Form HE(S→O)
GSAPS THE SUMMARY OF DOCTORAL THESIS
Socialist State Behavior toward the Ratification of the Convention against Torture (CAT):
The Case of Vietnam
40014S003-9 Huan Tuong Vo E. Chief Advisor: Prof. Yasushi Katsuma
Keywords:
State behavior, socialism, human rights, international civil and political rights treaties
Normative, rationalist (and its branch called reward-based model), and sovereignty approaches are the theories that contemporarily explain state willingness toward the ratification of international human rights (HR) treaties. With normative approach, states are said to join HR treaties because “their domestic normative values already conform to the normative values of the international agreements” (Aloisi 2011, p.85). In contrast, rationalist approach shifts the attention to more practical interests where states are believed to only accede to treaties that have easy complying provisions and require less effort of changing states’ domestic settings (Milner 1997). The focus of reward-based model, which is claimed to be unconvincing due to the “lack of empirical support” (Nielsen & Simmons 2014, is on the states’ evaluation of expected tangible and intangible benefits that they would receive if the HR treaty is ratified. Lastly, sovereignty approach treats HR issues as matters of sovereign states’
domestic jurisdiction; and potential high sovereignty costs imposed by HR treaties would negatively affect state’s willingness to sign and ratify to these treaties.
There have been various scholarly debates made in regard to these theories, particularly about the behavior of autocratic regimes, where they create interesting puzzles that need to be clarified by empirical research so that the relevant knowledge gaps arising from those disagreements in this issue can be filled. First, it is unclear whether the ratification behavior of autocratic states in this matter are due to changes in state recognition of HR values and interests to align with the international ones, as the normative approach explains, or it is because of treaty enforcement mechanisms, the calculation of costs and benefits of the ratification behavior, or both of these, as the rationalist and reward-based approaches dictate. Second, there is also ambiguity about the role of sovereignty when autocratic states decide their ratification behavior. Finally, it is still uncertain about the roles of domestic and external dynamics in shaping state’s decision behavior in this issue;
additionally, the actual influence of external threats and pressures on autocratic state behavior in this issue is also debatable.
In order to solve such puzzles and contribute to the knowledge gaps, the case of Vietnam’s ratification of the ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1987’ (CAT) in the period of 2013-2014 is chosen as the case study for this research, as Vietnam is a one-party socialist state of which it is claimed to be a type of autocracy, and the CAT is said to be a core civil and political rights treaty that has a “far-reaching scope” with the potential to be a strong monitoring mechanisms (Lippman 1994). There are two main research questions that need to be answered by empirical data from this case of Vietnam: First, what were the core factors that led Vietnam to develop behaviors to join the CAT during the period of 2013-2014? Second, did external dynamics play a more determinant role than internal ones in shaping Vietnam’s behavior toward the ratification decision? Why or Why not?
Findings and Theoretical Implications: First, core factors that shaped Vietnam’s decision to ratify the CAT in 2013-2104 include the relevant tangible and intangible benefits brought by such behavior at that period of time and the sovereignty factor. Second, international politics are considered more significant than domestic ones as they usually create
strong effect that relate to the socialist state’s formation of policies, especially in the HR field.
Via the case of Vietnam, there is insufficient evidence to confirm that the socialist state’s decision to accede to the CAT was caused by a change in its socialist cognition of human rights values and interests to become aligned with the prevailing international cognition. Therefore, it is suggested by the thesis that normative approach is not applicable for explaining the HR treaty ratification behavior of an autocratic state that is under a socialist regime. Second, this thesis reaffirms that tangible and intangible benefits became crucial in determining socialist state’s ratification behavior in this matter as they were considered to be closely associated with or capable of creating significant impacts on major national interests that the state was pursuing at that time. As a result, the practical evidence obtained from this Vietnam case can also help to address the current lack of empirical support the explanation related to the reward-based model.
Third, the sovereignty factor played an essential role in shaping the socialist state’s behavior in this matter; such joining behavior was considered essential for the state to prove that it respects HR and is willing to implement international standards of HR protection domestically. With this approach, this thesis recommends that, instead of focusing just on the HR treaty itself, the scope of this approach should be expanded to also cover the state’s determination of potential sovereignty violations caused by the larger international community (especially external political opposition to the state) to understand the sovereignty factor’s role in an autocratic state’s ratification decision. The thesis also challenges the academic view claiming that internal dynamics are more determinant than external ones in shaping autocratic state behavior in this issue. Additionally, via the case of Vietnam, socialist state could not avoid responding to pressures and threats imposed by important international players in relation to the HR field. This thesis suggests that the HR field has seen a positive correlation between increasing external pressures and threats and the state’s need to respond to them by deciding to accede to core international HR instruments.
References
Aloisi, R. (2011). The Threats to Compliance with International Human Rights Law (Doctoral Thesis). University of North Texas Digital
Library. Retrieved from
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc103282/m2/1/high_res_
d/dissertation.pdf (October 1, 2015)
Lippman, M. (1994). “The Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review. Vol.17, Iss.2, Art.3, 275-335
Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Nielsen, R. A., & Simmons, B. A. (2014). “Rewards for Ratification:
Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?”.
International Studies Quarterly. Vol.59, Iss.2, 197-208.
