The Japanese Motherhood Myth and Its Effects
on Women and Family in Contemporary Japan
journal or
publication title
Journal of SUGIYAMA JYOGAKUEN UNIVERSITY
Humanities
number
43
page range
59-68
year
2012-03-01
* School of Cross-Cultural Studies, Department of Foreign Studies
Yukiko TODA
椙山女学園大学研究論集 第43号（人文科学篇）2012
The Japanese Motherhood Myth and Its Effects
on Women and Family in Contemporary Japan
Yukiko T
ODA
*
Women’s lives in Japan are said to have changed drastically over the past few decades. Unlike the women in post-war cities, who were mostly housewives, more women now seek work and a life outside the homes. Since 1990, the Japanese government has taken various measures to meet the needs that have resulted from such changes in women’s lives so that more women can maintain a balance between work and domestic life. However, have peoples’ perceptions about gender roles really changed? This paper attempts to demonstrate that the “men work outside, women take care of the house” sexual division of labor and the motherhood myth still persist in Japan, and that they even underlie the very structure of Japanese society and perceptions of our people. The government policy, intended to support a better family life, is based on the traditional employment system that encourages sexual division of labor. This prevents it from achieving satisfactory results. In order to achieve healthier family relationships, the traditional employment system needs revision and amendment.
The Japanese Motherhood Myth
In recent times, the lives of Japanese women are changing with more women pursuing a career outside the homes rather than becoming housewives. It is often said that sexual division of labor within the family is being broken down. According to the statistics, 56.9 percent of the women oppose the idea that men should work outside the home while they stay at home.
(Graph 1) Views on “Husbands should work outside, Wives should keep house”
1992 1997 2002 2004 2007 Agree Male Disagree 65.7 64.9 51.3 49.8 50.7 28.6 30.8 42.1 43.3 46.2 55.6 51.9 43.3 41.3 39.9 38.3 43.6 51.1 53.8 56.9 1992 1997 2002 2004 2007 Agree Female Disagree
This data indicates that more than half of women now oppose sexual division of labor. It is important to remember, however, that opposition to gender roles does not necessarily mean that women want to or will choose to go against those traditional roles. In fact, as the next graph indicates, seventy percent women are still not working after they give birth, and surprisingly this figure has not changed for the past thirty years.
(Graph 2) Women’s Employment Status after Giving Birth
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–04 Continue working (maternity leave) Continue working (no maternity leave) Quit after giving birth Unemployed before giving birth Others, Unknown
“13th Birth Trend Basic Survey” by the National Social Security, Population Problem Research Institute
Although the number of mothers who take maternity leave has more than tripled since 1985, the total number of women continuing to work after giving birth has remained the same.
According to the 2004 statistics, 52 percent of the women had quit their jobs because they wanted to concentrate on housework and raising their children, and 24.2 percent had quit despite their wish to continue working. 24.2 is surely not a small figure and therefore, the government and their companies certainly need to take further steps toward supporting working mothers. However, what is striking is that more than half of the women voluntarily chose to become housewives. Their reasons for having quit twenty years earlier are unavailable, and hence, a comparison of the reasons cannot be made. However, 52 percent is a high figure, and together with the statistical fact that the percentage of housewives has not changed over the previous two decades indicates that women’s perception of motherhood has not changed significantly after the war.
The definition of motherhood has evolved throughout history. How people view mothers and how mothers are expected to live and cope with the whole experience of being a mother outlines the motherhood ideology of a particular historical time and place. The motherhood ideology currently prevalent in Japan developed after WWII. After the war, Japanese society experienced the rapid changes that accompanied modernization and globalization. Sexual division of labor—men earning wages outside and women taking care of the house and children—became an effective way to support the rapid economic growth of the country.
Sexual division of labor brought about the development of the motherhood myth called “Sansaiji Shinwa” (“Three-year-old Myth”). As Ohinata explains, this motherhood myth is a belief that all
The Japanese Motherhood Myth and Its Effects on Women and Family in Contemporary Japan mothers have an innate ability to love and raise children and therefore, they should be the child’s chief caretaker for the first three years of his/her life. In addition, this Japanese motherhood myth not only assumes that mothers have innate maternal instincts and abilities but perfect housewife qualities as well. This notion of a perfect housewife comes from the traditional Japanese family system that attaches prime importance to the sustenance of a family and not to the individual. Under such system, a woman is deprived of a self, and is expected to dedicate her life as a daughter, a wife, and a mother of the family. Gender roles push women in other countries to play similar roles; however, unlike women in most western countries, Japanese women, employed or unemployed, are expected to pay primary attention to the domestic sphere.
Post-war gender division of labor and the motherhood myth are apparent from the representation of women in the media, and it is the media that produces as well as reflects the general public opinion. A comparison of the articles of Asahi newspaper articles on the Peking 2008 Olympics written on the female and male Judo medalists illustrates the gender role and motherhood ideology in Japan.
On August 9th, 2008, Japan won two medals in Judo. Ryoko Tani won the bronze, and Masato Uchishiba won the gold. On the following day, they were both on the front page of The Asahi Shimbun. The sub-headlines for Uchishiba read—“He has shown his son the best,” and “His wife’s ‘efforts have finally been rewarded.’” The sub-headlines for Ryoko Tani, commonly known as Yawara-chan, read—“Medal—Mom’s Pride.” This demonstrates the emphasis put on one’s private family life in Japan, and that individual success is often defined in connection to one’s family role. Taking a closer look at what was included and excluded in the article elucidates the traditional gender roles accepted by the general public in Japan. The emphasis is put on women’s roles as mother and wife and men’s role as breadwinner of the family. Both articles do not simply praise the two athletes for their accomplishments, but discuss at great length their private family matters in order to strategically evoke the readers’ emotions. The journalist who wrote Yawara-chan’s article praises her for the bronze medal, but more for her effort to balance Judo with her roles as mother and wife. The journalist seems to imply that the bronze medal won by her is worth as much as a gold, by repeatedly emphasizing how hard it is for a mother and housewife to win an Olympic medal: “Training while raising her child wore her out daily.”
Had Uchishiba won a bronze medal, he would not have made the front page. Male athletes are expected to win gold medals. In the aforementioned article, the writer includes a promise that Uchishiba made, as a father to his son, to win a gold medal. The article also focuses on his wife, who, since the last Olympics, has been supporting Uchishiba by taking care of the housework as well as their son, even while she attended school in the day. It is interesting to note that there is no mention of Yawara-chan’s husband supporting her like Uchishiba’s wife did.
The remarks made by Uchishiba and Yawara-chan clearly indicate that they have internalized these gender roles. Uchishiba says “This is my job,” “I did what a father must do.” For Uchishiba, it is his job to concentrate on his performance and do well. On the other hand, Yawara-chan’s statements show that for her, duties as a mother and wife come before Judo. She says: “I am allowed to play Judo because I perform all the duties of a housewife properly.” Although she does
her best to take care of her child even while training, she is always wondering whether she should quit Judo. Her comment, “I don’t know whether I should continue with Judo …” shows that she feels guilty for not devoting her attention to housework and her child like she believes women should do. The views of a majority of women, whether working or actively engaged outside the homes (like Yawara-chan), have not changed.
Even though more women in our society are excelling in various fields, the basic perception of most people has not changed. By publishing comments based on gender roles, the media further stimulates the mechanism of gender role internalization. In the second part of the article on Yawara-chan, her junior, who is also a mother now and who had watched the finals with other mothers, declared that her bronze medal encouraged them and made them proud as mothers. The article concluded by saying that “her strenuous effort greatly appealed to the Japanese society, which lacks support for working mothers.”
Yawara-chan’s story enforces the mechanism of gender role internalization. Her remarks make people think that a woman needs to be a perfect housewife and mother if they want to continue working. Yawara-chan has shown how she wore herself out by performing the duties expected of her “properly.” Working mothers need to cut down their hours of sleep and be “worn out” like Yawara-chan, or else, feel guilty and quit their jobs. There are many working mothers who exhaust themselves by trying to do everything right, and many who quit working either because they are exhausted or feel pressured to concentrate on domestic chores. Mothers often experience a sense of guilt for not fully attending to their children. This sense of guilt is felt because they have internalized the motherhood myth.
Yawara-chan’s story makes life more difficult for non-working mothers as well. The motherhood myth pressurizes them to become perfect wives and mothers. Non-working women feel the need to be even more perfect than working mothers. Unlike the family and communal childrearing custom in pre-war and rural Japan, the nuclearization of the family in post-war Japanese cities has resulted in the responsibility of the children resting entirely with the mother. They share one-to-one relationship with their children, who become their raison d’être. There is abundant professional information on how to raise children “well,” and it is believed that children’s accomplishments reflect the mothering ability of their mothers. Women brought up in post-war families have had higher education, and expect their children to achieve even higher education. Whether the children will be among the “kachigumi” (winners group) or “makegumi” (losers group) completely depends on the mother’s ability to educate her children. This explains why early childhood education is very popular in Japan, sometimes starting during pregnancy itself (prenatal training). Babies are shown flashing picture cards and Dorman dots, and little children are taught letters and numbers even before entering primary school. In contemporary Japanese society where disparity between the “kachigumi” and “makegumi” is becoming more and more apparent, the pressure on mothers is mounting.
The Japanese Motherhood Myth and Its Effects on Women and Family in Contemporary Japan
Government Measures and Their Shortcomings
Traditional division of labor and the motherhood myth continue to affect women’s lives, often making them more difficult. The government has taken various measures to alleviate women’s burdens of childrearing, ironically however, not out of concern for women, but because childbearing became a “critical national concern” in the year 1990.
1990 is the year of the 1.57 shock when the total fertility rate of the previous year (1989) was lower than the national lowest of 1.58 in the year 1966. The fertility rate was low in 1966 because it was the year of the Fiery Horse, and according to a superstitious belief, girls born that year would bring destruction on their husbands. Therefore, when the 1.57 fertility rate broke this historical record, fast dropping population and future labor shortage were considered a critical national crisis, and became the focus of one of the central policies of the government. As Fukoin points out, the 1.57 shock turned what had been considered a mere “women’s issue” into a “national issue” needing immediate attention (Fukoin 45).
Since then, the Japanese government has taken various measures to increase the fertility rate to prevent further population decline. In the beginning, the government mainly focused on creating an environment that is easier for working mothers to raise children in. The first five-year plan called the Angel Plan (1995–1999) focused on improving the day care service, increasing the number of authorized day care centers around the country, admitting very young children from 0 to 2-year-olds, and extending day care hours from early morning (7:00) to late evening (around 19:00). The second five-year plan called the New Angel Plan (2000–2004) continued to focus on improving the day care service, the health care system of mothers and children, the nursing allowance, and the family support system.
Unlike other OECD precedents, however, these two plans were ineffective in increasing our country’s total fertility rate. On realizing the urgency of the problem, the government began working extensively with the local government and companies to comprehensively support the raising of future generations. The third plan called “Children and Child Rearing Support Plan” (2005–2009) thus enforces 130 comprehensive measures to help both men and women manage their career along with child rearing, improve the local child support system, support young people’s education and employment, and illuminate the importance of family and child rearing. In 2006, the government established 40 new measures called the “New Counterplans for the Falling Birthrate.” Although the fertility rate has risen slightly from 1.37 in the year 2008 to 1.39 in the year 2009, this small rise owes to mothers of the baby boom generation giving birth and not directly to the effects of the new measures. In fact, it has gone down again to 1.21 in the year 2011. Although recent government measures have provided women, particularly working mothers, with various childcare support, and lack of such measures may further reduce the current birthrate, it is unlikely that they will encourage married women to have more children than they currently have. The average number of children borne by married women has hardly changed over the last four decades and has stayed constant at 2.2 since 1972.
marrying late or never marrying have been increasing since the 1980s. Women pursuing their career and becoming financially stable are posited as some of the main causes for such trend, but surprisingly, financial instability of women and the young generations (male and female) in recent Japan has hardly been pointed out as one of the driving force for women’s reluctance to marry. Interviews with women who do not have fulltime jobs show that marriage and having children seems to be unrealistic in their current situation. In one of the interviews, a 33-year-old woman who works part-time as a university lecturer—and earns less than 2,500,000 yen per year—said “Marriage is something I cannot consider at the moment. All my friends who are married and have children are financially stable, and my friends who are not married are all financially unstable. When you think about it, it all comes down to financial stability.” She finds her financial state very unstable and is currently seeking for a tenure track position. “Marriage and having children,” she continues, “will become one of my possible choices only once I settle down with a fulltime job.” Her statement reflects one of the reasons why highly educated women who wish to become financially independent hesitate to marry and have children.
The financial instability of many women and young people in Japan stems from the employment system which has been developed in a manner that supports families on the basis of sexual division of labor. Under this division, only the male workers need to be financially insured because the women are supported by their husbands. Many women choose to earn less than 1,030,000 yen per year because they are then considered to be their husbands’ dependants, and exempted from paying taxes. Thus, the number of fully employed and socially insured women has been decreasing steadily since the 1980s. As this graph indicates, in 1985, the number of fully employed women was 68.1 percent, whereas in the year 2007, it was only 46.5 percent.
Graph 3 92.8 92.8 68.1 68.1 81.781.7 46.5 46.5 3.2 3.2 28.4 28.4 8.78.7 40.7 40.7 4 3.53.5 9.69.6 12.8 12.8 92.8 68.1 81.7 46.5 3.2 28.4 8.7 40.7 4 3.5 9.6 12.8
1985 Male 1985 Female 2007 Male 2007 Female
Fulltime Part-time Other
Typical vs Non-Typical Employment Ratio of Men and Women
“Labor Survey” by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
This decrease in the number of fully employed workers since the year 1985 is caused by two laws that were established that year—the Equal Employment Opportunity Law for Men and Women and the Contract Labor Law. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law could have enabled people to achieve an ideal work-life balance. Women could have helped alleviate the long working hours of men, allowing both men and women to have enough time for the family. As Takenobu points out,
The Japanese Motherhood Myth and Its Effects on Women and Family in Contemporary Japan the law instead forced women to work long hours like men, and the Contract Labor Law provided jobs for women who were unable to continue working long hours as fulltime workers (Takenobu 29). Originally, this contract Labor Law was established to supply temporary labor force to professional and technical fields so that companies could handle the labor shortage adequately and promptly without having to go through the normal employment procedure. However, after several amendments, the law has been extended to the contract field as well, and the restriction on contract duration has also been lifted.
Since 1985, the number of women working under non-typical or irregular employment has increased. According to the 2011 data introduced by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, more than 54.6% women now work as typical employees. Companies benefit from hiring non-typical employees because they do not need to cover their insurance or pay them bonuses. Recently, this non-typical employment has been drawing attention, especially when this type of employment started affecting male workers. According to the 2011 labor force survey, one in every two Japanese between the ages of 15 to 24 cannot secure typical, long-term employment. The diversification in forms of employment is one of the major reasons for the widening disparities recently seen in Japan.
This diversification in forms of employment is most conspicuous among women and young people. Whereas the overall average of men under non-typical employment is 20.1%, the average of women of all ages reached 54.6% in the year 2011. With such an employment system, women have a tough time securing financial stability, making it more difficult for them to support themselves, not to mention their children. Moreover, the diversification of employment style has reduced the number of men with sufficient income. These factors necessitate both married and single women to join the workforce.
Despite having promoted sexual division of labor all these years, the government’s current countermeasures against the dropping birthrate are founded upon a premise that majority of women want to work and raise children, or more precisely, should work and raise children. These countermeasures were established to prevent future labor shortage, and not out of concern for women and their lives. Otherwise, a work-friendly environment for women would have been created much earlier, in response to women’s demand for equal rights. These countermeasures have been ineffective in raising the birthrate precisely because they overlook the kind of lives women today want to live.
There are many women in Japan, who, if circumstances permit, want to dedicate their time entirely to child rearing. A 35-year-old of two children aged 4 and 1 said that a mother’s role is to “provide her children with limitless love.” Her views on the work-life balance for men and women are as follows:
“Work-life balance is something you would have to figure out with your partner. A mother is lucky if her real life is not very different from her ideal life. I think that children who are taken care of by mothers who want to be fulltime moms are very lucky. It is inevitable that fathers have to put more importance on work in contemporary Japan. They miss out so much of life as they have very little time to spend with their children.”
From this statement, it is obvious that she fully accepts the sexual division of labor and has internalized the motherhood myth. However, mothers, who sincerely believe in the importance of motherhood, are exactly the kind of ideal mothers that the government was trying to generate, and yet, the current work-life policy seems to disapprove of these mothers who do not participate in the workforce. Interviews conducted on fulltime mothers indicate that many of them still fully support the sexual division of labor.
Not all women who wish to be housewives can, however, become housewives without any need to work. After the collapse of the bubble economy, 40 percent of the entire employed population has become women. Women are now an indispensable part of the country’s work force. However, the current policy that encourages women to work is founded upon traditional gender roles, expecting women to take care of housework and child rearing as well. The semi-professional jobs or part-time jobs make it easier for women to manage both. As Rikitake points out, the current government policy intends to increase the number of these part-time workers with low pay to improve the country’s economy (Rikitake 81). As long as women’s wages are low, the main expectations of women will continue to be childbearing and household chores, and breadwinning will continue to be the expected responsibility of the man; this will inevitably strengthen the whole system of sexual division of labor. Moreover, whether working fulltime or part-time, engaged in professional or semi-professional jobs, working women feel obliged to take care of the house and children.
The sexual division of labor that expects men to be the main breadwinner of the family is another serious social problem in contemporary Japan. There has been an increase in the cases of death and depression among overworked men in Japan, especially after the collapse of the bubble economy. Men who were hired in the early 1990s are being seriously overworked as companies have not hired enough employees after them. These men evidently have no time to spend with their family. Many experienced workers were fired or forced to retire early, making them “unqualified” fathers as per the gender role. Recently, companies that benefit from non-typical employees are offering male workers this option as well. With an annual salary of less than 2,000,000 yen, it is even more difficult for men to consider marriage and starting a family, given that they are expected to be the main breadwinners.
On the surface, the government intends to support the diversity of women’s choices; however, on a deeper level, it entraps women once again. Measures taken to increase the fertility rate, propagating its importance to the sustenance of the country, are liable to condemn those who cannot contribute to such objective. Women’s rights for reproduction may once again be controlled by the country. As Sugimoto points out, these government measures could serve as a violation of women’s Reproductive Health Rights (Sugimoto 21), as confirmed by the United Nations in 1994. During WWII, a Japanese woman was not considered human if she did not give birth to five children. Under the severe traditional family system, women were even divorced if they failed to give birth to a family heir. The current national involvement in private choices concerning marriage, infertility treatment, and childbearing could once again result in women being valued according to the number of children they give birth to.
The Japanese Motherhood Myth and Its Effects on Women and Family in Contemporary Japan of work they do. Under the current plan, the government somehow presupposes that all women want to work or should work to prevent labor shortage. This is in spite of having established an employment system that, for over half a century, has offered quite the opposite. Many women wish to stay home and concentrate on child care and housework, and this will not easily change unless the traditional employment system changes. The government needs to realize that although more women are actively participating in society, most women are still set on following the traditional motherhood role.
The current employment system premises the work and life balance of a family and not of an individual. The non-typical employment form that stemmed and grew from such traditional system is adding more burdens, rather than alleviating them, on respective family members. In order to achieve a healthier family relationship, the government would need to start thinking about work and life balance of each individual, and not that of a family unit based on division of labor. Insuring both women and men as full time workers with flexible work conditions and legalizing “paternity leave,” for instance, can help individuals maintain a work-life balance. Another effective solution would be to lay down wage guidelines that would insure people the same amount of money for the same value of labor, as Takenobu suggests. This will reduce income disparity between men and women, and also typical and non-typical employers. A work-life balance can bring about a healthier family relationship. Sharing both work and life with one’s partner can lessen the burden of both husband and wife. It may reduce the overtime worked by fathers, and alleviate the burden experienced by mothers at home. In order to achieve this, a constructive start could be the revision and amendment of the current employment system.
* Parts of this paper have been presented at “Gender and Family in East Asia” International Conference held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in December, 2008.
Bibliography
Inoue, Teruko, and Yumiko Ehara. Josei no Data Book (Women’s Data Book). 4th Edition. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2005.
Fukoin, Aki. “Hoikuen karano Sakebi” (“An Outcry from Day Care Centers”). Agenda 20 (2008), 44–49. Matsunobu, Hiromi. “Shugyo Jyosei nitotteno Shokugyo to Kosodate” (“Work and Child Care for Working
Women”) in Shoushika Jidai no Jenda to Hahaoyaishiki (Gender and Motherhood Consciousness in the Age of Declining Birthrate). Yoriko Meguro and Sumika Yazawa Ed. Tokyo: Shinyosha, 2003, 149–168. Meguro, Yoriko, and Sumiko Yazawa. Shoushika Jidai no Jenda to Hahaoyaishiki (Gender and
Motherhood Consciousness in the Age of Declining Birthrate). Tokyo: Shinyosha, 2003.
Ohinata, Masami. Boseiaishinwa no Wana (Trap of the Motherhood Myth). Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron, 2000. ———. Boseiaishinwa tono Tatakai (Battle against the Motherhood Myth). Tokyo: Soudo Bunka, 2003. ———. Media ni Hisomu Boseiaishinwa (Motherhood Myth in the Media). Tokyo: Soudo Bunka, 2003. Omori, Junko. “Gendai Shinguru Maza no Kosodate Jijyo—Kosodate Shien ha Darenotame?” (“Child
Rearing of Contemporary Single Mothers—Whose Child Support Is It For?”). Agenda 20 (2008), 37–43. Rikitake, Yumi. “Jenda Byodo to Shoshika wo Meguru Giron, Seisaku, Jitsujo” (Discussions, Policies, and
Facts about Gender Equality and the Drop in Birthrate). Agenda 20 (2008), 72–85.
Sugimoto, Kiyoe. “Naze Shoushika Seisaku wa Kouka wo Agenainoka?—Shoushika Seisaku ga Kakaeru Hutatu no Mujun” (“Why Measures against the Declining Birthrate are Ineffective—The Two Contradictory Aspects”). Agenda 20 (2008). 14–21.
Takenobu, Mieko. “Misugosareru ‘Danseigata Hatarakikata’ Kaikaku” (“The Overlooked ‘Male Working Pattern’ Reform”). Agenda 20 (2008), 22–36.
Shoshika Shakai Hakusho (White Paper on a Society with a Declining Birthrate). The Cabinet Office. Tokyo: Saeki Publishing, 2008.
Yamada, Masahiro. “‘Yoriyoi Kosodate’ ni Oikomareru Hahaoya tachi” (“Mothers Pressured by ‘Better Child Care’”) in Shoushika Jidai no Jenda to Hahaoyaishiki (Gender and Motherhood Consciousness in the Age of Declining Birthrate). Yoriko Meguro and Sumika Yazawa Ed. Tokyo: Shinyosha, 2003, 69–87. <http://www.gender.go.jp/index.html>
