The Japanese Negative Interrogative ja nai? and Insubstantial Identity of Japanese Self: On the Basis of Buddhism Philosophy*

(1)

The Japanese Negative Interrogative ja nai?and InsubstantialIdentity ofJapanese Self:On the Basis ofBuddhism Philosophy

1.Introduction

　Recently therehasbeen much criticism from linguists,anthropologists,and philosophersforap- plying an ideologicalframework of“modern”western languagesin ordertounderstand Eastern language practices (Nishida 1987; Suzuki 1997; and a panel of the 10^t^h International Pragmatics Conferenceconvened by ScottSaft,SachikoIde,and William F.Hanks¹⁾).Oneofthemostsignifi- cantdiscussionsheld wasthatbetween linguisticanthropologist,MichaelSilverstein,and Japanese linguist,AkihoYamaguchi(2007),whoargued thatthehistory ofwestern linguisticscan beconsid- ered an instrumentoflogicand reason whosepracticeisowed totheinfluenceof“modern”western ideasofenlightenment,such asthosepresented by theBaconians.TheBaconians’centralbelief wasthatrhetoricallinguisticexpressionssuch asmetaphorswereobstructionsin thepursuitofsci- entifictruth,and they soughttodiscoveruniversalprinciplesthrough focusing on logicaland co- herentaspectsofdiscourse.Asaresultofthismethod,anumberofimportantaspectsoflanguage practice(namely,thepracticaland socialaspectsoflanguage)havebeen neglected.In thesamedis- cussion,AkihoYamaguchiclaimsthatsuch “modern”western ideasbecamethemain stream of Japaneselinguisticanalysis,afactthatisevidenced in theexampleofthe“nominativecase”ga, which,asevery Japanesespeakerknows,doesnotalwaysfunction asa“nominative”markerin Japa- nesecontexts.Tsurumiand Ikimatsu (1968)alsoemphasizetheimportanceofemicperspectivesof analyses,and suggestthatevery culturaloutcome— including languages,religions,and lifestyles

— includestheinhabitants’perspectiveson theirsocialworld,sothattheirown philosophy — which iscultivated within thecontextoftheirspecificsociety — isimmanentwithin thosecul- tures.Such criticismsremind usoftheSapir-Whorfhypothesis,which pointstotheinterrelated and interactionalconnectionsbetween languagesand theirsocio-culturalworld.

　Thispaperisan attempttosupporttheclaimsofsuch criticism.Through reexamining theJapa- nesecommunicativepracticeofthenegativeinterrogativefrom itsemicperspective,Iwillreveal whatismissing in thepreviousstudies,mostofwhich haveemployed thewestern framework.Spe- cifically,Iwillfirstpresentan interpretation ofselfin the“modern”western paradigm,providing an overview ofprevioussurveysoftheliterature.Next,Iwillconductpracticalanalysesofja nai in task-managementdiscourse,and show how theparticipantattunesherselftoherinteractantby

The Japanese Negat i ve I nt errogat i ve j a nai ? and I nsubst ant i al I dent i t y of Japanese Sel f :

On t he Basi s of Buddhi sm Phi l osophy*

Rumi ko Oc hi a i

Title:Yp099-111_落合るみ子.ec8 Page:99 Date: 2008/02/19 Tue 15:34:23

(2)

supporting theinteractant’spointofview in away thatcould beseen toabnegateheridentity.Last- ly,in discussion,Iwillarguethatthistendency toself-abnegateortoinsubstantiatetheselfmay be linked with theJapaneseconsciousnessofselfand other,which may begrounded in Buddhism philosophy.

2.Preliminary discussion

2.1 Previous studies on negative interrogative

　TheJapanesenegativeinterrogativeja nai?(COP＋NEG?)isan oralcontraction of“dewa naika (COP＋P＋NEG＋Q),”whosecomparableEnglish forms(i.e.,“Don’tyou〜?”)indicatethespeaker’s assertiveness(Heritage2002;Koshik 2005).According toIkeda(1967),whofound asimilarity to theEnglish phrase,thefunction oftheJapanesenegativeinterrogativeisalmostexactly thesame asitsaffirmativemeaning,despiteitsstructurehaving an interrogativeform.Thatis,thenegative interrogative shows the speaker’s high degree of assertiveness and certitude regarding what he/sheisstating.In thissense,itdiffersfrom thebasicfunction ofmostinterrogativeforms, which istoask thehearerforinformation.Similarly,Kawanishi(1994)pointsoutthatthenega- tiveconstructionja naiattachestotheinformation aboutwhich thespeakerismostsure.Shethus namesja naianon-challengeablemodal.Whatiscommon in thosepreviousstudiesisthatthey are greatly affected by theresultsofEnglish analysis,and regard thefunction asspeaker’sproperty.

　Moreover,Miyazakietal.(2002)pointoutthat,in thecaseoftheJapanesenegativeinterroga- tive,thespeakerasksthehearerforan agreementon theinformation aboutwhich he/sheismost confident.Hereagain,they focuson only thespeaker’sattitudetohis/herproposition,thusoffering nochallengetoKawanishi’s(1994)argument.Wecan inferfrom thesepreviousstudiesthatthey considerthenegativeinterrogativefrom adichotomousdistinction ofspeakerand hearer,and con- ceiveitonly from thespeaker’sperspective,ratherthan from thatoftheinteractant.Namely,they apply an English dichotomousmethodology ofspeakerand hearereven in analysisofJapaneseprac- tice,sothatthey aresimply awareofwhatthespeaker— thatis,thespeaking subject— believes. Wecan thusassumethattheirfocusisonly asinglepointof“self”which isrevealed on asurfaceof communication.

2.2 Western and Japanese structures ofself

　In thewestern paradigm,thespeakeristheoneand only centeroflanguagepractice(Nishida 1987;Machida2003;Shimizu 2006).According tothediscussion between Silverstein and Yama- guchi(2007),thespeakeristhecogito²⁾in which semanticthoughtisidentified asan existenceof socio-culturalinteraction.Here,thecogitoconsistsnotonly ofnominativesin asemanticorreferen- tialsense,butalsoincludesthespeaking subjectin thesocio-culturaldimension.In otherwords,the semanticorreferentialdimension definesthesocio-culturaldimension wheretheformercoverson thelatter.TheSilverstein and Yamaguchi’s(2007)discussion demonstratesthatthespeaker’sself in thewestern world isapivotofcommunication — i.e.,itisforegrounded and identified asan inde-

(3)

pendententity from everything and everyoneoutsideofit.Kopf(2001),alsoaddressing therela- tionship between thiscogitoand self-consciousness,writes:

WhileDescartesgreatly contributed tophilosophicaldiscoursewhen hethematized self-consciousnessand formulated theself-reflectiveand self-conscious“I”asthemeth- odologicalstarting pointofthephilosophicalenterprise,Ithink hisformulation reveals threefundamentalweaknesses:First,Hereifiestheexperiential“I”asthinking thing;

second,heequatesthecogitoand theself;and third,hefailstodistinguish between the cogitoas“consciousnessof”and self-consciousnessas“consciousnessofitself.”(Kopf 2001:40)(underlinemine)

Thissupportstheclaim thattheconceptofselfisforegrounded,and isthusregarded asan inde- pendententity in thewestern structureofconsciousness.

　Japanesephilosophersand linguists(Nishida1987;Machida2003;Yamaguchi2004;Shimizu 2006),in thissense,pointoutthedangersofadapting thiswestern modeforthinking aboutJapa- nesecommunicativepractices.They claim thateach languageisuniquein structure,sinceeach is based upon aparticularway ofthinking (aclaim which may recallagain theSapir-Whorfhypothe- sis).My idea,therefore,isthattheJapaneseunderstanding oftheselfand ofconsciousnessisfunda- mentally differentfrom thatofEnglish-speaking peoples,and thisdifferencein understanding has profoundly affected theJapaneselanguageon astructurallevel.

　A numberofstudieson theJapaneselanguagehavebeen conducted which,by using adichoto- mousframework ofspeakerand hearer,demonstratethedegreeofthespeaker’scertainty about his/herown statements.Such analysescertainly help pin down forustheexactfunctionsofthe negativeinterrogativeja nai. However,theseexplanationsarenotsatisfactory when applied to real-lifeconversations.In thefollowing sections,Iwilldemonstratethewaysin which theJapanese waysofthinking aboutselfand otherareunique.Also,by reexamining practicesoftheJapanese negativeinterrogativefrom an ethnographicalpointofview,Iwillshow how theideasofconscious- nessarestructured.

3.Data

　Thedataconsistsofsixteen transcriptionsofatask-managementdiscoursebetween Japanesefe- malenativespeakers³⁾.Pairsofinformantswereasked torearrangefifteen picturecardsasshown below in Figures1 and 2 tocreateanaturalstory.Theoriginalwork by LewisTrondheim (2003)is thestory ofamain characterwho,faced with thechallenging task ofleaping overacliff,isunable tosuccessfully completethetask afteranumberofludicrousattempts.Weasked,however,that theinformantscontinuetheirtask untilthey finally agreed with each otherthattherewasnocor- rectanswer.Theirnegotiationswerevideotaped by researchers.Wearranged fortwodifferent typesofgroups,which varied depending on thelevelofintimacy displaced between participants.

(4)

Thefirstgroup,or“in-group,”consisted ofparticipantswhowererecognized asfriends.Thesecond group,or“out-group,”consisted ofparticipantswhohad nevermetbefore.Thetotallength ofthe dataemployed in thispapertook about126 minutes,and approximately 8 minuteswerespenton each pair⁴⁾.

4.Analysis

　ThedataillustratesthattheJapanesenegativeinterrogativeja naihastheprimary function of expressing an indeterminacy in thespeaker’srecognition,ratherthan assertively requesting the hearer’sagreement.Ja naiallowsforthespeakertoentrustthetermination oftheprocedureto theinteractant,and allowsforthespeakertonothavetoemphatically insiston theaccuracy ofher own statement.

　Example1⁵⁾isaconversation between “in-group”participantsthatoccursin thebeginning ofthe negotiation.L in line1 askswhich ofthethreecharacterson thepicturecardswillcomein first place.

[Example1]

　01 L:Dare o saisho nisuru?

who OBJ first P do

‘Whodo(we)putfirst?’ 　02 R:Koreda yo, kore.

this COP FP this

‘Thisone,thisone.’ 　03 L:A, hontoda.

oh true COP

‘Oh,(that)’sright.’ ->04 R:Koreja nai?

this COP NEG?

Figure2.Sampleofpicturecards(“out-group”) Figure1.Sampleofpicturecards(“in-group”)

(5)

　05 R:De:: and

‘Aaand’

　06 L:De::,tanima ga [at-te:: and gorge TOP exist-LK

‘Aaand thereisagorge.’

　07 R: [Tanima ga at-te:: gorge TOP exist-LK

‘Thereisagorge.’

　In line2,R proposesan answertotheinteractant’squestion.Theproposalispreferably acknowledged by theinteractantin line3,butsheusesanegativeinterrogativein line4.Weshould notun- derstand this negative interrogative to be R’s request for an affirmative expression from the interactant,becauseL hasalready expressed such agreementin line3.Otherwise,shewould not continueherutterancesin line5 untilshereceivesacommentfrom theinteractant.

　Whatishappening hereisthat,sheleavesroom forfurthersuggestionstobeoffered from her interactantby showing herfeeling ofuncertainty through theuseofnegativeinterrogative,even though sheknowssheisgetting theaddressee’sconsensus.Conversely,sheneverimposesheropin- ion upon theinteractant,butrathermodestly approvesoftheinteractant’sinterposition asifto leavethedecision-making toheraddresseeby dintofdemonstrating indeterminacy toward herpro- posal.Thisisthepointmostworthy ofmention — indeed,moresothan thosepointsemphasized in previous studies. In addition, what can be inferred from this negotiation is that the negation markernaican play an essentialroleforcreating indeterminacy:itallowsfortheaddresseetofeel enough ateasetorepeatthenegativeform,sothatthespeakerdefersfrom thestated opinion.

Thus,asthisexampleindicates,thespeakerattemptstosettleitasan opinion produced by both participants,through themeansofshowing hermodestattitudetoward theproposal. In other words,both participantsshareand consentR’sideaasexpressed in line4.Asaresult,in termsof evidentiality,they seem toperceivethesourceoftheproposalasbelonging tothecommon spaceof both participants’consciousnesses,ratherthan only tothatoftheirindividualself’sorother’srecognition.Thisisalsoshown by thefactthattheinteractantL permitsR tocarry on herwith her turn,withoutexpressing any disagreement,and totakeoverthestory asin line6.Here,wecannot recognizethespeaker’sidentity.Even though herideaisaccepted by theinteractant,shestill showsindeterminacy and attemptstoabnegateherindividualidentity by notdisclosing hereviden- tiality.Therefore,R’sproposed and L’sapproved information existsin thecommon spaceofthetwo participants’ideas,sothatthephraseja naiboth enhancestheattention paid totheinteractant, and attuneseach other’srecognition.

　Example2 below isasequentialorganization of“in-group”participants,wherethenegativeinter- rogativeja naiservesasan answertoaquestion-answeradjacency pair.Whileja naihasbeen dealt

(6)

with in termsofthespeaker’sviewpoint— thatis,asking forconfirmation (Kokuritsu kokugo kenkyusho(Ed.)1960;Hasunuma1995 etc.)— thisexplanation hasseverallimitationswhen applied toExample2,in which ja naiservesastheaddressee’sutteranceby showing herin agree- mentwith thequestioner.

　Participantsaretalking abouthow they willtacklethegiven task.R takesahintfrom L’sutterancein line1 thatsomecardslook similar,and suggestsin line2 thatitmay work ifthey collect similarcardstogether.TheR’ssuggestion ispreferably acknowledged by L.L then takespartin collecting similar cards as in line 4. From this point on, the conversation seems to carry on smoothly within asealed consensus.

[Example2]

　01 L:Nan- kore to kore,onaji yoona mono da to omou kedo, whatthis and this same like thing COP P think CONJ kore dooshita no tte kanji da yo ne.

this what’s-happening Q LK like COP FPFP

‘Like-(I)think thisand thislook similar,butitislike“what’shappening?”here.’ 　02 R:Tashikani, zenbu koo yat-te matome reba i:: n da yo, onaji yatsu dake.

right all this do-LK collect CONJ good N COP FP same thing only

‘Right,(it)workswellif(we)collectthesamecardsalltogetherlikethis.’ 　03 R:Kore,[desho::

this COP+AUX

‘Thiswillgoeswith (theoneIfocuson).’ 　04 L: [Koreâto, kore^b mo da yo ne. 　　 thisâ and this^b too COP FP FP 　　 ‘Thisâonegoeswith this^bone,right.’ 　05 R:Kore^cmo kore^d da to omou?

this^c too this^d COP P think

‘Do(you)think this^conegoeswith this^done?’ ->06 L:Ja nai?=

COP NEG?

　07 R: =Kore-ppoine 　　 this-like FP 　　 ‘(It’s)likely.’

　Here,Iwould liketopay closeattention tolines5 and 6.QuestionerR startsthefirstpairpartof theadjacency pairin line5,and L answerswith “Janai?”in responsetoit.Itisobviousthatja nai hereworksby showing agreementtoherinteractant’squestion,ratherthan by asking in theform ofaquestion forinformation (asistheusualcasewith theinterrogative).Thisisalsoproved by

(7)

R’simmediateutterance“Kore-ppoine”in line7,wherethefinalparticlenesignifiesacondition in which both participantsshareinformation (Cook 1990).Now,onequestion arises:why did thean- swerernotclearly state“yes”based on conditionalrelevance(Schegloff1972)ifshehad agreed with theinteractant?Letuscomparean alternativeexpression — “Yeah,that’swhatI’m thinking”

— which may beaplausibleanswerin English conversation.With thisstatementshewould be abletodisplay thatherthoughttotally matchestheinteractant’sopinion by showing thatthey havereached aconsensus.Atthesametime,however,itcould alsoconvey thespeaker’sepistemic authority (Heritage2002)— i.e.,thatshehad already known itbeforetheinteractantproposed the question.Itthuscreatesan individualisticatmosphereasifherthoughtshould bedistinguished from another.On theotherhand,by using anegativeinterrogativeform,shesucceedsin encouraging theinteractant’sepistemicauthority withoutrevealing theindividualisticatmospherein making useofan up-rising question form.

　Furthermore,such aresponsewould display theanswerer’sharmoniousattitudein supportof theinteractant.In ordertorecognizewhy ja naiisabletoshow thefeeling ofagreementwithout epistemicauthority,itwillhelp toconsiderthefunction ofthenegativeinterrogative,which has been pointed outin thepreviousstudies.According toMiyazakietal.(2002),thenegativeinterroga- tiveisadeviceused when thespeakerrequeststhehearertoadmitthattheproposed information isappropriate— thatis,when thespeakerisconfidentofhis/herown information.Although the addresseeL in theadjacency pairdoesnotask R forconfirmation from speaker’sviewpoint,sheis confidentoftheaccuracy and appropriatenessoftheinformation precedingja nai.Therefore,she can convey theaffirmativemessagewithja nai.

　Itisparticularly worth noting thattheanswerertakesoverapartofthequestioner’sutterance. By simply saying “Ja nai?,”sheacknowledgesthepreceding information (i.e.,‘thisonegoeswith thisone’)whileatthesametimeattuning herselftothequestioner.Wecan inferfrom thisnegotia- tion thattheanswererimmediately groundsthequestioner’sinformation in herconsciousness,thus finding acommon ground.In otherwords,theinformation proposed by theinteractantispromptly recognized and shared in both participants’common spaceofconsciousness,asisexpressed in L’s harmoniousreply in line6.Wecan thusregard thisL’sbehaviorasan abnegation ofselforofindi- vidualidentity,sothatsheseemstobehaveasifboth participantswereoneperson.Thereisessen- tially nodistinction between theselfand theinteractant.

　From theseexamples,itispossibletoseetheJapaneseconception ofselfas,in asense,“insubstantial,”sincenoclearboundariesbetween selfand otherareevidentin eitherexample.Thepartici- pantin Example1 conveysthefeeling ofuncertainty regarding herproposition — even afterbeing approved by theinteractant— and sheattunesherselftotheotherwhilebacking offfrom insisting on heroriginalidea.BesidesExample1,theparticipantexpressesheragreementtothequestioner by using anegativeinterrogative,thusimmediately establishing acommon ground between the two.Ja naithussucceedsin sharing presented information with theinteractantby respecting the proposer’sepistemicauthority.Consequently,theinformation seemstobelong toboth participants’

Title:Yp099-111_落合るみ子.ec8 Page:105 Date: 2008/02/29 Fri 19:39:58

(8)

common spaceofconsciousnessratherthan theirindividualself’sorother’srecognition.Hereweno- ticethatthedistinction between selfand otherseemsbeyond separation in termsoftheircommuni- cation,somuch sothattheconception oftheJapaneseselfcan bewholly abnegated ormade insubstantialin theirnegotiation.

5.Discussion

　My analysishashopefully demonstrated thattheJapanesenegativeinterrogativeja naiindi- catesthespeaker’sadjustableattitudetotheinteractantby showing uncertainty toward herown proposition even afterbeing approved,and by encouraging theinteractant’sepistemicauthority,all thewhiletaking overapartofthequestioner’sutterancein thequestion-answeradjacency pair.We can inferfrom thesepracticesthattheJapaneseparticipant’srecognition isapttoregard one’sidea asthatofboth participants,ratherthan individualizing each thoughtand assigning ownership.In otherwords,they seem toshareacommon spaceofconsciousness,sothatthey willnotgoon tothe nextstep untiltheideaisshared in thatspace.Here,wecannotfind aclearindividualself,and the Japaneseselfthereforeappearstobean insubstantialentity.

　Whatcan begrounded in thisinsubstantiality ofJapaneseself?Iwould likeheretointroducea notion ofselfasunderstood in Buddhism philosophy.According tothepreceptsofJapaneseBud- dhism,theselfisconceived asinherently insubstantial,orasan entity that“fallsoffintoNothing- ness”(Izutsu 1977).In otherwords,the“relative”self— which isalwaysjudged in comparison with something else— isnotadmitted (cf.Suzuki1997).Izutsu (1977)givesusanoteworthy explana- tion on theselfasunderstood in thenativeJapanesereligion,Zen Buddhism:

The‘self’itself,therealsubjectivesubjectwhich goeson searching afteritself,remains alwaysbeyond ourreach,eluding foreverourgrasp.Thepuresubjectivity isreached only when man stepsbeyond theken ofthedichotomizing activity ofintellect,ceasesto look athisown ‘self’from theoutsideasan object,and becomesimmediately hisown

‘self.’(Izutsu 1977:4-5)

Whathepointsoutisthattheselfisneveradichotomouspartofobject;in otherwords,distinctions such as“I”and “you”or“speaker”and “hearer”arenotnecessary toexplain ourbehaviororthereal world.Namely,theselfitselfisamoreintricateentity,and isthusbeyond such dichotomousdis- tinctions— somuch sothattheindependentselfisnoteven recognized in Japaneseconversation.I should pointoutthatBuddhism doesnotdeny theentitiesof“I”and “you”or“speaker”and “hearer”; rather,itholdssuch distinctionsareneverpresented asfinalentitiesoftherealworld,butexist only asprocessesofnon-intentionalconsciousness.In otherwords,thedichotomousdistinctions such as“subject”and “object,”“I”and “you,”or“speaker”and “hearer”may existonly forthesakeof expedience.Ultimately,however,thismanifestation “regainsitsown originalunity”(Izutsu 1977), which istheintrinsicstateoftheJapaneseself.Wecan inferherethatallthingsarebeyond sepa-

(9)

ration in Buddhism philosophy.

　Somemay say thatBuddhism issubtly imprinted in Japanesepeople.Upon closerexamination, however,wecan seethatBuddhistphenomenaareactually embedded in many facetsofordinary Japaneselife,sothattheJapanesearein factwellaccustomed toitsmajortenets.Buddhistfolklo- riceventsareoneexample,among which isan annualeventheld in summercalled “Obon ,”in which family membersand relativesinvitetheirancestralspiritstothehometobehonored.When theholiday comes,they allassembleatthehousewherethey and theirancestorswereborn,and spend timetogetherwith theirancestralspirits.Furthermore,Japaneseareintimatewith holding afolkloricBuddhisteventnamed “Hoji,”which isaperiodicmemorialserviceforancestors.Again, notonly thefamily membersbutalsotherelativesparticipatein theeventsin ordertowish happi- nessupon theirancestorsin theafterlife,and totellthem thattheliving family membersareallin good health.SinceJapanesepeoplefrequently partakein such folkloricBuddhisteventsin their daily life,and conceiveofthem asordinary ritualevents,Buddhism philosophy can beunderstood asbeing “unintentionally”rooted in theJapaneseconsciousness. Thisiswhy itisoften inferred thattheJapaneseshareasimilarly Buddhistconception ofself,which servesasasortofcommunal

“common senseidea”(Hanks2005).

　Wecan find evidencesoftheJapaneseinsubstantiality ofselfin otherlinguisticfeatures.The firstevidenceisthatoftheunmarked subjectsin Japanese.Asanumberofstudieshavealready in- dicated (cf.Ide2002),subjectmarking isnotobligatory in Japaneselanguagepractices.Itisalready clearfrom Examples1 and 2 aswell.Below isanotherexamplethatclearly showstheunmarked be- haviorofJapanesesubjects.

[Example3]

　01 L:A, wakatta, saisho oh understand first

‘Oh,(I)understand,first’ 　02 R:[Un

yes

‘Yeah.’

　03 L:[Konochicchainode= this small N with

‘With thissmallone’ 　04 R: =Un

yes ‘Yeah.’

->05 L:“Pyo::n” to ikoo to shitara,tsuburechatta n jan?

Onomatopoeia LK go P do have-been-mashed N COP+NEG

‘(He)tried togolike“pyooon,”but(thesmallone)hasbeen mashed.’

(10)

　06 R:Aa:: oh

‘Oh.’

Example3 isanegotiation of“in-group”participantswherethreedifferentcharactersappearin theircards.AfterL attractsR’sattention in line1,shestartstodescribeherideain lines3 and 5 as

‘With thissmallone,(he)tried togolike“pyooon,”but(thesmallone)hasbeen mashed.’Here,we recognizethattwosubjectsin each clauseareunmarked.Moreover,thoseunmarked subjectsrefer totwodifferenttypesofcharacters— themain character“he”and “thesmallone”— in theircards. Nevertheless,interactantR hasnodifficulty in understanding whatthosereferencesare,sothat sheexpressesheracknowledgementin line6.Whatishappening hereisthatsheisrecognizing thosereferencesdepending on theircontextsor“ba ”(Shimizu 2006),which istheunintentional spaceformaking expression⁶⁾.Sincesheisfully embedded in thespacewheretherestandsnoin- tention orconsciousnessbetween participants,itimpliesthatboth participantsseem toshareasin- gle“ba,”i.e.,thecommon spaceofconsciousness,asweargued in theabovesection.Thiscan be related toIde’s(2002)discussion thatJapanesespeakershavean insider’sviewpoint— thatis,that they areembedded in thecontexts.

　Another instance is the grammatical feature of the negation marker, which is posited at sentence-finalslots.Such grammaticalbinding enablesthespeakertoturn heraffirmativeopinion intoanegativesentence,depending on herinteractant’sbehaviororreaction ateach successivemo- ment.Theexamplefrom “out-group”participantsshows:

[Example4]

　01 L:Nanka kore-tte saisho, ni, mitsukete toriniikut-te kanji,[ja nai, desu ka ne:: like this-LK first P find get go-LK like COP NEG HON Q FP

‘Itlookslike,maybehefindsout(thestick)first,and,like,goget(thestick),ormaybenot…’

　02 R: (reluctantly)[soo desu ne::, kore wa,tabun, so COP FP this TOP maybe

‘Maybeso…,thisone,’

In line1,L embarrassedly statesheropinion with frequentpauses.Aftersaying ‘Itlookslike… maybehefindsout(thestick)first,and… like… goget(thestick)…,’sheperceivesherinterac- tant’sreluctancy in line2,atwhich pointsheturnsheraffirmativestatementsintoanegative— or atleastan indeterminablestance— by saying ‘ormaybenot’attheend oftheutterance.Here,the negation markernaiatthesentence-finalslotencouragesthespeakertomend herattitudebefore deciding whetherornottomakethesentenceaffirmative.Consequently,shesucceedsin attuning herselftoherinteractant,whomay beuncertain oftheproposal.Thisevidenceillustratesthereluc- tanceon thepartofthespeakertowillingly distinguish themselvesfrom others,and thusshows

(11)

The Japanese Negative Interrogative ja nai?and InsubstantialIdentity ofJapanese Self:On the Basis ofBuddhism Philosophy theinsubstantialidentity oftheJapaneseself.

6.Conclusion

　Thehopeofthispaperistoshed lighton theelementsneglected in thepreviousstudies,mostof which haveapplied modern western frameworks.Wehaveobserved from theemicperspective thatthenegativeinterrogativeja naiservesthefunction ofattuning thespeakertotheinteractant by creating indeterminacy,ratherthan by showing thespeaker’sassertivenessorcertainty regarding itsproposition,orby requesting from theheareran expression ofagreement.Participantsavoid clarification in ordertomaketheirindependentidentity inconspicuous,and tobecomemerged with theinteractant.In otherwords,even though one’sproposition hasalready been approved,shedoes notcontinuetothenextnegotiation untiltheideaisshared in both herand theinteractant’scom- mon spaceofconsciousness.ThisillustratesthattheJapaneseconceptofinsubstantiality in prac- ticeservestoabnegate,oratleastdiminish,individualidentity.Wealsodemonstrated thatja nai wasnotalwaysthespeaker’sproperty,butratherthatitalsoplayed aroleforthehearer,aswas demonstrated in thequestion-answeradjacency pairshown in Example2.Whilein theprevious studies,ja naiisregarded asonly thespeaker’sproperty,herewefind thatthisisnotalwaysthe case.Moreover,thissupportsthefactthatdistinctionssuch as“speaker”and “hearer”arenotal- waysnecessary in Japanesenegotiations— in fact,such distinctionsbetween “speaker”and “hearer,”“I”and “you,”or“self”and “other”areinherently beyond separation.Becausesuch distinctions areoften precluded in Japaneseconversation,itcan besaid thattheJapaneseconceptofselfisitself ratherinsubstantial,and participantsbehaveasifthey wereindeed onesingleentity.

　Wethen discussed thatthisinsubstantiality had originated in theconceptofBuddhism philosophy.According totheBuddhism philosophy,theselfisinherently insubstantialsothatthereisno distinction between selfand others.Thisinsubstantialidentity ofJapaneseselfisnotonly aprop- erty ofJapanesenegativeinterrogative,butalsoofotherJapaneselinguisticfeatures,such asthe unmarked subjectorthenegation attheend ofthesentence.And from observing theritualistic, folkloriceventsofBuddhism — such asObon orHoji— wecan concludethatthephilosophy ofBud- dhism may beunintentionally grounded in therealworld sothatitisan embodimentofa“common senseidea”(Hanks2005),which isimmanentin Japanesepeoplewhosharethecommon world-view ofBuddhism.

　 Notes

＊ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 10^t^h International Pragmatics Conference (Göteborg,Sweden),8-13 July 2007.

1) Thenameofthispanelis“Toward an emancipatory pragmatics:Culture,language,and interaction in cross-linguisticperspectives.”They pointed outthedominantinfluenceofwestern frameworksas follows:

Most,ifnotall,oftheinfluentialtheoreticalperspectivesand analyticframeworksfalling underthe

(12)

labelofpragmatics[…]havedeveloped within western academiaand havebeen predominantly applied toEuro-American languages.Despiteoccasionalconcernsabouttheapplication oftheseperspec- tivestonon-western contexts,they nonethelesscontinuetobedominantin textbookson pragmatics and languageusage.(ConferenceAbstractp.216)

2) As Kopf (2001: 40) indicates, “thecogito became a philosophical entity with Descartes whose de- clared projectitwastofind an indubitableground ofphilosophy and ofhuman knowledge.”

3) Thedataiscollected underaGrant-in-Aid forScientificResearch from theJapaneseSociety forthe Promotion ofScience,fortheprojecton “Empiricaland theoreticalstudieson culture,interaction,and languagein Asia”(No.15320054,directed by SachikoIdeatJapan Women’sUniversity).

4) Although therearedifferentaspectsin thedatathatdepend on familiarity oftheparticipants,this study mainly focuseson languagepracticeofJapanesenegativeinterrogative.

5) Transcription conventionsareasfollows: ::indicatesprolonged sounds

[indicatesoverlapping i.e.participantsspeak atthesametime -indicatesword spoken haltingly

= indicateslatching i.e.participantstartsspeaking withoutperceptiblepause ()indicatesword supplied tomakeEnglish translation grammaticalorintelligible

AUX = auxiliary,CONJ= conjunction,COP = copula,FP = finalparticle,HON = honorifics, LK = linking word,N = nominalizer,NEG = negation marker,OBJ= objectivemarker,P = particle, Q = question marker,TOP = topicmarker

6) Thesimilarconceptof“ba ”(Shimizu 2006)can bean indexicalfield,ortheplaceorspacewhere socio-culturalinteractionsareconducted on thebasisoforigo(cf.Silverstein and Yamaguchi2007).It is,however,beyond thescopeofthispapertopresentthefull-fledged discussion.

References

Cook,HarukoM.(1990).Thesentence-finalparticleNeasatoolforcooperation in Japaneseconversation.

In HajimeHoji(Ed.),Japanese/Korean Linguistics.pp.29-44.Stanford:CSLI.

Hanks,William F.(2005).Explorationsin thedeicticfield.Currentanthropology,46 (2),191-220.

Hasunuma, Akiko (1995). Taiwa ni okeru kakunin kooi: ‘Daroo’ ‘janaika’ ‘yone’ no kakunin yoohoo [Confirmation in conversation: The study of ‘daroo’, ‘janaika’and ‘yone’ ]. In Yoshio Nitta (Ed.),Fu- kubun nokenkyuu [Thestudyofcomplexsentences]2.pp.389-419.Tokyo:Kuroshioshuppan.

Heritage, John (2002). The limits of questioning: Negative interrogatives and hostile question content. JournalofPragmatics,34,1427-1446.

Ide,Sachiko(2002).Thespeaker’sviewpointand indexicality in high contextculture.In SachikoIdeand KuniyoshiKataoka(Eds.),Bunka,Interaction,gengo[Culture,interaction,language].pp.3-20.Tokyo: Hitsujishobo.

Ikeda,Giichiro(1967).Eigonogoho6 :Hyogen hen [UsageofEnglish 6 :Expression ].Tokyo:Kenkyusha. Izutsu,Toshihiko(1977).Toward philosophyofZen Buddhism.Boulder:Prajñāpress.

Kawanishi, Yumiko (1994). An analysis of non-challengeable modals: Korean -canha(yo) and Japanese -janai.In NorikoAkatsuka(Ed.),Japanese/Korean Linguistics,4.pp.95-111.Stanford:CSLI.

Kokuritsu kokugokenkyusho(Ed.)(1960).Hanashikotoba nobunkei1:Taiwa shiryooniyoru kenkyuu [Sentencepatternsofspoken language1 :Thestudyofdialogue].Tokyo:Kokuritsu kokugokenkyusho. Kopf, Gereon (2001).Beyond personal identity: Do gen, Nishida, and a phenomenology of non-self.

(13)

Richmond:Curzon.

Koshik,Irene(2005).Beyond rhetoricalquestions:Assertivequestionsin everydayinteraction.Amsterdam/

Philadelphia:John Benjaminspublishing company.

Machida,Soho(2003).Jutsugotekironritonijusseiki[Predicativelogicand the20^t^hcentury].In Hayao Kawaiand Shin’ichiNakazawa(Eds.),Aimainochi[Thewisdom ofambiguity].pp.121-145.Tokyo:Iwa- namishoten.

Miyazaki, Kazuhito, Taro Adachi, Harumi Noda, and Shino Takanashi (2002).Modariti[Modality]. Tokyo:Kuroshioshuppan.

Nishida,Kitaro(1987).Nishida Kitarotetsugaku ronshuu [A collection ofphilosophyofNishida Kitaro]. (Shizuteru Ueda,Ed.).Tokyo:Iwanamishoten.

Schegloff,EmanuelA.(1972).Sequencing in conversationalopenings.In John Gumperz and DellHymes (Eds.),Directionsin sociolinguistics.pp.346-380.New York:Holt,Rinehartand Winston.

Shimizu,Hiroshi(2006).Seimei-chitoshitenobanotetsugaku [Philosophy ofbaasthewisdom oflife]. Logosdon,6.pp.6-27.Tokyo:Nuusu shuppan.

Silverstein,Michaeland AkihoYamaguchi(2007).“Gengogaku”okoete[Beyond “linguistics”].Gengo,36 (4)-(6).Tokyo:Taishukan.

Suzuki, Daisetz (1997).Tooyooteki na mikata [Eastern Perspectives]. (Shizuteru Ueda, Ed.). Tokyo: Iwa- namishoten.

Trondheim,Lewis(2003).MisterO.Tokyo:Kodansha.

Tsurumi, Shunsuke and Keizo Ikimatsu (Eds.) (1968).Tetsugaku 13: Bunka [Philosophy13: Culture]. Tokyo:Iwanamishoten.

Yamaguchi,Akiho(2004).Nihongonoronri[LogicofJapanese].Tokyo:Taishukan shoten.