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Vol.19 , No.2(1971)096中田 直道「Word and Inference in the Yuktidipika Part II」

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Word

and Inference

in the

Yuktidipik

Part II

Naomichi

Nakada

(In answer to the oppenent's view it) is said

Then why can

(the-words such as) the heaven and so on be the inferences?

(The oppene says You admit that Trustworthy

One's Word is an

independent means for getting the right knowledge, but it is not an

inde-pendent means. We can find an inference at the occasion of the actual

application of the means called Trustworthy One's Word). Since (a

propo-sition) -"Trustworthy One's Word is not contradictory" ((and this

proposition is necessarily to be found whenever a means called Trustworthy

One's Word is applied-)) can be (known) as the same (as the major

premise in the syllogism)11). and so on can be S, and Trustworthy

One's Word' M, not contradictory' P)). Just like the saying of the trustworthy

ones, who are Hairanyaka and so on, is unfailing, similarly the Supreme

Being and the great Rishis are trustworthy ones too and their saying is, unfailing. Therefore it can be considered that the scope of this (application.

of a means called Trustworthy One's Word) is common to (the scope of the application of the inference) too. As the inference is, so the traditional

doctrine is.

(the answer) is said. It is said (by the opponent) that (a means called)

Word is the inference, because it is the means to get the knowledge with the affirmation and the negation. To this (opponent's view), we say (as,

follows). This is not so12>. Because we do not admit (that such words as. happened following the ordinary life are the traditional doctrine). Since we

do not say that such words as happened) following the ordinary life (for example) "tree" and so on are the traditional teaching, but we say

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Word and Inference in the Yuktidipika (N. Nakada) (26) that (such words as) concerned13) what can not be exprienced absolutely

(for example) "the heaven" and so on are the traditional doctrine. Because of this, we do not admit (the words concerned the empirical things as the traditional doctrine, so it naturally follows that) this (oppo-nent' view is) not what abuses (us).

Or even with respect to (the opponent's view that the words concerned the empirical things are the traditional doctrine, we say that the traditional

doctrine is not the inference,) since (there is a difference between them, that is, the word) depends upon the speaker (but the middle term never changes depending upon the speaker). Or even with respect to (the opponent's view) that all words are nothing but the traditional doctrinel4>, 11) "aptavaco' visamvadasamarthyat" Yd. (Pandeya's ed. p. 45, 1. 22;

varti's ed. P. 53, 1. 7).

Cf. a ptavadavisamvada (samanyadanuma) nata/ Pramanavarttika, I, 218, a, b.

(Same as above) Pramanavarttika, I, 215, c. d.

aptavada'visamvadasamanyadanumanatah/ Slokavarttika, cheda, 23, c. d.

aptavakyavisamvadasamanyadanumanata/ NVT. p. 138, 1. 19, VSS. ed. aptavadavisarnvadasamanyat svargadisabdanam anumanatvam iti/ Yd. Pandeya's ed.

p. 46, 1. 17. (-vadana -in BORI. Ms. 36b, last line-vadena- in varti's ed. P. 54, 11. 13 f.)

The quoted one in NVT. is identified with a passage in the second chapter of the Pramanasamuccaya by S. C. Vidyabhusana (HIL. p. 288, note I) and this identification is introduced in Randle's "Fragments from Dirnnaga" p. 18. Moreover the reading in Slokavarttika, Sabdapariccheda, 23, c, d, is pointed

out in the connection with Pramanasamuccaya by Prof. Tsugihiko Yamazaki and his discovery has been introduced by Prof. Hidenori Kitagawa. (See Kitagawa: Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyu, 1965, Tokyo, pp. 92f. note 68). 12) "na". Yd. Pandeya's ed. P. 45, 1. 25. "na" is not found in BORI. Ms. 36 a 1. 4 as well as in Chakravarti's ed. p. 53, 1. II, immediately after "atra brumah". 13) -visayanam Pandeya's ed. p. 45, 1. 26 ;-vi jnananam BORI. Ms. 36 a, 11. 4f.,

vi jnananam Chakravarti's ed. P. 53, 1. 12.

14) BORI. Ms. reads "eva" immediately after "agamatvam" (36 a, 1. 5). kravarti's ed. too (p. 53, 1. 13). Pandeya's ed. lacks this (p. 45, 1. 27).

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999-we say they are different from the inference. For instance, (such an expres-sion equivalent to) the middle term as "because of being' the product" can be used even by the Candala and the Kapalika too, and it can effect the ascertainment depending upon its concomitance with (the major term). (The middle term) does not depend upon the particular speaker, but the word depends upon the particular speaker. Therefore (the word) is not the mi-ddle term.

Moreover (the word can not be the inference,) because the change is. seen (concenning the word). Because the middle term can not be changed (even) in the other place but the change is experienced in the case of the-word (according to the place). Because it is experienced that the the-word can not cause to recognize its own meaning under (the condition of) the diffe-rent place and the diffediffe-rent time, but show the other meaning15).

If (the opponent may say that the word is the inference) because another connection (than that which is found between the word and its meaning> is not perceived in another country viz. (the word is the inference, be-cause) the word is concerned with the meaning ((or the particular word is concerned only with its particular meaning))16) since another connection

(than that which is found between the particular word and its particular meaning) is not perceived in another country,

this opponent's view is impossible, since the Middle term is different from the word. It is because of this. When we perceive17) that which has the 15) BORI. Ms. starts with "sa eva" after "drsto viparyayo drstah/" (36 a, 1..

8). Chakravarti's ed. reads as-"drsto viparyayo'drstah/sa eva"-(p. 53, 1. 17). Pandeya's ed. starts with "sa eva" after "drs t o viparyayah". Translated as.

here, emending as-"drsto viparyayah/drstah sa eva"-.

16) BORI. Ms. 36 a, 1. 9 reads "tasmacchabdarthavisayam iti/". Chakravarti's ed. too (p. 53, 1. 19). Pandeya's ed. reads "-viparyaya iti" instead of "visayam:

iti" (p. 45, 1, 32).

17) Pandeya's ed. reads as "upalabdhau" (p. 45, 1. 2 from bottom.). BORI. reads as "upalabdho" (36 a, 1. 10). Chakravarti's reading is it upalabdhau"

(p. 53, 1. 20). Here the reading in Chakravarti and Pandeya's editions is, followed.

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Word and Inference in the Yuktidipika (N. Nakada) (28) -invariable characteristic mark and that can be admitted with (a

means ca-lled) the direct perception, the mark of the cow and so on is not what , can not be perceived. (Thus, the mark is found on the thing which has

the mark;) on the contrary, the words which are perceived can not be perceived on the cow and so on (for example, the word "cow" can not be perceived on the cow itself, although this word is audible).

Moreover (the word is not the inference,) since (sometimes the usage of a word) is restricted to the particular country. Since we do not find any restriction to a middle term according to (the difference of) the country but there is the restriction to (the usage of) a word according to (the difference of) the country. Namely... (the root) sav is said to have the meaning of "going" (gati)18), among the people of Kamboja, (Aryans say this in the meaning of "vikara" (viz. "death" or "ceased action"19), and this is said) as sav)...Ranh is said among the inhabitants of the east, (but Aryans use gam). In like manner, dati has the meaning of salt among the inhabitants of the east and (that is) datra (a sort of sickle) among the inhabitants of the north20). (On the contrary) there is no (such restriction) in another case (viz. in the case of the middle term). Therefore the word is not the inference.

Moreover (the word is not the inference). Since the word can be applied (for another meaning) according to the (different) wish (istato viniyogat), (on the contrary the middle term can not be applied for another thing). The characteristic (as the middle term) is inherent (in the object which has that characteristic). It is because of this ... It does not take place that the smoke, being separated form the fire, may be put in the water, the

18) Cf. Dhatupatha 725, "sava gatau".

19) Cf. Mahabhasyadipika p. 34, 11. 21f. jivatah prakrtir mrte vikarah/ mrtoo nasaih yata ityarthah/ athava gater vikarah gatyuparamah/ uparatakriye bhasante sava iti/...

20) Cf. Mahabhasya p. 9, 1. 25...p. 10, 1. I. This parallelism with Mahabhasya I. I. I. (on the Varttika "sarve desantare") is pointed out in Chakravarti's edition of Yd. lavanartho (BORI. Ms. 36a, 1. 12; Chakravarti's ed. P. 53, 1. 23), lavanartha ; (Pandeya's ed. p. 46, 1. 2).

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-997-wind, the sky or others (as the inherent characteristic for each) ; but the word is applied to anything which the speaker wishes (to communicate). It is like this. (Such) word as "vrddhi" and so on, whose own meanings -are well known to be "increasing" and so on, are applied to (others. For example, as for the word such as "vrddhi", it is applied to) "a", "ai", and "au"21). Therefore these (words such as "vrddhi") are not the middle term. If (the opponent may say that the word) has the ability to express every thing, so it is not fault for the word (to be considered as the characteristic as the middle term), ((this opponent's view is impossible)). (The opponent) may have (such a) view (as follows). (That is,) the word is the ability to express everything and the meaning is the ability to be expressed by every word; and the ability is separated concerning the two (viz. the word and the meaning) being employed by the people22). How (that is separated) ? 21) Chakravarti's ed. reads adaiksa (p. 53, 1. 26); BORI. Ms. and Pandeya's ed. read adaiksu (Ms. 36, b. 1. 2; p. 46, 1. 5 respectively). Here the latter is followed. This part is compared with Pa. I. I. I. in Chakravarti's ed. Cf. Vrtti on Vakyapadiya I, 59. "tatra vrddhyadayah sabdah svarupadhisthanah thenarthavantah svarupena sabdantarasvarupany upajighrksantah

sikyabhinnair akaradibhir adaicchabdadibhih pratyayitaih sambandharh yena prakarena pratipadyante, tenaiva prakarena duravadharatve 'pi bhedasya//"

(K. A. Subramania Iyer's ed. Deccan College Monograph Series).

22) "sarvabhidhanasaktih sabdah sarvabhidheyasaktiscarthas tayoh parena saktyavacchedah kriyate/" (Yd. p. 46, 11, 6 f.). See Note 23 for vabhidhana saktih sabdah". Compare the statement "sarvabhidheyasaktis carthas tayoh purusavyaparena saktyavacchedah" with the Vakyapadiya III,

2, 16, which is quoted in Sarvadarsanasarhgraha Chap. 13, 11. 262 f. with some change and this quotation is pointed out by Prof. Hajime Nakamura in his "Kotoba no kei ji jogaku" (Studies on the metaphysics of the word. Pracinavedantavadah, anukramankah 4, Tokyo, 1956) p. 403 and p. 406.

vacya sa sarvasabdanam sabdasca na prthak tatah/

aprthaktve ca sambandhastayornanatmanoriva// Vakyapadiya III, 2, 16 yankar & Limaye's ed.)

This (supreme material cause) is the thing to be denoted by all words and these words are not different from this.

Although (the word and the meaning are) not separate, their relation (appears)

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Word and Inference in the Yuktidipika (N. Nakada) (30) Let it be that any (particular) word causes to know any (particular) me-aning. Let this (particular) meaning alone be expressed with this (particular) word. People's usage (of the word) is of such extent. Therefore the word is inherently connected (with the meaning) and this connection is indicated with a view to the speaker. (So not only the characteristic as the middle term is inherently connected with the thing which has the characteristic but also the word is inherently connected with its meaning, therefore the word i s inference too).

This (opponent's view) is impossible too. Because still more it is attached (to the opponent's view) that the word is different from the inference. (Even the opponent may) consider the word thus, it still more happens that the word is different from the inference. Why ? Because it does not happen that the characteristic as the middle term can have all the meanings with a view

just as (that) between the two different souls (does).

(Concerning the inseparability of the word and the meaning, see Yd. p. 43, 1. 34...p. 44, 1, I. That is as follows. "yatha vakyam evam ca tadarthasca mukhyau sabdarthau, tayor abhinnarthatvad ity abhyupagamad ekam evartham

abhagam akramarh ca buddhavavasthapya..

.23) Cf. Sarvadarsanasamgraha Chap. 13, 11. 202...227, where two verses in Vakyapadiya are explained. These two verses are reported as the quotation

from the Vakyapadiya by Prof. Hajime Nakamura (op. cit., pp. 398-400). See his studies on jati, op. cit., pp. 237-252 where he introduces Bhartrhari's view on jati which can bring light on the subject discussed in this place of Yd.

The two verses are as follows:

sarhbandhibhedat sattaiva bhidyamana gavadisu/ jatirityucyate tasyam sarve sabda vyavasthitah// tam pratipadikartharh ca dhatvartham ca pracaksate/

sa nitya sa mahanatma tamahustvataladayah// (Vakyapadiya III, I, 33-34, Abhyankar & Limaye's ed.)

Being connected with the different things, Existence is found to be divided into the cow and so on, and it is called (this or that) Genus. All words are depending on it.

They call this (Existence) the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is eternal and this is the great soul. It is this what the affixed tva.

tal, and so on express.

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-995-to the speaker and can be separated from other thing just as the ability-of Word23), which has all the meanings and is (said as) "existence" (sat), (merely), is limitted (or separated to give many meanings) with a view to, the speaker. By which reason the characteristic as the middle term can! cause to know all the meanings just as one Word can set forth all the meanings, being said in the world and depending on people's use (purusa-viniyogapeksah)? (Though Word can set forth all the meanings in this way, on the contrary the characteristic as the middle term can not cause to know all the meanings).

Therefore the word can not be the characteristic as the middle term,. (so the word can not be the inference). (To be continued).

List of the differences of the readings in the texts of the Yuktidipika lated in the Part I (in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. XVIII, No, 2, pp. 41-45.)

R. C. Pandeya's ed. BORI. Ms. Chakravarti's ed.

p. 45, p. 52,

1. 1 -sadhyam 35a 1. 10 -siddham 1. 14 -siddham 1. 3 -sadhyam 1. 11 -sadhyam 1. 16 -siddham 1. 5 -pratibaddha 35b 1. 1 -pratibandha- 1. 17

1. 18 After devatadi, a hyphen

is put. 1. 6 syadetat, b 1. 2 tad 1. 19 tad

1. 8 tarkavrttir b 1. 3 tarkavrttir 1. 21 tarkapravrttir The letters "ka"

seems corrected.

1. 9 praptivighatah syat b 1. 4 -praptih 1. 22 -praptih

1. 9 -prayukto b 1. 4 "prayukto" is not 1. 22 "pray, ukto" is not

found. found.

1. 11 -drsvanam b 1. 5 -drsvanam 1. 24 -drsvanam 1. 12 yadi ca- b 1. 6 yadi va- 1. 24 f. yadi va-1. 12 svavisaye b 1. 6 avisaye 1. 25 avisaye 1. 15 agamo'rthantaram b 1. 8 arthantaratvarh 1. 28 arthantaratvarh

pratyuktam pratyuktam 1. 15 f-apeksa] lirngad b 1. 9 -apeksa lingad 1. 29 -apeksa lirngad

p. 53, 1. 18 drstah b 1. 10 drsta- 1. 3 drsta-1. 18 pratipattihetur b 1. 11 pratipattir 1. 3 pratipattir 1. 18 abhinna b 1. 11 bhinna 1. 3 bhinna 1. 20 avayavesu b 1. 12 vacanesu 1. 5 vacanesu 1. 20 tatha b 1. 12 tada 1. 5 tada

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