NII-Electronic Library Service
.lournat
oflhdian
andBudtthist StudiesVbl.63,
No.3,
March2015
(115)
Uddyotakara's
Criticism
of
the
Apoha-Theory
Reconsidered
OKAzAKi
Yasuhiro
Uddyotakara's
criticism of the crpoha-theory under NyAyasittra(NS)
2.2.66i)hasbeen
studied
by
several scholars.Hattori
andMatilal
translatedit
into
Japanese
andEnglish
re-spectively, andMuch
provided
a synopsis ofUddyotakara's
discussion
and clarified thecorrespondence
between
his
criticism andPramanasamuccaya
(PS)
.2)After
thosestudies, 3)Pind's
work onDignaga's
apoha was published.
By
virtue ofit,
we can easilyimagine
Sanskrit
textof PSV.
Inaddition Thakur'snew edition ofNyayavarttika(NV)
is
avail-able.4)
In
this
essay, using theseworks,I
will examineUddyotakara's
criticism ofapoha-thoeryagain, and trytoclarify
its
characters.
Uddyotakara
startshiscriticism after establishing Nyaya'sdoctrine
of meaning.His
crit-icism
begins
with thephrase,"`someone said thatneither universal nor shape nor individualis
a referent of term"(na
i{yaktyakrtija-tayah padZirthaitikecit,
p.672.1).Judging
from
this phrasehismain purposeof criticism seems be not toattack Dign5ga'sapoha-theory
but
todefend
Nyaya'sdoctrine
against Digniga'sobjections.
Uddyotakara's
discussion
in
NV
canbe
sectionedinto
four
parts:
(P)
Dignaga]s
argu-ments cited from Dignaga'sworks
(pp.
672.1-674.2),
(Ul)
counter-objections againstDignEga'sarguments
(pp.
674.3-679.3),
(U2)
additional counter-objections(pp.
679.4-686.5)and
(U3)
criticism ofthe concept ofc4Joha(pp.
686.6-689.10).5)
Firstly,
let
us examineDignaga's
arguments(P)
andUddyotakara's
counter-objectionsagainst them
(Ul)
, They are summarized inTable1,[Iitble1 P:Dignfiga'sargumentscitedinNV Ul CorrespondingPSandPSV P-1:Anuniversalcannotbeareferentofthe term,"existent"becauseitisappositional withtermsforindividuals(p.672.3-8). Ul-1:pp.674.4-675.14PSV2cdandPSVadPS V2d - 1209
The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies
The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies
(116)
Uddyotakara'sCriticismofthe .{ipoha-Theory Reconsidered(Yl
OpcAzAKi)P-2:AconnectioncannotbeareferentofUl-2:p676.1-3 PSV2e,V3andPSV termbecauseofthesamereason(p.672.8). P-3:IndividualscannotbereferentsoftermUl-3:pp.676.3-677.6PSV2abandPSV becauseoftheirinfinityanddeviance(pp. 672.8-673.1). P-4:Apossesorofuniversalcannotbearef-Ul-4:pp.677.6-678.1OPSV4aandPSVadPSV erentoftermbecauseofthelackofindepen- 4a(PSV8cd) den¢e(p.673.1-6). P-5:OurrepresentationoftheprimaryUl-5:pp.678.I1679.3PSVadPSV4b2,PSV meaningoftheterm,"existent"cannotbe 5ab,V6cd,V6ab metaphoricallytransferredtoapossesorof universal(p.673.6-9). P-6:Theterm"existent"cannotdenotethe' PSVlld particularshavinguniqueness.Atermex-clude$thereferentsofotherterTnsinitsown referent(p.673.9-674.2).
Dign5ga's
arguments citedin
NV
correspond toPS
V.2-11
andits
PSV
incontent. AsPind
pointedout,however,
Uddyotakara
seems tocitethem from PS and PSV as well asDignaga's
other works,Stmdnyapariksa,
itscommentary and so on. Forexample,Uddyo-takaracitesthe
fo11owing
phraseattheend ofP(p.
674.2)
:aayapadarthantarlipohamhitva
(NVT
omits: em. "hi") svdrthekuTvati
sirutirabhicthatta ityucyate(NV'
omits). Thisphrase
is
notfound
in
PS
orPSV,
but
citedin
Nayacakra
(NC)
and itsVptti(NCV).6)
7}
Pind suspects this
phrase
tobe
quoted
from
Stmfinyaparik$5vyasa.
He
alsothinks thatUddyotakara reproduced Dignaga's arguments on the basisof SEm2nyapariksivyisa in
several
portions.g)
Whether
Pind's
supposition istrue or not, we can safely say thatUddyotakara's
discussions
would be cited firomDignEga's lostworks except the case ofP-2,
whichis
treatedlightly
in
thern.
The
terrn,"samanlidhiharatrya"is
used throughoutP-1 and Ul-1, while Dign5ga uses
theterm "aprthaksfrutr'
instead
of"samdnddhiharaaya"
in
PS
V
2d.Uddyotakara
also citesDignaga's
unknown verse, which isa slightly revised version of VAkyapadiya(VP)
III.14.89)inUl-1
(p.
675.13-14).InP-3 Uddyotakara represents DignEga'sopinionin
termsof thephrase,"sacchabdah pin,
4dnam
vdeakobhavisyatiti
na yuktam"(p.
672.8-9)
,instead
of the propositionof PS V 2,"naja-tis'abdb
bheddndmp. . . vbcakah."In
contrastUddyotakara
uses thatofPSV2
in
Ul-3
(p.
676.3)
and U2.-1210-NII-Electronic Library Service
Uddyotakara'sCriticisrnof the
Apoha-Theory
Reconsidered(YOKAzA-)(117)
In
P-5,
thereasonsfbr
theimpossibility
of metaphorical transferenceare summarizedin
the
fbllowing
passage:"kTamavrttyahhavat," `beugapadasambhavat,"and
"ayathdrthojnNa-noipattiprasahgat"
(p.
673.8).
Thesepassages
are notfbund
in
PS or PSVbut
cited inNCV,
iO)whilethe
similar arguments arefbund
inPS V 5,6
andits
PSV.
Inaddition theorder of arguments
in
NV
differs
from
thatin
PS.
In
NV the argument about individuals(P-3),
whichis
placedatthehead
ofDignaga'sdiscussion
in
PS,is
po-sitioned afterthat
about theconnection, while theother argumentsfo11ow
the order inPS.
U2 isa criticism ofDignaga's
proposition,
"na]'a-tis'abdobhedtinarp
vbcakah."
Its
detail
isillustrated
by
'fable2.
Tlible2
Inthistable,U2-1-2 and
U2-3
are closelylinked
with Ul-3.InUl-3,
Uddyotakara
has
already
pointed
outthe
contradiction ofDigti5ga'sproposition.
He says, "Whodoes
say that
theterm
for
universal denotesindividuals?YOuhave
rejected only eloquence concoctedby
yourself"
(haS
caivam aha-ja-tis'dbdobhedtinaip
vacako iti2svayamprakiptdm vjcayuktim.bhavan
pratis.
edhati,p.
676.4).
U2-3 seems tobe
a repetition of theportion
ofUl-3
(p.
676.12-16).
InadditionU2-1-3
and U2-4 seem toexpound on the end ofUl-3(p.
-1211-The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies
The JapaneseAssociation ofIndian andBuddhist Studies
(l18)
Uddyotakara'sCriticismof thezipoha-Theory Reconsidered(Y
OKixzAKi)6),which
"existing"
Table 3
explains thatDignaga
(sat)
and "substance"'s
proposition
is
contradicted with co-referencebetween
(duavya).
p.686.6-11 p.687.1-4 U3-2.1U3-2-2-1 U3-2-2-2 U3-3-1p.687.5-12 U34 p.687.13-18 U34-1-1 U3-4-1-2 U3-4-2-l U3-S p.688.1-5 U3-5-1U3-5-1-1 U3-5-1-2 U3-5-2U3-6 p.688.6-7 U3-6-1U3-6-2U3-7: p.688.8-13 V3-7-1U3-7-2 pp.688.13-689.9 U3-8-1Theinitialrcpresentation adipratyaya) doesnot holdwithout any
aMr-mative referent of term.
Istheaayopoha
(exclusion
of others not non-cow) existence(bhava)
or non-existence(abhava)?
Ifitisan existence and cew, thereisno prQblem.
Ifitisan existence and non-cow, the referent of term would beconfused.
Ifitisanon-existence thecommand and itsagreement should not hold. Inthe case of apoha,there aretw'odomains
(rdsi)
One isnegated andtheother isnot. Buttheterrn,sarva
(all)
doesnot havesuch domains.Evenif"one" and so on are the negation of "`all,"
theaggregate named
"all"doesnotholdwithout one andsoon.
What istheobject of"apohd'
(exclusion)
fbmiingan action? Ifitisa cow acow should havcnon-existence ofcow.Ifitisnon-cow, the object ofaction should difTerfrom its own.
Ifnon-cow isnegated incow, thenon-cewness tobenegated should
cen-nect with cow.
Withouttherepresentation ofcow, we can negate nothing incow. Indeed
thereisno intialrepresentation ofcow.
Isthe aityopoha different
<io,atirikta)
from cow or not?Ifitisdifferentisitdependent
(asrita)
or not?Ifitisdependent itisan attribute
(gu4a)
andhas no co-reference.Ifitisnot dependent,thereis no genitive-relation.
Ifitisnot differentitisthecow itselfl
Istheaayopoha concerning each entity one or many? Ifitisone itisthecowness itselfl
Ifitismany, itdoesnot hotdbecauseofinfinitityjust likeindividuals. Istheaaylipoha denetableor not?
Ifitisdenotablethere
is
an infiniteregress(anavastha)
Ifitisnot denotable,itwould becontradicted with Dignaga s passage,
aayaSabdZirthlipoha"
(the
exclusion ofreferents ofether terms)The term "aneha"
(not-one)
must bedependentonparticulars.Without
dependenceon particulars,theunderstandmg ofpaniculars through the
terinfbrgeneral
(samaayaSabda)
isnotjustified Sincebothterms, "blue"and "lotus" are
primary,thereisno qualifier-qualified relation
(vis'eFapavis'esyabhava
betweenthem.Inthe case ofaayopoha, itemsinco-reference cannot beexplamed.
-NII-Electronic Library Service
Uddyotakara'sCriticismofthe
mpoha-Theory
Reconsidered(Yl
OKAzAKI)(119)
Tb sum up, most of U2 isparalleltosome
portions
ofUl-3. What U2 adds toUl-3
isU2-2,which explains thesimilarity
between
therealisticconcept ofuniversalGbti)
and apoha.Finally,Uddyotakara criticizesthe concept of crpoha
itsel
£ Thepoints
ofhis
criticismare summarized by [fable
3.
In
his
criticism,U3-5
andU3-6
are clearlyparallel
tothe arguments about universal (sa-maayaijdti) whichis
described
by
Uddyotakara asdiffering
from
individuals,
one and thecause of representation of similarity
(NV
ad NS 2.2.64,p.
669.13).
Moreover theinitial
representation
discussed
inU3-1 seems tobe
one of subjectsin
the argument of universal.In
theargument ofuniversal he says: "Befbrethecowness,
this
is
neither cow nor non-cow ...andbefore
connecting with thecowness theentitydoes
not exist,"(prlig
gotvdtndsaugauk ntipy agaur iti...na caprag gotvayogdd vastu vidyate.
NV
adNS
2.2.64,p.
669.1
1-13)
.At
least
he
imagines
thesituationpreceding
the
first
representation of cowin
thecaseof universal, while there
is
adifference
between
theepistemological viewpoint and theon-tologicalthat.
The
fault
of apoha theory inU3-4
also arrives atthe
impossibility
of theini-tialrepresentation. Moreover
U3-7-1
showsthe
problem
thatthe realistic concept ofuni-versal might also cause, thatistheinfiniteregress.
In
addition, U3-2is
discussed
intheframework
ofVaiSesika.Uddyotakara
seems tore-gardnon-existence
(abhbva)
as an independentcategory ofVaiSe$ika-system(c
£NV
adNS 1.1.4,p.97.7;ad
NS
1.1.14,p.204.10).U3-3 about thedivision
intotwodomains
might takethesame
line
of U3-2.Thatistosay, twodomains
in
U3-3 can be interpretedasthe
domain
ofnon-existence and thatofexistence, while theterm, "domain"(rEi"i)
might
remind the
discussion
about thetrairiipya-theory.ii)
Through
the above observations, we can see thatUddyotakara realizes thesimilaritybe-tween apoha and
his
own concept ofuniversal.As
it
is
shownin
U3-8,however,he
regardstheterm
denoting
apoha
tomake no reference toparticulars.Although thisproblem mightbe
solvedin
Dignaga's
system through theconcept of SabdZintarjipoha,Uddyotakarane-glectssuch an aspect of apoha theory,probably
because
he
fbcuses
hisattention on therefierent of term.
[Ibsum up, thesources ofUddyotakara's criticism isamixture of
DigriEga's
PS,PSV andhis
lost
works. Uddyotakara seems to cite Dignaga's arguments from themfairly
freely.
The
inconsistency
ofcitation and theredundancy of arguments arefound
in
his
discussion.
These
facts,
however,
vvould ofler a key toUddyotakara's
intention,thatis
torefute-The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies
The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies
(120)
Uddyotakara'sCriticismof the4poha-Theory
Reconsidered(Y
OKAzAKi)naga's opinion thatneither universal nor
individual
isa referent ofterm. For thisreasonhe
selects theproposition
which iseasy to criticize, and persistentlycriticizesit.
Indeedit
would seem toUddyotakarathat
theproposition
inP-3,`Lsacchabdokpin.
dandrri
..." hasno contradiction. The change of order of P-3 could also
be
explainedby
hisintention.Heregards P-4 and P-5 to
be
attendant onP-3,
and P-3 as themost serious problem.From Uddyotakara'spointof view, the apoha functionsas a new type of universal at
some
points,
while there remain some problemscaused from itsnegative character.On
theother
hand,
theproblem
isthattheapoha theory seems tohave dithcultyindenoting
indi-viduals. Uddyotakara would think thatany theory of meaning cannot be established
with-out any reference to
individuals.
Especially
thereference toindividuals
plays
an importantrole inexplanation of co-reference and mataphorical reference. In
this
sense, Uddyotakara wouldhave
todeny
thestatement thatenly the`rpoha isthereferent ofterm.
In
order todefendNyaya's doctrineofmeaningfrom
Dign2ga's
argument, there are twoissuesthatUddyotakara
has
to address. Oneis
Dign5ga'sargument thatneither individualsnor universal isa referent ofterm, and another ishisopinion thatonly theapoha isa refer-ent of term. The
fbrmer
isUddyotakara's
main concern.As
regards thelatter,itis
dubious
thathe
has
anintention
torefute theconcept of apoha exhaustiyely.1
)
NV: A5,dyadarSana with vatspidyana's Bhasya, UtldyotakaraiyPZrttika,P7icaspatiMiSra's
7bipa-ryalika & ViSvanittha's Ulrtti,ecl.T.N. Tlarkatirthaand A.Tarkatirtha,CaleuttaSanskritSeries18,29
(Calcutta:
MetropolitanPrinting& PublishingHouse,1936-1944;repr., Kyoto:RinsenBook Co., 1982).Thepage numbers inthisessay refer tothistext.2
)
HattoriMasaakiEK$iEop,
"Nyayavtirttika, II.2.66ni okeru ap6ha-ron hihan"Nyayavarttika,t12.66
e:
fo
Vt6 7'}i£h 2Nthan
!l!U[Uddyotakara's
criticism on theApoha-theoryintheNyayavdrttika,II.2.66],inMikkyOtolvdoshis6:MlrtsuoGihaihakushi
koki
kinenronshaMX
2
EPR.Nfi.H..:
diElrZk
ture:l:ilinlefS;ge.fi
(Kyoto:
Shuchiin DaigakuMikky6gakkai,1980);Bimal Krishna Matilal,"apoha: Uddyotakara'sCritiqueof Dinnaga,"71ijeindianJburnal
ofBudtthist
Studies1, no. 2
(1989)
:4-12;Matilal,"Apoha:
Dinnaga as interpretedby Uddyotakara,;'T}lreindianJburnai
ofBudethist
Stud-iesl
(1989)
:53-60;MichaelTbrstenMuch,・`Uddyotakaras Kritikdesopoha-Lehre(Nyayav5rttika
ad NS II2.66)," maenerZeitschrij}.MrdieKunde SiidasiensundAnchivYSZr indischePhilosophie38
<1994):351-366.
3
)
OlePind,"DignAga'sPhilosophyofLanguageDignfigaon Anyapoha"
(PhD
diss.,Universit2tWien, 2009).
4
)
NV': ?YtydyavdrttikaqfBharadvby'aUddyotakara,ed. AnantalalThakur(New
Delhi:IndianCouncilofPhilosophical Research,1997).
-NII-Electronic Library Service
Uddyotakara'sCriticismofthe
Apoha-Theory
Reconsidered(YL
OKAzAKi)(121)
5
)
Much sectioned Uddyotakara'sdiscussionintothree,thatis,puttogether U2 and U3 intoone. As a matter of fact,we hayetheimpressionthatUddyotakara'scounter-objection hasfinishedat theendofUl. Attheend of Ul hesays:". ..Therefore,
since thecreeper offalsereasons issurelyremoved,
itisestablished thatthereferentofterrn isindividual,shape and universali'
(p.
679.2-3).But U2 is closely linkedwith Ul.6)
CDvadashra)
IVdyacakra,edited with SirphasUragani'scornmentary by Muni Jambuvijaya(Bhavnagar:
SriJainAtmanandSabha,1966-1988), p.612 and others.7) Pind2009,pp.182-183.
8)
EspeciallyP-1,P-5,and Ul-1 inIIbble1.SeePind2009,pp.141-142, 147,160,and l64.9
)
UiikyopadtyaofBhartrhari
with the PrakimpakaprakdsaofHlelarby'a,
ka4deMpt. ii,ed. Subra-mania Iyer(Poona:
Deccan College,1973),p.153.26-27:vibhaktibhedo nlyamadgunaguuyabhi-cV:tlyinohlsamana-dhiharaayasya2t!!EidEILIe!lu!llgyxE{igeg(Rz{ledh tim bcla hffV-translationofPSVadPSV2dcites! itinoriginal form
(Derge
66b6). But Uddyotakara cites it as Digniga's opinion inthefbllowingform:. . .Lsamandicthikaraaydsiddhih.
(NVT:
-haraayas.vt-zsiddhih.)
saddraioiaSabduyoh/1.10)
kramavrttyabhava-cca, ...tan niipigu4opakarat,sphatikavadvis'esa4crprakansiam agrhitvdvis'e-syapratyayaprasahgdt...ldficaE2tEgtEEnjlgti@!el!lgglekh th ttth...ldfica2uggegEd!gEgtt!2t!el@ggebh ・NCV,p・ 625.11)
As faras my limitedobservations go,Uddyotakara uses theterrn,"rdsi"
only inhisebjections
againstBuddhistlogic
(cL
NV ad NS I.1.5,p.164.3;ad NS I.1.35,p.301.13;ad NS 3.1.1,p.703.4).IguessthatUddyotakaraborrowsthistermfromsome work ofearly Buddhistlogic.
<Keywords>
Uddyotakara,apoha,Digntiga,ja-ti(Instructor,Koyo-Higashi High School,PhD)