• 検索結果がありません。

Aspects of Privacy for RFID Systems

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

シェア "Aspects of Privacy for RFID Systems"

Copied!
23
0
0

読み込み中.... (全文を見る)

全文

(1)

Aspects of Privacy for RFID Systems

著者 Inoue  Sozo

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10228/00007655

(2)

Aspects of Privacy for Aspects of Privacy for

RFID Systems RFID Systems

Sozo Sozo INOUE INOUE

System LSI Research Center System LSI Research Center,,

Grad.

Grad. SchSch. Information Science & Electrical . Information Science & Electrical Engineering,

Engineering,

(3)

2

An RFID System is

An RFID System is … …

Unique nouns to every person, and any objects in the world by IC cards & RFID tags

• Automatic correspondence between name (virtual) and entity (real) Automatic updates of the states, locations

RFID tags (with IDs)

DB

Real World

Wireless Wireless Wireless Wireless

Communication Communication Communication Communication

Readers

Network Network Network Network

Virtual World

(4)

What is special privacy What is special privacy

in RFID systems?

in RFID systems?

• Virtual world: Merely the same as the conventional information systems.

• So? RFID tags need low cost.

RFID tags (with IDs)

DB

Wireless Wireless Wireless Wireless

Communication Communication Communication Communication

Readers

Network Network Network Network

(5)

RFID tags on nameplates RFID tags on nameplates

at a conference at a conference

Session Entrance Board Personalization

Poster

Banquet

(6)

Indeed, at the backstage,

Indeed, at the backstage,

(7)

Can trace personal behavior!!!

Can trace personal behavior!!!

Board Terminal 2 Session Room D Session Room C Session Room B Board Terminal 1 Session Room A

09:00 12:00 15:00 18:00

Location

Time (Jan. 23)

User 1 User 2 User 3

(8)

Unlinkability Unlinkability

• The property that the system is not able to identify multiple accesses from a user as the same person.

– Independent of whether the system knows who the person is (anonymity).

• [S. Steinbrecher and S. Köpsell,”Modelling Unlinkability”, Workshop on Privacy

Enhancing Technologies 2003. ]

(9)

New!

Suppose: Ad.: Super RFID chips Suppose: Ad.: Super RFID chips

which protect complete privacy!

which protect complete privacy!

……..Really?

How can we believe?

→ the Visibility of Privacy Protection!

(10)

How? Visibility?

How? Visibility?

• Fully-automatic approach is not appropriate.

• How to 1:

Users can have something to do in a way they can trust, But secure by default

• How to 2:

Physical “key” device to control the privacy.

e.g. Blocker tags:[A. Juels, R. Rivest, M. Szydlo, "The Blocker Tag: Selective Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy", http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/, (2003)]

• How to 3:

Simple mechanism which is easy to understand.

(11)

• [H. Takagi, “

ユビキタス社会を支える

IC

タ グの現状と課題

”, IC Card World 2004]

– Red: ID and personal information – Yellow: ID

– Blue: No fixed ID +Plus:

– Communication range, – Security level,

Proposal of RFID marks

Proposal of RFID marks

(12)

Our research Our research

Technique for controlling unlinkability while ensuring visibility to users.

• 3 approaches:

1. User oriented ID definition

[S. Inoue, et al., ``Privacy in the Digitally Named World with RFID Tags'', Workshop on Socially-informed Design of Privacy-enhancing Solutions in Ubiquitous Computing, 2002]

2. Physical distribution of IDs

[S. Inoue, et al, ``RFID Privacy by User-controllable Uniqueness’’, RFID

(13)

Related work Related work

[S. A. Weis, S. E. Sarma, R. L. Rivest, D. W. Engels, ``Security and Privacy Aspects of Low-Cost Radio Frequency Identification Systems'', Int'l Conf. Security in Pervasive Computing, 2003]

[M. Ohkubo, K. Suzuki, S Kinoshita, “Cryptographic Approach to a Privacy Friendly Tag”, RFID Privacy Workshop, 2003]

[A. Juels, R. Rivest, M. Szydlo, "The Blocker Tag: Selective Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy",

http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/, (2003)]

(14)

1 1 st st Approach Approach

110110010・・・・

ROM Rewritable

Public-ID mode::

110110010・・・・

001010・・・・

ROM Rewritable

Private-ID mode::

Combination of ROM and rewritable

memory on an RFID tag

• globally unique ID on the ROM

• localized ID on the rewritable memory (EEPROM, FRAM)

(15)

14

1 1 st st Approach Approach

• Public-ID mode

– Any users can identify the product.

• Private-ID mode

– The owner decides the private ID value.

• Only the owner can

identify, and can relate the private ID and the public ID.

• Avoids Linkability by visibly changing the private ID.

• Low cost than

implementing crypto.

Production

Distribution, Retail

User Services

110110010・・・・

Public mode

110110010・・・・

Public mode

Recycle

110110010・・・・

001010・・・・

Private mode

110110010・・・・

111010・・・・

Memory

(16)

2 2 nd nd Approach Approach

To a Consumer

101101001… …101

Globally Unique ID

Class ID Pure ID

Option 1:

Option 2:

…101 101101001…

To a Consumer

011010…

User-defined Class ID

(Rewritable)

…101 011010…

Killed

(17)

2 2 nd nd Approach Approach

• The owner can identify,

Other users cannot, from user-defined Class ID and Pure ID.

• The users who can see the object may identify: on-site identification

A repairer can know the product type (sometimes from the barcode) and identify from the Pure ID.

• Privacy is protected by default (without the owners’ labor)

Object cannot be identified only by Pure ID.

• Privacy is visible by physically-separated RFID tags.

No more special RFID tags.

(18)

3 3 rd rd approach: approach: PID PID

• Originally designed to fit smart cards.

• A scheme for preventing linkability between multiple services

gathering access logs.

(19)

PID PID : Very long ID sequence : Very long ID sequence for each RFID tag

for each RFID tag

RFID tag 1 RFID tag 2 RFID tag 3 RFID tag 4 RFID tag 5

Service

b

a1

a3 a4 a5 a2

b1 b2 b3 b4 b5

c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 Service

a

(20)

PID PID : Long ID sequence for an : Long ID sequence for an RFID tag

RFID tag

Issuer

Identification

PID

RFID

(21)

3 3 rd rd approach approach

• Intends to use single RFID for multiple services

• Prevents the linkability between services gathering access logs.

• Prevents personal information integration undesired by users

• In emergency, the issuer can integrate ore explore the personal information.

• An update of a SubPID for a service does

not affect other services.

(22)

• Experiments for RFID Systems in middle-sized population:

•Campus Card with PID

•IDs for students, staff with multiple usage

•Keys to buildings, facilities, and parking

•Access control to campus information

•E-money

•E-administration

•Services to Students

•NTT, Panasonic etc.

•RFID Tags to Equipments

•Library

•Equipments management

New campus of Kyushu

University

Open in 2005.

Experiments in Kyushu Univ.

Experiments in Kyushu Univ.

(23)

Concluding Summary Concluding Summary

1. The Visibility of Privacy Protection 2. ID Localization Approach

1. Combination of ROM and Rewritable memory 2. Physical-ID Separation

3. Sub-ID for each service

Not necessarily cryptographic.

Visible to the owner and Low Cost.

3. Future Work:

System level solution for ID conflicts:

Technology for Semi-AUTO-ID:

e.g. Location + ID = Unique

2nd approach: how to associate a Class RFID and a Pure RFID when there are multiple ones in a range?

参照

関連したドキュメント

12) Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, September 2020, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5. 13) Risk Management Framework

メイン プログラムウィンドウでの作業 [スタート] → [すべてのプログラム] → [Acronis] → [PrivacyExpert] → [Acronis Pricacy Expert

Our goal is to define and examine the “manifold” of all solutions of the system ( ∗ ) using a generalized notion of manifold which, in effect, allows for non-standard solutions..

In this paper, we will apply these methods to the study of the representation theory for quadratic algebras generated by second-order superintegrable systems in 2D and their

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the uniqueness problems of meromorphic functions that share a small function with its differential polynomials, and give some results which

Theorem 5 was the first result that really showed that Gorenstein liaison is a theory about divisors on arithmetically Cohen-Macaulay schemes, just as Hartshorne [50] had shown that

During stage 1, we used an adaptively preconditioned thick restarted FOM method to approximately solve the linear system and then used recycled spectral information gathered during

is the Galols group of the maximal p-extenslon kP/k which is unramlfled outside p and This shows that every central embedding problem E ro for Gk(p) has finite p-I. exponent,