Several Arguments against Incongruity Theory
Robert L. Latta
Obviously, the fact that a given stimulus to humor—a witticism, a funny accident, etc. —may be said to manifest an incongruity by no means entails that a recognition of that incongruity figures in the humor process through which a subject goes in response. But this holds even if the terms of the incongruity clearly play a pivotal role in the humor process. The reason is this. In any case in which something A and something B incongruous with A figure pivotally in the humor process, it may be that they do so in that in one way or another they induce a cognitive switch which brings about the humorous effect whether or not the subject recognizes the incongruity between them. Consider several examples. (1) As an example of humorous relational reversal, the ma-thematician John Allen Paulos, in his book Mathematics and Humor, (University of Chicago Press), presents a cartoon of a greyhound dog with a speeding bus tattooed on its side. There is indeed a point of view from which the tattoo is incongruous with the dog—viz., the point of view that is perhaps best expressed in the words "That doesn't make any sense." But it might not be a recognition of this incongruity that accounts for the experience of humor. It might instead be a cognitive switch that accounts for it—viz., a sudden switch from an orientation that might be expressed in the words "I want to solve this one" to one that might be expressed "That's the solution": the former prompts an effort which is terminated by the latter. (This is not, of course, to say that the subject actually utters these words; they serve merely to indicate two different orientations.) But the latter explanation is by no means the same as the former. To perceive the incongruity in question is one thing, to make the switch in question quite another. To perceive the incongruity is as it were to say "That doesn't make sense," whereas to make the cognitive switch is as it were to say
Mtk)3-tf.f9J-VEM.M.S751t "I see how it m
akes sense," but these, of course, are opposites. In order to make this switch, however, the subject by no means need take as his starting point a recognition of this incongruity . He can start, rather, from the assumption that there is a hidden congruity, a hidden point. To start from this assumption is not, of course, to recognize an incongruity, for it is, as it were, to refuse to recognize any incongruity . But in fact, the subject may be expected to start from this assumption, for, given the context, it would be most abnormal for him to start from the assumption that there is an incongruity, a lack of sense, in the tattoo. In sum, if the explanation of this example outlined just above is correct (for some cases), then (in those cases) though the subject might indeed react initially by thinking "This doesn't make any
sense," if he does so, this is merely an irrelevant false start: the humor process begins when it first occurs to him to think "I wonder how this
makes sense."
(2) Groucho Marx quipped, referring to a safari in Africa : "We shot two bucks, but that was all the money we had." Needless to say, following this involves putting first one interpretation and then another very different one on "shot two bucks." Groucho's statement may be said to manifest an incongruity in that the initial interpretation , under which "bucks" refers to animals, doesn't fit the statement as a whole, which is undeniably about spending money. It is quite conceivable, however, that this incongruity has nothing to do with the humorous effect. Perhaps , on the contrary, the humorous effect is brought about by a cognitive switch from the initial interpretation to the final one, under which "bucks" refers to money : this switch renders pointless (momentarily) both any further effort, if such an effort was in progress, soberly to follow the account of the safari, and any further continuation of suspense as to when Groucho will say something funny. But clearly, making this switch does not essentially involve recognizing the incongruity between the initial interpretation and the statement as a whole, for it simply involves abandoning that interpretation— that is, it doesn't involve noting its relation to the statement as a whole or to anything else.
(3) A defect in a presentation of any sort can bring amusement. For example, in the Sherlock Holmes story The Hound of the Baskervilles,
-Dr. Watson remarks at one point: "And yet all is not as quiet as it seems. Did you hear a woman howling in the night?" or something to this effect. On one occasion, this passage, just because it lacks subtlety, broke the spell of the narrative for a listener (who was listening to a tape) and caused him to chuckle in amusement. The passage may be said to be incongruous with the story as a whole precisely in that it is ineptly written. (Here the reader may wish to substitute an example of the same type from his own experience.) The amusement it brought, however, was not necessarily due to a recognition of this incongruity. Perhaps it was due rather to a sudden cognitive switch from an orientation in which the listener was absorbed in the story, that is to say, from the object level, to one in which he was emotionally detached from it and took an objective, critical view, that is, to the metalevel. (Paulos points out that the terms "object level" and "metalevel" can be used in the analysis of humor.) Such a switch, if it took place, surely undermined, as it were; the arousal and ongoing effort of attention that had prevailed to that point. To make this cognitive switch from the object level to the metalevel, however, is not the same thing as registering the incongruity in question, and does not entail regIstering it. That incongruity is registered, if at all, from the metalevel and from the metalevel alone. If the subject makes the cognitive switch and then goes on to register the incongruity, in doing the latter he takes an additional step, one which, if the explanation just suggested is correct, lies outside the humor process.
(4) A cute little three-year-old girl bites into a cookie and says in a loud, grainy, adult voice, "Ah, I really needed that." There is an in-congruity here in that the little girl's way of speaking in this instance, the content and manner of her utterance, don't go with what she is, an innocent little girl. An adult, of course, might find this incident quite funny, but his amusement does not necessarily stem from a recognition of this incongruity. It is possible to imagine that the humor process takes the following course in this case. The little girl's utterance causes the adult subject fleetingly to see her as a formidable, demanding, vulgar, grown woman, in more or less the way in which the audience at a play sees an actress as something she isn't, and in consequence, fleetingly and
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automatically, he adopts attitudes appropriate to an encounter with such a person; this includes a certain emotional mobilization and guardedness. But then, of course, he makes a cognitive switch back to seeing her as the
innocent little thing she is. This is the crucial cognitive switch , for
instantly it renders pointless his mobilization and guardedness and thus
sets the stage for relaxation. Several other factors might enter into the
humor process in this case: for example , the little girl's utterance might
well startle the subject, and the unrelaxation entailed by this response
might function as additional fuel to his laughter . For present purposes, however, these other factors, whatever they might be, can be ignored. The important thing to note is that making the cognitive switch in question
does not entail recognizing the incongruity between the little girl and her
utterance. To recognize that incongruity is to note a certain relation which
obtains between the little girl and her utterance; to make the cognitive switch is simply to make the transition from seeing her as a formidable
woman to seeing her again as an innocent little girl. These are simply
two different things. The little girl's utterance does of course figure in
the cognitive switch, but it figures not as a term of an incongruity , but
rather as the stimulus factor which causes the subject momentarily to see her as a formidable grown woman.
This argument does not by itself refute incongruity theory .
Never-theless, it poses a grave challenge. Its import is that vast classes of cases
which might be thought to afford the clearest evidence of the truth of
incongruity theory are thrown seriously into question .
In those cases in which the humor stimulus may be said to manifest an incongruity, that incongruity appears from a specific point of view , but the point of view of a person whose response takes the form of an
ex-perience of humor is different. The former point of view fosters a serious
frame of mind, while from the latter it is possible to appreciate the humor
in the case but no incongruity appears. Most inconveniently for incongruity
theory, precisely in the fact that one thing doesn't fit with another , there
simply isn't anything funny. Consider a few examples. (1) Woody
Allen's movie Zelig has to do with a character of that name , the "chameleon
man," who rapidly acquires the opinions, manner, and even the knowledge, skills, and physical characteristics of anyone he happens to be with at the moment (though not the physical characteristics of women). At one point Zelig, played by Allen, describes his background in psychiatry (actually he has none) to a female psychiatrist: "I, uh, studied a great deal. I worked with Freud in Vienna. —Oh. —Yes. We, we broke over the concept of penis envy. Freud [thoughtful pause] felt that it should be limited to women." This implies, of course, that Zelig thinks the concept of penis envy should be applied to men, too. An incongruity may indeed be said to lie in this: its terms are a male, any human male, and the predicate "suffers penis envy"—that is, from a certain point of view, it is incon-gruous to speak of men suffering penis envy. This point of view is that of Freudian analysis, and from it, it is simply a mistake to attribute penis envy to a male. Precisely in this mistake, there is nothing in the least amusing. The proper way to deal with it is of course to correct it, and this is of course a matter of serious-minded instruction. On the other hand, from a different point of view, it makes perfect sense to attribute "penis envy
," envy of another man for his particularly large and effective organ, to a man. This is the point of view of one who is thinking in everyday, nontheoretical terms of the psychology of the human male, and from this point of view, there is no incongruity at all. The thing to note is that it's only when the subject adopts this everyday point of view, from which he perceives no incongruity, that is, fully accepts the idea of attri-buting penis envy to a male as making good sense, and not when he adopts the point of view of Freudian analysis, from which alone an incongruity appears, that he experiences humor. In this case, at least, if the subject adopts the point of view from which the incongruity appears, he will not experience the humor in the case. To adopt that point of view is to fail to see that a jest is intended, or to refuse to be drawn into it.
(2) Consider again the case of the greyhound. Clearly, it is only from a definite, limited point of view that any incongruity appears here. Only so long as the subject feels or thinks "That doesn't make any sense" can he be said to perceive an incongruity.
But let us for the moment drop the question whether any incongruity —101—
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is perceived in the course of the humor process in this case, and ask instead
whether there is any incongruity here. The answer, of course, is an
unequivocal no: the tattoo of the speeding bus has a perfectly intelligible meaning and thus is quite in place on the dog. The cartoon is of course a jest, and within the context of the jest, the tattoo constitutes a puzzle,
not an incongruity. That is to say, if the subject approaches the cartoon
correctly, in the understanding that it is a jest which requires that he solve
a puzzle, then up to the moment at which he succeeds in solving the puzzle,
he faces a puzzle, not an incongruity. He doesn't adopt the point of view
of one who believes "This just doesn't make any sense," though he might confess "This doesn't make any sense to me at the moment"; rather, he asks "How does this make sense?" A person who perceives an incongruity
in this case, then, misperceives: the point of view of such a person is all
wrong. Is this illusion of incongruity, then, essential to the subject's
experience of humor? No it isn't. It arises if and only if the subject
fails to realize that the whole presentation is a jest. The basic point,
though, is that here, once again, as in example (1), it's clear that the
incongruity appears only from a deadly serious point of view, and not
from that of a person who appreciates the humor in the case.
(3) One segment of the Monty Python television series begins as
follows. "Face the Press" appears on the screen. The camera pans down
to the "Moderator," a man sitting in an armchair, a serious expression on
his face. He begins: "Hello. Tonight on 'Face the Press' we're going to
examine two different views of contemporary things. On my left is the
Minister for Home Affairs [shot of a strong-boned, masculine face; he has a mustache and is smoking a pipe], who is wearing a striking organza dress in pink (camera backs off to reveal pearl necklace, exposed neckline, orchids, frilled pink dress; laughter, perhaps canned, drowns out the
following few words] with matching pearls and a dear.... collar neckace
(laughter, here and in the following timed, apparently, to the appearance
of visual images]. The shoes [shot of pink, high-heeled shoes; camera
pans up bare lower legs to frilled hem, then back up to masculine head; man makes flirtatious feminine gestures all the while] are in brushed
pigskin (laughter] with gold clasps by Maxwell of Bond Street (relaxed
-fashion-show music, which began subtly between "shoes" and "are," becomes more prominent and continues to end). The hair is by Roger and the whole ensemble [laughter) is crowned by a spectacular display of Christmas orchids Claughterj.... "
Does this skit present any incongruity ? It is tempting to answer immediately that there is of course a glaring incongruity between the man and his attire (and also his flirtatious feminine gestures, but this refinement can be ignored for present purposes). One who succumbs to this temptation, however, has forgotten two things. First, quite in general, an incongruity, if it appears at all, appears from one or more determinate points of view. Secondly, in this case, there is only one relevant point of view: that of a member of the audience who appreciates the humor of the skit. It is by no means clear, however, that there is any incongruity between the man
and his attire from the viewpoint of such a subject.
Imagine a test of mental functioning for people who have undergone brain injury, or an intelligence test for people of very low intelligence.
The test is designed for and applied by and to people of mainstream Western culture. One item consists of a photograph of a rugged man in a pink dress with the question "Is there anything wrong here?" Clearly, in this case, an incongruity does appear both to the examiner and to a respondent who is able to determine the correct answer. Now imagine another case. A somewhat conservative Englishman is walking down a street in London when suddenly he catches sight of a rugged man in a pink dress. He sees no indication that this is meant to be a jest—indeed, there is none—and he feels deeply shocked at the sight. Clearly, it may be said that an incongruity appears to him. In both these cases, the subject appeals to the norms of his culture and arrives at the judgment that the dress is out of place. In both cases, he may be said to reject the dress: to say no to it, as it were. In both cases, his attitude is quite serious.
The crucial question, of course, is whether an incongruity appears to a subject who appreciates the skit (this means, of course, whether it is essential to his appreciation of the skit that an incongruity appear to him). This question is extraordinarily delicate, but perhaps answerable. To begin with, let us note that the joke context is very clear in this case, and that
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the viewpoint of a subject who is primed to experience the humor in a skit of this type is very special, and very different from that of the examiner
or the conservative pedestrian in the examples just desribed. To assume
that whatever is true of the latter viewpoints must be true of the former also is to commit a serious error.
Now it may be granted that it is reasonable to assume that the subject
who appreciates the skit is started to see the pink dress. That he is startled
to see it, however, by no means entails that he conceives it as incongruous. To say that he conceives it as incongruous is to say that he makes a judgment
to the effect of "That dress doesn't belong on him," but for him to be
startled to see the dress on the man is by no means for him to make this
judgment. It may be granted, too, that it is to be assumed that the subject
is fully aware that in his culture there is a norm to the effect that a man
is not to wear such a dress. But this does not entail that he conceives
the dress as incongruous, either. The question is whether, knowing of this
norm, he applies it in the present case, or rather, in view of the joke context, decides not to apply it.
Intuitively, it is more or less clear, though this is a delicate point,
that in the case of a skit like the one in question if not in general, the joke context signals the subject that he is to take whatever happens in
stride, as it were. To take things in stride means to relax, to accept
things as they occur in the skit, and to refrain from making earnest
ob-jections of any sort. It means to relax and make no objection to just such
a thing as the man's feminine attire. Within the context of the skit, this
attire, far from being incongruous, is in fact quite appropriate to him: it goes to show, as do further developments, that he is a very silly man.
A circus clown's audience does not rebel either intellectually or emotionally against his silly costume and makeup, for they fit his character and role
to a tee. Just so in the case in question. Again, it is more or less clear
intuitively that taking the feminine attire in stride, accepting it as
appro-priate, is what brings the laugh: the subject makes a cognitive switch
from seeing the "Minister" in one way, as a formidable, weighty, very
masculine individual, to seeing him in another way, as a most unformidable,
unweighty, unmasculine, silly individual, but seeing him in this latter way
involves an easy acceptance of the way he dresses. A member of the audience who says "That dress doesn't belong on him," that is, who judges the dress to be incongruous, is, quite obviously, taking entirely the wrong attitude. It's the wrong attitude in that it will keep him from appreciating the humor in the case as long as he maintains it.
Here, too, then, no incongruity appears from the viewpoint of a person who appreciates the humor in the case.
Let's return for a moment to the humor theorist to whom it appears obvious that there is an incongruity between the man and his pink dress. What point of view has he adopted? It's fair to say that in the process of reaching his conclusion that the dress is incongruous, he acts in essentially the same way as the examiner and the examinee in the brain-injury test and in essence takes the point of view of the latter: he asks himself "Is there anything wrong here?" and answers by appeal to the sartorial norms of his society. This point of view, however, is irrelevant. To adopt it is to engage in a fallacy. This might be called the fallacy of mistaken viewpoint. It is, no doubt, the earnest, probing, coping orientation of the humor theorist, which contrasts so sharply with that of the subject who enjoys the humor in a given case, which leads him to commit this fallacy.
(4) Imagine a political cartoon in which the instantly recognizable head of a world leader has been attached to the body of an infant who is playing with toy missles. Let us assume that the point of the caricature is obvious and well taken: this leader's thinking on nuclear weapons shows ignorance and a dangerous lack of concern. Now, what incongruity might the stimulus side be said to manifest in this case? There is, to begin with, an incongruity in that the head of an adult has been attached to the body of an infant. But this, of course, is not the point at all; this is not what brings a laugh from the subject who understands. There is also an incongruity between the world leader as depicted and the world leader as he is, in that he doesn't really have the body of an infant and doesn't really (it may be assumed) play with toy missles. But this, too, is beside the point. The point, in fact, quite obviously, is that the depiction is congruous with the reality. However much incongruity a viewer may see here, it's all quite irrelevant. The humor process, in this case, whatever
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it might involve, clearly does not involve the recognition of any incongruity. The two incongruities which have been described may be expected to appear from the point of view of a humor theorist who puts himself in the position of an examinee who must answer the question "Is there any incongruity here?" But this point of view is both perfectly serious and irrelevant. (One might feel templed to take up the question how a young child might react to the cartoon. Assuming, however, that this child is in no position to see the point of the caricature, his viewpoint is entirely irrelevant to the discussion of this particular example: it's no more relevant than the viewpoint of a cat.)
(5) A highly advanced Star Trek robot who looks exactly like a human being and thinks and behaves almost exactly like one, so much so that the viewer tends to forget that he's a robot, says, with reference to a difficult assignment. "I hope I shall function adequately." His application of the word "function" to himself is not in the least amusing so long as it strikes one as incongruous. It becomes amusing only when one realizes how it is that it fits. If the incongruity in question appears to a viewer, his point of view is that of a person who doesn't see the humor in the case; from the point of view of a person who does see the humor, there is a congruity in the only place, as it were, in which a person might see an incongruity, that is, in the relation between the utterer and his utterance. In this particular case, it is fair to assume that the subject goes through a process of puzzling things out, and it must be admitted that it's likely that he begins with the suspicion that there might be an incongruity, though he doesn't necessarily do so. This admission, however, does not invalidate the theses in question: the point of view from which an incongruity appears (in this case, that of the puzzler who suspects an incongruity) is a serious one from which no humor appears, as it were, while the point of view from which humor appears (that of the subject who in puzzling suspected an incongruity or else did not suspect one, but who sees the humor in the case) is a different point of view and from it no incongruity appears.
(6) The musical theme of the Monty Python television series is a jaunty, bouncing tune which ends abruptly with the sound of a fart in place of the note one expects to hear—that is, if one's expectations are
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-determined by musical considerations. It is only within the context of such considerations that the fart doesn't fit. A humor theorist who asks himself whether there is an incongruity and answers by appeal to musical considerations puts himself, of course, in the position of a music critic.
This point of view, however, is irrelevant. A critical attitude kills the humor in the case. The fart is a creative stroke, but it is so in the realm of humor, not in that of music. It is only as a stroke in the realm of music that it may be said to be incongruous; as a stroke of humor, there is nothing incongruous about it. But the context, of course, is humor, not music. Without a doubt, the fart does figure essentially in the psy-chodynamics of the case. It does so, however, not as a term of an incongruity, but rather as the stimulus factor which triggers a cognitive switch: briefly, the fart opens a trap door, as it were, under the emotion generated by the music.
(7) In the movie City Lights, the powerless, impoverished little man played by Charlie Chaplin, who is good-hearted but used to scrapping on the streets, befriends an immensely wealthy man who clothes him ex-pensively and sends him out on an errand in his very expensive car.
From the car, he sees a smokable cigarette butt on the sidewalk, and an innocuous little vagrant about to pick it up. He leaps out of the car, bumps the vagrant back forcefully, grabs the butt, and climbs back in the car with a glance of triumph at the thoroughly puzzled vagrant. It is, of course, incongruous for a wealthy man to behave this way. The viewer, however, knows that the Chaplin-character is not a wealthy man but a man of the same social class as the vagrant, and so from his point of view this incongruity does not appear. It appears only from the point of view of the vagrant on the sidewalk, but he doesn't laugh. He might, to be sure, be imagined to puzzle through to the conclusion that the other is very eccentric, and then laugh. But if so, he laughs only when he conceives the other's behavior as congruous with his eccentric personality.
It might be objected that the subject must first take the point of view of the vagrant on the sidewalk if he is to see the humor in the case. This "take," however, is ambiguous. It might mean "try out (without adopting as his own)" or it might mean "adopt as his own." Under this
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latter interpretation, the objection is unsound. The viewer must indeed understand the vagrant's thinking, but he need not adopt his point of view as his own. That is, he must recognize that the vagrant sees an incongruity in the Chaplin-character's behavior, but he need not see one in it himself. To understand another's point of view and to adopt it as one's own are two different things. On the other hand, under the former interpretation, the objection loses its force, for to say that the subject must try out the vagrant's point of view is not to say that he must see an incongruity : it is to say only that he must see that the vagrant sees one.
(8) `Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
This is the first and last verse of Lewis Carroll's immortal nonsense poem "Jabberwocky ." It's possible to explain the amusement this poem brings in terms of cognitive-switch theory, with no reference to incongruity : Momentarily but repeatedly, the reader (to take a hint from Arthur Koestler) perceives it as a heroic ballad but then switches suddenly to the realization that it is in fact nonsense, and this renders pointless all the attitudes and perceptions that are appropriate to the former orientation. It's not easy to find any true incongruity here from any point of view, but it may be said that the repeated momentary appearance that the narrative makes sense is incongruous with the fact that it doesn't: the appearance doesn't match the facts. It is, however, only from a very abstract or philosophical point of view that this incongruity manifests itself. This point of view is most unconducive to any experience of humor, and it is very different from that of the subject who enjoys the humor in the case and hence is irrelevant.
(9) Consider one last case, the Groucho Marx quip. To recognize the incongruity here is to perceive that the initial interpretation of "shot two bucks," under which it means "shot two male antelopes" or the like, doesn't fit the utterance in its entirety, which, again, relates quite undeniably to spending money. But there simply isn't anything remotely amusing in the thought that "shot two male antelopes" can't be the meaning intended. So far as the humor in the case is concerned, focus on this fact leads
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-nowhere.
Why is it that in cases in which the stimulus side may be said to
manifest an incongruity, to focus on that incongruity is to stall or kill the
experience of humor? Cognitive-switch theory implies a straightforward
answer. In some cases, the humor process might begin with the perception
that there is an incongruity, but the cognitive switch which precipitates
the laugh entails an abandonment of that perception and hence no
ex-perience of humor occurs as long as the subject fails to abandon it. In other cases, focus on an incongruity simply stalls any cognitive switch that might bring laughter, without promoting the humor process in any way.
Another argument can be constructed on more or less the same basis
as the one just presented. Consider examples of humor which appear to
show both incongruity and a cognitive switch, and assume that in each
case the humorous effect is due to the one or the other. Then it will be
possible to determine which if it is possible to manipulate the various
factors involved in such a way as to produce the following four conditions:
incongruity and cognitive switch; no incongruity and no cognitive switch;
incongruity but no cognitive switch; cognitive switch but no incongruity.
The first two conditions, however, are of no interest, for they don't
con-tribute to a decision. Take the third condition, then: incongruity but no
cognitive switch. Can this condition be produced for the case of the
Grouch() Marx quip, for example? Yes, it can. Consider a person, a
humor analyst, perhaps, who focuses on the fact that the initial interpre-tation of "shot two bucks," under which it means "shot two male antelopes,"
is incongruous with the import of the utterance as a whole, and who,
for whatever reason, does not make the cognitive switch to the final
inter-pretation. For him, the incongruity in the case appears but no cognitive
switch occurs, and the result, of course, is that he does not laugh or feel
amused. Now take the fourth condition: cognitive switch but no
incon-gruity. For a person who simply passes from the initial interpretation,
"shot two bucks" = "shot two male antelopes
, " to the final one, "shot two bucks" = "spent two dollars carelessly," without registering the fact that the
former is incongruous with the import of the utterance as a whole, a
cognitive switch occurs but no incongruity appears. The result is laughter
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and amusement (if no extraneous factor prevents it). The same goes for every other case of the sort in question. In the competition between cognitive-switch theory and incongruity theory, this, of course, counts against the latter.
The fact that incongruities are not funny has not entirely escaped the notice of incongruity theorists. Paulos, for example, writes :
Incongruity by itself is not, however, a sufficient condition for
humor for three reasons: (1) it may not be noticed ; (2) it may not
have a point or be reasonably resolvable; and (3) the "emotional
climate" may not be right....
Together then, two ingredients—a perceived incongruity with a point and an appropriate emotional climate—seem to be both necessary
and sufficient for humor. (pp. 9-10)
Similarly, the psychologist Thomas Schultz writes, in his article "A Cognitive-Developmental Analysis of Humour" (Chapter I of Chapman and Foot's Humour and Laughter, Wiley):
A number of. . . . theorists. . . . have argued that incongruity alone is insufficient to account for the structure of humour. They have
proposed in various arguments that there exists a second, more subtle
aspect of jokes which renders incongruity meaningful or appropriate
by resolving or explaining it. Within this framework, humour ciation is conceptualized as a biphasic sequence involving first the
discovery of incongruity followed by a resolution of the incongruity.
The mechanism of resolution is apparently necessary to distinguish
humour from nonsense. Whereas nonsense can be characterized as pure or unresolvable incongruity, humour can be characterized as
resolvable or meaningful incongruity. (pp. 12-13)
Paulos and Schultz appear to agree, as do many other theorists, that an incongruity, having been recognized, must be resolved (and hence resolv-able) to be funny. Though this thesis appears reasonable at first sight, in fact it precipitates a total collapse of incongruity theory.
To begin with, the very notion of resolving an incongruity is prob-lematical. Paulos appears to assume that to resolve an incongruity is to
succeed in seeing some point in it. He may be said to take the same position Schultz appears to take: that to resolve an incongruity is to make sense of it. If, however, two things are truly incongruous—as, for example, torn, grease-smeared blue jeans at a formal reception—then they truly don't go together, and hence, in cases in which going together is a matter of making sense, they truly don't make sense. Hence if it's possible to see how they do go together, they are not truly incongruous. A "resolvable incongruity" is a false incongruity. Strictly speaking, the whole idea of making sense of an incongruity doesn't make sense. If it means anything, it just means discovering an unobvious congruity where a person might erroneously think there's an incongruity. To make sense of an incongruity is to see that there was no incongruity in the first place. (For all this, in loose, casual, conversation, it is of course permissible to speak of resolving an incongruity.)
Under the proviso that an incongruity must be resolved if it is to yield an experience of humor, incongruity theory collapses into what may be called "false-incongruity-and-cognitive-switch theory"—that is, if it doesn't collapse even further. (The word "collapse" is warranted here in that it is a falling-away from unadultered incongruity theory that is in question.) The qualification "false" has just been explained. As for the addition "and-cognitive-switch," although the mere recognition of an in-congruity entails no cognitive switch, for to recognize an inin-congruity is simply to recognize that a certain relation obtains between a certain pair of terms, to make a shift from puzzling as to the point or meaning of something to seeing it is to make a cognitive switch precisely of one of the sorts which figure in cognitive-switch theory. The same goes for any other shift to seeing the point or meaning that might be posited by Paulos, Schultz, or another like-minded incongruity theorist. In other words, to posit that an incongruity must be resolved if it is to yield an experience of humor is in effect to posit that a cognitive switch figures in the basic humor process. Any "false-incongruity-and-cognitive-switch theory," how-ever, is at least as much a cognitive-switch theory as an incongruity theory—particularly in view of the fact that the theory itself states that the incongruity in question is false and the cognitive switch quite real.
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It is to be noted that a "false-incongruity-and-cognitive-switch theory" recognizes only one type of cognitive switch, which unfolds as follows: the subject recognizes an incongruity (Paulos and Schultz say this) which is in fact false (they must say this) and puzzles over it, if only for an instant, then suddenly recognizes a true congruity between the terms in question.
The position that the subject must recognize an incongruity which is in fact false if he is to experience humor is indefensible, however, and for this reason incongruity theory collapses further. What does it mean to recognize an incongruity which is in fact false? It might mean to succumb to the illusion that there is an incongruity though in fact there is none, or, perhaps, to feel some doubt as to whether there is an incongruity though in fact there is none, or, perhaps, to recognize that a person might succumb to the illusion that there is an incongruity though there is none. As for the thesis that the subject must succumb to the illusion that there is an incon-gruity if he is to experience humor, consider the case of the greyhound. It's obvious that the subject need not believe even for a second that the bus-tattoo doesn't make any sense. If he is a normal subject, he recognizes the joke-context instantly and assumes or, at any rate, tends strongly to suspect, that the tattoo is perfectly congruous, though in an unobvious way. But this is to say that he suffers no illusion of incongruity. As for the thesis that the subject, if he is to experience humor, must feel some doubt as to whether there is an incongruity, this is clearly false. In the case of the greyhound, for example, the subject might well take into account the joke-context, the greyhound's confident expression, and the fact that there is nowhere the joke might reside but in the meaning of the bus-tattoo, and feel no doubt whatsoever but that the tattoo must somehow make good sense. And as for the thesis that the subject, if he is to experience humor, must recognize that a person might succumb to the illusion that there is an incongruity, Paulos and Schultz are quite correct to point out that if a person simply perceives an incongruity, he does not experience humor. Hence to succumb to the illusion that there is an incongruity between the terms in question is tantamount to thinking "This isn't funny: it's just incongruous." Quite obviously, however, the thought
-that a person might think this need not enter into the humor process.
"False-incongruity-and-cognitive-switch theory," then, collapses into
"hidden-congruity theory." The basic idea here, of course, is that what is essential
to the experience of humor is the discovery of unobvious congruities.
This, too, is a form of cognitive-switch theory, for the discovery in question constitutes a switch precisely of one of the sorts which figure in cognitive-switch theory—viz., a cognitive-switch from puzzlement to insight. "Hidden-congruity
theory" is not, however, a form of incongruity theory at all.
The collapse of incongruity theory, however, does not stop even here,
for the question immediately arises: why must the crucial cognitive switch be from puzzling to perceiving a hidden congruity ? It's easy to find cases
in which it isn't. In some cases, for example, the audience neither puzzles
nor perceives a hidden congruity; rather, they anticipate that such and such will happen and see their expectations fulfilled, and this, of course, is a
different thing altogether. Hence, "hidden-congruity theory" collapses into
some broader form of cognitive-switch theory.
The upshot, then, is that to posit that an incongruity must have a
point or be resolvable to be funny is tantamount to abandoning incongruity
theory. Not to posit this, however, is to leave incongruity theory open to
the fatal objection that incongruities, in the only acceptable sense of the
term, just aren't funny.
A further note: To stipulate that an incongruity must be resolved to be funny is in effect, wittingly or unwittingly, to import cognitive-switch
theory into incongruity theory. Incongruity theorists have often imported
other theories, even rival theories, unwittingly. They have often imported
cognitive-switch theory unwittingly. To take another example, to confuse
the experience of encountering something which fails to match expectations
with that of recognizing an incongruity is in effect unwittingly to import
an utterly different account of humor into incongruity theory : one based not on the thesis that the recognition of incongruities is essential to humor,
but rather on the thesis that such encounters are essential. To a great
extent, incongruity theory owes its appeal to this sort of importation—in
effect, this surreptitious importation—of other accounts. It has a great deal
of borrowed plausibility.
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There is another, much simpler, argument against positing that an incongruity must be resolvable to be funny. In very many if not most cases, the only incongruity to which an incongruity theorist might point is unresolvable. For example, Paulos writes (in the course of an en-lightening discussion of the logical structure of nonverbal humor):
. . The dignified movements of Charlie Chaplin clash humorously with his appearance as a powerless little man. (p. 66)
From the standpoint of incongruity theory, this case is not at all like that of the greyhound. In the case of the greyhound, the incongruity between the dog and the tattoo is merely apparent and a process of puzzling leads to an understanding of the point of the tattoo and hence to the recognition of a genuine underlying congruity. In the case of Chaplin's dignified novements, on the contrary, the incongruity in question is perfectly genuine and does not disappear upon reflection; and there is, properly speaking, no point and no underlying congruity, and hence no process of puzzling to the point or underlying congruity. In other words, there is no process of resolution. Probably, this is why Paulos speaks in terms of a clash rather than in terms of sudden insight.
It is of course reasonable to say that there is a reason why a powerless little Chaplin-character adopts dignified movements—viz., that he wishes to appear to be a person of consequence. This; however, does not constitute the point of the incongruity in question in the sense in which Paulos uses the term, for the fact that the Chaplin-character adopts dignified movements in order to appear to be a person of consequence does not in the least go to show how it is that the terms of the incongruity in question, his dignified movements and the factors which give away the truth that he is a powerless little man, are in fact congruous. To repeat, they just aren't. Hence the conclusion of the previous paragraph stands.
If incongruity theory is correct, then it is to be expected that it will prove on examination that humorists use devices which function to shepherd the subject's attention, at the start of the humor process at any rate, towards the crucial incongruity—that is, the incongruity which must be crucial if an explanation in terms of incongruity. ncongruity applies—and avoid
-maneuvers which would draw attention away from it. On the other hand, if cognitive-switch theory is correct, then it is to be expected that humorists use devices which serve to draw attention away from the allegedly crucial incongruity in cases in which focus on it might interfere with the crucial cognitive switch, and devices which function to promote that switch. In fact the latter expectation is born out and the former not.
Examples: (1) Consider again the case of the greyhound. If there is any incongruity here which figures in the humor process, it is that which may be said to obtain between the tattoo and the dog. In the details of the cartoon, however, there are several interesting things. First, there is a rabbit crouching directly under the greyhound; the rabbit is looking up at the tattoo in a posture and with a facial expression which indicate interest, puzzlement, and perhaps amusement. Secondly, the greyhound itself wears an expression of great confidence. It's very easy to dismiss the rabbit as a cute touch which has nothing much to do with the psy-chodynamics of the case, but this is an error. In fact the rabbit functions, at least in part, as a device to channel the viewer's thoughts into a process of puzzling and away from a humor-killing fixation on incongruity. The rabbit is attempting to puzzle through to the meaning of the tattoo, or has already puzzled through and is now amused though still in a posture of puzzlement, and this strongly encourages the viewer to puzzle himself. Moreover, the greyhound's expression of confidence clearly carries the implication that everything is quite in place, that there is no incongruity; this, too, constitutes a device the purpose of which is to shepherd the viewer's thoughts away from any fixation on incongruity and into the puzzle the solution to which brings the crucial cognitive switch to "That's the meaning." In this one cartoon, then, there are two devices which strongly discourage the viewer from taking the sole point of view from which the allegedly crucial incongruity appears, that is, the point of view of a person who thinks "This doesn't make any sense," and simultaneously serve to steer him towards the crucial cognitive switch. This indicates, of course, that this incongruity doesn't really figure in the humor process at all, and that it is, rather, the cognitive switch which brings the experience of humor.
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(2) Consider again the example from the Woody Allen movie Zelig, cited above, in which the character Zelig remarks: "I worked with Freud in Vienna.... We, we broke over the concept of penis envy. Freud [thoughtful pause] felt it should be limited to women." To repeat, the terms of the incongruity this may be said to manifest are a human male, any human male, and the predicate "suffers penis envy." This incongruity, however, appears only from the point of view of a Freudian analyst, and from that point of view there is nothing funny in Zelig's remark: it simply shows a failure to adhere to doctrine. The joke context, however, is very clear in this case: here is Woody Allen about to say something about penis envy in the middle of a very' funny movie. Clearly, the joke context functions here in part precisely to prevent the audience from adopting a strict Freudian viewpoint—that is, precisely to prevent any humor-killing focus of attention on the incongruity in question. In other words, the joke context signals that it is inappropriate to adopt the viewpoint of a Freudian analyst, and hence any normal viewer who happens to notice the incongruity which appears from that viewpoint simply ignores is as irrelevant.
(3) Schultz writes:
In verbal jokes, the incongruity consists in the relation between the last line, or punchline, and the part that precedes the last line.
Consider the old W. C. Fields joke where someone asked, 'Mr. Fields,
do you believe in clubs for young people?' and he replied, 'Only when
kindness fails'. At first, his answer does not seem to fit with the
question. Whatever expectations were set up by the question are
disconfirmed by the answer. This incongruity can be resolved. ...
(p. 13)
Schultz, then, takes the position that Fields' reply suddenly brings the listener face to face with an incongruity. It might be worthwhile to note that the listener might understand the reply immediately, without having to puzzle at all, and might find it funny even though he didn't have to puzzle. He might find it funny simply in that it causes him to make a cognitive switch from "He's talking seriously" to "He's only joking," or from "When is he going to, make a joke?" to "There it is." Hence Schultz is not justified in claiming without qualification that "at first, his answer
does not seem to fit with the question." For present purposes, however, the important point is this : The very fact that the respondent is W. C. Fields, together with the fact that the sense of the reply is not immediately apparent, functions as a joke cue which signals the listener that there is no incon-gruity, that he is to skip over any apparent incongruity as false and irrelevant. Thus the stimulus side in this case, far from confronting the subject with an incongruity, guides him away from the point of view from which an incongruity appears. To put it simply, Schultz maintains that the listener is led to think "incongruity," but in fact he is led to think "no incongruity." (Needless to say, this does not apply to the case of a listener who doesn't know W. C. Fields and fails to pick up on any joke cues that might lie in the situation, facial expressions, tones of voice, etc.)
All joke cues carry the message "Don't take this seriously." But this means, among other things, "Don't fasten on incongruities," for to fasten on an incongruity is to take things seriously. Thus, devices which function to draw attention away from incongruities, far from being odd or rare, constitute one of the most common and pervasive features of humor technique.
