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What is to be Written? Setting Agendas for Studies of History

著者 竹中 千春

journal or

publication title

明治学院大学国際学部付属研究所研究所年報 = Annual report of the Institute for

International Studies

number 6

page range 43‑89

year 2003‑12

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10723/456

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What is to be Written?

Setting Agendas for Studies of History

March 1-2, 2003 9.30-17.15 Conference Room

Building 1, 10th Floor, Shirokane Campus, Meiji Gakuin University

(明治学院大学白金校舎本館10階大会議場)

竹 中 千 春

文部科学省および明治学院大学・学術フロンティア・プロジェクト3年目の共同研究と成果発表企 画として、国際ワークショップ“What is to be Written? Setting Agendas for Studies of History”を、2003 年(平成15年)312日、明治学院大学白金キャンパスにて開催した。以下に掲載する英文の報 告は、ワークショップ開催の主旨を示した書簡と、会議の要旨である。

これは、前年度2002年(平成14年)319日に開催した同プロジェクトの第1回・国際ワーク ショップ“Can We Write History? Between Postmodernism and Coarse Nationalism”を引き継ぎ、アジア における歴史研究の現在を問うことを課題とした。現代アジアの社会で歴史がどのように捉えられて いるのか、どのように研究されることが可能なのか――こうした問題を設定し、複数の研究者が共同 で新しい解釈の枠組みを模索するために、学際的かつ国際的な学術交流の実験として企画したもので ある。

アジア社会における歴史研究をめぐって、現在二つの傾向が指摘できる。まず、第一は、歴史を叙 述することが極めて政治的に捉えられる傾向である。たとえば日本では、歴史教科書や戦争責任の問 題が、1990 年代に重要な政治的焦点となり、国内における意見の対立をもたらしただけでなく、東 アジア・東南アジアの諸国で展開する新しい世論の動きと結びついて、国際関係における緊張を招い た。しかし、歴史が政治化する傾向は、日本に限られた問題ではない。国民国家の歴史が半世紀以上 に及び、古い体制が揺り動かされている冷戦後、自由化・民主化後のアジア諸国では、それぞれ独特 な歴史的条件を背負いつつ、相似した現象を抱えている。つまり、「国民の歴史」を「修正」しよう とする勢力が新たに登場してきているのである。

以上のような現実政治と深く関連して、第二に、思想的な領域において、歴史研究をめぐる新たな 潮流が現れている。それは、1990 年代のアジアで、実証的な歴史学を批判する傾向が強まったこと である。1960 年代以後フランスを中心にヨーロッパではそうした議論が蓄積されてきたが、これが アメリカを経由してポストモダン・ポストコロニアルな批判としてアジアに影響を与えることになっ たのが、1990 年代であった。その背景には、言論の自由化過程で新鮮な議論が輸入されたこと、独 裁・軍政による国家開発を支えた合理的計画主義への信頼が失墜したこと、社会主義勢力の衰退過程

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でマルクス主義的な歴史学が影響力を失ったことなどの条件が挙げられる。こうして概観するなら、

社会を構築するタイプの思想的枠組みよりも、既存の体制を脱構築するタイプの議論が魅力を持ち、

西欧近代の構築的な方法論に基づいた歴史叙述が批判を一身に浴びることになった。

もちろん、上に掲げた研究課題は、2 日間の会議で結論が出るほど単純な問題ではない。けれども、

アジア諸国の歴史を考察してきた個性的な研究者が集い、真剣に討論し、共同で学問的な出口を探す ことで、問題の本質に迫ることはできたと思う。これはまた、21 世紀における国際学の新しい扉を 開く試みでもあった。以下の報告に、それを読みとって頂ければ幸いである。なお、これをもとにし

Proceedings の編集も進行しており、来年度には2 度の国際ワークショップを基礎とした単行書を

英語・日本語でほぼ同時に出版する予定である。

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― Agendas ―

On March 19 in the last year, we held the first international workshop, Can We Write History?

Between Postmodernism and Coarse Nationalism at Meiji Gakuin University (Shirokane, Tokyo), funded by Meiji Gakuin University and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan. This is the second round of our joint study on historiography, and its title begins, again, as a question: What is to be Written? Setting the Agendas for Studies of History.

This time, after one year, we all expect each other to write whatever it is for studies of history today. To inform our new colleagues as well as to remind ourselves, I quote the original agenda for the last workshop as follows:

The end of the Cold War has transformed the previous political, economic and social settings, which used to be constructed under the two superpowers’ rivalry. This change went along with the process of liberalization, democratization and globalization in Asia, as elsewhere in the world, in 1980s and ’90s. It was good to send farewell to military dictatorship or state- controlled economy, but it also meant giving up the once ambitious human endeavor to realize a new society through state power and rational plans. At the same time, national autonomy, to whatever extent, gives away to the hegemony of the United States and the global market.

In the academic discourse, too, new tendencies have grown influential for these two decades. One is the postmodern critique that situates the bias of the modern, especially post- enlightenment, intellectual framework as western-centric, capitalistic, imperialistic, and patriarchal, etc. The other is various types of right-wing nationalism or religious fundamentalism, which cause tensions in many societies. Interestingly, both tendencies have aggressively confronted with the well-established disciplines of historical studies.

Postmodernists question a historian as a ‘subject’ who too easily gives reasonable interpretation;

ultra nationalists or religious extremists attack the ‘objectivity’ of the positivistic data-analysis based on historical materials.

It might not be misleading to point out that post-WWII and postcolonial societies in Asia more or less share this kind of situation. Today a historian should fight two fronts: to prove one’s own concepts and methods still relevant at the age of postmodernism, while to take a risk of being accused to be anti-national/anti-religious in her/his society. Still, there is considerable difference among nations, too. As such brave scholars, we will invite Dr. Tanika Sarkar, Dr.

Reynaldo C. Ileto and Dr. Daqing Yang to talk on historiography in India, the Philippines, Japan and China in this workshop. Through provocative presentation and discussion with comparative perspective, we believe this meeting will offer a unique opportunity for all participants to rethink the dilemma and possibility of historical studies: ‘Can we write history?’

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After one-day intensive discussion of the last workshop, it could be said that all of us opened our eyes to new questions and started to see things from different angles. Although we, scholars, always struggle to free our intellectual activities from the limited environment, it is quite easy to be trapped in narrow national/social boundaries. We sincerely hope this series of small workshops will break up our own boundaries to enlarge the scope for alternative studies of history for the global society.

― Speakers ―

Patricio N. Abinales Kyoto University

Donna J. Amoroso Kyoto University

Kiichi Fujiwara The University of Tokyo Reynaldo C. Ileto National University of Singapore

Kiyoshi Kojima Iwanami Publisher

Tessa Morris-Suzuki Australian National University

Yoshiko Nagano Kanagawa University

Nariaki Nakazato The University of Tokyo Tanika Sarkar Jawaharlal Nehru University Sanjay Seth La Trobe University Hatsue Shinohara Meiji Gakuin University

(Waseda University from 2003.4) Chiharu Takenaka Meiji Gakuin University

Daqing Yang George Washington University

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― First Day: March 1 (Sat.)

9.30-9.35

OPENING REMARKS: Chiharu Takenaka

9.40-12.00 SESSION 1 “Questioning Historiography”

Chair: Michael Watson Speakers: Tanika Sarkar

‘Contested Histories in the Indian Context’

Sanjay Seth

‘Reason or Reasoning / Clio or Siva?’

Kiyoshi Kojima

“World History” as Method Discussant: Rajyashree Pandey

(LUNCH)

13.15-15.00 SESSION 2 “Rereading Nationalist History”

Chair: Akira Oki

Speakers: Reynaldo C. Ileto

‘Historiography in the Shadow of Empire: A Philippine Case Study’

Yoshiko Nagano

‘Collective Memory in a‘Globalized’Society:

The Debate on the Philippine Revolution Reconsidered’

Discussant: Tessa Morris-Suzuki

COFFEETEA BREAK

15.30-17.15 SESSION 3 “Reconstructing the National Narrative”

Chair: Hatsue Shinohara Speakers: Patricio N. Abinales

American Lineages of Filipino Official Nationalism Donna J. Amoroso

Taking Stock of the Past/Pasts: Ways of Making Sense ofMalaysia’’

Discussant: Kiichi Fujiwara

RECEPTION

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― Second Day: March 2 (Sun.) ―

9.30-12.00 SESSION 4 “Recovering the Memory of Violence”

Chair: Shigeki Takeo Speakers: Daqing Yang

‘The Ghosts of Nanjing’

Nariaki Nakazato

‘The Calcutta Communal Disturbances of 1946: Politics, Mobilization and the Riotous Crowd’

Chiharu Takenaka

‘Can the Victims Speak? Gendered Wars in 1990s’

Discussant: Tanika Sarkar

(LUNCH)

13.15-15.45 SESSION 5 “Writing History under the American Hegemony”

Chair: Michael Watson Speakers: Kiichi Fujiwara

Who are to be Remembered? Commemorating the War Dead in Japan Hatsue Shinohara

‘Teaching of the Atomic Bomb as History: A Challenge to Transnational (Global) History

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

What is to be Filmed? Visual Representation and the Writing of History Discussant: Patricio N. Abinales

COFFEETEA BREAK

16.00-17.15 SESSION 6 Discussion and Summary Chair: Chiharu Takenaka

CLOSING REMARKS:Reynaldo C. Ileto

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― Summary ―

DAY1

OPENING REMARKS

Chiharu Takenaka, Meiji Gakuin University

Prof. Takenaka welcomed participants to the workshop. She explained that the workshop was jointly supported by Meiji Gakuin University and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. She noted that the workshop was not a formal one, but nonetheless, participants were expected to produce a result at the end of two days of discussions and presentations.

Prof. Takenaka explained that the workshop would result in the publication of a book, in order to share the results of the work with other scholars and academics around the world. She also stressed the importance of making friendships with scholars and academics around the world who share similar interests.

Prof. Takenaka introduced the organizing team for the workshop. She explained that Prof.

Takeuchi would be joining the workshop in the afternoon.

SESSION 1 Questioning Historiography Chair: Michael Watson, Meiji Gakuin University

Prof. Watson introduced the speakers and requested that they provide their presentations to the workshop.

Contested Histories in the Indian Context

Presentation by Tanika Sarkar, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Prof. Sarkar began by noting that the predicament in India was one between teaching and writing history. History has never been as problematic as it has now, and has reached an acute point. The two sources that problematize history are post-modernism and the Hindu right.

Three kinds of post-modern influences have been significant. First, the textualized nature of accounts and historical narratives. The second critique has been of historicism, of grand narratives that move teleologically under the steam of some transcendental logic, obeying iron laws of history. The third critic of history in India is that history has developed as a separate discipline in colonial times.

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is a cadre-based organ with strong hegemonic aims. In other words, it seeks to politically educate its chosen cadres, so that they can, in their turn, disseminate

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select portions of the message among the various mass fronts that they might work with. The cadres develop different addresses for the different fronts, the accents and emphases varying considerably from the one to the other. Cadres thus are, in relation to the mass fronts, teachers, and, indeed, the affiliates of the Sangh do call the Sangh itself their classroom. Teaching, therefore, is crucial to the agenda, something that is evident in the fact that the Human Resources ministry is reserved for a RSS hardliner. There is a strange relationship with the past on the part of the RSS - there is a focus on the past, and a usable past

the argument goes that the Hindus must have revenge in order to develop.

Hindurashtra or the Sangh vision of Hindu nation that seeks to replace the secular- democratic one - presupposes great excisions in collective memory as well as the production of counterfeit historical memories: experiences of poverty and exploitation to be overwritten by narratives of foreign conquests, military defeats and the ills that rulers of a different faith had allegedly done to Hindu temples, women, cows. Beyond a point, actual historical evidence for all this is thin, patchy or absent.

There is, on the other hand, embarrassingly strong historical evidence to confirm the absence of the Sangh from the ranks of anti-colonial movements, of its transactions with Italian fascism and self-modeling on the politics of Nazi genocides which Golwalkar, an early leader, much admired.

Recent events in Gujarat will illustrate the Sangh methods of using and invoking the past. Last year, on 27 February, in the middle of long and violent anti- Muslim campaigns, a group of Hindu train passengers, who were also part of the campaigns, were very brutally murdered at Godhra in Gujarat where a BJP government. In “reaction”, the most widespread and savage forms of violence known to our recorded history were unleashed upon Gujarat Muslims for months, with the full connivance of the government. However, Muslims who were massacred were obviously Indians, most of them so far removed for Godhra that they could not possibly have had a hand in those atrocities.

How does the Sangh propose the simultaneous demolition of accepted historical knowledge and construct its own version as authentic scholarship? Above all, the Sangh had founded schools. The first school emerged in a significant context. It was during the partition riots and their aftermath that the Sangh made its real breakthrough in North India. However, its rapid expansion was briefly stalemated as it came under a cloud of suspicion after the assassination of Gandhi. In the 1952 elections, however, the Left emerged as the major Parliamentary opposition to the Centrist politics of the Congress. At the national level of political decision-making, the Sangh vision found little purchase.

To vault over the impasse, the first thing that the Sangh did was to found a primary school at Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh in 1952, which rapidly spawned other Saraswati Shishu Mandirs in its wake.

In 1977, Vidya Bharati was institutionalized to coordinate schools at the all-India level. By the early 1990s, it was running the second largest chain of schools in the country. Sangh schools follow the regular school board curricula and examination system. However, their schools leave their own distinctive inscription on education in a variety of subtle ways. Significantly, an entire apparatus of audio-visual and

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pedagogical operations was developed to intervene in remaking historical understanding in opposition to older textbooks. Revenge is used as a means of teaching.

As the authentic history of Indian civilization, such textbooks are faithful to Savarkar’s definition: Hindutva, as a continuous, historically stable cultural essence, unifies India. The landscape is bereft of all Muslim or Christian cultural or religious presence. Nor do they figure as historical actors except as fifth-columnists for foreign powers or as invaders. Muslims and Christians are not simply invaders and conquerors of the past, they are fixed in eternal postures of aggression which, today, translates as insidious and covert gestures of hidden expansionism and conquest, carried on through conversion and terrorism.

There are glaring omissions in the curriculum, however. There is no analysis of caste, poverty, gender abuses, no mention of what Hindus have done to Hindus. Nor, for that matter, of what Muslim emperors have done to Muslim peasants. Anger or even critical introspection into histories of internal, social violence is carefully excised.

The Sangh’s pedagogical method uses to a very large extent oral telling and the story format. As a pedagogical tool, especially for very small children, it is very effective. However, its dominance as a tool helps foreclose critical enquiry into the source, provenance, motivation, mode of construction of the narrated tales. The stories acquire multiple authorization.

In conclusion, we engage in such debunking of serious history, however, only when we are ignorant of the practice of history, of the spectrum of theoretical debates that emerges from an experience of that practice and which place historians within a creative and complex ambiguity that grapples with the inherent limitations and provisionality of the truth claim and the necessary discipline that still compels us towards accuracy and precision in investigation. It is out of this continuous, painful and necessary tension that rich historical understanding and description may emerge.

Reason or Reasoning/ Clio or Siva?

Presentation by Sanjay Seth, La Trobe University

Prof. Seth began by stating that it was believed that everyone has a history, though not everyone has historiography. The West developed a tradition of history-writing; the Muslim world and the Chinese are admitted to have had such a tradition, albeit in an underdeveloped form; but most cultures had myths and religious epics instead of history-writing, even if they sometimes confused the former for the latter.

Let us call this complex of attitudes Reason, or more accurately, the commitment to an idea of a Reason which is singular and universal. Let us note that although this Reason has not been dethroned, it is nonetheless tottering on its pedestal. One strategy for problematizing Reason is therefore to demonstrate

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the contingencies and exclusions which went into its making.

Historicism, the idea that the ‘savage’ and the Oriental were ‘backward’ and belonged to a time past, even as they inhabited the present, was the main mode by and through which the reason of non-West was declared to be lesser. Historicism was what allowed a liberal like John Stuart Mill to aver that colonial India was ‘not yet’ fit for democracy, and required an extended period of British rule and its civilizing effects before it would become so. Politically, that which was previously historicized as the pre- modern, the ‘survival’, the fragment of a past continuing into the present (and at times this included whole societies), now also participates in the rituals and practices of the modern- statehood and nationhood, citizenship, and so on.

But there have always been many, quite possibly a majority, of the world’s population whose world is peopled by gods who act in and on the world and whose agency must be registered in any account of the world, just as there are people whose temporality as it is lived allows for their dead ancestors to directly intervene in their affairs. But how do we do so, how can we find a place for gods and spirits in modern historical consciousness and history writing? One possible method is a nominalist one, and here we can look to the law for precedents. An interesting example is that of how contemporary British law found a place for the Indian god, Siva, when Siva was named as a plaintiff in a court case. It is of course true that recognizing Siva as a ‘juristic personality’ is not quite the same thing as treating him as a historical actor. To produce a history which included Siva would be incoherent.

An obvious objection to the argument so far is that if it is belief in gods and their agency, which is taken as the marker of that which cannot be coded in history, this does not serve to distinguish west from non-west. The very enterprise of representing religion within the ration(ist) code of history is a curious one.

It is often pointed out that ‘history’ is unusual in that the term for the discipline simultaneously designates its object, but history as discipline is not so innocent of preconditions. The past is not forever available to the present, a mute entity waiting for the historian to give it voice. The times of history are discontinuous and multiple, rather than continuous and singular; they are constituted by history as a code, not given in advance and simply ‘broken up’ into smaller segments by the historian for reasons of convenience in practicing his/her craft.

It has often been considered one of the virtues of historicism that it attends to difference. We might wonder however, whether claiming that everyone has a history, but a different one, is not to attend to difference but rather to universalize a particular way of conceiving of, relating to and recording the past.

Could it be that when it comes to recognizing and representing difference, historicism is part of the problem, rather than the solution?

History-writing is one way of conceiving and relating to the past. Humanism anchors the notion

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that there is a single Man, but many histories of him. It is true that history-writing is increasingly imperial in its pretensions to represent all pasts, and that this is not just a matter of arrogance, but a real consequence of the transformations of the world. In India the demand that Indians write their own history was made by Bankimchandra Chatterjee in the nineteenth century , and this demand was echoed- and met- in subsequent decades. Indian nationalism was one of the main vehicles for this- it succeeded both in producing a nation, and in producing a history of that nation. History and historical consciousness are prized because they are seen as connected to citizenship, patriotism, certain narratives of social justice, secularism, and the like.

In conclusion, to pluralize reason is not to abandon reasoning; to deny that there is an Archimedean point from which one can criticize is not to call for an end to criticism. But it is to call for a reconsideration of what we think we are doing when we redescribe the past of peoples in terms which are alien to them. We have to conceive writing history in the western, modern mode not in an Imperial vein but as a translational exercise. If we take this as a regulative ideal- not a regulative ideal of a singular reason, in the Kantian sense, but as a regulative ideal of how to give reasons when confronting other modes of reasoning- it may serve to make history-writing an ethical rather than an imperial practice.

‘World History’ as Method

Presentation by Kiyoshi Kojima, Iwanami Publisher

The idea of world history of a historian, Senroku Uehara (1899-1975), of which I will speak of today, may seem at first rather peculiar and hard to understand. My aim is to make his idea of world history a meaningful and convincing one to the audience by the time I finish my presentation. The

“thirteen world region theory” and the “thirteenth century starting point theory,” will not be fully discussed today.

Uehara had already established his status in Japan in the field of European history with his publications demonstrating his mastery of the German empirical historicism at the highest level. Uehara’s post-war began with an awareness on how should he, both as a historian and as a citizen of reborn Japan, cope with the reality of the new world Japan faced after losing World War II. His study of world history was thus formed through post-war Japan’s unique “world experience.”

Uehara’s search for a subjective way to grapple with the “world” Japan faced after the defeat continued on for over thirty years. Uehara repeated his self-refinement in its course through activism, and thus developed his unique study of world history. As we read Uehara’s works chronologically, we notice that his tone changes after the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960.

When we examine Uehara’s world history, we must first unlearn what we have acquired as

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image and knowledge of the “history of the world.” We call upon and question the past to resolve the politico-economic, socio-cultural issues the “present” thrusts toward us, or to examine both the breadth and depth of those issues in order to confront them.

Uehara considered the issues post-war Japan faced were immeasurable in its breadth and depth within the standard of individualized national history or intercultural history based on national history. In Uehara’s case, the very impact of the issues he became aware of drove him to readdress his object of historical recognition beyond national history to world history.

Uehara had a unique idea of “historical space” brought up in his article, “The Starting Point of World History” written in 1968 without the intention of being published, and the other is the idea of

“patterns of historicizing recognition” proposed in his article, “Problems in Recognition of the Present”

written in 1963. In the former article, Uehara suggests that historical space, where present issues originate, develop, and resolve, are composed of five hierarchical dimensions.

According to Uehara, “historicizing recognition” aims to historicize the living reality, which is an attitude to clarify the nature, structure, and meaning of the issues of daily lives by grasping them as and through history. Uehara’s world history is the fundamental structure of general historical recognition in general, and we must notice that “historicizing recognition” is in fact the other name of his “world history.”

To understand the meaning of “human history,” we must first understand the unique idea Uehara invented as the fundamental structure of world history, the “starting point of history.” When we explore the history of the world for the range projected by the issues the present thrust toward us, we will eventually reach a point where we can no longer trace back. Uehara calls this the starting point of world history, and argues that the starting point can be variously placed in accordance with the contents and intensity of our awareness. By separating human history from world history and by categorizing human history as one of the patterns of world history, Uehara stressed that world history is a more fundamental and action-based historical image with the purpose of resolving present issues.

Uehara regards human history as a history, which systematized human development from the perspective of “uncivilized or civilized,” or “uncivilized to civilization.” As long as this human history is a modern European pattern of historicizing recognition, we must consider it as a subjective construct of living awareness based on the historical space and time of modern Europe. We may understand that this image of world history is the one corresponding to the urgent awareness modern Europeans needed to systematize and give meaning to their “world experience” when they expanded toward the world, encountered different people in unknown space, battled, and conquered them as uncivilized. If we may think in this way, we have also ascertained the effective limits of the human history. To recognize human history as one of the patterns of world history, a historical image, which is a product of historicizing

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recognition, would be to re-position the universalism Europe has continued to reserve for their own as one form of historic nature of the European society.

Prof. Kojima concluded with a summary of the “thirteen world region theory” and the

“thirteenth century starting point theory” of Uehara.

Discussant: Rajyashree Pandey, La Trobe University

Prof. Pandey began by noting that the discipline of history writing is facing a crisis. Historians have been forced to become more critical of their own procedures. She noted that all speakers had covered this issue.

It was noted that Prof. Sarkar had pointed out the difference between the original and its transmission. Post-modernism might have a useful lesson for historians that history does repeat itself.

Robinson Crusoe, when published, was seen as a romantic, Promethean tale in India, and in Japan it acquired enormous popularity. These different readings of the same text, tell us of different responses to the West. The concern of the post-modern has been the pre-modern. Cartography has also been hijacked by the Hindu right in India, but the question arises concerning place names as whether their usage in India as religious locations actually achieve their nationalist purpose. It is necessary to know more about the conceptual categories in which the pre-moderns perceived their world.

Discussion

Mr. Hokari thanked the speakers for their presentations and asked how non-secular agents are treated in history writing. He asked whether consideration should be made of the readers of a particular history, and at the time when it is being written.

Prof. Kojima responded that for Uehara, the non-human, non-secular agents were out of his realm of study, however, during the final phase of his life he attempted to incorporate such concepts.

Prof. Sarkar addressed the question of combining secular and non-secular. She stated that non- secular did not necessarily only mean non-sacred, and asked whether it would be possible to write another history concerning sacred places and events as interpreted by people who lived through them. She added that there is a collapsing of post-enlightenment with the national, and the national with the godless.

Concerning the point of grappling concepts that are created outside academia, Prof. Sarkar stated that this was a question of government or media intervention on the popular levels.

Dr. Morris-Suzuki asked a question concerning the issue of multiple ways of thinking about the past. She stated her doubts about the image of the secular West. She stated that many Western historians have religious beliefs and asked whether it would be possible to think of multiple rationalities existing in different places, but also within the same person. She addressed a question to Prof. Kojima concerning

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understanding of world history.

In response, Prof. Seth stated that the West is not secular. He stated that we have learned to compartmentalize our souls. As an historian, one has to follow the methods of one’s peers and therefore in the West, multiple rationalities coexist in the same person. The modern requires that personal convictions and rationalities do not cloud the writing of history.

Prof. Kojima responded that Uehara’s “13 region theory” was incomplete, and that he had made some changes to his original theory. Originally the theory was a “ten region theory.” In addition, he divided history into pre and post 13th century. After the 13th century the many diverse regions were integrated into fewer areas.

Prof. Fujiwara thanked Prof. Kojima for raising the concept of “world history” as it appears in Japanese history. He stated his belief that excessive focus on world history stemmed from concerns on a national level of national history in the context of world history. He asked how the situation was in India, and whether efforts were made to link Indian history with world history.

Prof. Sarkar responded that in India, from the colonial period onward, there was a preoccupation with the West as represented by Britain. She added that in medieval history, there were strong links with Southeast Asia. She added that in the case of India, it happened that accounts of world history came into the country from the colonial period onwards.

Prof. Seth posed a question back to Prof. Fujiwara whether the desire to locate was connected with Buddhism.

Prof. Yang asked about Prof. Seth’s classifications as he had used them in his paper, asking whether they were all “Western” concepts.

Prof. Seth responded that he was not referring to nations. He explained that his argument was that what constitutes a sense of belonging is the way in which the past was constructed of people. Sense of belonging is therefore shifting constantly. He stated that his intention was not to establish categories.

Prof. Nakazato asked a question about Senroku Uehara and whether he could be considered as a Buddhist historian. He asked how historiography and the religious beliefs of Uehara could be reconciled.

Prof. Kojima responded by saying that Uehara felt that Japanese intellectuals were weak in understanding religious issues. He acknowledged that it was a difficult task to link the religious beliefs and historical writings of Uehara.

Prof. Abinales asked why the United States was not covered in the writings of Uehara.

Prof. Kojima responded that Uehara did include study of the United States, in two phases. He had studied cultural anthropology of the United States prior to westernization, and the period thereafter.

Prof. Sarkar asked how the history of gods could be written. She stated that the sacred could only be approached in certain ways and on certain occasions. She added that Dalit critique of the pantheon of Hindu gods also exists. Prof. Sarker stressed also that history of gods are written because people believe in gods. She also made a comment about the refusal of cramming.

Prof. Seth explained that his argument was that we should explore the possibility of writing

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histories of the gods, but then agree that it would not be possible to do so from a historical viewpoint.

What he wanted to stress was the existence of non-human actors.

The Chair thanked participants and closed the session.

(Lunch)

SESSION 2 Rereading Nationalist History Chair: Akira Oki, Meiji Gakuin University

The Chair convened the session and asked the speakers to deliver their presentations.

Historiography in the Shadow of Empire: A Philippine Case Study Presentation by Reynaldo C. Ileto, National University of Singapore

An account of history and nation-building on the Philippines would not be in line with the presentation I gave last year, so for my presentation this year I decided to continue from the presentation I gave last year. In 1988, I published a critique of Philippine nationalist historiography that highlighted its progressivist, Enlightenment lineage, its linear construction, and the exclusions that invariably accompanied such an emplotment. Echoing Foucault, I called for the resurrection of suppressed knowledge and the writing of history that resists incorporation into the nation-state’s grand narrative. I was very interested in the grand narratives in the 1980s in the Philippines.

In my paper for last year’s workshop, I returned to one of the texts I scrutinized in my 1988 essay and began to interrogate my previous conclusions about the repressiveness of nationalist history.

The text in question was Teodoro Agoncillo’s A Short history of the Filipino People, a typical nationalist work in which the past is harnessed to the building of the nation-state. In critiquing nationalist historiography in the early- to mid-1980s and in celebrating the contingent, the local, and the nonlinear ― I was writing against the ideological underpinnings of the Marcos state, whose history textbooks bore the same structural features as Agoncillo’s.

Last year, I began to trace the genealogy of my engagement with nationalist historiography and its alternatives. I began with my Cornell mentor Oliver Wolters’ warning in 1967 that I should not write a history book like Agoncillo’s. I tried to show that nationalist historiography and discourse, or at least its Philippine articulation, has been much more complex than we have taken it to be. I also revisited the alternative that was being pushed at that time, and which still holds currency today “autonomous history” as articulated by John Smail in the early 1960s.

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My statements about Filipino domestic or “nationalist” historiography cannot be separated from my multiple positioning as a “traveling scholar.” In this essay, I retrieve three unpublished texts I wrote at various stages of my career. The first was written in 1986, as I was preparing to leave the University of the Philippines after having taught there since 1977. The second text I examine was written for a historiography workshop in Canberra in early 1991. The third and last text was written towards the end of 1994 after I had interviewed a number of historians from Southeast Asia and organized them into a colloquium for the IAHA convention in Tokyo earlier that year.

During my time at the James Cook University, Queensland, the pride and joy of the James Cook University history department, Queensland was a glass-paned, polished wood cabinet filled with over a hundred honors and post graduate theses, bound in black with bold gold lettering. The cabinet occupied a privileged space because it was meant to signify a successful, productive, flourishing history department, however it was the case that the University history department was singularly characterized by this thesis cabinet and its contents. .

A colloquium on “Indigenous Southeast Asian Historiography” for the 13th conference of the IAHA (the International Association of Historians of Asia) was held in Tokyo in September 1994. At that time there was discussions of nationalist historiography, and I was able understand how historical writing gets to be practiced in different context in Southeast Asia.

What are the implications of the three short essays that wrote? Through revisiting my three earlier essays, some idea of “context” can be gleaned. I can see how my interactions with historians in Australia and Southeast Asia altered my views about Filipino historiography, and helped set my research agenda for the late 1990s.

Although I have not specifically brought this matter up in this essay, I want to stress that debates on national history were set not just within domestic concerns but also against a backdrop of American imperialism and its various forms of hegemony. After all, the Philippines was conquered in 1901 and colonized for nearly half a decade by the United States. Much of Filipino nationalist history in the 1950s and 60s was part of a broad, decolonizing effort.

Relating Filipino nationalist historiography to our post-September 11 concerns about the activities of the U.S. global hegemon, when American military forces returned to the Philippines in the early months of 2002 to help their local allies pursue the “war against terror,” not many Filipinos realized that history was repeating itself. Most are familiar with the story of the “birth of the nation,” celebrated in a massive way during the centennial of the Revolution that reached its climax in the Grand Parade of June 12, 1998. With threats of war hovering over the world at large since September 11, 2001, the events that radical nationalist historians have being castigated for dwelling too much on the Revolution of 1896-98 and the Filipino-American war of 1899-1902, which take on a significance that we have not seen since the

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late 1960s when the Philippines was referred to as the “first Vietnam.” Given the incredible “War on Terror” that has begun to fill the vacuum of the “Cold War,” it is important to understand what really took place in the “Cold War” of the 1950s to 1970s when historians, in the Philippines at least, wrote in the shadow of the American empire. With this empire now practically unchallenged globally, perhaps the Filipino experience can serve as a useful example to others.

The Chair thanked Prof. Ileto for his presentation.

Collective Memory in a ‘Globalized’ Society: The Debate on the Philippine Revolution Reconsidered Presentation by Yoshiko Nagano, Kanagawa University

During the 1990s we witnessed the rising importance of multiculturalism. After the September 11th 2001, the US has extended its influence, and US ascendancy in the cultural sphere has also extended.

Or, to say more properly, our views on the post-Cold War era has traumatically changed after the September 11th attacks.

It is important for us today to examine how historical narrative is changing in an ear of globalization. Based on my understanding on the significance of collective memory in a “globalized”

society, this paper will argue the meaning of a recent debate on the Philippine Revolution as one of the most striking examples as a hegemonic war between American and Filipino scholarships in Philippine historiography.

Glenn May’s book entitled: Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio is the most controversial book in Philippine historiography throughout the past decade. Because May aimed not only the total negation of the interpretation of the Philippine Revolution that have been reconstructed by Filipino scholars since Agoncillo’s The Revolt of the Masses but the previous writings by Filipino contemporaries or writers on the Revolution.

When I read May’s Inventing a Hero in April-May 1998, my major interest was to find out the genuine motive of Glenn May who wrote his book. What I found after its careful reading including all the sentences in endnotes is that May’s genuine motive is the total overthrow of the image of the Philippine Revolution that has been constructed by Filipino scholars, by way of contesting the authenticity of historical materials or interviews that they used to prove the Bonifacio’s role in the Philippine Revolution.

If we read May’s book carefully, we might notice that May follows the trajectory of the Philippine Revolution, focusing on Bonifacio’s life and his role.

By reading Inventing a Hero in this way, we might get Glenn May’s view on the Philippine Revolution. His image of the Revolution is that the revolutionary forces or its government were organized and controlled under the leadership of local elites throughout the course of the revolution. It is extremely

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important to note here that May’s view on the Philippine Revolution might be interpreted exactly the same as the old image on the Revolution, not only before Ileto’s Pasyon and Revolution, but also even before Agoncillo’s The Revolt of the Masses.

Glenn May’s attack against Filipino scholarship on the Philippine Revolution gave a tremendous shock to Filipino historians and they repeated criticism or rebuffs as previously mentioned. Among them, it was Reynaldo Ileto who took a firm stand against May and has seen that May’s genuine intention does not lie in the criticism of the weakness of scrutiny of historical sources, but in the total negation of the interpretation of the Philippine Revolution that have been reconstructed by Filipino scholars since Agoncillo’s The Revolt of the Masses. The confrontation between Glenn May and Reynaldo Ileto did not last long: first by Ileto’s perfect refutation against May, and second, by May’s abandoning his scholarship on Philippine history.

In the Introduction of Inventing a Hero, Glenn May gives a detailed explanation why he came to write his book. He says that at the beginning he never thought of writing this kind of book. In 1989 he launched his research project on the Philippine Revolution, seeing that the centennial of the Revolution was approaching. By and by his interest was focused on Andres Bonifacio and he started his preparation to write a book on Bonifacio from his own viewpoint. However, he found that his attempt should not materialize due to the lack of historical materials at hand. Instead, he decided to write a book on the questions of the authenticity of historical materials that have been widely used in the studies on the Philippine Revolution.

May’s probable assumption that Filipino historians could not perceive his “trap” discloses itself his way of thinking that he as American scholar should stand on an superior position to the Filipino historians in Philippine studies. It seems to be particularly so to Reynaldo Ileto whom Glenn May attacks most severely and even sarcastically. Ileto however, easily deciphered May’s “trap” and counterattacked against the overall riticism on the Philippine historiography that had been constructed since independence.

Ileto even took a further step: he initiated the deconstruction of American colonial discourse that had bound Filipino’s mode of consciousness for a long time. Echoing Ileto’s new direction of Philippine historiography, the relatively young generation of Filipinos as well as Filipino-American scholars is coming up in the fields of history, politics and comparative culture that might bring us dynamic contributions to the Philippine studies in the first decade of the 21st century.

Discussant: Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Australian National University

Prof. Morris-Suzuki stated that prior to her first visit to the Philippines she had visited Japan and had noticed the difference in nationalism from country to country. Nationalism is an enormously complex thing, in all contexts. For that reason, it is important to think carefully about the critique of nationalist

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history. The critique of nationalism is not necessarily complicit with globalization any more than nationalism is a move against globalization.

Prof. Morris-Suzuki highlighted the comment by Prof. Ileto about his experience at a small university in Australia, and suggested that the problem was rather than a lack of theory, it was how the theory was being used.

Concerning the question of US hegemony and neo-colonialism, Prof. Morris-Suzuki likened the papers to the situation in Japan currently, where there is a resurgence of negative feeling towards the United States. She suggested that while a critique of US hegemony was important, it was important to conduct it through dialogue among academics and leave room for the voices of immigrants and diasporas throughout the world. It is also important to cross the boundaries between academia and other areas of society.

Discussion

Prof. Fujiwara thanked the speakers for focusing debate on what is a hot topic in the Philippines.

He questioned whether Glenn May’s book was really an example of US hegemony of historiography, suggesting that May’s work was rather a retreat from US hegemony. He suggested that the question was one of persons studying the history of the Philippines who are not Filipino.

Prof. Ileto responded with a comment about Glenn May. He stated that the problem with the work by May was a lack of self-reflection, pointing out a gap between colonial and post-colonial scholarship. He urged that scholars should remember their forebears in historical writing, and there were links with writing in the present and several decades previously.

Prof. Nagano responded that she had the opportunity to meet with Glenn May on several occasions, and was very interested in his book. She had the impression that he is an American with some cultural ascendancy issues.

Prof. Ileto stated that some things that appeared in US history in the past are not covered in contemporary discussion. He expressed concern at these selective amnesiac tendencies of US scholars.

Prof. Abinales suggested that the tension was no longer with the US, but may have something to do with Filipinos and their ideas of democracy. He asked Prof. Nagano what her idea of a typical American was and commented on the war background of many Filipinists.

In response, Prof. Ileto stated that a creative rewriting of history in the 1950s had become dogma by the time of the 1970s. In addition, concerning Americans, Prof. Ileto expressed interest that the likes of Glenn May could be against the Viet Nam war and Japanese aggression and yet not be greatly opposed to the Philippine war.

Prof. Nagano responded that she did have some anti-US feeling, stemming from the time of the Korean War, but that US influence in Japan remains strong. She stated people of a later generation may

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harbor different feelings.

Prof. Fujiwara suggested that Glenn May was the person who everybody loves to hate, but suggested that his example should not be so surprising.

Prof. Ileto responded to a question from Mr. Hokari, recommending that he look at the book of a colleague.

Prof. Takenaka referred to national heros and religious leaders, asking how they should be viewed.

Prof. Ileto responded that the Philippine and Indian case were very different. He suggested that the original event of the nation state in the Philippines was the revolution.

Prof. Sarkar referred to the military activism of the US.

The Chair thanked participants and closed the session.

(Coffee/Tea Break)

SESSION 3 Reconstructing the National Narrative

Chair: Hatsue Shinohara, Meiji Gakuin University(Waseda University from 2003.4)

The Chair convened the final session of the day and requested that the speakers deliver their presentations.

American Lineages of Filipino Official Nationalism Presentation by Patricio N. Abinales, Kyoto University

In his classic book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson talks about the evolution of

“nation-building” in the post-World War II period as one where “one sees both a genuine popular nationalist enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth.” Anderson, however, proceeds to explain the development of this “colonial nationalism” in territorial terms and the nature of the control by a “bilingual intelligentsia poised precariously over diverse monoglot populations.” What he left unexplained is the ideological genesis of this “colonial nationalism,” or more particularly what role the departing colonial master had in the shaping of its nationalist progeny.

Nationalist politics and historiography have, understandably, de-emphasized these connections, even going to the extent of denying the bond between colonial and national. This refutation all the more is strongly asserted when national independence is gained through the military defeat of the colonial power.

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The more significant cases, however, are those post-colonial states where no military or political “break”

occurred between the colonial and the national periods, but instead “smooth transitions” or remarkably peaceful transfer of power.

The Philippines is such society. American influence continues to pervade post-colonial Philippines, eliciting unremitting criticism of an undying “colonial mentality” that had, among other things, stunted the quest for nationhood. There is very little examining of American hegemony in

“Gramscian” terms, i.e., through means that appear less intrusive and more “enlightening,” but with the most far-reaching, and to nationalists, devastating effects on the national psyche.

According to Hayden, the bond between the United States and the Philippines lies first and foremost in the legacy of Western governance that the Spanish implanted and which the Americans then preserved and then improved upon. Spanish rule implanted a Latin type of regime while the U.S. an

“Anglo-Saxon” one which then created a carapace upon which the Philippines was to be protected from

“racial inundation by mass immigration from any other Oriental country.” This “Western legacy” was also American colonialism’s line to the Philippine Revolution. Instead of repudiating the 1896 revolt against Spain and the creation of the Malolos Republic, Hayden acknowledged how much the Revolution’s quest for national liberation resonated with themes close to American political beliefs. It was this compatibility that mitigated the dark side of early Filipino-American war relations.

Filipino participation was expanded after newly elected President Woodrow Wilson pushed through with his promise to Filipinize the colonial state. Filipinization had destroyed the institutional harmony that was brought about by FilipinoAmerican cooperation, and endangered the entire state by placing it in the hands of relatively inexperienced Filipinos, according to Hayden.

Hayden made a textual maneuver in his book that portrayed the U.S. as a colonial regime different from the rest of the region, agreeing to “listen” to the desires of Filipinos as articulated through their “Spanish-trained” leaders and enabling Filipinos to play a major role in colonial governance and in determining the direction of national development. This transmutation from an invading force to an ally, adviser and guide to the Filipinos’ moderated nationalism provides us with the first clue to why Filipino official nationalism saw no contradiction with the ideological presence of American colonialism.

By the 1930s, Filipinos were in control of the state. At the center of colonial politics the Nacionalista Party and its leaders Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmena. The absence of any serious challenge to the Nacionalistas also meant that the only politics left were the factional battles inside the dominant party. By the time of the Commonwealth, Hayden admitted that “only a split in the Nacionalista Party could produce an effective party of opposition.” Hayden was thus arguing that Quezon’s Commonwealth was “not merely the replacement of Americans by Filipino officials,” but the evolution of something that was a definite departure from the “Anglo-American party system” [p. 453]. It was, in short,

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Filipino, not anymore American. Its popularity, stability, and the fact that in Quezon it had the only “chief executive perfectly qualified” (p. 68) to run the Commonwealth, meant that despite its deviation from the “Anglo-American party system” it was something worth defending. And it is this critical defense of the defective that enabled Hayden and American colonialism to further embed an American presence in the Filipino official nationalism.

Hayden devoted an entire section on this “phase of development of a national state in the Philippines” that was most important, noting how enthusiastic the Filipino response had been to a bold and comprehensive American plan to provide education as part of the training “in democratic political processes”. Filipinos desired to be educated and the Americans, in Hayden’s eyes, were responding to this need. The vigorous collaboration between Filipinos and Americans in improving the educational system ensured its consolidation. Even in the Commonwealth era, Filipinos continued to work closely with their colonial mentors.

With the creation of the Bureau of Education, American-written textbooks for American children were “supplanted any texts written by Americans especially fro Filipino children” and books containing materials “prepared exclusively by Filipinos” soon after replaced those co-authored by Filipinos and Americans. By the time of the Commonwealth, the curriculum department of the Bureau was “wholly Filipino and brings to its task both the Filipino viewpoint and excellent professional training in modern education” (pp. 487-489). By 1939, the entire education bureau had come under the full political and executive control of Filipinos. Both Filipinos and Americans viewed education not merely as an instrument to modernize Filipinos, but as an important ideological rampart for any state seeking to keep itself highly legitimate in the eyes of society.

As an American, Hayden viewed the educational system mainly as a “supplement [to] the home in imparting the more formal part of the established national culture to the coming generation and to prepare the youth of the land to participate as free individuals in a national society.” The main purpose of education was “to develop the individual intellect and character,” not to serve the “specific needs of the state” ; it was preservative of “traditional national institutions” not aimed at destroying or modifying them.

These values however did not fit the Philippine context, and Hayden himself was first to admit that, in actual fact, the Philippine educational system resembled more “the totalitarian systems.”

Here lies the crux of the American question that puzzled Benedict Anderson. For unlike its counterparts in the region, the American project in the Philippines was both a colonial as well as a national project. Most Americans in the colony interpreted “benevolent assimilation” as something that was to eventually lead to Filipinos taking over the cudgels of the state and determining their future. The outcomes may vary in character and substance, and may sometimes lead to alterations unfamiliar to the American political experience, but it was no denying that they were the product of Filipino-American collaboration.

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The reasons for such peculiarly un-colonial actions were as diverse as they were often contradictory. They ranged from an evolving view that while progressive imperialism may have brought benefits to Filipinos, the annexation of the Philippines was, in the long run, a mistake. In the eyes of officials like Theodore Roosevelt, the Philippines “were a military Achilles heel and an economic drain, and [Roosevelt] hope to set them free as soon as possible. Racial prejudice was likewise a strong undertone when American policy-makers argued that the Philippines be best left on its own rather than be eventually added to the Union. Here we see the coming together with the Progressive notions of modernizing the state with its exclusionary attitude towards the issue of citizenship. According to Roger W. Smith, a “four-part hierarchical structure of citizenship laws” based on who should be excluded and who could become citizens among the peoples of the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico and Hawaii placed Filipinos in the same category as migrant Chinese laborers, i.e., “people denied entry to and subject to expulsion from the U.S., generally owing to their ethnic and ideological traits.” The Filipinos were considered too racially distinct, inferior and troublesome to possess any form of U.S. citizenship or nationality. Their acquisition had been imprudent. They should be tutored as subjects for a time, then gradually expelled from formal affiliation with the U.S. via independence...The U.S. should, however, maintain a guiding role.

The tutoring however would be conducted along progressive lines. The colonial state that would govern the Filipinos must strive “to bring economic, political, and moral order to their turbulent world by adopting many modern innovations while trying to sustain the finest cultural verities of the past.” This was the ideal that Hayden had in mind when he began writing his book. The outcome may have deviated from the original idea, but what the colonial state or its Republican successor could not deny was how much they were also the progeny of the Americans as they were of Filipinos.

On this acknowledged pedigree the Americans would anchor their legitimacy, and the continuing popularity of the United States as a former colonial power in the Philippines, to this very day, is an affirmation that they had succeeded. And it is this resilient reputation that continues to bedevil and haunt Filipino nationalism in its continuing struggle to bring the nation-state to its full fruition.

Making Sense of ‘Malaysia’

Presentation by Donna J: Amoroso, Kyoto University

There have been two books recently published, the first by Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, and Farish A Noor’s The Other Malaysia: Writings on Malaysia’s Subaltern History, that are very different in their outlook and focus. Malaysia’s historians have thus far to discuss the history of Malaysia as a nation-state, but that is currently changing.

The events of the last few years in Malaysia have encouraged discussions on history,

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accompanied by the rise of new public media. Farish A Noor’s book is a collection of columns written for a web page, in which he refers to a state of “radical dislocation” that makes it possible to bring in alternative and marginalized voices. Some of the marginalized voices in Malaysia are now being recorded.

The issue of academic versus popular history is also an issue that should be explored. In addition, I will touch upon socio-political paradigms and dominant discourses shaped by state practice.

In The Making of a Nation, Cheah asked “Who would inherit power from the British? Who would receive independence?”. Cheah analyses Malaysia through the prism of “give and take”

examining the tension between Malay and Malaysian nationalism. Such “give and take” may seem axiomatic to the practice of even quasi-democratic parliamentary politics, but in Malaysia, “give and take”

is also a political position condemned by “exclusivists.”

Cheah’s narrative begins in the post-war, pre-independence period (1945-1957). The years 1945-48 were especially crucial in deciding who would inherit the state from the British. Cheah sees in the 1948 Federation of Malaya agreement, “a major shift towards an inclusionary multi-ethnic nationalist perspective” on the part of an “enlightened leadership”. As embraced by successive UMNO prime ministers, this inclusive nationalism comprised multi-racial cooperation and common loyalty to Malaysia, a balancing of interest not always appreciated by UMNO members, especially when it was pursued for the political survival of the prime minister.

Concerning communism, Cheah points out that it is wrong to call the communist movement a

“Chinese movement” not because there were significant number of non-Chinese participants, but because the Communist Party of Malaya opposed the government and its supporters, who included many Chinese.

Disunity was the rule in other communities as well. Malay anti-feudalism is cited as the best example of the flowering of Malay nationalism. Several political contests led to the independence and formation of Malaysia, including ideological challenges to communalism. At the time, the specter of class division loomed very large indeed, as revolutionary nationalist movements raged in Viet Nam and China and a “social revolution” massacred royal families in neighboring Sumatra.

Cheah gives a very dispassionate account of Malaysian history, whereas Farish A. Noor has a very different agenda. A much younger scholar, Farish is already well-known as an “academic and activist.” If Cheah, the historian, has written his history of Malaysia “as it is” using the work of political scientists, Farish, the political scientist, writes of history in order to discover what might have been. He immediately targets biases that marginalize many, as well as a “tendency to accept...essentialist categories” that distorts and cripples the majority.

I would like to talk about the idea of Malaysia. Cheah’s text constructs a smooth narrative, discussing tension between communities that is managed, limited by state practice. Farish wants to

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deconstruct this smooth narrative in order to create the possibility of multiculturalism. He says that

“Malaysia still has a long way to go.” Farish also starts where all historians start, with Malay political primacy. Farish gives the impression of a helpless and fraught centrality however. This is a recurring theme in Malaysia literature, and articulates a frustration that has not been resolved.

From 1997 to 1999, economic and political crises provided a real rupture in discourse, in which anxiety and anger was not successfully deflected outside the Malay community as it often is when anger erupts against power and corruption. Farish uses the language of feudalism, because he is using the language of radical Malay nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s. Farish wants to point out that it wasn’t always this way, in other words it wasn’t always the case that unassailable leaders ruled the country. He focuses on elites and leaders, which is a feature of Malay history. Farish also gives the Islamic opposition party the same treatment.

In conclusion, it should be noted that much of what Farish writes is not new. The question is how it can become more effective and if books such as Farish’s are an effective way of talking to the public.

Discussant: Kiichi Fujiwara, The University of Tokyo

The title of this panel is “Reconstructing the National Narrative” - we are talking about narratives of nation-building. The first case of the Philippines compares the national and the colonial, focusing on the educational policy jointly introduced in the Philippines. Studies on the Philippines are for the large part written by American authors who were in the colonial administration, and they tend to boast about their role in the colonial state.

Japan’s colonial practices share some similarities with the American case in the Philippines.

However, the Japanese focused on the theme of protecting the Asian people from Western Imperialism, rhetoric that was quite different from classic colonialism. The US case was similar, with the Americans not proselytizing class colonialism, but bringing with them ideals of liberalism. The US occupation of Japan was a revival of the colonial administration in the Philippines.

Prof. Fujiwara asked Prof. Abinales how he would place Mindanao in the Philippine context.

Concerning Malaysia, the post-war state might not have been anti-colonial, but there is a disassociation. There was also a discussion concerning the differences between Malay and Malaysian identities. The use of the word feudalism is also very interesting and needs further elaboration.

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Discussion

In response to Prof. Fujiwara, Prof. Abinales stated that in the case of Mindanao, the presence of the US is reacted to in a pragmatic manner. One of the enduring philosophies of the US is the notion of pragmatism. People in Mindanao have accepted US troops as a means of diluting Philippine influence.

Prof. Amoroso responded by stating that feudalism and neo-feudalism are precisely the right words to use, implying the continuity of colonial-type rule and support of traditional elites.

Professor Ileto spoke about “official” versus “unofficial” nationalism, noting that these terms were a throw back to the language employed in the 1920s and 1930s. He asked whether Hayden actually acknowledged the area of “unofficial” nationalism. He also posed a question to Prof. Amoroso concerning Farish A. Noor, pointing out that Farish is based in the Netherlands, whereas Cheah is based in Malaysia but is of Chinese origin.

Prof. Amoroso responded that while it is true that Farish A. Noor lives in somewhere other than Malaysia, she could not answer the question. She pointed out that the website from which Farish writes is physically based in Malaysia. Concerning the two authors ethnicity, Prof. Amoroso stated her preference not to mention ethnicity. Concerning communalism and Islam, she pointed out that in the 1960s the concept of a Malay nationality was raised, and attempts have been made to narrow Malay identity down to Islamic roots. She explained that Farish critiques both leaders and Islamic nationalism.

Prof. Abinales responded that the Philippines was not the only country occupied by the United States: Hawaii, Cuba, Guam and Alaska also suffered the same fate. He stated that what should be done is to analyze the political situation in the United States at the turn of the century.

Prof. Nagano expressed her concern about how to consider the US period of colonialism in the Philippines. She asked Prof. Abinales whether he thought US colonialism should be differentiated in periods over its 50-year duration. She suggested that prior to World War I, the US colonial state was very fragile and it came into its own during the 1920s.

Prof. Abinales responded that the weakness of the colonial state in the Philippines was the US’s lack of will to remain, and the lack of US funds to support the colonial government. He mentioned that unlike the British, the Americans did not know how to create a colonial state. He stated that perceptions and policies began to change in the 1920s.

Prof. Fujiwara agreed with Prof. Nagano that the colonial state was strengthened after World War I, but that the character of rule was being changed, and that this was also the case in the British colonies.

Prof. Takenaka stated that the discussion around communalism is quite different in Malaysia and India. She stated that in India it is often said that communalism is a result of British colonial rule. She also referred to the concept of Malay and Malaysian.

Prof. Amoroso agreed that British colonialism was very much to blame for communalism, through immigration and census categories. Concerning the meaning of “Malaysia”, Prof. Amoroso

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