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2017 S2 Term

Empirical Industrial Organization II

Basic Information

• Instructor: Naoki Wakamori, Room 1212 Economic Research Building

• Office Hours: 13:30-14:15 or by appointment

• Course Website: https://sites.google.com/site/nwakamori/teaching/

• Prerequisites:

– Undergraduate-level: (Theoretical) Industrial Organization – Graduate-level: Microeconomics and Econometrics

• Course Description:

This course is designed for the second year master students. The course aims to give a solid grounding in understanding the strategic interactions of firms in markets, and their implications on firms’ profits and consumer welfare. The main goals of this course are to familiarize students with the important methodologies and topics in the literature and to put students in a position to do their own research. In particular, we will cover the basic methodology of structural estimation - production function estimation, estimation of static entry/exit models, single-agent dynamic models, and dynamic games.

• No textbook will be used for this course.

– Jean Tirole (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. The MIT Press If you wish to review undergraduate-level material, the following three textbooks are recommended:

– Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz (2015). Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies (2nd Edition). Cambridge University Press

– Luis M. B. Cabral (2017). Introduction to Industrial Organization (2nd Edition). The MIT Press

– Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff (2015). Modern Industrial Organization, Global Edition (4th Edition). Pearson Education Limited

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• Evaluation: Grading will be based on 1. Class participation (40%), and

2. Homework Assignments or Presentations (60%)

Tentative Course Schedule

Class #01(06.06): Estimating Production Function (Lecture)

Class #02(06.08): Estimating Production Function (Lecture + Exercise) Class #03(06.13): Estimating Static Games (Lecture)

Class #04(06.15): Estimating Static Games (Lecture)

Class #05(06.20): Estimating Single-Agent Dynamic Models (Lecture) Class #06(06.22): Estimating Dynamic Games (Lecture)

Class #07(06.27): Estimating Dynamic Games (Lecture)

Class #08(06.29): Preparation for Presentations (Open Office Hours) Class #09(07.04): Price Discrimination (Lecture + Student Presentations) Class #10(07.06): Network Externalities (Lecture + Student Presentations) Class #11(07.11): Vertical Relationships (Lecture + Student Presentations) Class #12(07.13): Static Games (Student Presentations)

Class #13(07.18): Dynamic Games (Student Presentations) Class #14(07.20): Some Other Topics (Student Presentations)

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Reading Lists

Production Function Estimation

• Steven G. Olley and Ariel Pakes (1996). “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry.” Econometrica, 64(6), 1263–1297.

• James Levinsohn and Amil Petrin (2003). “Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobserbables.” Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317–341.

• Daniel A. Ackerberg, Kevin Caves, and Garth Frazer (2015). “Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators.” Econometrica, 83.6, 2411–2451.

- Jan De Loecker and Frederic Warzynski (2012). “Markups and Firm-Level Export Status.” American Economic Review, 102.6, 2437–2471.

- Ulrich Doraszelski and Jordi Jaumandreu (2013). “R&D and Productivity: Estimating Endogenous Productivity.” Review of Economic Studies, 80.4, 1338–1383.

- Allan Collard-Wexler and Jan De Loecker (2015). “Reallocation and Technology: Ev- idence from the US Steel Industry.” American Economic Review, 105.1, 131–171. - Serguey Braguinsky, Atsushi Ohyama, Tetsuji Okazaki, and Chad Syverson (2015).

“Acquisitions, Productivity, and Profitability: Evidence from the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry.” American Economic Review, 105.7, 2086–2119.

Static Games

• Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss (1991b). “Entry and Competition in Con- centrated Markets.” Journal of Political Economy, 99.5, 977–1009.

• Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss (1991a). “Empirical models of discrete games.” Journal of Econometrics, 48.1-2, 57–81.

• Steven T. Berry (1992). “Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry.” Econometrica, 60.4, 889–917.

• Katja Seim (2006). “An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices.” RAND Jouranl of Economics, 37.3, 619–640.

* Ariel Pakes (2010). “Alternative Models for Moment Inequalities.” Econometrica, 78.6, 1783–1822.

* Ariel Pakes, Jack Porter, Kate Ho, and Joy Ishii (2015). “Moment Inequalities and Their Application.” Econometrica, 83.1, 315–334.

- Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel (1999). “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting.” RAND Jouranl of Economics, 30.3, 397–420.

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- Michael J. Mazzeo (2002). “Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure.” RAND Jouranl of Economics, 33.2, 221–242.

- Federico Ciliberto and Elie Tamer (2009). “Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets.” Econometrica, 77.6, 1791–1828.

- Patrick Bajari, Han Hong, and Stephen P. Ryan (2010). “Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game of Complete Information.” Econometrica, 78.5, 1529–1568.

- Kate Ho and Ariel Pakes (2014). “Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians.” American Economic Review, 104.12, 3841–84.

- Alon Eizenberg (2014). “Upstream Innovation and Product Variety in the U.S. Home PC Market.” Review of Economic Studies, 81.3, 1003–1045.

- Thomas Wollmann (2016). “Trucks without bailouts: Equilibrium product character- istics for commercial vehicles”. Unpublished Manuscript.

Dynamic Models - Single Agent

• John Rust (1987). “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher.” Econometrica, 55.5, 999–1033.

• V. Joseph Hotz and Robert A. Miller (1993). “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models.” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 497–529.

• Joseph V. Hotz, Robert A. Miller, Seth Sanders, and Jeffrey Smith (1994). “A Simula- tion Estimator for Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice.” Review of Economic Studies, 61.2, 265–289.

+ Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira (2010). “Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Survey.” Journal of Econometrics, 156.1, 38–67.

- Gautam Gowrisankaran and Marc Rysman (2012). “Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New Durable Goods.” Journal of Political Economy, 120.6, 1173–1219.

- Igal Hendel and Aviv Nevo (2013). “Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable Goods Markets.” American Economic Review, 103.7, 2722–2751.

Dynamic Models - Game

• Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira (2007). “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games.” Econome, 75.1, 1–53.

• Martin Pesendorfer and Phillip Schmidt-Dengler (2008). “Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games.” Review of Economic Studies, 75.3, 901–928.

• Patrick Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin (2007). “Estimating Dynamic

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+ Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira (2010). “Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Survey.” Journal of Econometrics, 156.1, 38–67.

* Peter Arcidiacono and Robert A. Miller (2011). “Conditional choice probability estima- tion of dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity.” Econometrica, 79.6, 1823–1867.

- Ronald L. Goettler and Brett R. Gordon (2011). “Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More?” Journal of Political Economy, 119.6, 1141–1200.

- Stephen P. Ryan (2012). “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry.” Econometrica, 80.3, 1019–1061.

- Allan Collard-Wexler (2013). “Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete In- dustry.” Econometrica, 81.3, 1003–1037.

- Myrto Kalouptsidi (2014). “Time to Build and Fluctuations in Bulk Shipping.” Amer- ican Economic Review, 104.2, 564–608.

- Przemysaw Jeziorski (2014b). “Estimation of cost efficiencies from mergers: applica- tion to US radio.” RAND Journal of Economics, 45.4, 816–846.

- Masato Nishiwaki (2016). “Horizontal mergers and divestment dynamics in a sunset industry.” RAND J, 47.4, 961–997.

- Mitsuru Igami (2017). “Estimating the Innovator’s Dilemma: Structural Analysis of Creative Destruction in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 19811998.” Journal of Political Economy, 125.3, 798–847.

Price Discrimination

- Phillip Leslie (2004). “Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater.” RAND Journal of Economics, 35.3, 520–541.

- Brian McManus (2007). “Nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly market: the ase of specialty coffee.” RAND Journal of Economics, 38.2, 512–532.

- Chenghuan Sean Chu, Phillip Leslie, and Alan Sorensen (2011). “Bundle-Size Pricing as an Approximation to Mixed Bundling.” American Economic Review, 101, 263–303. - Nathan H. Miller and Matthew Osborne (2014). “Spatial differentiation and price discrimination in the cement industry: evidence from a structural model.” RAND, 45.2, 221–247.

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Vertical Relationships

- Sofia Berto Villas-Boas (2007). “Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data.” Review of Economic Studies, 74.2, 625–652. - Gregory S. Crawford and Ali Yurukoglu (2012). “The Welfare Effects of Bundling in

Multichannel Television Markets.” American Economic Review, 102.2, 643–685. - Matthew Grennan (2013). “Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence

From Medical Devices.” American Economic Review, 103.1, 147–177.

- Gautam Gowrisankaran, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Town (2015). “Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry.” American Economic Review, 105.1, 172–203.

- Laura Nurski and Frank Verboven (2016). “Exclusive Dealing as a Barrier to Entry? Evidence from Automobiles.” Review of Economic Studies, 83.3, 1156–1188.

- Kate Ho and Kate Ho. Lee (2017). “Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets.” Econometrica, 85.2, 379–417.

Network Externalities and Two-Sided Markets

- Marc Ry (2004). “Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages.” Review of Economic Studies, 71.2, 483–512.

- Robin S. Lee (2013). “Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets.” American Economic Review, 103.7, 2960–3000.

- Ying Fan (2013). “Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the US Daily Newspaper Market.” American Economic Review, 103.5, 1598–1628. - Przemysaw Jeziorski (2014a). “Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: The US

Radio Industry.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6.4, 35–73.

参照

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