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The Early Stage of the Transformation of National Universities into Executive Agencies: A Step toward Privatization of Japanese Higher Education Institutions

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformationof

NationalUniversitiesintoExecutiveAgencies:

ASteptowardPrivatizationofJapanese

HigherEducationInstitutions

MasateruBaba

Abstract Thetransformationintoquasi-governmentagenciesofJapanese nationaluniversitiesbecamearealisticissuein1999becauseofstrong publicdemandforreducingbureaucracy.In2004,nearly100national universitieswereformallytransformedintoexecutiveagencies,subjectto reformalongwithothergovernmentalinstitutionssuchashospitalsand researchcenters.ThemovementwasmodeledafterEnglandwhohad madedrasticchangeundertheleadershipofMargaretThatcherinorder toincreaseefficiencyandcutdownbureaucracy.Thisexploratorystudy focusesonthelegal,financialandpersonnelpreparationsneededtodeal withtheramificationsofsuchchange.

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1.Introduction

Theformationofquasi-governmentagenciesasthelegalframework ofnationaluniversitiesbecameacontroversialissueonthenational agendabybothuniversityprofessorsandpoliticiansin1999.The conceptofexecutiveagenciesdidnotoriginateinJapan,butwas

borrowedfromEnglandandemergedasacompromiseforfulland

immediateprivatizationofJapanesenationaluniversities.Theoutcry fromthegeneralpublicforreformingnationaluniversitieswasstrong, butoppositiononthepartofprofessorswasalsostrong,and,asa result,bothpartiessoughtamiddlegroundtomitigatethegapbefore fullimplementationofprivatization.Althoughtheideaofprivatization emergedfordifferentreasonsindifferentcountries,theconceptreceived widespreadattentionthroughouttheworldfromthe1980s.Each countryaddressedthechallengeinitsownway,andvariousformsand structuresofprivatizationemerged. Thecentralargumentforprivatizationofnationaluniversitiesin Japanwasthattheirmissionhadbeenover.Itwasnolongermorally orlegallyvalidtogivespecialadvantagetonationaluniversitieswith taxpayermoneyinthecurrentJapanesehighereducationmilieu. Privateuniversitiesrepresentednearlythree-fourthsoftheoverall nationalenrollmentatthattirneandtheirstandardshadimproved significantly.Infact,someprivateinstitutionswereequaltotoprated nationaluniversitiesintermsofresearchandteaching. Anothernotableargumentwasthatbureaucraticreformmustinvolve nationaluniversitiesbecausetheywereanintegralpartoftheJapanese bureaucraticsystem.Theywereoftenconsideredinneedofreformdue tooutdateduniversitygovernanceandthelackofcollaborationwith

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformationofNationalUnlversitiesIntoExecutiveAgencies: ASteptowardPrivatizationofJapaneseHlgherEducationInstitutions industry,whichmanypoliticiansconsideredofvitalimportancetothe futureprosperityofthenation. Inessence,thefollowingthreefundamentalissuesareidentifiedand seriouslydiscussed: 1.Thelegalityofthenationaluniversities 2.Theefficiencyoftheiroperationsasacadernicinstitutions 3.Thequalityofhighereducationinstitutionsbasedonglobalstandards

2.BriefHistoricalReview

InMarch1997,theNationalReformCommissiononBureaucracy officiallyrequestedthattheMinistryofEducationlookintothe reformationofnationaluniversitygovernance,specificallytoexplorethe possibilityoftransferringthejurisdictionofuniversitiesfromthe MinistryofEducationtomunicipalgovernmentsorpossiblytonon-profit privateorganizations.Asexpected,thereactionswerenegativefrom theMinistryitselfandtheAssociationofNationalUniversitieswhich wasformedbytheprofessorsofthenationaluniversities.Theyfelt thattheautonomyandindependenceoftheinstitutionsmightbe jeopardized,andbecauseoftheirreluctance,thereformrequesthad beenleftunaddressedforaconsiderableperiodoftime.Reflectingthis non-committalattitude,thereportcompiledbythecabinetinJanuary, 1999,simplystatedthattheincorporationofnationaluniversities,and possibletransferofuniver.sityjurisdictionwouldbedecidedbytheyear 2003. However,inApril1999,thecabinetcouncildecidedtotakeanother drasticmeasure,inwhichareductionofthenumberofgovernment workerswasdelineated;about25%ofthetotalgovernmentalworkforce

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wouldbereducedby2010.Theeffectofthisdecisiononnational universitieswouldbecomeeminentprovidedthattheLawpassedin

Accordingtothecommission,thereductionwouldbe

2000. implementedthroughdecentralization,privatizationandabolishment.The impactofthisseriousproposalwassignificantbecauseallprofessorsof nationaluniversitiesweregovernmentemployeesandweresubjectto theeffectsofdownsizing. Facedwiththissituation,theMinistryofEducationexaminedall possibilitiestoevadetheeffectsofdownsizingincludingmaking exceptionsforuniversityprofessorstosecuretheirpositionswhileall othergovernmentbrancheswouldbeaffectedbydownsizing.Even thoughthepercentageofprofessorsintheoverallgovernmentwork force(16%)wassmall,itwasunlikelythattheywouldbeexemptfrom thenationalagendaofdownsizing.Theyhadtofindotherjustifications forkeepingtheirprivilegeoverothergovernmentbranches. Asaresult,theycameupwiththeideaoftransferringnational universityjurisdictionfromtheMinistryofEducationtoindependentnon-governmentalagenciesasameansofprotectionandcompromise.This conceptwascalledtheexecutiveagency.Theconceptwasintroduced in1997whenapoliticalmissiontraveledtoEnglandtostudythe efficacyofpublicservice,andwasusedbytheministrytoprotect positionsinnationaluniversities.

TheMinistryofEducationwasaskedbytheCommissionto

respondbyJuly2000,astowhetherornottheywouldacceptthe

conceptofexecutiveagency.Incidentally,theMinistryofPostsand Telecommunicationswhichconstitutes35.5%ofthegovernmentwork forcehadalreadydecidedtocreatequasi-governmentalagenciestoavoid thereduction.Inaddition,theMinistryofFinanceandtheMinistryof

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformatlonofNatlonalUniversitiesIntoExecutiveAgencies: ASteptowardPrivatlzationofJapaneseHigherEducationInstltutions HealthandWelfareemployedasimilarconcepttosecuretheworkplace andintegrityoftheirorganization.Aspredicted,theMinistryof Educationwouldfollowthesamepattern(Fujita,1999).

3.SchemebehindJapaneseBureaucraticReform

Itisusefultoknowthatthedrivingforcebehindthecurrent Japanesebureaucraticreformanditsdirectionwastherulingpolitical

partyofconservatismandbusinessgroups.Theywereinfull

agreement,andunanimouslysupportedthedownsizingofthe

government,andagoalof25%workforcereductionin10years.Their mainstrategywastodecentralizethegovernmentandtodelegatemore administrativefunctionstolocalgovernments.Also,theystrongly favoredlettingtheprivatesectortakechargeoverthepublicsector. Theproponentsofreformwerewillingtotransfergovernmental authorityandsanctionprivatesectormanagementifnecessary.They alsobelievedthatcompetitionwasbetterthancontrol;prosperitycame withfreeenterprise,andthatitwasnecessarytobecomeaplayerin globalcompetitionbygettingaheadinscienceandtechnology. Therefore,educationandschoolsneededtobemodifiedtoservethis purpose(Association,1999). TheJapanesebureaucraticreformmovementhadalreadygained momentumwithinthepoliticalareabythenandwasabletopassalaw tochangethebasicministerialstructure.ThestructureoftheMinistry ofEducationwasredesignedandresultedinitsunionwiththeScience andTechnologyAgencyasthenewMinistryofEducationandScience whichfocusedonthelinkbetweenuniversitiesandindustriesinthe fieldsofresearchandscienceandtechnology.

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4.ExecutiveAgencies

Thelawsthatauthorizeexecutiveagenciestotakeontheoperation ofvariousgovernmentalfunctionswaspassedinJuly1999.Thelaws haveabroadscopeandtheymandatethetransformationof89different governmentalbranchesintoexecutiveagencieseffectivefromApril2001 to2004(Fukuie,1999).However,itwasnotdefiniteatthatmoment whethertheoperationofnationaluniversitieswouldbeoneofthem. Thefinaldecisionwasmadeshortlyafter. Thebasicconceptbehindcreatingexecutiveagencieswasthe separationofplanningandimplementation.Inshort,thegovernment wouldcontinuetoholdtheplanningfunctionandtheexecutiveagencies wouldexercisetheimplementation.Accordingtotheguidelinesof executiveagencieswhichmightbeadoptedfortheoperationof universities,thefollowingchangesweretotakeplace(Association, 1999): 1.Presidentsandauditorsofuniversitiesweretobeappointedbythe MinisterofEducationandScience. 2.Agencieswererequiredtopresentamediumrangeplan(3-5year plan)totheMinistry,andtheformatoftheplanistobeapproved bytheministry. 3.Evaluationsofschooloperationweretobemadebytheevaluation committeeestablishedbytheministry. 4.Universitiesweretoadoptstandardbusinessaccountingprocedures, whichincludeabalancesheettoshowtheprofitandlossofthe agenciesasindependentaccountingunits. 5.Universitiesweretoreceivemoneyfrornthegovernmentbasedupon theirbudgetplanwhichisdirectlylinkedtotheirmediumrange

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformatlonofNatlonalUnlversitiesintoExecutiveAgencies: ASteptowardPrivatizationofJapaneseHigherEducationInstltutions plan. 6.Thestatusofprofessorswasexpectedtobechanged,buttheywould remainpublicemployeesforthetimebeing. Asstatedearlier,theconceptofexecutiveagencywasborrowed fromEngland,buttheJapanesegoalsandrealityweredifferentinthat thereformersweremoreinterestedindownsizingthegovernmentand reducingtheworkforceofgovernmentemployeesthanimprovingthe qualityofservice,whichwasthecaseforEngland.However,there weresomecommonelementssuchasefficiencyanddiscretion.For example,theEnglishagenciesweregivenmorefreedomandauthority inexercisingtheiradministrationtoimprovetheefficiencyofoperations. ThissituationwasthesameforJapanesetotheextentthatmore freedomandoptionsweregiventotheinstitutionsbyshiftingtheir jurisdictionfromdirectgovernmentcontrol(Fujita,1999;Sakakibara, 1998a).Inotherwords,onceuniversitieswereincorporated,they wouldthenbeabletoabidebytheirownprinciplesandguidelinesand wouldnotbesubjecttostringentgovernmentalcontrol.Therewasto benochangeintheemploymentstatusofJapaneseprofessorsforthe timebeing;butchangemightoccurinthefuture,andnobodyknewfor surewhatwouldhappeninthenextfiveyears.Butitwascertainthat thedirectiontocreateexecutiveagencieswasset,anditwouldbecorne reality.

5.ControVersies

Fromtheverybeginningofthereformmovement,alargenumber ofquestionswereraisedbyopponentsaswellasproponentsregarding theautonomyofuniversitygovernance.OnSeptember20,1999,Mr.H.

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Nakasone,theMinisterofEducation,summarizedhispositiononthe executiveagencies,whichheenthusiasticallypromoted:"Inorderfor universitiestohavesufficientautonomyandself-governingability,they mustbeincorporatedandhavediscretionarypowerwithintheirown legaliramework.Traditionally,nationaluniversitiesweregranteda broadrangeoffreedomandresponsibilities,buttheyneededmoreif theyweretoexercisetheiroptionsandworkunderadiversifiedplan, andforthatpurpose,beingincorporatedasexecutiveagencieswouldbe appropriate(MinistryofEducation,1999a)." Anotherareaofcontroversywasthepromotionofdiversityand individualityoftheinstitutions.Theproponentsoftheagenciesasserted thatthemorediscretionarypowertheyhad,themoreindividualitythey woulddemonstratebecausetheycoulddesignandexpresstheirideas withoutthefearofoversightandrejectionbygovernmentalauthority. Theseargumentswereabstractandcontainedmanyopenquestions. Thechanceofreachingaccordamongdissidentswassrnall,andmost likelytheargumentswouldcontinue.Therealcontroversieslayinthe followingconcreteissues: 1.Employmentstatusofprofessors Legislaturepassedtheexecutiveagenciesproposaltomaintainthe currentstatusofprofessorswhichmeansthattheprofessorswill continuetobepublicemployees.Manyreformproponentsthoughtit wasanunfavorablepoliticalcompromise,andthatitwoulddiminishthe valueofthereformitselfbecauseprofessorsshouldnotbepublic

employeesbutbenon-publiconesintheoryasoneoftheaimsof

bureaucraticreformwastoreducethesizeofpublicemployees. Nonetheless,thelawswerepassedlargelyduetothesupportand mitigatingeffortsbytheMinistryofEducation.

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformatlonofNationalUnlversitlesintoExecutiveAgencies: ASteptowardPrivatizationofJapaneseHigherEducationInstitutions 2.Structureofmanagement Executiveagenciesclearlyintendedtochangetheorganizational structureoftheuniversitiesfromanacademictoabusinesshierarchyin thattheusualflatstructurewastobereplacedbyafunctionalvertical

structure.Theproposalgavemoreauthorityandpowertothe

presidentoftheuniversityandestablishedaboardoftrusteesasan

essentialpartofthemanagementbody.Inthereformplan,the

presidentwasnotchosenbytheprofessors,butbytheboard,andthe boardmemberswerebasicallychosenfrombroadsegmentsofthe society,notjustuniversities.Consequently,themainqualificationofa boardmemberwasshiftedfromacademictomanagerialskills.Inturn, theboardtendedtoseekcandidatesfromothersectorsthanacademia. Obviously,theprofessorsdidnotlikethispractice. 3.Separationofplanningfromimplementation

Thedivisionofuniversitygovernanceintoplanningand

implementationwasnotpopularwithprofessorsbecausetherewas ambiguityinregardtotheboundarylinethatseparatedplanningfrom implementation.Althoughtheoutlinesof.theagenciesstipulatedthat

themediumrangeplanwastobegeneratedbytheuniversityand

submittedtotheministryforreviewandapproval,itleftmanyquestions astowhohadtheauthoritytomakefinaldecisionswhendisputes arose,andtheavailabilityofrecourseincasesofdiscrepancy. 4.Evaluationcommittee Theinstallationofaneutralevaluationcommitteeofuniversities

withintheMinistrywaswellintendedbutnotwellacceptedby

professors.Thelaw-makers'intentionwastovitalizetheacademic communitiesbybringinginmorecompetitionandprovidingmore incentivesandrewardsforacademicaccomplishments.Theevaluatio~l

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councilwaslaunchedinApril2000.Professorsclaimthatacademic achievementsarenoteasilymeasuredintheshortterm.Theyalso claimedthatbasicresearchsuccess,whichwastheprimaryobjectiveof universities,wasdifficulttomeasureintermsofefficiencyand productivity.Theunderlyingconcernbytheprofessorswasthatthe evaluationitselftendstofocusonquantifiableaspectsandneglectsthe fieldsofliteratureandhumanities,wheresuccessismuchmoredifficult tomeasurethaninscienceandtechnology. 5.Financialplan Thereformcommission'sdecisiontoadoptstandardbusiness accountingproceduresandtoreplacethepublicsector'saccounting practicesgeneratedanapprehensiveresponsearnongadministratorsof

universities.Mostofthepeoplewhowereinchargeofschool

accountingwerenotfamiliarwitheventheconceptofdepreciationand didnotknowhowtocreateabalancesheet.Accountingatnational universitieswasvastlydifferentfromthebusinesssectorinthatit lackedaccountability.Therevenuesoftheuniversitycamefromthe nationalbudgetandfundswereallocatedbytheMinistryofEducation. Asaresult,universityadministratorswereonlyconcernedwiththe expendituresideofaccountingandhadverylittletodowithbudget planningorraisingmoney.Althoughthedesignersoftheexecutive agenciesdidnotintendtoimposeaself-sustainingfinancialoperation fromthebeginning,itwastheirultimategoalthateveryuniversity wouldhavefinancialindependenceandbeaccountableforitsown financialoperations. Therewasanadvantageassociatedwiththeagencies'financialplan. Universitieswouldhavemoreflexiblediscretionaryfundsavailableto usefortheirownagendas.Therefore,oncethebusinessaccounting

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformationofNationalUniversitlesIntoExecutiveAgencies: ASteptowardPrivatizationofJapaneseHigherEducationInstitutions systemwasestablishedtheywouldnothavetogothroughdetailed auditingorgovernmentinspections.Forexample,thesalaryscalesset foragencyemployeeswereuniqueandtheywereexemptfromstandard governmentregulation,whichmeanttheycouldcreatetheirown incentivesandgiverewardstopeoplewhodemonstratedexcellent performance.Thefinancialplanoftheexecutiveagencieswaspivotalin thatitwastransitionalandresponsibleformanyfutureimplications.It wasachangefromprocess-orientedaccountingtoresult-oriented accounting,andmostacademicsandadministratorswereskepticalabout thenewaccountingsystemslinkedtoreform.

6.ConcludingRemarks

Themajordrivingforcebehindtheexecutiveagenciesfornational universitieswasundoubtedlytheNationalReformCommissionon Bureaucracy.Theirobjectivesweretwofold:onewastomakeclearthat thegovernmentwasresponsibleforpublicservicessuchasdiplomacy, maintainingpublicpeace,nationaldefenseanddevelopmentofnew energysources.Theotherwastoreduceresponsibilityofgovernment bytransferringvariouspublicfunctionstothehandsoftheprivate sectorintheinterestsofefficiencyandbetterservice.Theyoriginally aimedtofulfillthelatterobjectivebyprivatization.Iftheycouldnot achieveprivatization,thentheywouldresorttotheirsecondbest alternativeofexecutiveagencies. Plannersoftheagenciesbelievedthatthiswasarealisticstep towardprivatizationofnationaluniversitiesandthatitwouldenhance collaborationbetweenuniversitiesandindustry.TheNationalEconomic StrategyCouncilwhichwasformedundertheprimeministerstrongly

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assertedthatcooperationbetweenacademicinstitutionsandindustrywas essentialforthefutureprosperityofthenation.Theycontendedthat makingnationaluniversitiesmoreflexibleandefficientbyremoving bureaucracythroughthischangeofjurisdictionwasworthwhile. Theauthorofthispaperagreesthatprivatizationwillcertainly precipitatemorecollaborativeworkwithindustriesespeciallyinthefield ofinformationtechnologywherecreativethinkingandinitiativearemost neededinordertokeepupwithworld-wideinnovations.Theauthor alsobelievesthatprivatizationofuniversitiesisalogicalextensionof whatishappeninginthecurrentmarketplace.Thebenefitsand rewardsaregivendirectlybacktotheindividualswhocontributetothe improvementofprojectsandenvironment,andthisistheareawhere mostprofessorsareconcerned. Theinstallationofthirdpartyevaluationteamswasoneofthevital functionsoftheagenciesandinturn,theallocationofmoneywouldbe

basedupontheoutcomeoftheevaluations.Thiswaswhatmost

professorsdidnotlikeandshowedtheirreluctancebecausetheyhad somedoubtsaboutaspectsofresearchandteachingassessmentand foresawsomeincreaseofcontrolbythenewframeworkofagencies, whichwasalegitimateconcern. Atthesametime,publicsupportofnationaluniversitieswas erodingasseenbytheincreaseinpublicsentimentforprovidingless taxmoneytonationaluniversities.Itillustratedthechangingroleof thenationintermsofprovidinghighereducationforitscitizens.It wasanewrelationshipinwhichtheroleofgovernmenthadchanged fromplayerinthearenatofacilitatorofthegame.Itwassomewhat ironicthatinthepast,governmentsupportedhigherinstitutionsby beingmoreinvolved,butnowithadbecomelessinvolvedinorderto

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TheEarlyStageoftheTransformationofNationalUniversitiesIntoExecutiveAgencies: ASteptowardPrivatizationofJapaneseHigherEducationInstitutions promotemoreefficiencyattheuniversities.Neavedescribedthis changeofgovernmentasatransferfromthebureaucraticstatetothe evaluativestate(Neave,1988).Thisdoesnotmeanthatthecentral governmenthasloststrengthinitspower,rather,itmaintainsthe strongleadershiptoplanandexecutewithoutdirectinvolvement.This

changecanbesummarizedasadepartureiromabureaucratic

administrationtopublicmanagement. References AssociationofJapaneseScientists(1999);IsItTrueNational UniversitiesWillDisappear?-ExecutiveAgenciesQandA,Tokyo: Suiyosha. Fujita,O.(1999);NationalUniversitiesandExecutiveAgencySystem, Jurist,N0.1156,pp.109-122. Fukuie,T.(1999);IntroductiontoExecutiveAgencies(Fukuie,T., Hamakawa,K.andHaruyama,I.(eds);ExecutiveAgencies-the OutlineandIssues,Tokyo:Nihonhyoransha,pp.112-129). Hasebe,Y.(1998);ExecutiveAgencies,Jurist,N0.1133,pp.99-104.

Hosoi,M.(1997);ExecutiveAgencySystemintheUK-HowHasIt

,Socialism(Associationof

BeenandWhatIssuesDoesItHave?-Socialists),Decemberissue,pp.128-132. InstituteforDemocraticEducation(2000);ImportantIssuesin2000, ContemporaryHigherEducation,N0.414,Tokyo:IDE. lwasaki,M.andOzawa,H.(1999);GreatMovement!NationalUniversiti es-WhereWillExecutiveAgenciesGo?,Tokyo:Miraisha. KyotoUniversity,FacultyofComprehensiveHumanSciences(2000); BoardofFaculty'sViewonExecutiveAgencies,20January,2000. MinistryofEducation(1999a);SpeechbytheMinisterofEducationat

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thePresidentsCouncilofNationalUniversitiesandCollaboration Institutions,20September1999. MinistryofEducation(1999b);TheReviewonTransformationof NationalUniversitiesintoExecutiveAgencies,20September,1999. Neave,G.(1988);OntheCultivationofQuality,Efficiencyand Enterprise:AnOverviewofRecentTrendsinHigherEducationin WesternEurope,1968-1988,EuropeanJournalofEducation,23 (1/2),pp.7-23. Nishimura,M.(1998);WhatDoExecutiveAgenciesAimtoReform?, TheWorld,January1999,pp.22-26. Sakakibara,H.(1998a);TheUK,fromAdministrationtoManagement, Horitujiho(CurrentLaws),70(3),pp.25-28. Sakakibara,H.(1998b);WhatIsanExecutiveAgency?-Executive

AgenciesintheUKandaProposalfromtheNationalReform

CommissiononBureaucracy-,SalaryandSocialSecurity,N0.1222, pp.35-44. Yamamoto,R.(1999);ExecutiveAgencies,Jurist,N0.1161,pp.127-135. (Thisistherevisedversionofthepaperwhichwaspresentedatthe 2000CIESannualmeeting,SanAntonio,Texas,USA,March8-12, 2000) (Receivedon20October2005)

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