賀 長 雄 (1860–1921). ARIGA was one of the nine students who attended FENOLLOSA's lectures on the history of philosophy in 1879.
When considering the issue of materialism and anti-materialism at the University of Tokyo, it is first necessary to consider the textbook Fenollosa used in his class on early modern and modern philosophy: the above mentioned Modern Philosophy writ-ten by Francis Bowen, who was Fenollosa's teacher at Harvard University. A closer look at this text reveals a sharp critique of materialist philosophy,9 as there are some
passages of his work where Bowen, himself a Christian, considers materialism a largely baseless, incorrect, and meaningless hypothesis.10 Further, in the fourth and
fi-nal chapter of his history of philosophy, he gives a detailed introduction to Arthur SCHOPENHAUER (1782–1860) and Hartmann's thought, specifically in distinction to
materialist philosophy.
Moreover, considering the content of Fenollosa's lectures on early modern philos-ophy at the University of Tokyo, a critique of perspectives based solely in science and materialism comes into focus. That said, while he refers to Bowen's texts, he takes a different position from him on this matter. The reason is that, unlike his mentor, there is a clearly visible inclination towards an anti-Christian, pantheistic perspective in the record of Fenollosa's lectures.11 Further, Herbert SPENCER (1820–1903), a
contempora-9 MIYAKE Yūjirō三宅雄次郎, better known as MIYAKE Setsurei 三宅雪嶺 (1860–1945), who attended FENOLLOSA's lectures in 1880 and 1881, recalled their content as follows: "While Fenollosa intro-duced German philosophy to Japan, he had not studied it very deeply. He said that he wanted to go to Germany and do research there, but later he got interested in Japanese art, plunged into it and left philosophy. The reference material for students in class was the English translation of Schwegler's History of philosophy, without more specifications. Therefore, students mostly read on their own in the library, learning outside the course through the history of modern philosophy [written] by the American [professor] Bowen. While Bowen was Fenollosa's instructor at Harvard University, he never mentioned this." (MIYAKE Yūjirō三宅雄次郎.「明治哲学界の回顧（附記）」[Reflections on the world of Meiji philosophy, with an appendix],『 岩 波 講 座 哲 学 』[Iwanami course in philosophy] (Tokyo: 岩波書店, 1933): 91). In spite of MIYAKE's words, if we take a look at FENOLLOSA's lectures taken by his students and available to us nowadays, it is noteworthy that BOWEN and his history of philosophy are quoted several times. See, for example, IKEGAMI Tetsuji 池上哲司, ed.『フェノロサ「哲学 史」講義』[Fenollosa's lectures on The History of Philosophy] (Otani University, 2013), 43, 49, 50– 51, 63, 75, 87, 102.
10 Francis BOWEN. Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann, vol. 2 (New
York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1877), 466.
11 He writes that: "the natural phenomena are produced or caused by the inner, abstract, indefinite power. So that all the social phenomena are governed by a supernatural power. So there soon comes something which the scientific method cannot explain or solve" (IKEGAMI.『フェノロサ「哲学史」講義』
(see note 9), 111). Further, when introducing Spencer's thought and assessing a pantheistic world-view he explains: "Mr. H. Spencer living in the present day of nineteenth century holds nothing dif-ferent from this. Instead of God, he erects the Unknowable," (Ibid. 162). In FENOLLOSA's first lectures in Japan, "On the Origin of Religion and the Theory of Evolution" (1878), he discusses the ori -gin of religion, calling for a Spencerian, anti-Christian, anti-revelatory understanding of religion. In other words, he proposes that humanity originally did not have an idea of religion, but rather it was a phenomenon that arose as humanity's intellectual capacities developed, born gradually from a belief in the existence of the soul. See Ernest FENOLLOSA; YAMAGUCHI Seiichi 山口靜一, ed.『フェノロサ社会 論 集 』[Collection of Fenollosa's papers on social theory] (Kyoto: 思 文 閣 出 版, 2000). However,
neous thinker who Fenollosa greatly admired, had called for an anti-Christian, anti-rev-elatory theory of the origin of religion, which nonetheless cannot be considered to be anti-religious.12
In concrete terms, Spencer's First Principles (1862) proposes a division of all hu-man knowledge into two areas: the "knowable" and the "unknowable." This was of course based in Kant's theory of "phenomenon" and "noumenon." However, Spencer provided a novel perspective from which to analyze this distinction. Spencer's realm of the "knowable," equivalent to Kant's realm of "phenomenon," was the realm which could be cognized by the human mind. In other words, all phenomena in that world are the object of scientific research and in accordance with the laws of science (for in-stance, the laws of conservation of energy, conservation of mass or the theory of evolu-tion). Notwithstanding, according to Spencer, while ultimate reality is "unknowable," it is in some way fathomable. In other words, there is a "force" behind all phenomena that is the driving impulse of everything in the universe, which Spencer calls the "first principle."
This postulate was shared by several other 19th-century thinkers. For example, it is not difficult to find resemblances between this theory and Schopenhauer's concept of the "will" or Hartmann's concept of the "unconscious," among others. That is to say, unlike the perspective of materialism, they considered it impossible to explain the inner
FENOLLOSA's opinions on Christianity seems to be slightly different later on in his life. For example, in his 1898 Materialism, he asserts that "one cause" of the spiritual degradation of late 19th century Japan was the "skeptical individuality born from the discovers of natural sciences," and as a result, "not only was materialism temptation rampant, but faith in ideals had been shattered," ( p. 268). Of the worsening situation he also comments that, "the great battle over materialism in Japan is also be-ing fought today the world over [...] there is no East vs. West [here], on both sides the same kind of skepticism is being fought," (p. 272) in relation to which he expresses his hope that Buddhism and Christianity could be possible tools to help in combating these trends. Furthermore, he called for the cooperation among Buddhists and Christians in order to protect the "shared belief of all in Heaven, the immortal soul and the spirit," common to both traditions (p. 273). Ernest FENOLLOSA; MURAKATA Akiko 村形明子, ed.『アーネスト・F・フェノロサ文書集成 : 翻刻・翻訳と研究』[Ernest Fenol-losa's collected writings: Reprint, translation and research], vol. 2 (Kyoto: 京都大学学術出版会, 2001). 12 SAKATANI Yoshio's阪谷芳郎 (1863–1941) record of FENOLLOSA's lecture shows that KANT's
philo-sophical thought was introduced not only in relation to German Idealism, but also in relation to SPENCER: "We know nothing about Ding an Sich. This is the skeptical result of Kantian Philosophy. We can not prove God because we have no intuition. So far as Philosophy is concerned, Spencer's philosophy is the new Kantianism, though he is superior to Kant as far as science goes. In fact, all modern philosophy is affected by Kant." SUGIHARA Shirō杉原四郎.「フェノロサの東京大学講義：阪谷芳郎 の 筆 記 ノ ー ト を 中 心 に 」[On Sakatani Yoshio's notes from Fenollosa's lectures at the University of Tokyo],『季刊社会思想』[Quarterly journal of social thought] 2.4 (1973): 193. As the above shows, FENOLLOSA understood KANT's influence to have extended to early modern and modern philosophy, and Spencer to be representative of the New Kantians. In other words, SPENCER, like KANT, based his theory of knowledge on the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, but ultimately ar-rived at different conclusions.
workings of the universe based on matter alone. Hence, in their understanding it was necessary to imagine the existence of a kind of "force" working as the foundation of phenomena. Although this idea was not directly connected to any religious interpreta-tion, it allowed for potential religious, and in particular pantheistic perspectives.
Furthermore, TOYAMA Masakazu's "Lectures on Western Philosophy" at the
Uni-versity of Tokyo was a course which principally studied psychology of the day, making use of Alexander BAIN's (1818–1903) Psychology, William CARPENTER'S (1813–1885)
Principles of Mental Physiology, Spencer's System of a Synthetic Philosophy (1881),
and others.13 If we take a look at the content of these works, it is worth to note
Spencer's questioning of epiphenomenalism, the theory that all mentation is reducible to epiphenomena of neurological processes.14
Fenollosa eventually left his post at the University of Tokyo and founded the Tokyo Fine Arts School (now the Tokyo University of the Arts). In 1887, a German scholar named Ludwig BUSSE (1862–1907) took up his position in the University of
Tokyo's Department of Philosophy, a crucial change that allowed Manshi to be in close contact with a genuine researcher in the field of philosophy. Busse based his lectures primarily on Lotze, Kant and other contemporaneous German philosophers. While Lotze has been largely forgotten today, his work is highly representative of late 19th-century German philosophy, being a thinker who specialized in medicine and philoso-phy, attempting to unify metaphysics and science. While Busse's lectures at the Univer-sity of Tokyo have not yet been studied by scholars today, Busse's bend towards anti-materialism is undeniable. For example, in 1903, after returning to Germany, he pub-lished a work entitled Mind and Body, Soul and Body (Germ. Geist und Körper, Seele
und Leib) which presents a critique of materialism and a call for idealism and monism.
It is as well significant that, outside of the lectures at the University of Tokyo, En-ryō and Manshi encountered the work of other scholars which advocated theories of the soul and anti-materialist thought. One example in particular are the lectures of the Canadian Methodist priest Charles Samuel EBY (1845–1925), whose "Tokyo Lectures"
every Saturday between January 6th and April 14th of 1883 at the Meiji Hall in Kobi-kichō were conducted in both Japanese and English.15 The lectures, aimed at young
13 MIURA Setsuo 三浦節夫.『井上円了：日本近代の先駆者の生涯と思想』[Inoue Enryō: The life and thought of a pioneer of Japanese modernity] (Tokyo: 教育評論社, 2016): 106.
14 Cfr. Herbert SPENCER. Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton and Company,
1881), 129–142. Also, John FISKE, who was another of FENOLLOSA's teachers at Harvard, explained SPENCER's theories in Cosmic Philosophy, vol. 2 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1874), 73–97. 15 On EBY, see TAKAHASHI Masao高橋昌郎.『明治のキリスト教』[Meiji Christianity] (Tokyo: 吉川弘文館,
members of the Japanese intelligentsia, voiced opposition to Spencer's theory of the unknowable and Darwin's theory of evolution, with the goal of defending and prosely-tizing Christianity. In June of the same year, Eby published the record of his lectures as
Christianity and Humanity.
One of those lectures is worth noting in this context. Entitled "The Scientific View: The Relations of the Christian Religion to Natural Science, especially to the Theory of Evolution," it was delivered by a Scottish faculty member of the University of Tokyo who specialized in Mechanical Engineering named James Alfred EWING
(1885–1935). Ewing was a gifted engineer and physicist, and in 1883, the year of Eby's lectures, he returned to England to become a faculty member at Cambridge University. Later he was chosen as a member of the venerated Royal Society, becoming a well-known scholar and eventual president of the University of Edinburgh. A scientist of the highest caliber, Ewing set out in his lecture at the University of Tokyo to reconcile reli-gion (Christianity) and science.16 When reading his lecture, it becomes clear to us that
he relied heavily on the thought of physicist James Clerk MAXWELL (1831–1879).
Even if we cannot count this lecture as a major influence on Enryō's thought, in Enryō's notes from his time as a University of Tokyo student we can see references to Ewing's conference. Specifically, in notes written in English during his third year as a student of philosophy, in a section entitled "A Note from Tokio Lecture by J. A." we find the following passage:
The progress of science has added nothing of importance to what has always been known about the physical consequences of death, but has rather tended to deepen the distinction between the visible part, which perishes before our eyes, and that which we are ourselves, and to show that this personality, with respect to its nature as well as to its destiny, lies quite beyond the range of science.17
16 EWING attempted to refute the claims done by John William DRAPER (1811–1882) in his The History of Conflict between Religion and Science, an anti-Christian tract translated in Japanese in 1883 which received attention not only in the West, but in Japan as well. There, DRAPER claimed against
the "intolerance of Christianity towards scholarship," reacting against the bull Dei Filius issued in 1870 by Pope Pious the 9th (1792–1878). Pope Pious document criticized Protestantism, rationalism, pantheism, materialism and atheism, and ultimately called for a unification of reason and belief. As a response, DRAPER wrote a history of the attacks on science by the Catholic Church. We can also find references to DRAPER in Enryō's notes from his student years. See KITAGAWA Toyoie 喜多川豊宇.「井 上円了英文稿録解」[Edition of Inoue Enryō's English notebook], in『井上円了と西洋思想』[Inoue Enryō and Western thought], ed. by SAITŌ Shigeo ed. 齋藤繁雄 (Tokyo: 東洋大学井上円了記念学術振興基金, 1988), 214–215.
17 KITAGAWA.「井上円了英文稿録解」(see note 16), 209. This is a citation from EWING's which is in turn a
quote from MAXWELL's essay "Paradoxical Philosophy." See James Alfred EWING, "The Scientific View: the relations of the Christian Religion to Natural Science, especially to the Theory of Evolu-tion," in Christianity and Humanity, ed. by Charles S. EBY (Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn & Co., 1883): 86–87; or, for the original work, see James Clerk MAXWELL. The Scientific Papers of James
Although we do not know whether Enryō also attended this lecture, since the memo coincides with the published record of the lecture, we can presume it to be a transcrip-tion taken from Eby's work.
As I have tried to show in the above paragraphs, at the University of Tokyo Enryō and Manshi were introduced to many thinkers pursuing the reconciliation of religion and science or advocating for anti-materialist theories, and others who supported the theory of the immortality of the soul. Further, Fenollosa, who taught Enryō and Man-shi, as well as Busse, who taught ManMan-shi, in a wider sense can be regarded as anti-ma-terialists. As I will expand on below, Enryō and Manshi used these scholars' work as a foundation in their efforts to respond to the theories of materialism and prove the exis-tence of the spiritual dimension. To them, the exisexis-tence of the soul was in fact a neces-sary condition of the spiritual world, and thus they strove to prove its existence. More-over, they not only took up the issue of the existence of the soul but emphasized its im-mortality as a key topic as well.
3. Enryo and Manshi's Theory of the Immortality of the Soul
Statements about the existence of the soul and its immortality can be found in a variety of Enryō's works. For instance, the issue is treated in his 1894 Lectures on Mystery
Studies『妖怪学講義』(IS 18: 150–151), his 1898 The Buddhist Science『仏教理科』(IS 7: 463) and Refuting Materialism『破唯物論』of the same year. As well, his 1899 (Popular
Lectures) On the Immortality of the Soul『（通俗講義）霊魂不滅論』systematically laid out his theory of the soul. In the following pages, I will focus on Enryō's theory of the im-mortality of the soul relying on this book.18
Clerk Maxwell, ed. by W. D. NIVEN, vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1890), 762.
18 On Enryō's ideas about the soul and the theory of the immortality of the soul, see: KŌDA Retsu 甲田 烈.「「不思議」の相含構造：井上円了と南方熊楠をめぐって」[The mutually inclusive structure of 'mystery': on Inoue Enryō and Minakata Kumagusu], International Inoue Enryō Research 3 (2015): 64–81. KŌDA Retsu甲田烈.「円了哲学のスピリチュアリティ：回転の論理を中心に」[On the theory of return: Spiri-tuality in the philosophy of Inoue Enryō], Annual Report of the Inoue Enryo Center 24 (2016): 65– 100. KATŌ Hisatake 加藤尚武.「死生観の東西：井上円了の霊魂論」[Views on life and death in East and West: Inoue Enryō's theory of the soul], Annual Report of the Inoue Enryo Center 25 (2017): 3–20. On Manshi's theory of the soul and its immortality, see: HINO Keigo 日野圭悟.「清沢満之の『宗教哲学骸 骨』第三章「霊魂論」について」[On chapter three, 'Theory of the Soul' in Kiyozawa Manshi's Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion],『大谷大学大学院研究紀要』[Bulletin of the Otani University Graduate School] 21 (2004): 29–54. TAMURA Akinori 田村晃徳.「清沢満之における｢霊魂｣ 」[The soul in Kiy-ozawa Manshi],『日本仏教学会年報』[Annual report of the Japanese Buddhist Studies Association] 71 (2005): 257–58. HINO Keigo 日野圭悟.「清沢満之と「自己」の問題｣ [Kiyozawa Manshi and the problem of the 'self'],『宗教研究』[Research on religion] 79.4 (2006): 1183–85.YAMAMOTO Nobuhiro山本伸裕.
While Enryō was elder and became a mature scholar before Manshi, Manshi dis-cussed the theory of the soul and its immortality as a fundamental issue earlier in his career. In fact, Manshi conceived his theory of the soul in an array of texts he wrote on the philosophy of religion (materials written between 1888 and 1893); a theory of the soul that we can interpret as the fundamental principle of his philosophy of religion.19
In the below sections I will introduce and analyze Enryō and Manshi's theories along five different lines of inquiry.
3.1 Opposition to Materialism
As mentioned in the previous section, Enryō and Manshi were at great odds with ma-terialist scholars and thinkers who negated the existence of religion, thus an essential task for them was defending religion and providing proof for its necessity.20
In the case of Enryō, while he did not take up the issue of the soul or its immortal-ity in earnest until the turn of the century, his thought consistently contains critiques of materialism. For example, in the Epitome of Philosophy『哲学要領』when he traces the thread of Western philosophy, he divides the history of philosophy and its evolution into seven stages. Within them, materialism is considered the second stage, in other words, a low position within this schema (IS 1: 152–53). Further, when analyzing the materialist reduction of the mind, he provides the counterargument that the question of
「清沢満之の霊魂論｣ [Kiyozawa Manshi's theory of the soul],『現代と親鸞』[Contemporary times and Shinran] 12 (2007): 24–44. Bernat MARTI-OROVAL.「清沢満之の「自覚の一体」としての霊魂定義について： ロッツェの影響を中心に」[The influence of Lotze in Manshi's definition of the soul as an 'apperceiving substance'],『印度學佛教學研究』[Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 60 (2011): 547–50. Bernat MARTI-OROVAL.「清沢満之の宗教哲学における霊魂滅否について：西洋思想の影響を中心に」[The influence of Western thought in the theory of the immortality of the soul in Kiyozawa Manshi's philosophy of religion],『近代仏教』[Modern Buddhism] 19 (2012a): 85–106. Bernat MARTI-OROVAL.「清沢満之の 宗教哲学における霊魂論：仏教教理を中心に」[The influence of Buddhist doctrine in the theory of the soul in Kiyozawa Manshi's philosophy of religion],『印度學佛教學研究』[Journal of Indian and Buddhist studies] 61 (2012b): 185–89.
19 Manshi cultivated a new research field in Japan, the study of philosophy of religion, the results of which can be seen in his Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion『 宗教 哲学 骸骨 』(below Skeleton), a summary of his lectures on this topic held at the Shinshu University in 1892. However, because this work just gave general outlines of his thought, to get a clearer picture of his understanding of philos-ophy of religion it is necessary to consult all the materials he wrote between 1887 and 1893 relating to this topic: articles, notes, lectures or even the notes he took when he was a student (all of which are collected together in vol.1 of KMZ).
20 For example, as he wrote when he still was a student at the University of Tokyo: "I feel certain that Christianity is not my greatest enemy, but it is those who possess no religion or who are against reli-gion [...] [these] are the so called physicists, lawyers and politicians. Some developing theories, the others investigating through experimentation, attempting to show my religion to be nothing more than empty and erroneous theories" (IS 25: 718). Cited in HASEGAWA.「ヴィクトリア時代英国における不 可知論と井上円了」(see note 4): 59.
what matter is in itself is never clearly answered by materialists. For his part, Enryō suggests that mind and matter are born of the same "mysterious" principle (IS 1: 177).
Moreover, Refuting Materialism (1897) is, as the title indicates, Enryō's earnest endeavor to oppose the theory of materialism. The following year he also wrote On the
Immorality of the Soul, in which he introduced the problems from the previous work in
an extended, albeit simplified fashion. As he wrote in his On the Immorality of the
Soul, this work was the result of "feeling a need to introduce to the world a more
famil-iar, everyday explanation than in Refuting Materialism" (IS 19: 309). Therefore, as he explained he "intended to reject materialism by advocating a theory of the soul," (IS 19: 328) which means that, from his point of view, proving the existence of the soul immediately leads to refuting materialism.
While Manshi did not take up the denial of materialism as fervently as Enryō, in passages where he does analyze various theories of the soul, his critique of materialism is fierce. In particular, his Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion (below Skeleton), pub-lished in 1892, calls "utterly illogical" (KMZ 1: 15) the materialist understanding of the soul, that is, he rejects the assertion that what we call "the soul" is a mere epiphe-nomenon of physical activities, and our psyches no more than the results of a physical reaction. In the sections below, I will delve into greater detail about the bases on which Enryō and Manshi built their critique of materialism's negation of the soul.
3.2 The Immortality of the Soul as an Essential, Metaphysical Truth
Enryō and Manshi, along with INOUE Tetsujirō (1855–1944), developed their
philo-sophical inquiry assuming metaphysics as its foundation. According to them, while the object of natural sciences consists of studying, analyzing, and measuring phenomena, metaphysics investigates their fundamental, universal principles. In other words, it traces things back to the ultimate principles common to all forms of knowledge, and uses the deductive method to construct a philosophical system that includes all knowl-edge.21 This is because they believed that the universe itself is rational and the
funda-mental principles of the universe could be understood through reason. Though their un-derstanding of philosophy was rooted in Ancient Greece, in particular Aristotelian thought, it has many points in common with German idealism.
21 For the understanding of metaphysics in Meiji era Japan, see KOSAKA Kunitsugu小坂国継.『明治哲学の 研究：西周と大西祝』[Research on Meiji philosophy: Nishi Amane and Ōnishi Hajime] (Tokyo: 岩波書 店, 2013), 297–399. KOSAKA Kunitsugu 小坂国継「明治期の形而上学」[Metaphysics in the Meiji pe-riod],『国際哲学研究』[International philosophy research] 3 (2014): 95–107.
That understanding of philosophy was set forth by Enryō, for example, in an 1887 article in the first issue of the Journal of the Society of Philosophy『 哲学 会雑 誌』, in which he writes that philosophy "is a discipline which inquires into the principle of things, and the laws of thought" (IS 25: 745). In other words, for him philosophy was an investigative activity, which clarified the fundamental principles of all fields of study. He of course approached issues in On the Immortality of the Soul in the same way. For instance, it is obvious how he deeply believed in the power of reason when he states that: "reason is the transcendental imagination [超理的想像] of the utmost refine-ment and profundity in our thinking [...] the relationship between our minds and the unknowable lies nowhere else but in our reasoning power [...] as such I consider reason to be a limitless faculty, which unites philosophy and religion" (IS 19: 359–60). As well, when he remarks that, "as explained in [my] theory on the immortality of the soul, for that which fundamentally cannot be reached through experience, proof is of-fered ny means of all the principles of reason [理 想 の 道 理]," (IS 19: 361). In other words, he considers metaphysics to be superior to the knowledge achieved by inductive reasoning of the natural sciences, considering reason to be far beyond experience.
We can see a similar methodology in Manshi's essays on the philosophy of reli-gion. While he uses natural scientific research as evidence in support of his theory of the soul, in the end he judges that "it is utterly impossible to establish that the soul is immortal or not from the experiential facts [実験上ノ事実], no matter what is said, the souls immortality must be decided through the reason we have put forth already," (KMZ 1: 242) thus rather than by "experience," the foundation of the theory of the soul's immortality must lay in "reason."
While both thinkers deployed reason to build their own theories of the immortality of the soul, their methodology was slightly different. In order to clarify the differences, we can first summarize Enryō's thinking in the form of the following syllogism:
1. According to the laws of the universe, no matter ever ceases to exist, (which is the major premise), therefore
2. All existing beings are a unity of soul and matter, (minor premise), thus 3. The soul is immortal (conclusion).
In a more concrete explanation of the major premise, Enryō held that the entire uni-verse was governed by three laws, "the law of the preservation of matter," "the persis-tence of force," and "the persispersis-tence of cause and effect." These three laws in fact show the deep impact Spencer had on Enryō, as these concepts were introduced in the three
following chapters of Spencer's First Principles: "The Indestructibility of Matter," "The Persistence of Force," and "The Persistence of Relations Among Force."
Enryō introduces the first law as, "that which is cannot become nothing, and noth-ing cannot become somethnoth-ing," and thus on the basis of this he concludes that "there is no doubt about the immortality of the soul" (IS 19: 315).22 Further, as another scientific
basis for the immortality of the soul, he mentions the second law of the "persistence of force," explaining that "this law [proves that] even if an existing force can become mo-tion or heat or kinetic force, it is never extinguished even if it goes through many changes" (IS 19: 326). Finally, as a response to materialism, he adds the "ammunition of the law of the persistence of cause and effect" (IS 19: 326).
Continuing with the explanation of the above minor premise, Enryō called for a "theory of unity between matter and mind," to establish a monism that transcends both the theories of materialism and idealism. As such, the world viewed from this ultimate perspective would unite the dual realms of matter and mind in an inseparable relation-ship.23 Drawing from a theory which holds that within all beings is housed both a mind
and body and applying it to his concept of the soul, Enryō elucidates that:
In ancient theories of the soul it was thought that there is a substantial spirit separated from the body, which could freely enter and exit [the body], and when this spirit entered into a body it was brought to life, and when it left the body it returned to death. However, from recent experiments is known the dif-ficulty of completely separating the body and soul. When realizing that this free entrance and exit [of the soul from the body] is impossible, the theory of the soul will naturally undergo a complete change. Beginning with me, most of the advocates for the immortality of the soul think that there is no place for the complete separation of the soul from the body, but rather it is intimately bound to the body. We speak of 'life' as long as this internal mind exhibits its function on the body, which is a gathering of matter. We call it 'death' when it recedes and is submerged back inside. (IS 19: 345)24
22 This probably is a translation of a passage from SPENCER's First Principles, where he writes: "it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something." Herbert SPENCER. First Principles (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1864): 181–82.
23 For example, in Enryō's『哲学一夕話』[An evening conversation about philosophy], he takes the posi-tion that: "Principle includes both mind and matter, and mind and matter furnish principle; there is no distinction between the two. Although they are distinct, they are not separated. I take this to be the middle way of philosophical principles" (IS 1: 35).
24 However, while advocating for the "unity of mind and body" there are passages in Enryō's works where he clearly leans toward idealism. For example, when he states: "The human spirit is not pro-duced out of the makeup of the flesh, the various patterns and causes in which the spirit itself was originally collected together work beyond the material and make up the flesh. In other words, our bodies are made up out of the operations of the spirit. To put it even another way, we come back to
Finally, combining the minor and major premises mentioned above, Enryō writes that, "if we have to consider the permanence or extinction of the soul, [as] equated to that of the body,then as long as the permanence of the existence of the body is clear, we must also admit the immortality of the soul" (IS 19: 316). Thus, based on the (1) universal law of the preservation of matter, and (2) the unity of matter and the soul, then (3) the immortality of the soul becomes the inevitable conclusion.
Let me now examine Manshi's theory of the immortality of the soul. According to Manshi, the soul is a "particular core substance" which binds "mental activities" (KMZ 1:15). In addition, he wrote that its existence is an "unconditional postulate" (KMZ 1:82). This is because, as Manshi theorizes in chapter four of his Skeleton, even if all phenomena in the universe may change, there exists a "persistent substance" 一体貫通 which serves as its indispensable basis (KMZ 1: 17). Manshi considered that, as hap-pens in the case of natural phenomena, there must exist a foundation to all the changes that happen to human beings, and that basis must be the soul (KMZ 1: 15–16; 312). Further, that "persistent substance" does not only refers to the basis on which the order of natural things is made possible, but it is also the grounding of the law of karmic ret-ribution, in other words, the foundation of morals and religion itself. As he explains:
if the so called 'shift of delusion into awakening' [転迷開悟] or are in the end no more than a transformation process, it must exist a persistent substance. What is that entity that [suffers] 'delusion' or [attains] 'awakening,' that 'cultivates and experiences'? It is none other than each of our own souls. In other words, our soul is the substance that persists [in the transition] from delusion to awak-ening, that persists between spiritual practice and its outcome. (KMZ 1: 17–18) This does not only demonstrate the existence of the soul, but its immortality as neces-sary, a priori. That is, in his works on philosophy of religion the soul is defined as an existence that can "develop" 発展, which aims to achieve the state of limitlessness from a state of limitation: "it is undeniable that the soul [霊魂] is that existence which can de-velop without limit and arrive at the point of completion" (KMZ 1: 303). Based on this definition, Manshi asserts the immortality of the soul: "[if the soul] is the substance that can achieve unlimited development [...] and must follow that unlimited path, then it is necessary that it does not perish" (KMZ 1: 303). As such, because this limited thing directed towards limitlessness (the soul) would need infinite time to reach that
the idea that the spirit is the cause, and the flesh is the result" (IS 19: 346). Thus, as we can see in this quote, while in his monistic thinking the body and the spirit are the same, spiritual matters are given a governing role over material matters.
limitlessness, we must presuppose its immortality. In other words, through his own def-inition of the soul, Manshi deduces its immortality.25
3.3 The Use of the Term "Soul"
While this point may already be clear, both Enryō and Manshi used the term "soul" 霊 魂, which was originally unrelated to Buddhism. As I will explain below, their theory of the immortality of the soul attempted an analysis of religion and philosophy as a universal phenomenon while rooted in some key Buddhist concepts. This explains why, when in the following passage Enryō lamented the growing influence of the de-nial of the existence of soul among late 19th-century Japanese elites, he stated that "it appears that everyone has become a critic of the theories of the soul established in an-cient times, like [that of] Shintō, Buddhism and Christianity." Therefore, from his point of view, his "theory of the soul" was something shared by Buddhism, Shintō and Chris-tianity. It is also plausible to think that, through their use of psychological terminology both had learned in their classes at the University of Tokyo, they tried to make their theories appear "modern" and "scientific." However, there is an issue of consistency between their theory of the soul and the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of "no-self" 無 我, even if they made little comment on this point.26
3.4 The Influence of their University of Tokyo Education
An analysis of Enryō and Manshi's theory of the immortality of the soul would clearly show the influence they received from the materials they read and the thinkers they en-countered during their time at the University of Tokyo. As already stated, this was cer-tainly the case with Spencer, but we can see the influence of other philosophers as well. For instance, in Enryō's On the Immortality of the Soul it is established that because mind and body, physical and mental realms, are inextricably united, the division be-tween life and lifelessness remains unclear: "we must reflect on the inanimate material
25 Even now materialism and antimaterialism continue to be an important topic of debate in the philo -sophical world, particularly in the field of the Philosophy of Knowledge. While it is true that materi-alism and monism constitute the mainstream of current scholarship, there are thinkers who, in con-trast to materialism or neurological reductionism, still hold that it is impossible to explain the experi-ence of self-consciousness or subjectivity based on the material alone. For an example of such an anti-materialist position, see David CHALMERS. The Conscious Mind, in search of a Theory of Con-scious Experience (Oxford University Press, 1995).
26 On the relationship between theories of the soul and non-self in Manshi's work, see MARTI-OROVAL. 「清沢満之の宗教哲学における霊魂論」(see note 18): 185–89.
world that has existed since eons ago at the beginning of time. As such, since we know the spirit [精神] existed within matter eons ago, we can understand that it was within this lifeless material that the mind was conceived" (IS 19: 330–331). As I will explain in the following paragraphs, this way of arguing is reminiscent of Hartmann's notion of the "Unconscious."
Hartmann stated in his Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869) that we could not make a clear distinction between life and death in organisms, and that a separate soul did not exist, but rather there was a hidden force called "the Unconscious" (das Unbe-wusste), distinct from organic and inorganic material, which served as the basis of the universe. In other words, he proposed that what was normally called "the soul" was no more than the working of this "Unconscious." In Enryō's essay we can find some pas-sages which remind us of Hartmann's idea of the unconscious; as, for example, the fol-lowing quotation shows: "In my opinion, this world is a wave of unconscious material emanating from the universe's great energy surface. That wave's inertia reaches the spiritual plane, undulating in alternating flows, back and forth between light and dark, becoming the consciousness of the spirit itself" (IS 19: 346)
Besides Hartmann there are, of course, numerous philosophers that Enryō studied at the university, who influenced him and shaped his theory of the soul. As another ex-ample, using Spencer's concept of "the knowable" and the "unknowable" he provides a counterargument to the denial of the soul by materialist scholars:
The explanation given until now of the immortality of the soul has been an in-terpretation only up to the one side that is knowable, but we must understand that there is another unknowable side [...]. For example, reaching into the root of the human spirit, to the level of substance, was unknowable to ancient schol-ars, unknowable to today's experimentation, and will no doubt remain unknow-able in the future as well. (IS 19: 357–58)
Following the above reasoning, Enryō argues that although materialists attempt to re-duce the entirety of spiritual life to material components, if we were to consider what, ultimately, matter is in itself, the only possible answer would be that it has a mysterious existence, that it is "an uncertain, undetermined object shrouded in mystery [...] a giant specter" (IS 19: 332). However, while Enryō here expresses along with Spencer that matter is an ungraspable existence, he ultimately asserts that through a metaphysical methodology it is possible to come to an understanding of it, at least to a certain extent. In other words, Spencer argues about the ungraspable existence of the principles of the universe while leaving room for the potential existence of religion, but he avoids any concrete explanation of that ultimate reality precisely because it is ungraspable. For its
part, Enryō goes into more detail, calling this principle "the great spirit" 大精神 among other things, and affirming a pantheist perspective.
Manshi as well drew frequently from the work of thinkers he studied during his University of Tokyo days when offering his own proof of the existence of the soul.27
When discussing the immortality of the soul he quotes Spencer, Kant and other philosophers to prove his theories. I have examined at length these questions in another paper, so I will concentrate here only on his use of Hartmann's ideas. It is, however, worth noting that while he did use some of Hartmann's ideas as a proof of the immor-tality of the soul, he also remained highly critical of Hartmann's theory of the soul. As we can see in the quotation bellow, Manshi, while following Hartmann's ideas, asserts that the definition of life (生活 in Manshi's text) and death, as well as the distinction be-tween organic and inorganic material, were not as clear as previously thought:
The amoeba's body is said to divide into two (by binary fission). Is this death? The rotifer, it is said, when dried up hardens and has no movement, but when put in water once again returns to life. Is drying up becoming lifeless? More-over, there are beings that, after being frozen for hundreds or thousands of years, come to life when thawed. Hartmann [pp.] 553–554 [explains about] frogs that had been encased in rocks for thousands of years, and still where able [to keep] a minimum level of activity when liquid penetrated through those rocks. However, in the case of a frozen organism, even if there is a very slight evaporation of the surface, the indispensable conditions for life such as the endosmosis processes and the movement of fluids [流 動] are not given. What is the status of life and death in ice? We cannot say that in these cases that which is not moving on its own is dead. It would be difficult to say that the things we normally call inanimate (inorganic) are also alive, there are those an-imate bodies without movement that are said not to rot away and living bodies like those of lepers [which do rot away] (in Lotze's work). (KMZ 1: 304)28
The main reason Manshi cites this text is to show that while the phenomenon of death is visible to the world of experience, it is not a determinate fact, rather "it is altogether false to attempt to judge the absence of an internal spirit from a change in external form" (KMZ 1: 304). That being said, in consideration of the entirety of Manshi's
27 For the relationship between Manshi's theory of the immortality of the soul and Western philoso-phers including Kant and Spencer, see MARTI-OROVAL.「清沢満之の宗教哲学における霊魂滅否について」
(see note 18): 85–106.
28 This is a citation from the chapter "The Essential Notion of Generation from the Standpoint of the Universality and Unity of the Unconscious" in Eduard von HARTMANN's Philosophy of the Uncon-scious, transl. by William Chatterton COUPLAND (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., 1893), vol. 2, chap. 9, pp 288–89. The respective passage in the German original can be found in pt. 3, chap. 8, section C of Die Philosophie des Unbewussten (Berlin: Duncker, 1869).
thought, there are plenty of differences between Manshi and Hartmann's theories. Hart-mann, grounded in his notion of the "Unconscious," negated the existence of an indi-viduated soul in each being. In fact, when Manshi classified the different theories of the soul, he called this the "theory of the unsubstantial soul," writing that thinkers rep-resentative of this perspective could be found in ancient times in Plato, and in modern times in Hartmann. Still, he offered a critique resembling that of materialism in relation to Hartmann's denial of a substantive, individuated existence of the soul:
Today's theories consider the [soul to be the] mere manifestation of molecular binding, saying that even though there is no substance, there is a structure. However, the theory that the soul is unsubstantial is the most illogical of all theories of the soul, still [that theory] is the best fit to the principles of modern physics and chemistry. It is obvious that they fall into this bias because they consider matter to be the source of the soul. (KMZ 1: 232)
In contrast, Manshi's perspective was entirely different. With the disappearance of the body came the dissolution of its component parts; however, since the soul was immor-tal, Manshi thought it was not a part of the body, but rather had its own substantive, singular existence. He makes this point clear in the following quotation:
Because the soul is one, its constitution never breaks up, nor does it extinguish. If, with the advance [of time] this one [substance] had to lose its quality of one-ness it would be something, but because this quality of one-ness is never lost, the soul never disappears. Therefore, the soul is immortal. (KMZ 1: 84) As explained above, while Manshi was partly influenced by Hartmann and quoted some of his ideas to defend the immortality of the soul, he did not agree with his denial of an individuated existence of the soul. As I will try to show in the following section, the source of this conflict could be based on the reliance of Manshi's theory of the soul on the Buddhist notions of the "store-house consciousness" 阿頼耶識 and "Buddha na-ture" 仏性.
3.5 Relations to Buddhism: The Store-house Consciousness and Buddha Nature When considering Enryō and Manshi's theories of the soul and its immortality, their understanding of the soul's existence seems to be partly shaped by the Buddhist con-cept of the "store-house consciousness," which is the ground for the law of karmic ret-ribution and the theory of transmigration.
In the case of Enryō, as I will explain in detail further on, his use of the term "soul" in his On the Immortality of the Soul includes a wide variety of meanings. In
one instance of his explanation of the soul's immortality, he uses Buddhist concepts like "the transmigration through the three worlds" 三 界 流 転 or "the transmigration through the six realms" 六道輪廻 (IS 19: 350) as evidence of its immortality. As he ex-plains in the passage below, the law of karmic retribution, the theory of cause and ef-fect and the theory of transmigration serve as the foundation of the soul's immortality:
If we erect a theory about karmic retribution, a theory of transmigration must be [necessarily] expounded [...] Buddhism is idealism, the exact opposite to materialism. The material world is constituted by phenomena that emerge out of the mental world, and thus there is no material substance distinct to the men-tal. Furthermore, because the material world emerges from that mental realm, it is said to arise from past actions transmitted within mental substance. In other words, this mind contains within it a yet unapparent world, whose origin lies in actions of mind, body and speech already carried out, which gradually, as time passes, reach this world, and as a result come to appear. (IS 19: 351)
There are, however, those who could question Enryō's theory of the soul as an immor-tal substance that goes across the three realms, inquiring whether "the connection of memory between not just the present and future world, but also among lifetimes in this world is vague" (IS 19: 320). In response, Enryō theorizes that we cannot deny the im-mortality of the soul, based on the fact that "we have no memory of being a baby at 1 or 2 years old, or of being in the mother's womb" (19: 320). In his opinion, it is the ex-istence of the soul which makes possible not only the law of karma, i.e., "retribution of good and bad actions" 善悪応報, but also the attainment of awakening: "as we gradually accumulate lives and return to death, step by step we progress up through the realms, finally reaching the boundaries of the realm of thusness. This is called "Buddhahood" 成仏, the realm of awakening apart from that of delusion" (IS 19: 354–55).
Manshi similarly relies on the concept of the "store-house consciousness" in order to explain how the law of karma (retribution of good and bad actions) operates. As the three passages below show, he does not use the term "store-house consciousness" itself, but rather explains his understanding of the soul through a series of concepts clearly re-lated to the Yogâcāra Buddhist tradition:
The interior is spiritual, and the external is material. Depending on accumu-lated karma, transmigrations are of different kinds. This is not what we nor-mally think of as the soul. Karma changes continuously and the unifying func-tion [統一作用] is [also] constantly changing. The workings of the law of karma and its effects [業感] not only operate when we are reborn, that is, when we die, but every moment [刹那々々ニ] are altered by our previous thoughts and actions [念業]. This will become clearer if we [explain it] in relation to the Yogacāra
concept of the phenomenal world that [arises from] the seeds [現行種子] [stored in the receptacle consciousness]. Although the functions of our mind are hid-den, at some point they manifest. (KMZ 1: 254)
Good and bad karma are the causes of the varying retributions we receive. This karma-cause [業 因] is nothing but the imprints [印 象] (in Buddhism they are called the non-manifested forms [無表 色] or seeds [種 子]) of our live conduct. Their retributive effect is the mind and the body we receive in this world. (KMZ 1: 318)
[T]he soul is a substance and, notwithstanding, it transmigrates through many material particles. It is just like a tenant who [during his lifetime] moves to many different houses. This is the reason why the soul must be conceived, from the molecular point of view, as an imprint. In my opinion, the energy con-tained in the interior of one particle is perceived by other particles that receive and store this impression. In Buddhism this is called creating karma [造業] or seeds [種子]. That is the reason why the doctrine of the 'good and bad actions [make us] experience [pleasant or unpleasant retributions]' [善悪業感] exists, or why it is said that 'the phenomenal world perfumes the seeds' [現行薫種子] [...]. Depending on the quantity and quality of the karma-causes (the imprints), the soul will transmigrate into a superior or an inferior realm [境界]. (KMZ 1: 319– 20)
We can see in the above not only traces of the notion of the store-house consciousness in Manshi's theory of the soul, but also the influence of the universalist concept of Buddha nature. In his Skeleton, Manshi presents the following definition of religion: "the essence of religion lies in the transformation, trough the activity of an unlimited power, from a limited [existence] to an unlimited [existence]" (KMZ 1: 12). This "lim-ited" refers to a limited, relative and incomplete existence. In other words, it is every-thing that has a relative existence, human life being the most representative example. On the other hand, the "unlimited" is that which is limitless, independent, absolute and complete, i.e., the object and goal of religion. Further, he expressed that, "speaking from the side of the limited, the development of the limited is in progression towards the unlimited [...] the essence of religion consists in the development and evolution of each soul or consciousness [心識] to reach the unlimited" (KMZ 1: 12). In this sense, what makes possible reaching the unlimited is "the soul."
Manshi's explanation of the "development" from limited to unlimited is also based in a Buddhist perspective on human life. For instance, in his Skeleton, we find passages such as "the awakening [覚信] to the infinite consists in recognizing the infinity that is found in each one of our minds; in other words, it is the awakening to the infinite
con-tained within us [含藏無限] or to the potentiality of the infinite" (KMZ 1: 28). This is just one example representative of his understanding of "Buddha nature," the universal, unlimited nature of humankind, and its potentiality to reach awakening. Furthermore, in other materials in his philosophy of religion he adds: "When in the Skeleton I refer to 'the infinite contained within us'; I mean that the unlimited is within the limited. For example, as [it is stated for instance in the saying from the Nirvana Sutra] 'all beings possess Buddha-nature' [一切衆生悉有仏性]" (KMZ 1: 96). Likewise, some pages later, he compares the soul to Buddha nature and the womb of the Tathāgata in the following way: "if all the 'self' understands the connection between one thing and the totality, in other words, if the soul achieves its ultimate development, it would mean that it has achieved the unlimited. In the Nirvana Sutra, it is said about 'all beings possess Bud-dha-nature,' or about the womb of the Tathāgata [如来蔵], both concepts expressing this state [of development]" (KMZ 1: 99). Thus, in the Skeleton he expresses the possibility of all beings existing in the phenomenal world to achieve awakening, along similar lines to Tendai Original Awakening 本覚 thought:
While the limited can be said to encompass myriad different things, the essence is that our true soul [霊 魂] or consciousness [識 心] develops until it reaches the unlimited. However, this does not mean that our soul is some par-ticular kind of thing among the myriad of limited things, rather, it is because it is merely one among those many limited things that we are able to elucidate [the nature] of our soul and, from there, to all the limited things (it is said that 'grass, trees and land, all can attain Buddhahood' [草 木 国 土 悉 皆 成 仏], which means that just as it is possible for us to achieve the unlimited, so it is possible for grass, trees and land). (KMZ 1: 12–13)
4. Points of Divergence between Enryo and Manshi
As we have seen when comparing their theories of the soul and its immortality, there are many points of convergence between Enryō and Manshi. However, there are also naturally areas of divergence, which I will analyze below in three different sections. 4.1 The Practical Aspect of the Theory of the Soul
As we have already seen, the immortality of the soul for Enryō and Manshi returns, eventually, to the necessity of reason, that is, a metaphysical a priori. For instance, if there is no soul, there is also no possibility for the existence of a moral universe in which there is karmic retribution, and therefore moral responsibility becomes
meaning-less. The practical implications of this line of argument goes without saying, however both Manshi and Enryō treated this issue principally as a theoretical problem. In other words, precisely because the universe is rational, we can deduce that it is organized by the principle of karmic retribution. As well, this principle makes the existence of the soul a necessary premise.29 Thus, Manshi's philosophy of religion had a relatively thin
link with the secular world, and his proof of the existence of the soul remained only theoretical, consistent in his attempt to construct a universal philosophical system. On the other side, in Enryō's case, he of course argued in favor of the existence of the soul using the above logical reasoning, but he also took up the practical consequences re-lated to the immortality of the soul.
First, from Enryō's perspective, believing in the immortality of the soul gives peo-ple hope, and a sense of relief when facing death. Enryō himself explains the sense of relief he felt through this believe:
Luckily, this principle, that human being's death is not true death, i.e., knowing that it is just a temporary rest, and understanding that I will once again awake, brought to my mind comfort for the first time after decades of being lost and suffering, like the sky opening up, the myriad clouds clearing and seeing, tem-porarily, the clearness of the moon. (IS 19: 348)
He criticized, on the other hand, the theories of the soul as put forward by materialism, which only aroused a sense of discouragement in people's mind (IS 19: 364). In addi-tion, as Enryō writes: "if there is no expectation of fulfillment in this world there will only remain a mere path of desperation [...] so surely many morals of society will be terribly corrupt, falling into the extremes of unethical and immoral thinking!" (IS 19: 364–365); thus the world-view of materialism is seen in his view to cause chaos in so-ciety and a breakdown in morality.30 As shown below, Enryō puts forward his theory of
29 For example, Enryō writes that: "According to the theory of the immortality of the soul, a firm belief that one's actions be either punished or rewarded after our death is essential [...]. However, the right principle of our world is the right principle of the universe, and the right principle of the universe is the law consisting of punishment for evil and reward for good actions. This law must be grounded on the immortality of the soul. It is clear that we cannot reach a state of reliance if there is no doctrine of the immortality of the soul" (IS 19: 369).
30 Similar reservations about the Enlightenment and empiricism can be found in the notes he took when attending FENOLLOSA's lectures. For example, when discussing the topic of how French Enlighten-ment, inheriting empiricist theories, judged traditional religion and morality, we can read as follows: "people had been worshipping for thousands of years these false illusory ideas. They rejected even the possibility of moral responsibility. The idea that soul exists after death is the fantastical supersti-tion; even soul itself is nothing; the conscious state comes with bodily organization, when it is dis-solved, there is no soul. There is also no fundamental distinction between good & bad, which are re-garded by the moralist & the religionist; all we shall do, depends upon our own pleasure; all men do the same thing as beasts do. There is no law; no divine ordination; all are matter of experience; there
