智山學報 第37 022宮坂 宥洪「The Notes on the Concept of Delimitation」

rvut\wac=-+eta

The

Notes

on

the

Concept

of

Delimitation

Yak6

MIYASAKA

Summary

A

frequent

usage _of

the

terms

_{awacchedaka and avacchinna}

character-izes

the

NavyanyEya

language.

Although

such

terms

had

been

_used

in

ma-ny

Sanskrit

litertures

from

a

long

time

before

'the

age of

Navyanyaya,

vie

could

not

find

any

technical

sense

there

as specified

by

NavyanyEya

in

later

_period.

It

is,

in

fact,

these

terms

which

_play

an

important

role

in

differentiating

Navyanyaya

_("new"

Nyaya)

from

Pracinanyaya

_("old"

Nya-ya).

However,

since

the

emergence of

Navyanyaya

as a new methodolo=

gy

for

a systematic analysis of a

doctrine

in

the

thirteenth

century

to

the

fourteenth

century

A.D.

almost

all

other

_{philosophical}

systems of

Indian

philosomby

could not

but

adopt

the

same style of

Navyanyaya

language

in

order

to

explain even

their

own

doctrines

in

a rnost

_preclse,

minute, and

unambiguous manner.

The

present

paper

is

intended

to

try

to

deduce

the

nature and scope of

the

concept of `delimitation'

for

the

_purpose

of which

these

terms

are

clarified

from

the

aspect

of

its

clerivation

as well as

frorn

that

of

their

historical

development

exclusively

in

the

Ny5ya

literature.

It

also exami-nes

the

relevance of such _a concept

_of

`delimitation'

in

the

eplstemologi-cal analysis of

Navyanyaya

system.

1.0

A

frequent

usage _of

the

terms

awacchedaka and avacchinna

-47-NII-Electronic Library Service

'The

Notes

on.

the/Concept

of

Deliinitation

(Yuk6

MIYASAKA)

cterizes

the

Navyanynya

language.

It

is,

in

fact,

these

terms

which

play

an

important

rgle･

･ip･

,differe'i

tiating

Navyanyaya

("new"

Nyaya)

from

PrE-cinanyaya

("old"

Nyiya).

However,

such

terms

had

been

used

from

a

long

time

_before

_the

age of

Navyanyaya.

The

_present

writer's

concern

is

to

make

elear

the

necessity

atid

advantage of

_pestulating

the

coneept

of

these

terms

in

the

Nyaya

_philosophy.

tt

1.1

In

this

_paper

are

discussed,

first,

the

derivative

meaning

of

the

ter-rns of avacchedaka and avacchin'

na,

the

_general

idea

of

`delimitation'

throughout

the

_Nyaya

_history

and

then

_going

on

to

the

_{philosoPhical}

im-plication

ef

this

eoncept

by

skewing

$ome

typical

instances

oi utilazation

of

it

in

NavyahyAya.

2.0

We

shall.first

illustrate

the

derivative

meaning of

the

terms

of

ahacchedaka and

awacchinna.

2.1

The

word

dvacchedaka

is

derived

from

the

root chid

_prefixed

vvith ava-

_plus

the

agent suffix-afea.

Thus

it

is

explained;

avacchinnati

ity

avacchedakab.

The

root-sense of

this

chidis "to cut".

The

sequence

avachid conveys

the

meaning "to cut

into

a

_particular

slze'),

i.e.,

"to

limit"

or "to

delimit".

Thvts,

the

referent of

the

word avacchedaka,

in

a

'

_literal

sense, will

be

an agent of

delimitation

or a

delimiting

factor.

2.2

The

word avacchinna

is

case,

lt

wlll

literally

mean

an

i.e."limited"

or "delimited".

The

word

avacchedakatva

awacchedaka,(i)

and

the

word

a

_past

_passive

form

of ava+ chid.

In

this

object which

is

"cut

into

a

_particular

size",

refers

to

the

state or nature

(bha'-va)

of

the

avacchinnatva refers'to

that

of

the

avac･

-48-igtu\tuee='fltpt

chinna.

The

concept of avacchedakatva

is

of

reference

to

the

avacchinnatva.

course a correlative abstruct with

3.0

Let

us

talk,

now, a

historical

account of

this

¢oncept of

delimitati-on.

What

we _want

to

discuss

here

is

the

attestation of

the

terms

awacc-hedaka

and avacchinna and

their

synonyms exclusively

in

the

Ny5ya

literature

only.

Following

the

Indian

tradition

we can

divide

the

entire

bulk

of

the

Nyaya

literature

under

twQ

heads,

namely,

the

old

Nyaya

(PrEcinanyEya)

and

the

new

Nyaya

(Navyanyaya).

3.1

First

of all, we will

trace

out

some

_passages

in

the

old

Nyaya

texts

wherein

these

terms

are used and

try

to

deduceageneral

idea

behind

them.

3.1.1

It

is

interesting

to

note

that

such

terms

are not at all

found

in

Gautama's

Nydyastitra

and

VatsyAyana's.

Nya-yabha-sya.

We

find

only one

instance

of

the

word avacchinna

in

Uddyotakara's

Nydyava-rttika

which runs as

follows:

KirTi

punar

anityarp nEma?

Yasya

anityatvarp

tad

tha

anityatvarp

kim

?

ah satta vE

tadviSesanam.{2)

-

Here,

the

w'ord- avacchinna means "(the existence of a

thing)

delimi-ted

by

(both

the

bQundaries

of

time)"`

VficaspatimiSra

comments on

this-

_passage

in

his

Nya-yava'rttikata-tpary-alika- as

follows:

_./

Avacchedakatvam

ca

upalaksa4atvarp

na vigeea4atvarTi,

tat

ca

aparEntasya

bhinnak51asya

sarpbandhasya

'api

virodhitaya

1

histhasya

sarpbhavati.

TathE

ca

_yE

eva

apara-nta-vacchinnasya

-49-NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

on the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(Yfik6

MIYASAKA)

satta

_pitharasya,

sa eva

apara-nta-vacchinna-gabdasya'pi.

Evarp

sattA-samavayo'pi

taddhvayoh

_{pithara-gabdayob}

samtinah････････-･-･････････････TasmEt

ptirva-nta-vacchinna-vastusattaya

tatsarpbandhena

va

tasya

eva

vastuno'pi

para"nta-wacchinnata-

tatsarpbandho

_va

jfiapyata

iti

sararp ramaniyam.

C3)

He

interprets

the

word

avacchedakatva

by

the

term

upalaksaptatva and

remarks

that

it

is

not used

in

the

sense of vis'esanatva

in

this

context.

To

say

that

something

is

transistory

(anitya)

means,

according

to

Ud-dyotakara,

that

the

existence _of

that

thing

is

delimited

by

both

_the

ant-erior and

_posterior

boundarfes

of

time.

Here

each

_particular

time

is

sup-posed

to

be

a

delimitor

of

the

existence

of

transitory

things,

e.

g.

_pot,

sound etc.

Since,

however,

such a

_particular

time

is

not always a

diffe-rentiator of

the

said existence of

transitory

things

(from

that

of eternal

things),

VAeaspatimigra

states

that

it

is

an tipalaksapta,

i.

e.

non-perma-nent

distinguisher.

3.1.2

A

few

words may

be

in

order with regard

to

the

difference

betw-een

viSesagea and zipalaksa4a.

It

is

_generally

known

that

the

term

viSe-sa"a

means

_qualifier

in

a

_{qualificative}

cognition

(viSis.eav'nNa-na).

The

qualifier

of an object

is

nothing

but

a

distinguisher

of

the

same.

This

function

can

be

ascertained

from

etymological sense.

Bimficarya

says

:

Atra

vyutpattih, vigisyate

bhidyate

anena

(lyut)

iti

vigesa4ar;i

bhedakam.

Vyavartakarp

prakaro

va viSesarparp

bhavati.{4)

The

xtptdivartaka

(

`distinguisher' or `differentiator'

)

is

_generally

supp-osed

to

be

the

cause

for

_{a cognition of}

the

difference

_{of one}

_object

from

the

other.{5)

While

sometimes

the

differentiator

of an object

is

an

ewm\wag=--f--t

wt

ial

determiner

of

the

same as

in

the

case of

the

_potness

of an object

_pot;

sornetimes,

however,

it

is

a mere

indicator

of

the

object of cognition,

e.

_g.

a crow sitting on

the

house

is

just

an occasional

indicator

of

that

house.

Though

in

both

cases such

differentiators

appear

in

one's cognition

as

_qualifiers

of

the

objects such as `the

_pot',`that

house'

etc.,

the

anent'

differentiator

is

_{called vis'esa4a}

_to

be

distinguished

from

a4a which means a `non-permanent'

differentiator

or

distinguisher.

'

3.1.3

The

term

upalaksa4a reminds us a similar

term

lafesa4a

which

is

also regarded as a

distingusher.

The

term

laksaea

is

_generally

used

in

the

context of

definitition

in

Indian

Logic.

Vatsyayana

defined

it

as a

property

which

determines

the

real nature of

the

object

to

be

defined.(6)

It

should

be

noted

that

such a

defining

_property

laksana

is

different

from

uPalaksa4a since

it

must

be

a

_permanent

distinguisher

of

what

is

defined.

According

to

Uddyotakara,

laksapta

is

to

be

a exclusive mark

(ayavacchedaka-hetu)C7)

of

the

object which

is

differentiated

from

all

rs, namely, similar and

dissimilar

class of object.(S)

Udayana's

definition

of

laksapta

is

asa-dha-rapadharma

(`perculiar

or

'

characteristic

_property'):

according

to

him,

laksa4a

has

two

functions,

mely,

the

differentiation

_{of one object}

from

the

_other

(itaravya-vrtti)

and

the

accomplishment of verbal

behavour

(ayavaha-ra-siddhi).(si

In

short, all

these

terms,

viz. vis'esana, upalaksa4a and

laksa4a,

do

the

function

of

distingushing

(zb,dvrtti).

It

is

the

mode of

function

which

makes

the

difference

of

the

usage of

these

terms

in

each

_particular

text.

3.2

We

have

shown an

instance

of avcchedaka which

is

regarded as a

synonym of

mpalaksa4a

in

a

_particular

context.

We

find

some other

-51-NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

on

the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(Yak6

MIYASAKA)

stances

vihere

this

term

avacchedalea seems

to

be

regarded as a'

_general

terrh

for

wya-wartaka.

3.2.1

The

difference

between

viSeEapta and upalaksa4a

is

clearly

expl-ained

by

Udayana

in

terms

of avacchedaka.

aO

Let

us explaih

his

_position

in

brief.

3.2.2

The

notion of `qualificand'

(viSesya)

in

a

_{qualificative}

cognition

iS

･of

the

nature･ of `distingushed'.

A

-cognition

of `blue

_pot',

for

instance,

is

a

_{qualificative}

cognition

(vis'i.slav'n-a-na)

because

it

contains a

blue

co-lour

as

its'

_qualifier

(wiSeEapa)

which acts as

distingusher

of

the

main

ob-jeet

from

all other objects.

Unless

such a

_qualifier

is

cognized at

the

same

time,

one can never

have

the

cognition `blue coloured

_pot'

but

have

a

mere cognition `pot'

(wherein

the

_potness

alone

is

to

appear as

its

quali-fier).

_Now,

in

the

cognition

of

`Devadatta

posessing

a stick' also,

the

stick

acts.

_{as a}

distingusher

_of

the

_{main object} `Devadatta'

from

_{all other}

persons.

No

doubt,

the

stick appears as a

_qualifier

in

this

case.

But,

even

if

Devadatta

does

not actually

_possess

the

stick at

the

moment of

eogni-tion,

still

he

could

be

recognized

by

such a cognition wherein

his

stick

is

a mere

indicator

of

the

_person

Devadatta;

that

is

to

say, whether

or

not

the

stick

is

_present

in

Devadatta

still

it

acts as

his

differentiator,

but,

nevertheless

it

is

a

_property

of

non-concurrence

(vyadhikaragea-dharma),

i.

e.

it

does

not co-exist with

the

devadatta-ness

or

the

distinguished-ness

(vya-varttyata-,

to

_put

it

in

the

Navyanytiya

term).

On

the

other

hand,

a

blue

colour _of

the

_pot

_exists

inseparably

in

one and

the

same

locus,

that

is

the

_pot

which

is

cognized as a

blue

_pot.

In

other words, such a

differentiator

of

the

object

is

a

_property

of

concurrence

(sama-na-dhikara-ptadharma),

i.

e.,

it

co-exists with

the

_potness

or

the

distingushed-ness

of

rwme}iiglac=-+-ttwt

the

object.

In

this

context,

Udayana

used

the

term

avacchedaka as ageneral

term

for

a

distingusher,

that

is,

as a synonym of

_aya7vartaka.

Here

the

term

ayavacchedaka

is

used

in

the

same sense.

'

3.3

Comparatively

VacaspatimiSra

uses

the

term

avacchedaka or

avacc-hinna

frequently.

We

will show some

instances

from

his

works.

3.3.1

EkasmTtisamaritdhfi

var4a ekartha-pratipadandvacchinnah

ithahgD

.

Here,

avacchinna

means

"(syllables) characterized or conditioned

(by

the

denotation

of

a single word

to

a $ingle referent).

Evarp

svirthasmrtyavdntaravyEpEra4Erp stttrapadanErlr

dErthaviSis!aikarthapratyayaikakarya"vacchinna-na-f?z

samitho

veL

ditavYab･

ca

'

Here,

avacchinna means "(words) characterized or conditioned

(by

a

single

effect of

knowing

a

single

referent)".

_,

In

both

cases cited

above,

the

concept

of

avacchedaka

is

implied

in

the

sense of a

_perrnanent

characteriser

or

conditioner

which,

however,

amounts

to

mean viSesana.

T-3.3.2

Yady

api

visayalj

gariram

api

tathE'pi

anyatha

asya

dubkhahetu-.

bhava

ity

5ha

Sariram

iti.

Sarira-vacchinna

atmapradedo

hdnyataram

iti

garirarp

duljkhanyataram

uktam.

ca

Here,

avacchinna means "(the

Soul)

reStricted or

delimited

(bY

indivi-dual

body)".

Here

in

this

usage

we

observe

the

etymological sense

of

.

t

imitation'.

NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

on

the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(Yukd

MJYASAKA)

3.3.3

Yo

'yarp

gamaka-rasa-samanakalo

rapaksapab,

sa

kirp

kasya

rifpaksarpasya svabhava uta

tatsvabhavavacchedako

havabhittah@

.

Here,

awacchedaka means "a

determiner

(of

the

nature of

the

mornent

of

the

_production

of colour)".

Each

particular

time

is

the

`determiner'

in

this

context.

Thus

the

term

awacchedaka

is

used

here

in

the

sense of

up-alaksana.

--3.3.4

Udahararpam

aha,

"yatha

_icchadibhir

_atma".

_Tad

eva vibhajate.

"icchadayalj

khalu

dharmi4o

bhavanti",

manasapratyaksadTstab,

tesirp

"atma

viSesarparp"

kutab.

Guuabhttto

'vacchedakataya

yatas

tasmad

atmaviSlsta

icchEdayab

sadhya

ity

uktarp

bhavati.qO

Here,

avacchedaka means "permanent characterizer

(of

the

Soul

or

Self)".

The

desire

etc. are special

_qualities

of

the

Soul

and so any of

them

can

be

taken

as

a

_probans

(hetu)

with

reference

to

the

Soul

which

is

a

_probandum

(sa-ddya).

This

is

stated

in

the

NydyabhaHirya

by

the

sen-tence

_yatha-

iccha-dibhir

a-tma-

(quoted

above).

However.

the

sentence

iccha-dayah

khalu

dharmin.

o

bhavanti

(quoted

above

from

the

Nya-oraw-a-rttika) means

that

the

desire

etc. are

known

to

be

the

loci

of

the

qua-lityness

(guptatva)

and, according

to

Uddyotakara,

what could

be

inferred

(by

sa-mamayatod.rs.

!a)

should not

be

the

Soul

on

the

basis

of

the

desire

etc.,

but

the

`dependence of

the

desire

etc. on some substance' alone

co-uld

be

inferred

on

the

bases

of

the

_{qualifyriess,ae}

whereafter

the

`depend-ence on

the

Soul'

could

be

inferred

only

by

the

method of elimination,aO

and

finnaly,

the

desirer

etc. could

be

known

to

be

_qualijVed

by

the

Soul.

In

this

context,

the

word viSesagea

(in

tlie

Nordyawa-rttika)

means

just

a

_qualifier

only

in

the

epistemological

level,

and

it

denotes

the

Soul

(whi-ch

is

known

to

_qualify

the

desire

etc.

);

on

the

other

hand,

the

word

-54-cchedafea

is

used

in

which

here

donates

`substance').

3.3.5

am\wrg=-ttva

the

ontological sense of

_aya-wartafea

(`distingusher')

the

_quality

in

_general

(which

distinguishes

its

locus

Here.

avacch case

that

some

_place

sence.

Since,

er

_place

and, such

a

house

it

is

an

mpalakFaua.

3.3.6

Not

only some

_particular

_place

but

also

be

a

delimitor

of

the

`absence'.

For

example:

I

Pragabhavavacchedaka-kElopEdhis･･･.ts

3.4

We

have

already seen similar usage of

the

can also

_quote

some such

instances:

Na,

pramEpaviniScitasya

sArpSayikena

_{pratiksepayogat.}

Napi

pramarpaviniScito'bhava

eva

_paksikarp

tasya

_g;hasattvam

api

pratiksepturp

sEmSayikatvam vE 'panetum arhati

iti

_yuktam,

grha-vacchinna-bhavena

grhasattvam

viruddhatvat

_{pratisiddhyate}

-

- t

'

na

tu

sattvamatrarTi

tatra

tasya

auda-sinyat.

Tasmad

_g;habhavena

siddhena _sato

bahirbhavo

'numiyata

iti

_yuktam.

Etena

viruddhayolj

_pramErpayor

avirodhapEdanarp

visayavyavas-tha

arthapatti-visayalj

_parastab,

avacchinna-vacchinnayor

aviro-dhat.

Tasmad

na anumanat

prama4at

_{pramarpantaram}

arthapattir

iti

sthitam.

ae

inna

means "(an absence)

delimited

(by

the

house)".

In

the

absence of some

_person

is

_particularly

mentioned as

found

in

such as `this

hou$e',

such a

house

is

said

to

delimit

that

however,

the

same absence may _also

be

found

in

some

further,

this

house

cannot always

delimit

the

same absence,

cannot

be

a

_permanent

functioning

to

the

absence.

In

short,

.some

_particular

time

will

NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

on the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(YUk6

MIYASAKA)

Atra

brttmab

pratiyate

tavad

etasmad vijfiantit

parvaparak51a-vacchinnam

ekam vastutattvarp

tad

_{apy asya}

visayo na

bhavati

iti

sarpviruddham.ee

,

Here,

each

_particular

time

(i.e.

earlier or

Iater

time)

is

avacchedaka,

namely, a

delimitor

of

the

existence of

things.

3.4.1

TathEhi

pttrvadig-avasthitab

paramanur

yatha'

-

paradig-avasthitena

parama4una

'paradig-avacchedena

Evrtaritpa

utpannah

tatha

eva

kirp

_{pitrvadigravacchedenapi.eD}

Here,

each

_particular

space

or

direction

is

'supposed

to

be

a

delimiting

factor.

.

t

t

3,4.2

l

Mitrtatvam

avacchinnaparimanayogyatvam.za

,'

'

Here,

avacchinna stands

for

paricchinna

meaning a

particular

size _or

dimention,

which

is

also

frequently

used.

'

4.0

We

can now conclude

the

following

'remarks

ftom

the

above

.

rvatlon.

'

4.1

Instances

of

the

terms

avacchedaka and avacchinna are

vely very

few

in

the

old

Nyaya

literature.

They

are not at all.

ther

in

Gautama's

Nordyasutra

or

in

the

VastyEyana's

Nydyabha-sya.

However,

the

frequency

of

these

terms

increased

in

the

course of

time.

'

4.3

The

term

avacchedalea seems

to

be

used

_generally

in

the

sense

of

a

delimiting

factor.

Such

a

factor

may

be

a

_particular

time

or space or

directien

to

the

`absence' or `presence' of

individual

things,

an

individ:

ual

body

to

the

Soul

(A-tman),

and

the

like.'

.

'

rvut\wag=-ttpt

4.4

Some

instances

show

that

the

term

avacchedaka

is

used as a

gene-ral

term

for

_aya-vartaka

(`distingusher').

It

can

thus

be

appilied

to

both

viSesapa

(`permanent

distinguisher')

and upalakgana

(`non-permanent

dis-tinguisher').

In

this

sense of

_aya-wartaka

the

_word

_{ayavacchedaka}

is

_alse

used

just

asasynonym of avacchedafea.

,･

4.5

It

can

be

said

in

conclusion

that

though

the

old

Nyaya

_philosophers

knew

the

concept of `delimitation' still

they

did

not use

'frequently

the

terms

avacchedaka and avacchinna and nor,

did

they

regard

these

words as

technical

terms

for

analysis of

the

content _of cognition.

This

fact

_may

imply

that

they･did

not attaeh

_prime

importance

to

the

epistemological'

analysis as compared

to

the

new

Nyfiya

_{philosophers.}

5.0

Let

us, now,

_proceed

to

the

new

Nyiya

_position.

We

have

seen

that

the

basic

idea

of `delimitation'

is

to

specify

the

larger

area

by

a

_particular

thing

or

time

or space

intoasmallerarea.

The

specification of

the

area

is

nothing

but

the'differentiation

of

the

exact

object

from

all other objects.

'

'

5.1

Ofcourse,

the

Navyanyaya

_philosophers

also use

this

concept

in

such

a

general

sense of `delimitation', e.

_g.

Yat

tu

idarp

sarp sanyiyogi-dravyatvad

ity-atra

avydpti-vEragLiya

tatsarpyogasya

Sakhadyavacchedena

v!tter vrksatvavacchedena

tatsamanyabhavasya

vTttav avirodhat.as

Navin5s

tu

utpattikala"vacchedena

_ghatadau

_gurpasya

pralayavacchedena

gaganadau

sarpyogasya. stimanyabhavo

''

vartate,

t･･

Evarp

_{pratiybgimator}

api

kaladeSayor

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The

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Concept

of

Delimitation

(Yuk6

MJYASAKA)

l

deSakalabheda-vacchedena

tadabhavab.of

ln

such

_cases

the

exact

time

er space of either

the

_presence

or

the

sence of an object of cognition

is

specified on accQunt of

introducing

cencept of `delimitation'.

ab-the

5.2

The

meaning of vigefaua

is

alse conveyed

by

the

term

avacchedaka

in

Navyanyaya.

For

example:

Tfid;ganvayabodhotpattiprayojaka

cchinnavigesyakalopasthiti-tadavacehinna-viSesyaka-yogyata-jfiaT

'

nadighatitatuagry- eva.

es

Here,

the

word

awacchinna can

be

rendered' as `determined' _,

in

_which

ease' one may ohserve

that

the

_qttalifier

(vis'e"ana

or

avacchedaka)

ls

a'

property

of what

is

determined

(vis'esnyya

or avacchedya)

in

an

ontologi-cal

level.

It

can

be

noted

that

the

_{qualifier-qualificand}

relationship

(vis'esapta-vi-Se

£

ya-bha-va)

in

an

epistemologlcal

Ievel

does

not always eorrespond

to

the

_{property-locus}

relationship

(aLdha-ra-a-d.haya-bha"wa)

in

an

ontological

'!evel.

_Sometimes

_the

qualifier'

co-exists with.

the

_qualificand,

e.

_g.

Na

api

_{paksadharma"vacchinnasadhyavyEpakatve}

sati sadhana-,

vyEpakatvam upEdhitvarp

hyavySpanat,

ee

6..O

･In

_{most cases,}

_however,

_we

and'

avacchinna as used

in

their

we will see

hereafter.

find

instances

of

the

terms

avacchedaka

technical

sense

in

NavyanyEya,

whieh

6.1

of

Any

cognition

something.

.requ!resits

object.

Acognitionis

alwaysa cognition

rwm\wtag=-ttw

According

to

Nyaya,

cognitions are

divided

into

two

types,

viz.

ficative

cognitions _or

determinate

_{cognitions and unqualificative} cognitions

or

indeterminate

cognitions.

The

_{qualificative}

cognition

(vis'is.

Fav'n-a-na),

which alone can

be

the

object of analysis, contains, at

least,

three

ents, viz. a

_qualifier

(viSesa4a

or

praka-ra),

a

_qualificand

(wiSexya)

and

their

connector

(sai?zbandha):

the

unqualificative cognition

is

a

logical

tulation

by

way of which

the

_{qualificative}

cognition

is

ascertained without

postulating

endless

_preceding

cognitions.

6.2

Take

a negative cognition

for

example.

A

negative cognition refers

to

an absence

(abha-wa)

_of something.

Although

the

absence

itself

is

a

negative entity

(namely,

an

independent

category

according

to

Nyfiya),

it

should always

be

cognized

differently

in

each

_particular

case

because,

according

to

old

NyEya,

it

is

delimited

by

each

_particular

time

_or space;

and also

because,

according

to

new

Nyfiya,

its

counterpositives

gin,

i.

e., objects of negation) are

different.

To

say

that

an absence of

_pot

(gha!aMbha-va)

is

different

from

an

ence of cloth

(pala-bha-va)

is

due

to

the

fact

that

the

_pot

is

different

from

the

cloth.

Now,

to

say

that

the

_pot

is

different

from

the

cloth

is

due

to

the

difference

of

their

own

_qualifiers,

namely,

_potness

and

ness,

because

any cognition

(of

_pot

or of cloth) whlch

is

fit

to

be

analyzed

is

a

_{qualificative}

cognition as stated

above,

namely, a cognition of what

is

qualified,

and so

the

difference

of each

_qualifier

alone makes

the

difference

of

the

content

(or

object)

of

each cognition.

From

this

aspect, such

_qualifiers

as

being

differentiators

might

be

called

delimitors

(awacchedaka).

When

this

term

avacchedaka

is

used

in

this

sense of `delimitation', what

is

delimited

(avacchinna)

is

always

the

_qualificand

in

cognition.

-59-NII-Electronic Library Service

The

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Concept

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Delimitation

(Tuk6

MIYASAKA)

6.3

The

object

of negation

is

various.

Suppose

one

negates

the

ce

of

_pot

semewhere

and

$ays

"There

ls

ne

pet".

In

this

case,

the

object

Qf negation

is

pot

in,general,

i.

e.,

all

_pots

in

the

world.

But

hovvr

is'it

possible

to

imagine

all

_pots

in

the

world.

According

to

Nyaya,

the

fact

is

that

instead

of

enumerating

all

individual

_pots,

we sirnply cognize

its

generic

property

`potness'･as

delimitor

of

the

state

of

being

the

object

of

negation

(prattyQgita-vaccheduka).

Sometimes

one may negate a

_particular

_pot

in

the

same

_place,

where

different

pots

may exist.

IR

this

case,

we

are

to

cognize

its

_{part.ieu}arity}

or

individuality

(tadayaktitva),

i,.

e'.

this-individual-potness

or

ness, as

delimitor

of

the

state

of

being

the

object

of

negation.

,

In

this

way, Qnce something

is

taken

as

an

object

of

negation.

a

iar

property

callad `counterpositiveness'

(lpratlyogita-,

i.

e.

the

state

of

being

the

object

of

negation)

is

to

be

imposed

in

the

object,

and,

since

such a

_property

can

be

imposed

in

any

lo

¢us,

the

area of

its

occurence

mdst

be

delimited.

It

'is

in

such

a

case

that

the

Navyanyaya

eoncept of

tlelimitation'

is

most

technically

used.

_.

6.4

Actually

speaking,

however,

an

object

may

_possess

several

tties.

While

sometirnes an essential

determiner

(i.

e.

a

_generic

_property

such as

_potness

etc.).

alone

may

appear

as

a

_qttalifier

in

a

ccgRition;

rnetimes a mere

_{partlcularity}

or

individuality

(e.

_g.

this-pot-ness)

may

appear

there

and can act as a

delimitor

of

the

state

of

being

the

object

of negation ete.

As

a matter

of

faet,

the

nature

of

.a

delimitor

is

ed

by

the

intention

or attitude of a

_person.

In

other

words,

the

angle

of

looking

of a

_person

determines

the

existence'of

that

thing

in

a

_partidular

form.

Thus,

as

he

observes so

he

negates.

Naturally,

a siRgle object can

rvpt\eqee=-tept

have

several

_properties

depending

upon

the

angle of observation of a

rson.

These

_properties

behave

as

delimitors.

'

6,5

Thus,

a single entity smoke,

for

example, may

be

cognized as an

evidence

for

establishing

the

_presence

of

fire

on

the

mountain,

in

which

case

the

state _of

being

an evidence

(hetuta",

`probansness'

)

_existing

in

_the

smoke

is

cognized as

delimited

by

the

smokeness and not

by

any other

property,

not even

by

this-smoke-ness

(i.

_,

e.

the

mountain-smoke-ness)

_;

otherwise,

the

wy`ipti-relation could not

be

cognized

in

this

smoke and

so

the

inference

would

become

impossible.

We

will see

this

_point

later

in

some more

detail.

Or,

the

same smoke may

be

cognized

_as

a

_particular

object

of

negation

(e.

g.

"This

srnoke

does

not exist

there"

etc.),

in

which case

the

state

of

being

the object of negation

is

delimited

by

this-smoke-ness

because

what

is

ernphasized

here

is

the

individuality

of

the

_smoke.

'

6.6

Relations

as

well

as

propenies

can

be

accepted

as

delimitors.

Here,

the

`relation'

means

that

by

which

the

object of cognition

is

expected

to

exist somewhere.

In

case of

the

cognition stated as "There

is

no

_pot",

the

_pot

is

_generally

expected

to

exist

in

any

_place

by

the

relation of

ysical

contact

(sai2zDioga),

and so

this

relation should

be

taken

as a

imiting

relation of

the

counterpositiveness.

But

even

though

there

is

a

_pot

still one can say

that

there

i$

no

_pot

in

the

sense

that

the

pot

does

not exist on

the

_ground

by

the

relation of

inherence

(samawdya)

because,

according

to

the

NyEya

ontology,

the

_pot

as a whole

(avayavin)

exists

by

this

relation

in

its

parts

(avayava)

only.

In

this

case,

the

delimiting

relation

is

inherence.

This

argument rnay apparently appear

to

us

as sophistic one.

But

a

-61-NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

on

the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(Ytik6

MIYASAKA)

closer

look

will show

that

such a specification

in

terms

of `delimitof

is

surely

indispensable

for

_precise

analyses

of

the

content of cognition

in

each

and every case.

This

is

why

NavyanyEya

_philosophers

fully

utilized

this

concept of `delimitation'

in

their

epistemological analyses.

7.0

We

haVe

already observed

that

in

any

kind

of a

_{qualificative}

cogn-ition

the

main

object

occupies

the

_position

of

a

_qualificand

wherein a

qua-Iifier

or

_qualifiers

must appear,

and

when

such

a

_qualifier

is

a

_general

character

(or

`relational abstruct'

in

Ingalls's

termen

such as

counterposi-tiveqess

etc.)

imposed

on

the

object

then

it

requires

to

be

specified

or

de!imited

by

another

_qualifier

which

is

intended

by

a

_person

to

determine

the

existence of

that

object: or,

it

is

to

be

delimited

by

a relation

by

which

the

object

is

expected

to

exist

in

a certain

locus.

There

_are

actu-ally

innumerable

`relational abstructs'

_postulated

in

Navyanyaya

system;as

e.

_g.

pratlyagita-,

ka-raptata-,

ka-i:yata-,

adhikarageata-, a-dhayata-,

visaya-ta-,

vis.

_ayita-,

pralea-rata-,

viSesapata-, viSesyata-, saptbandhataM,

samband-hita-,

_j'anakata-,

_jaayata',

va-cakata', va-ayata-,

hetuta'",

sa-d]lyata-,

lakenyyata-.

anzayogitd,

and

so

on,

7,1

It

is

to

be

noted

that

the

delimiting

factors

(both

_properties

and

re-lations)

must co-exist with

the

relational abstructs

in

the

main object of

cognition.

For

example,

the

cause-ness

(ka-rapata-)

of

fire

with reference

to

smoke _must share a

locus

(namely,

_each

fire)

_with

the

fireness,

_and

not with any other

_property;

similarly,

the

effect-ness

(ka-t:yata)

of smoke

with reference

to

fire

must

share

a

locus

(i.

e.

each smoke) with

the

smokeness.

In

the

same manner,

the

cause-ness of

fire

must _exist

in

_each

fire

which

is

a counter-relatum

(sambandhigta:pratlyogin)

of

the

relation of

'

'

･

rvN\vaee=-+tpt

contact

(samptoga)

by

which

the

fire

exists somewhere

like

in

the

kitehen:

likewise,

the

effect-ness

of

smoke rnust exist

in

each smoke

which

is

a

counter-relatum of

the

relation of contact

by

which

the

smoke exists

in

the

kitchen

etc.

'

7.2

By

the

way,

the

cause-ness of

fire

cannot

be

cognized

independently

of

the

effect-ness of smoke.

Thus

it

is

said

that

the

cause-ness

･of

fire

is

conditioned

(nirmpita')

by

the

effect-ness

of

smoke, ahd at

the

same

time,

the

cause-ness of

fire

conditions

(niriipaka)

the

effect-ness of smoke.'

In

short, while

the

delimitor-delimited

relationship

cchedya-bha'va)

is

observed

in

one and

the

same

locus,

'

the

conditioned relationship

(niriipaka-niniltrva-bha'va)

is

in

different

loci.

8,O

It

can

be

_noted

in

this

_connection

that

regarding

the

case

of

negative

cognitions,

however,

there

seems

to

be

two

different

views among

the

Navyanyaya

philosombers

as

to

whether or not

the

delimiting

factors

ould co-exist with

the

state

of

being

the

object

of

negation

(pratlyogita",

counterpositiveness).

'

8.1

A

famous

example of

this

argument

in

Indian

_philosomby

would

be

the

negation of rabbit's

horn

(expressed

as "There exists no rabbit's'

horn"

s'aSa-s'rhga2?z na-sti).ts

Some

might analyse

this

negation as speaking of

an absenee whose counterpositive

is

the

horns-of-rabbit

as

qualified

by

the

existence,

and

thus

the

delimiting

_property

of

the

ess

(pratiyogita-)

of

the

object of negation would

be

the

existence

or

the

state _of

being

the

horns

of a rabbit.

However,

such a

delimiting

_property

can never exist

in

this

object

Xorns

of

rabbit'

because

the

horns

of

rabbit are

fictitious

by

themselves.

-63-NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

on

the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(Ylik6

MIYASAkA)

and

.so.

natutally' such a

delimiting

_property

cannot

be

said

to

co-exist

with

the

counterpositiveness

(pratlyotita-).

This

is

the

ease

of

an

abse-nce whose.counterpositiveness

is

delimited

by

a

_property

which

does'

not

share a

locus

with

the

counterpositiveness

(xtyadhikara4adharma-vacchi-nna-bha-va), and such a

type

of negation

is

accepted

by

some

Naiyayikas

sdch as

Saundadopadhyaya.oo

But,

this

is

rejected

by

Gafigega.

He

says:

'

Pratlyogyravrttis

cd

dharmo

na

PratlyQgita-vacchedakab.eO

,

(A

,property

which,dOes not.exist

in

the

counterpositive cannot

be

a

delimitor

of

the

counterpositiveness.)'

･

_According

to

GafigeSa,

the

said negation

sliou!d

be

analysed

as

speaking

of an absence whose eounterpositive

is-

the

horns

(or

the

existence

bf

the

horns)

in

a

icabbit;

just

as

in

the

case

･Qf

an

-absence

of smoke

in

the

red-hot

iron

ball

etc.

In

other words, what

is

exactly

denied

here

is

the

rel-ation

between

the

horns

and

the

rabbit

ln

the

same

1ine

as we

deny

the

contact

betw

¢err smpke'and

the

red-hot

iron

ball.

In

consequence,

the

delimiting

property

in

this

case

would

be

the

hor4-ness,

which

does

co-exist with

the

eounterpositiveness

in

the

horn.

8.3

Although

the

_{ayadhikara4adharma-vacchinna-bha-va}

is

not accepted

by

GafigeSa

and

his

followers

in

this

way,

the

ayadhikarageasa2gebandha--vacchiina-bha"'va

(an

absence whose counter-relatum

is

not

the

counter-Positive)

seems

to'be

accepted

by

them

to

a certain extent.ea

For

insta-nce, when

the,

presence

of some

eolour

is

'negated

in

a

_pot,

the

absential

counterpositiveness existing

in

that

colour

is,

as a

_general

rule,

delimited

by

the

relation of

inherence

(samavdya)

since

the

colour'

(rmpa.

i.

e.

one of

the

attributes of substance)

is

always expected

to

exist

in

its

locus

(namely,

substance)

by

the

_same

relation'only; nevertheless, one could

hegate

the

_pre'sence

.of

the

same colour

by

some other relatibns.such

as

rvde\vace!+kpt

a

_physical

contact

(samyoga)

in

the same

_pot

(e.

_g.

_{a red-colour}

does

not exist

in

the

_pot

by

the

relation of contact), and

thus,

though

the

physical

contact can never

be

the

relation

by

_which

the

colour exists

in

its

locus,

it

can

be

taken as a

delimiting

relation

dha)

of

the

counterpositive.

9.0

So

far

we

have

seen an

important

_{role of}

the

_{concept of} `delimitor'

in

the

Navyanyaya

philosophy.

Let

us, now, examine

the

necessity of

.

introducing such concept especially

in

the

definition

of

_ayopti.

9.1

It

is

true

that

the

exact

term

wympti i'snot

found

either

in

ama's

Nydyasutra

or

in

Vatsyayana's

NNdyabha-sya,

but

it

would not

be

proper

to say

that

the

concept of ztydybti was not at all

known

to

ose

earliest writers,

be

¢ause

they

did

deal

with

the

theory

of

inference.

The

Nbldyastitra

does

use

the

words

hetu

dnd

sa-d]lya, and

from

this

it

is

evident

that

Gautama

knew

that

the

inference

should

be

conducted on

some

_ground

of

the

knowledge

of

_aympti

of

the

hetu

with reference

to

sa-dhcra,

though

the

relation

(i.

e.

invariable

concomitance or vympti)

is

not explicitly mentioned

there.

'

Commenting

on

Nbldyastitra

1.1.5.,

VatsyEyana

says

that

the

inference

should

be

_preceded

by

the

_perception

of

the

relation

between

the

_probans

and

the

_probandum

(liiga-liiginoh

_{sambaitdha-dars'anam).}

But

_still

he

does

not explain

the

nature of

this

relation.

It

is

PragastapEda

who clearly

_presents

this

relation

(samaya

in

his

term)

as "Where

there

is

smoke

there

is

fire,

and where

there

is

no

fire

there

is

no smoke either,"ee which

he

calls vidhi

(form),

and

he

says

that

the

conviction of

fire

arises as

the

result

_of

_remembering

the

istence

(sa-hacar:ya)

of smoke

with

fire.

-65-NII-Electronic Library Service

The

Notes

en the

Concept

of

Delimitation

(Yak6

MIYASAKA)

Jayanta's

definition

of

the

concept of

_aympti

runs as

follows:

xrvoptih.

avina"bha-vacar:yah.@

(What

is

meant

by

zrvtipti

is

an

inseparable

connection,

that

is,

a

ular co-existence.)

9.2

In

short,

the

term

_aympti

itself

seems

to

be

a

later

invention

and

even

its

concept

in

those

days

was

defined

only

by

such

an

illustrative

manner _as mentioned

by

Pragastapada.

It

is

the

Navyanyaya

_philosophers

who

first

ana!ysed and

formulated

the

_general

idea

of vyopti

in

a most

precise

manner.

What

they

did

is

an epistemological analysis of

the

cture

of

a

_{qualificative}

cognition

of

w),mpti.

It

is

in

this

connection

that

the

technical

term

avacchedaka would

become

useful

because

of

its

uable

function

of

determining

the

content of

_{qualificative}

cognitions.

9.3

In

case

that

a smoke

is

invariably

concomitant with

a

fire,

the

oke

in

_general

must

be

cognized as

having

the

invariable

concomitance

with reference

to

the

fire

in

_general.

First

problem

is

concerned with

how

to

know

the

smoke

in

_general

and

the

fire

in

_general.

Any

individual

smoke or

fire

can

be

cognized as a

smoke or a

fire

because

of

its

having

the

_generic

character smokeness or

fireness.

Thus,

instead

of enumerating all smokes and all

fires

in

the

world, one can refer

to

the

smoke

in

_general

and

the

fire

in

_general

as

that

which

is

_qualified

(vis'is.

ta

or

avacchinna)

by

the

smokeness

and

as

that

which

is

qualified

by

the

fireness

respectively.

It

can consequently

be

said

that

the

invariable

concomitance

is

to

be

cognized,

in

this

case, as existing

in

that

which

_qualified

by

the

ness with reference

to

that

which

is

_qualified

by

the

fireness.

The

second

_problem

is

concerned with

how

to

_present

the

general

am\ww=.+Fl

pt

eme of

the

notion of vytipti which

is

exemplified

in

the

case of smoke

and

fire.

To

say

that

the

smoke

is

a

_probans

(hetu

or saUdhana) with

referenee

to

the

fire

which

is

a

_probandum

(sa-dhora)

means

that

the

sm-oke

is

cognized as

having

the

probansness

(hetuta-)

and

the

fire

is

cogn-ized

as

having

the

_{probandumness}

(sa-dhyata-).

The

probansness

of

the

smoke

is,

of course, conditioned

(niredpita-)

by

the

_{probandumness}

of

the

fire,

and vice versa.

However,

such

_properies

as

_probansness

and

_{probandumness}

are

_general

characters

(namely,

relati-onal abstructs) of

_probans

and

_prebandum

respectively

in

any

inference,

and so

they

must

be

specified.

Since

the

_probansness

of

the

smoke

is

a

property

imposed

on

that

which

is

_qualified

by

the

smokeness _only,

it

can

be

said

to

be

delimited

(awacchinna)

by

the

smokess;

likewise,

the

prob-andumness of

the

fire

can

be

said

to

be

delimited

by

the

fireness

only.

Thus

it

can now

be

said

that

the

invariable

concomitance

in

_general

is

to

be

cognized as existing

in

that

which

is

qualified

by

a

delimiting

pro-perty

of

the

_probansness

with reference

to

that

which

is

qualified

by

a

delimiting

_property

of

the

_{probandumness.}

9.4

Now.

to

say

that

one

thing

x exists regularly with another

thingy

means

the

absence ofy

does

not _exist

in

any

locus

of

the

thing

x.

In

other words,

if

there

be

absence

(of

something, say x) co-existing with

x,

_y

cannot

be

the

absencial-counterpositive

(i.

e. x).

That

is

to

say, an

essential

_property

existing

in

_y

and

delimiting

the

_{probandumness}

of

_y

can never

become

the

delimitor

(avacchedaka)

of

the

counterpositiveness

of

the

absence existing

in

the

locus

of x.

In

fact,

this

is

what

is

prese-nted

by

GafigeSa,

in

his

conclusive

definition,

as

the

_general

scheme of

the

notion of xLytipti.es