The
Examination
of the External
Object in the Tattvasamgraha
Akira
Suganuma
Tattvasamgraha written by Santaraksita opens with a salutation to the (1)
Buddha who taught the doctrine of pratityasamutpada. Fundamentally this work, therefore, explains the doctrine of pratityasamutpada from different. views. According to Kamalasila, an excellent commentater on the subject,
' the Bahirarthapariksa' of the Tattvasamgraha is set forth in order to prove that the origination of the world depends upon only 'consciousness' or vijnana.
In this chapter named 'the examination of the external object', the author quotes many views insisting upon the existence of the external object, and points out their absurdity. Kamalasila explains the most basic standpoint, the vijn"anavada of Santaraksita at the beginning of his commentary on this, chapter. He says that the Vijnanavadins think; the triple world is being-only-consciousness (vijnaptimatrata), and this vijn"ana, though the diversity of chains of each individual, is endless and impure for persons who have not
(2) realised the truth, but it is pure for those who have cut off all obstacles; it is one on which all beings depend and which is destroyed at every moment; the triple world is not one and also unmodifiable as held by the followers
(3)
of the Upanishads. According to kim, that the triple world is mere vijnana is proved by the following reasons: (1) Since the external objects in the form of earth etc. to be recognised do not exist, there can be no recogniser;
(2) although it exists in another chain, there can be no 'recognised' (grahya) and 'recogniser' (grahaka). He further summarizes it into the following
(1) Tattvasamgraha, Karika. 1.
(2) For prahinacarana read prahinavarana. Tib. bsgrib pa spans. (3) Tattvasamgrahapanjika. p. 550.
11(52) The External Object in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma) argument.
Every cognition (jnana) is devoid of both 'recognised' and 'recognises'. Because it is cognition (jnanaty. at).
Just like the cognition of the reflected image (pratibimbavat).
From the above point, Santaraksita criticizes the realistic views. The arguments may be mainly devided into two classes: one is atomic (paramanu)
theory and the other is vijnana-theory. The atomic-theory is asserted by (4)
three realists, Subhagupta, Kumarila and Sumati of Digambara who insist on the existence of the external object, according to their own atomic-theory.
Santaraksita's refutation to their views concerning atomic-theory, however, almost coincides with Vasubandhu's and Dignaga's attitude towards the realists
(5) (6)
in the Vimsatika and the Alambanapariksa. So I do not refer to them here, but only to the discussions concerning the vijnana-theory.
Bahirarthapariksa presents very five realistic views based on the vijnana-theory and its criticism.
(1) The first realistic view is said to be asserted by Subhagupta. He says: "Th
e vijnana, even without having the form (akara) of things, can certainly recognise things, as it leads only with the knowledge of things.
Santaraksita criticizes the above view. He says: The vijnana never cognises the external objects either with the form (sakara), or without the form (nirakara, anakara), or with a different form (anyakara). It is the true nature of vijana that they themselves rise one after another without reference to any external objects.
(2) The second one is asserted by Kumarila of Mimamsa: The vijnana, in which reflections of the objects appear, should require some other cognition (jnanantara) for its reflection in it. For instance our eyes are able to see
(7) other objects, but not able to see themselves.
(4) As to Subhagupta, see Hattori, M.; "Bahyarthasiddhi of Subhagupta". (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Study. Vol. VIII, No. 1)
(5) Cf. Vimsatika. K. 11-14 etc. (6) cf. Alambanapariksa. K. 4-5 etc.
The External Object in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma) (53) To the second view, Santaraksita says: It is the nature of vijnana that it shines itself without any help of the other cognition (anyavedakam na vyapeksate) If it requires any help to rise, there will be no end to it (ana-vastha). The example of the eyes which is adduced by you is not adequate, because the vijnana shines itself without any help, while the eyez are the
(8) causes for shining. That is, the vijnana is only self- recogniser (svasamveda). (3) The third assertion is also by Subhagupta : The external objects can be proved (bahyarthasiddhi) by perception (pratyaksa) as well as by inference (anumana). As a matter of f act, we always perceive the objects and we are able to infer as to their existence, because we obtain the expected effects. from them.
Santaraksita criticizes this : The existence of the external objects cannott be proved by perception. For example, the perception that has no blue form (nilakara) cannot reflect blue things. If the perception has a blue form and the external object is also blue, then there would be two blue vijnana. This
(9)
is quite absurd. By inference also the existence of the external objects cannot be proved at all, because the reason advanced by you is not acceptable to
(10) both parties.
(4) The fourth assertion is by Uddyotakara of Naiyayika : That which appears in various places should be regarded as different from the internal perception (antaranubhava), or in other words, the objects which appear in, the vijnana are different from their perception, because they are
cogni-(11) sable, like the cognition in the different chain (santanantara).
Santaraksita answers Uddyotakara thus: The vijnanas are not different-from the things appearing in the vijnana, because, as the vijnanas themselves,
(12) are cognisable, they are not different from themselves.
(5) The last assertion is as follow: The external objects exist, because, they are reflected in the vijnana. Taking an illustration, such as when you see your face in the glass, you understand that the rays of the eyes returned
(8) K. 2017-28. (9) K. 2051.
(10) K. 2052-4. (11) Cf. Nyayavartika, 4. 2. 34. (12) K. 2057-8.
(54) The External Object in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma)
by the glass see the face behind. If there is no face, we cannot prove this phenomenon.
Santaraksita refutes above : It is quite absurd that the rays of the eyes returned by the glass see the real face. If it is so, the rays should feel the face as a real face, but it is normal that they feel the contrary. For example, when a man facing the South (daksinabhimukha) looks at the face of a mirror (darpanatala), what he perceives in the mirror is the face facing the North (uttarabhimukha). Therefore the existence of the external objects cannot be proved.
Thus proving to be false of the realistic views, Santaraksita urges that Being-only-consciousness or vijnaptimatrata has been clearly established by the wise, and so he has trodden the same path for the ascertainment of the
(13) absolute truth.
I think that the first discussion is most important to ascertain the true (14) standpoint of Santaraksita who is said to belong to the sakaravijnanavada
(15)
and by others to the nirakaravijnanavada. Investigating further into the first discussion, I will try to get a clue for solving this problem, wether he belongs to the nirakaravijnanavada, or to the sakaravijnanavada.
According to Santaraksita, if the external object is recognised, it is re-cognised either by the formless (anirbhasa=nirakara) cognition, or by the cognition having a similar form (sanirbhasa=sakara), or the cognition endowed
(16)
with a different form (anyanirbhasa=anyakara). Only one of these is possible under our consideration.
The first alternative cannot be accepted. The formless cognition (nira-(17) karajnana) is not able to come into connection with the external object. If such cognition is supposed to recognise the object, it cannot recognise it as it really is, because 'the formless cognition' is defined as one which has no form of the object, and, on the basis of that, these two (the cognition and
(13) K. 2084.
(14) Cf. Yamaguchi, S.; Hannyashisoshi. p. 174. (15) Cf. Nakamura, H.; lado-Shisoshi- p. 200. (16) KL 1999. (17) K. 2020.
The External Object in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma) (55) (18)
the form) are different from each other.
Other parties like the Vaisesika, the Mimanisaka, the Jaina and the rest, however, contend that the cognition recognises the object even though it is devoid of its form, just as a sword cuts an elephant without being endowed
(19) with its form and fire burns the fuel without having its form.
To the above argument Santaraksita urges: It is a false analogy, because a blow of the sword is the productive cause (utpattihetu) of separation of the limbs of the elephant, but the cognition (jnana) is not. That is, when the elephant is struck by the sword, 'an elephant with sundered limbs' is produced, and, on account of that, the sword is named as 'the Cutter '; similarly when the fuel is touched by fire, it becomes the live-coal. Even so, the cognition does not confer any benefit on the object, and on the
con-(20)
trary it is the object that produces the cognition clearly. So the cognition which does not modify the object cannot recognise the object.
Further it may be said that the cognition, even though it is devoid of the form of the object, does recognise the object, because it is of the nature
(21)
of a discernment (paricchedarupatva) of the object. But Santaraksita answers as follows : If it were proved that the cognition is of the nature of recog-nition of something other than itself, all this would be true. But as a matter of fact this has not been proved, because the cognition does not recognise
(22)
the object by its mere existence (sattamatrena). In reality the cognition does not recognise anything other than itself. It is only a 'self -recogniser' (sva-samvedaka).
Thus it is proved that the formless cognition cannot recognise the external object.
The second alternative also cannot be accepted. 'The cognition with a form' (sakarajnana) is explained by Santaraksita as follows : Under the view of the cognition with a form (sakarajnanapaksa), there is difference between the cognition and the form envisaged by it; yet as the reflection has the
(18) panjika. p. 564. (19) K. 2007.
(2t)) panjika. p. 560. visayenaiva vijnanam vispastam upajanyate. (21) K. 2041. (22) K. 2009-10.
(56) The External Object in the Tattvasarngraha (A. Suganuma)
same form as that which is reflected, there might be the, recognition in the (23)
secondary sense. But for one who does not regard the cognition as bearing the imprint of the form in object (arthakaroparagavat), there can be no,
(24)
recognition ' of the external object. As 'the reflection' (pratibimba) in the above is expounded to mean 'the form of the cognition' (jnanakara), it is understood that the cognition with a form (sakarajnana) is one which, though it has no form in itself, is imprinted by the reflection of the form of the object in it. Santaraksita makes this more clear by saying that, under the view of the cognition with a form, the cognition has the reflection of the
(25)
object (arthapratibimbaka), and on the contrary there is one who regards the (26) cognition as not imprinted with the form of the object, like the pure crystal. Consequently it is quite clear that 'one who does not regard the cognition as bearing the imprint of the form of the object' is the ni rakarajnana-vadin, and on the contrary 'the sakarajnana' can be defined as 'the cognition imprinted by the form of the object.'
But according to Santaraksita, it is quite impossible that even such cog-nition recognises the external object, because the cogcog-nition with a form is unreal (alikatva). If there would be such cognition, as the form would be not different from the cognition, there would be no multiplicity of the form (akarabahuta). Consequently there can be no recognition of the object (arthasamvedana). Or, as the cognition is not different from them, there
(27)
would be a variety (anekata) even for the cognition. Further if the cognition were completely like the object, then it would have the character of non-cognition (ajnana), or of the nature of material (jadarupatva) . If it is partially like the object, then every cognition should be the recogniser of(28) every object (sarvavedaka). Therefore, such cognition cannot be connected with the object, and so cannot recognise it.
The third alternative is, through an explanation of the commentator,
(23) K. 2005. pratibimbasya tadrupyad bhaktam syad api vedanam. (24) K. 2006. (25) K. 2020.
(26) K. 2035. suddhasphatikasamkasam arthakarair anankitam. (27) K. 2037-8. (28) K. 2039.
The External Object in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma) (57)
arranged for those who contend that the cognition with one form (anyakara) recognises the object with another form (anyakara); as an example, the cog-nition with a yellow form (pitakara) also recognises white conch-shell
(sukla-(29) sankha).
But Santaraksita urges that there cannot be such cognition, because the cognition with one form of the object cannot recognise another object. If it
(30)did so, it would happen that every cognition recognise every thing. Therefore the third alternative is proved to be incorrect.
Thus Santaraksita accepts neither the nirakaravi jnanavada, nor the saka-ravijnanavada, or the anyakaravijnanavada. According to him, the cognition is spoken of as 'recognising the unreal form' (abhutakara) only through delusion. and in reality it does not recognise anything at all, for the simple
(31)
reason that it has no object (nirvisaya). In other words, the cognition is devoid of both the recognised (grahya) and the recogniser (grahaka), and it is only self-cognition (svasamveda).
In conclusion, the arguments of- Santaraksita, who criticized these realistic views in the Bahirarthapariksa of the 7 attvasamgraha, accepts neither form, nor object, but mere vijnana. Therefore, I think that his vijnana-theory does not belong to any of our relative treatments of the nirakaravijnanavada and the rest, but only to one which is transcendent of these all. So I want to name his presentation as 'the Absolute formless 'one, from which he criticizes the views insisting on the existence of the external objects.
