Word and Inference
in the Yuktidihika.
Part I
Naomichi
Nakada
Translation of the Yuktidipika, R. C. Pandeya's ed., p. 45, 1. 1-p. 46, 1. 3 from bottom.
"That imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that (Samanyatodrsta inference) is known through the traditional doctrine given by trustworthy one." (SK. 6). With this (part of SK. as) ... which cannot be known even through that", (Isvarakrsna) tells that it is impossible for samanyatodrsta to appear (as applicable) wherever the traditional doctrine is applicable (as the means for the right knowledge). The statement (in SK.) "that imperceptible thing" is with regard to the object.
Having it as a topic that "(it) is known through the traditional doctrine given by trustworthy one, " (the opponent) says (as follows). It is said that (such) things (mentioned subsequently) that cannot be known by that saman-yatodrsta inference either are known through the traditional teaching given by the trustworthy ones. They are as follows : (that with which) the direct perception is obtained but which itself is imperceptible ; the object which is obstructed (to be perceived) owing to other cause, that which is absolutely imperceptible, or that in which the similar characteristic with other is absent, (for example, ) Heaven, the final beatitude, the deity and so forth.
The traditional teaching given by trustwothy one would not be a means for getting the right knowledge, since such an error that all doctrines can be 1) Samanyato drsta Inference in the Yuktidipika is treated with translation. See "N. Nakada: Three Kinds of Inference in The Commentaries on khyakarika, Part I & II", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. XIV. No. 2; Vol. XV, No. I, especially pp. 41 f. in the latter.
valid would be attached to (this assertion) ... that is, if then the traditional teaching (given by trustworthy one) would be thus regarded as authority, then it would be necessarily admitted that all those who are versed in each teaching have the authority (to prove). If it would be like this, every teacher could have the authority to prove, so the various logics which have many alternative cases could appear. Therefore there could be no fixed opinion, so (accordingly) the error would be attached to (Isvarakrsna's view).
If it is like this, those who are desirous of knowing may be prevented from getting the final beatitude. Therefore it does not please us that you use the teaching of other just like a doctor does.
(Answer) This (objection) is not right. Why ? Since the characteristic of the trustworthy one is not ascertained. We say those, like Isvara and Maharsi's, who do not have the errors which are the affection and so on, whose intellects are free from any doubt, who can see the objects which are beyond the range of the senses, are the trustworthy2). All teachers cannot always be the trustworthy. Or if there is another characteristic (concerning the traditional teaching given by trustworthy one), let (that traditional teach-ing) be the means for getting the right knowledge.
Moreover since, having its own object, there is no fault for it to be the authority to prove. It is necessarily to be admitted that (in the case too that) there is an object for a traditional teaching given by trustworthy one, the latter can be the means for getting the right knowledge (sadhanam prama-nam) concerning the former even if the latter may not be accompanied by any voice (viz. may not be pronounced)3). Otherwise in every Sastra the knowledge of such things as had not yet been taught on the order of the practice and how to live and behave would not be possible. (itaratha pratisastram acarasthitiniyamanam adrstarthanam apratipattih syat.)
Therefore it is answered that this traditional teaching is different from all 2) Cf. Yd. p. 3, ii. 21 f.; Tattvayatharthyadipanam (Sarnkhyasamgraha p. 83). 3) Cf. Mahabhasyadipika p. 2, ii. 15-17, agosabdavacyasya to yatha gudasya madhuryam valpatvam vandhakare dravyantarebhyo bhedakam gudoyarn
nanyadravyam iti/
-1021-the middle terms. As it is known that -1021-the reasoning is admitted to be used with many words, so the traditional teaching is different from the middle terms which is basing on the reasoning4).
(The opponent) says. It is not so. Since (the traditional teaching) is the means to get the knowledge with the affirmation and the negation. The cha-racteristic (M) such as "being the product" and so forth is known to be within the range (or extent) of "not being eternal" and so forth (P), and wherever there is no P no M is seen. Therefore there is an ascertainment on the thing which is not eternal. In the same way, a word is known in the meaning of its own, and there is not the knowledge of that word in the other place (viz. -where there is not its own meaning) of the same kind, therefore the word i s the inference.
(The answer) is said. Now, why there can be the knowledge concerning those which are quite uncommon like the moon and so forth (viz. those which have no extensions) ?
(The opponent) says. The words, the moon and so forth have many meanings depending on the parts (as the intention) ...viz. Genus6>, Thing7), Quality8), Action9>. Such a word as Dittha and so on can be said to be the same (since it has many meanings as its Intention). Therefore the words of such a kind as (the moon and so on which do not have the extensions) cannot be different from the inference either'0). (to be continued)
4) Paksa, hetu and drstanta are called as many words. See Nyayadvara, the beginning part; 宗 等 多 言 説 能 立(in text of Ui's Studies in Indian Philosophy,
Vol. 5, p.544).宗 等 多 言 説 能 立 者, 由 宗 因 喩 多 言 辮 読 他 未 了 義 〔爲 開 示 〕故, 此 〔之 〕 多 言 於 論 式 等 説 名 能 立.(Ui: ibid., p.547.)
5) Cf. Mahabhasyadipika p. 2, 1. 1. atha gaur iti. avayavasabdo' yam bahusv arthesu abhidhadisu eva. (Now the cow. The (words concerning the) name and so on have many meanings, and this is a word which has the parts (that are concerned with the meanings) ).
6) Cf. Mahabhasyadipika, p. 3, 11. 17 ff. akrtir iti na tat sarnsthanam kirhtarhi jatir eva/ yatha akrtyabhidhanam va japyayana iti/ akriyate'nayeti akrtih/ akriyate iti bhidyate padarthantarebhya ityakrtih/ akriyete buddhisabdav asya iti akrtih/. On the relationship between jati and dravya, see pika, p. 3, 11. 13-17. tatra yesam arthantarabhuta jatis tesam visistesu
pindesu anuvartamanarh gotvaih tesam samanyam nasvadinarn sarvesam iti tadapeksa upamasambandhah/yesarn tat dravyani ca tesam api yebhyo bhedo nopapadyate tesam parityagad yasmacca sakya bhedapratitih tasya copadanat samanyagunatvam ityuktam/
7) artharupa=pinda=dravya (Mahabhasyadipika p. 2, ll. 13-18). artharupo'yam gopinda ityarthah/ (ibid., 1. 17).
8) On the relationship between dravya and guna, see Mahabhasyadipika, p. 3, 11. 10-12. netyaha guno nama sa iti na yuktam dravyasya nirdesat/ naisa dosah/ ubhayavacanat/ sukladayo dravyavacanah pragupanyastah/ sarhprati gunaparo nirdesa iti/
9) On the relationship between akrti=jati and kriya, see Mahabhasyadipika p. 2, 1. 25-p. 3, 1. 3. atha va jater eva gotvasya kriyatvam/ yatha sattetyasyah kriyasabdenabhidhanam asti/ yathaiva gatam' gotvam evath ingitadyapyarthato mahisadisu drstam/ vyutpattya'pi karmanyasriyamane gamivat visesanam
durakhyanamupadadano gacchati garjati gadati va gaur iti/
10) Thus the opponent says that such a kind of the words as moon and so on are to be called the inferences, however this opponent's view is rejected later on (Yd., p. 46, 11. 13 f.) for the reason that this kind of word is quite common. The word "moon", in spite of its having the intention, can not yet have the extension. Cf. "yatrapyasadharanatvad anumanabhave sabde
dhenaviruddhenarthenapohyate, yatha... acandrah sasi sattvad iti nasau sah." Tattvasamgrahapand jika ad v. 1395, p. 503 (Varanasi edition). (p. 411,
in Baroda edition.) ((This quotation is discovered to be from Dignaga's
"正 理 門 論"(Nyay
advara or Nyayamukha). See H. Ui:Studies in Indian Philosophy, Vol V, P.516. Its Chinese version runs as follows: 又 若 於 中 由 不 共 故 無 有 比 量, 爲 極 成 言 相 違 義 遣, 如 説 懐 兎 非 月 有 故.Baroda edition gives the
reading "sabdaprasiddhena" for "sabde prasiddhena." Patna Ms. too.)) Another objection is raised to this opponent view on the ground that Genus and so on said by the opponent are what to be proved of their having the motives different each other; and on the ground that the collection of the individual members (samudaya) is what to be proved, too (Yd., p. 46, ii. 15 f.). We can know, from what Bhartrhari says, that there are some problems concerning the independence of some part (avayava), which is concerned with the intension of the idea (sampratyaya said in Mahabhasya p. 1, ii. 10 f.). This objection as found in Yd. is under the influence from these problems.
There is an objection to Patanjali's view which admits Quality (as avayava). That is said for the reason that what is called Quality is the detailed state-ment of Thing. (nety aha guno nama sa iti na yuktam dravyasya nirdesat. Mahabhasyadipika, p. 3, 1. 10). Bhrtrhari's answer to this is as follows. "This is not in fault. Since they mention it in both ways. White and so on are
explained before as expressing Thing. Now (this) detailed tatement treats Quality as the chief object". (Mahabhasyadipika, p. 3, ii. 10-12. The text
in note 8.)
Now Quality, (white and so on) can be taken as communicating visesana or distinction (Cf. ibid., ii. 5 f.). For example, when they express the ox and
the horse white respectively, they use the word "sukla" for the former, "karka" for the latter (Cf. ibid.). On the other hand, Action as found in the
intension is difficult to communicate such distinction. Bhartrhari says that (the word) "ox", depending on the action through the derivation of the word from the root, has the difficulty in communicating the distinction, like the root "gam" as far as said with "gacchati, garjati or gadati" (Ibid., 11. 2 f.; the text in note 9). Action (kriya) is Genus according to others, thus rhari says. (Cf. Vakyapadiya 111-8-21. This verse is quoted in
samgraha Chapter 13, 1.221. See Hajime Nakamura "Pracinavedantavadah " Vol. 4, p. 399). It is said in Mahabhasyadipika (p. 2, 1. 25-p. 3, 1. 2) that there is "being Action" (kriyatvam) in Genus "being the ox"; that is as follows, when Existence (satta) is mentioned, it can be told with a word "Action" (kriya); it is like this, when "being the ox" may be disappeared, the
gesture and so on can be seen really in the buffalo and so on, too. (The text in note 9.)
