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Vol.63 , No.3(2015)208岡崎 康浩「ウッドヨータカラのアポーハ論批判再考」

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NII-Electronic Library Service

.lournat

oflhdian

andBudtthist StudiesVbl.

63,

No.

3,

March

2015

(115)

Uddyotakara's

Criticism

of

the

Apoha-Theory

Reconsidered

OKAzAKi

Yasuhiro

Uddyotakara's

criticism of the crpoha-theory under NyAyasittra

(NS)

2.2.66i)has

been

studied

by

several scholars.

Hattori

and

Matilal

translated

it

into

Japanese

and

English

re-spectively, and

Much

provided

a synopsis of

Uddyotakara's

discussion

and clarified the

correspondence

between

his

criticism and

Pramanasamuccaya

(PS)

.2)

After

thosestudies, 3)

Pind's

work on

Dignaga's

apoha was published.

By

virtue of

it,

we can easily

imagine

Sanskrit

textof PS

V.

Inaddition Thakur'snew edition ofNyayavarttika

(NV)

is

avail-able.4)

In

this

essay, using theseworks,

I

will examine

Uddyotakara's

criticism of

apoha-thoeryagain, and trytoclarify

its

characters.

Uddyotakara

startshiscriticism after establishing Nyaya's

doctrine

of meaning.

His

crit-icism

begins

with thephrase,"`someone said thatneither universal nor shape nor individual

is

a referent of term"

(na

i{yaktyakrtija-tayah padZirthaiti

kecit,

p.672.1).

Judging

from

this phrasehismain purposeof criticism seems be not toattack Dign5ga'sapoha-theory

but

to

defend

Nyaya's

doctrine

against Digniga'sobjections.

Uddyotakara's

discussion

in

NV

can

be

sectioned

into

four

parts:

(P)

Dignaga]s

argu-ments cited from Dignaga'sworks

(pp.

672.1-674.2),

(Ul)

counter-objections against

DignEga'sarguments

(pp.

674.3-679.3),

(U2)

additional counter-objections

(pp.

679.4-686.5)and

(U3)

criticism ofthe concept ofc4Joha

(pp.

686.6-689.10).5)

Firstly,

let

us examine

Dignaga's

arguments

(P)

and

Uddyotakara's

counter-objections

against them

(Ul)

, They are summarized inTable1,

[Iitble1 P:Dignfiga'sargumentscitedinNV Ul CorrespondingPSandPSV P-1:Anuniversalcannotbeareferentofthe term,"existent"becauseitisappositional withtermsforindividuals(p.672.3-8). Ul-1:pp.674.4-675.14PSV2cdandPSVadPS V2d - 1209

(2)

The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies

(116)

Uddyotakara'sCriticismofthe .{ipoha-Theory Reconsidered

(Yl

OpcAzAKi)

P-2:AconnectioncannotbeareferentofUl-2:p676.1-3 PSV2e,V3andPSV termbecauseofthesamereason(p.672.8). P-3:IndividualscannotbereferentsoftermUl-3:pp.676.3-677.6PSV2abandPSV becauseoftheirinfinityanddeviance(pp. 672.8-673.1). P-4:Apossesorofuniversalcannotbearef-Ul-4:pp.677.6-678.1OPSV4aandPSVadPSV erentoftermbecauseofthelackofindepen- 4a(PSV8cd) den¢e(p.673.1-6). P-5:OurrepresentationoftheprimaryUl-5:pp.678.I1679.3PSVadPSV4b2,PSV meaningoftheterm,"existent"cannotbe 5ab,V6cd,V6ab metaphoricallytransferredtoapossesorof universal(p.673.6-9). P-6:Theterm"existent"cannotdenotethe' PSVlld particularshavinguniqueness.Atermex-clude$thereferentsofotherterTnsinitsown referent(p.673.9-674.2).

Dign5ga's

arguments cited

in

NV

correspond to

PS

V.2-11

and

its

PSV

incontent. As

Pind

pointedout,

however,

Uddyotakara

seems tocitethem from PS and PSV as well as

Dignaga's

other works,

Stmdnyapariksa,

itscommentary and so on. Forexample,

Uddyo-takaracitesthe

fo11owing

phraseattheend ofP

(p.

674.2)

:aayapadarthantarlipoham

hitva

(NVT

omits: em. "hi") svdrthe

kuTvati

sirutirabhicthatta ityucyate

(NV'

omits). This

phrase

is

not

found

in

PS

or

PSV,

but

cited

in

Nayacakra

(NC)

and itsVptti

(NCV).6)

7}

Pind suspects this

phrase

to

be

quoted

from

Stmfinyaparik$5vyasa.

He

alsothinks that

Uddyotakara reproduced Dignaga's arguments on the basisof SEm2nyapariksivyisa in

several

portions.g)

Whether

Pind's

supposition istrue or not, we can safely say that

Uddyotakara's

discussions

would be cited firomDignEga's lostworks except the case of

P-2,

which

is

treated

lightly

in

thern.

The

terrn,"samanlidhiharatrya"

is

used throughoutP-1 and Ul-1, while Dign5ga uses

theterm "aprthaksfrutr'

instead

of"samdnddhiharaaya"

in

PS

V

2d.

Uddyotakara

also cites

Dignaga's

unknown verse, which isa slightly revised version of VAkyapadiya

(VP)

III.14.89)inUl-1

(p.

675.13-14).InP-3 Uddyotakara represents DignEga'sopinion

in

termsof thephrase,"sacchabdah pin,

4dnam

vdeako

bhavisyatiti

na yuktam"

(p.

672.8-9)

,

instead

of the propositionof PS V 2,"na

ja-tis'abdb

bheddndmp. . . vbcakah."

In

contrast

Uddyotakara

uses thatofPS

V2

in

Ul-3

(p.

676.3)

and U2.

(3)

-1210-NII-Electronic Library Service

Uddyotakara'sCriticisrnof the

Apoha-Theory

Reconsidered(YOKAzA-)

(117)

In

P-5,

thereasons

fbr

the

impossibility

of metaphorical transferenceare summarized

in

the

fbllowing

passage:"kTamavrttyahhavat," `beugapadasambhavat,"

and

"ayathdrthojnNa-noipattiprasahgat"

(p.

673.8).

These

passages

are not

fbund

in

PS or PSV

but

cited in

NCV,

iO)while

the

similar arguments are

fbund

inPS V 5,

6

and

its

PSV.

Inaddition theorder of arguments

in

NV

differs

from

that

in

PS.

In

NV the argument about individuals

(P-3),

which

is

placedatthe

head

ofDignaga's

discussion

in

PS,

is

po-sitioned after

that

about theconnection, while theother arguments

fo11ow

the order in

PS.

U2 isa criticism ofDignaga's

proposition,

"na]'a-tis'abdo

bhedtinarp

vbcakah."

Its

detail

isillustrated

by

'fable

2.

Tlible2

Inthistable,U2-1-2 and

U2-3

are closely

linked

with Ul-3.In

Ul-3,

Uddyotakara

has

already

pointed

out

the

contradiction ofDigti5ga's

proposition.

He says, "Who

does

say that

theterm

for

universal denotesindividuals?YOu

have

rejected only eloquence concocted

by

yourself"

(haS

caivam aha-ja-tis'dbdo

bhedtinaip

vacako iti2svayamprakiptdm vjcayuktim.

bhavan

pratis.

edhati,

p.

676.4).

U2-3 seems to

be

a repetition of the

portion

of

Ul-3

(p.

676.12-16).

Inaddition

U2-1-3

and U2-4 seem toexpound on the end ofUl-3

(p.

(4)

-1211-The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

The JapaneseAssociation ofIndian andBuddhist Studies

(l18)

Uddyotakara'sCriticismof thezipoha-Theory Reconsidered

(Y

OKixzAKi)

6),which

"existing"

Table 3

explains thatDignaga

(sat)

and "substance"

's

proposition

is

contradicted with co-reference

between

(duavya).

p.686.6-11 p.687.1-4 U3-2.1U3-2-2-1 U3-2-2-2 U3-3-1p.687.5-12 U34 p.687.13-18 U34-1-1 U3-4-1-2 U3-4-2-l U3-S p.688.1-5 U3-5-1U3-5-1-1 U3-5-1-2 U3-5-2U3-6 p.688.6-7 U3-6-1U3-6-2U3-7: p.688.8-13 V3-7-1U3-7-2 pp.688.13-689.9 U3-8-1

Theinitialrcpresentation adipratyaya) doesnot holdwithout any

aMr-mative referent of term.

Istheaayopoha

(exclusion

of others not non-cow) existence

(bhava)

or non-existence

(abhava)?

Ifitisan existence and cew, thereisno prQblem.

Ifitisan existence and non-cow, the referent of term would beconfused.

Ifitisanon-existence thecommand and itsagreement should not hold. Inthe case of apoha,there aretw'odomains

(rdsi)

One isnegated and

theother isnot. Buttheterrn,sarva

(all)

doesnot havesuch domains.

Evenif"one" and so on are the negation of "`all,"

theaggregate named

"all"doesnotholdwithout one andsoon.

What istheobject of"apohd'

(exclusion)

fbmiingan action? Ifitisa cow acow should havcnon-existence ofcow.

Ifitisnon-cow, the object ofaction should difTerfrom its own.

Ifnon-cow isnegated incow, thenon-cewness tobenegated should

cen-nect with cow.

Withouttherepresentation ofcow, we can negate nothing incow. Indeed

thereisno intialrepresentation ofcow.

Isthe aityopoha different

<io,atirikta)

from cow or not?

Ifitisdifferentisitdependent

(asrita)

or not?

Ifitisdependent itisan attribute

(gu4a)

andhas no co-reference.

Ifitisnot dependent,thereis no genitive-relation.

Ifitisnot differentitisthecow itselfl

Istheaayopoha concerning each entity one or many? Ifitisone itisthecowness itselfl

Ifitismany, itdoesnot hotdbecauseofinfinitityjust likeindividuals. Istheaaylipoha denetableor not?

Ifitisdenotablethere

is

an infiniteregress

(anavastha)

Ifitisnot denotable,itwould becontradicted with Dignaga s passage,

aayaSabdZirthlipoha"

(the

exclusion ofreferents ofether terms)

The term "aneha"

(not-one)

must bedependenton

particulars.Without

dependenceon particulars,theunderstandmg ofpaniculars through the

terinfbrgeneral

(samaayaSabda)

isnotjustified Sincebothterms, "blue"

and "lotus" are

primary,thereisno qualifier-qualified relation

(vis'eFapavis'esyabhava

betweenthem.

Inthe case ofaayopoha, itemsinco-reference cannot beexplamed.

(5)

-NII-Electronic Library Service

Uddyotakara'sCriticismofthe

mpoha-Theory

Reconsidered

(Yl

OKAzAKI)

(119)

Tb sum up, most of U2 isparalleltosome

portions

ofUl-3. What U2 adds to

Ul-3

is

U2-2,which explains thesimilarity

between

therealisticconcept ofuniversal

Gbti)

and apoha.

Finally,Uddyotakara criticizesthe concept of crpoha

itsel

£ The

points

of

his

criticism

are summarized by [fable

3.

In

his

criticism,

U3-5

and

U3-6

are clearly

parallel

tothe arguments about universal

(sa-maayaijdti) which

is

described

by

Uddyotakara as

differing

from

individuals,

one and the

cause of representation of similarity

(NV

ad NS 2.2.64,

p.

669.13).

Moreover the

initial

representation

discussed

inU3-1 seems to

be

one of subjects

in

the argument of universal.

In

theargument ofuniversal he says: "Befbre

thecowness,

this

is

neither cow nor non-cow ...and

before

connecting with thecowness theentity

does

not exist,"

(prlig

gotvdtndsau

gauk ntipy agaur iti...na caprag gotvayogdd vastu vidyate.

NV

ad

NS

2.2.64,

p.

669.1

1-1

3)

.

At

least

he

imagines

thesituation

preceding

the

first

representation of cow

in

thecase

of universal, while there

is

a

difference

between

theepistemological viewpoint and the

on-tologicalthat.

The

fault

of apoha theory in

U3-4

also arrives at

the

impossibility

of the

ini-tialrepresentation. Moreover

U3-7-1

shows

the

problem

thatthe realistic concept of

uni-versal might also cause, thatistheinfiniteregress.

In

addition, U3-2

is

discussed

inthe

framework

ofVaiSesika.

Uddyotakara

seems to

re-gardnon-existence

(abhbva)

as an independentcategory ofVaiSe$ika-system

(c

£

NV

ad

NS 1.1.4,p.97.7;ad

NS

1.1.14,p.204.10).U3-3 about the

division

intotwo

domains

might takethesame

line

of U3-2.Thatistosay, two

domains

in

U3-3 can be interpretedas

the

domain

ofnon-existence and thatofexistence, while theterm, "domain"

(rEi"i)

might

remind the

discussion

about thetrairiipya-theory.ii)

Through

the above observations, we can see thatUddyotakara realizes thesimilarity

be-tween apoha and

his

own concept ofuniversal.

As

it

is

shown

in

U3-8,however,

he

regards

theterm

denoting

apoha

tomake no reference toparticulars.Although thisproblem might

be

solved

in

Dignaga's

system through theconcept of SabdZintarjipoha,Uddyotakara

ne-glectssuch an aspect of apoha theory,probably

because

he

fbcuses

hisattention on therefi

erent of term.

[Ibsum up, thesources ofUddyotakara's criticism isamixture of

DigriEga's

PS,PSV and

his

lost

works. Uddyotakara seems to cite Dignaga's arguments from them

fairly

freely.

The

inconsistency

ofcitation and theredundancy of arguments are

found

in

his

discussion.

These

facts,

however,

vvould ofler a key to

Uddyotakara's

intention,that

is

torefute

(6)

-The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies

(120)

Uddyotakara'sCriticismof the

4poha-Theory

Reconsidered

(Y

OKAzAKi)

naga's opinion thatneither universal nor

individual

isa referent ofterm. For thisreason

he

selects the

proposition

which iseasy to criticize, and persistentlycriticizes

it.

Indeed

it

would seem toUddyotakara

that

the

proposition

inP-3,`Lsacchabdok

pin.

dandrri

..." has

no contradiction. The change of order of P-3 could also

be

explained

by

hisintention.He

regards P-4 and P-5 to

be

attendant on

P-3,

and P-3 as themost serious problem.

From Uddyotakara'spointof view, the apoha functionsas a new type of universal at

some

points,

while there remain some problemscaused from itsnegative character.

On

the

other

hand,

the

problem

isthattheapoha theory seems tohave dithcultyin

denoting

indi-viduals. Uddyotakara would think thatany theory of meaning cannot be established

with-out any reference to

individuals.

Especially

thereference to

individuals

plays

an important

role inexplanation of co-reference and mataphorical reference. In

this

sense, Uddyotakara would

have

to

deny

thestatement thatenly the`rpoha isthereferent ofterm.

In

order todefendNyaya's doctrineofmeaning

from

Dign2ga's

argument, there are two

issuesthatUddyotakara

has

to address. One

is

Dign5ga'sargument thatneither individuals

nor universal isa referent ofterm, and another ishisopinion thatonly theapoha isa refer-ent of term. The

fbrmer

is

Uddyotakara's

main concern.

As

regards thelatter,it

is

dubious

that

he

has

an

intention

torefute theconcept of apoha exhaustiyely.

1

)

NV: A5,dyadarSana with vatspidyana's Bhasya, UtldyotakaraiyPZrttika,P7icaspatiMiSra

's

7bipa-ryalika & ViSvanittha's Ulrtti,ecl.T.N. Tlarkatirthaand A.Tarkatirtha,CaleuttaSanskritSeries18,29

(Calcutta:

MetropolitanPrinting& PublishingHouse,1936-1944;repr., Kyoto:RinsenBook Co., 1982).Thepage numbers inthisessay refer tothistext.

2

)

HattoriMasaaki

EK$iEop,

"Nyayavtirttika, II.2.66ni okeru ap6ha-ron hihan"Nyayavarttika,

t12.66

e:

fo

Vt6 7'}i£h 2N

than

!l!U

[Uddyotakara's

criticism on theApoha-theoryintheNyayavdrttika,

II.2.66],inMikkyOtolvdoshis6:MlrtsuoGihaihakushi

koki

kinenronsha

MX

2

EPR.Nfi.H..:

diElrZk

ture:l:ilinlefS;ge.fi

(Kyoto:

Shuchiin DaigakuMikky6gakkai,1980);Bimal Krishna Matilal,

"apoha: Uddyotakara'sCritiqueof Dinnaga,"71ijeindianJburnal

ofBudtthist

Studies1

, no. 2

(1989)

:

4-12;Matilal,"Apoha:

Dinnaga as interpretedby Uddyotakara,;'T}lreindianJburnai

ofBudethist

Stud-iesl

(1989)

:53-60;MichaelTbrstenMuch,・`Uddyotakaras Kritikdesopoha-Lehre

(Nyayav5rttika

ad NS II2.66)," maenerZeitschrij}.MrdieKunde SiidasiensundAnchivYSZr indischePhilosophie38

<1994):351-366.

3

)

OlePind,"DignAga's

PhilosophyofLanguageDignfigaon Anyapoha"

(PhD

diss.,Universit2t

Wien, 2009).

4

)

NV': ?YtydyavdrttikaqfBharadvby'aUddyotakara,ed. AnantalalThakur

(New

Delhi:Indian

CouncilofPhilosophical Research,1997).

(7)

-NII-Electronic Library Service

Uddyotakara'sCriticismofthe

Apoha-Theory

Reconsidered

(YL

OKAzAKi)

(121)

5

)

Much sectioned Uddyotakara'sdiscussionintothree,thatis,puttogether U2 and U3 intoone. As a matter of fact,we hayetheimpressionthatUddyotakara'scounter-objection hasfinishedat theend

ofUl. Attheend of Ul hesays:". ..Therefore,

since thecreeper offalsereasons issurelyremoved,

itisestablished thatthereferentofterrn isindividual,shape and universali'

(p.

679.2-3).But U2 is closely linkedwith Ul.

6)

CDvadashra)

IVdyacakra,edited with SirphasUragani'scornmentary by Muni Jambuvijaya

(Bhavnagar:

SriJainAtmanandSabha,1966-1988), p.612 and others.

7) Pind2009,pp.182-183.

8)

EspeciallyP-1,P-5,and Ul-1 inIIbble1.SeePind2009,pp.141-142, 147,160,and l64.

9

)

Uiikyopadtya

ofBhartrhari

with the Prakimpakaprakdsa

ofHlelarby'a,

ka4deMpt. ii,ed. Subra-mania Iyer

(Poona:

Deccan College,1973),p.153.26-27:vibhaktibhedo nlyamad

gunaguuyabhi-cV:tlyinohlsamana-dhiharaayasya2t!!EidEILIe!lu!llgyxE{igeg(Rz{ledh tim bcla hffV-translationofPSVadPSV2dcites! itinoriginal form

(Derge

66b6). But Uddyotakara cites it as Digniga's opinion inthefbllowing

form:. . .Lsamandicthikaraaydsiddhih.

(NVT:

-haraayas.vt-zsiddhih.

)

saddraioiaSabduyoh/1.

10)

kramavrttyabhava-cca, ...tan niipigu4opakarat,sphatikavadvis'esa4crprakansiam agrhitvd

vis'e-syapratyayaprasahgdt...ldficaE2tEgtEEnjlgti@!el!lgglekh th ttth...ldfica2uggegEd!gEgtt!2t!el@ggebh ・NCV,p・ 625.11)

As faras my limitedobservations go,Uddyotakara uses theterrn,"rdsi"

only inhisebjections

againstBuddhistlogic

(cL

NV ad NS I.1.5,p.164.3;ad NS I.1.35,p.301.13;ad NS 3.1.1,p.703.4).

IguessthatUddyotakaraborrowsthistermfromsome work ofearly Buddhistlogic.

<Keywords>

Uddyotakara,apoha,Digntiga,ja-ti(Instructor,

Koyo-Higashi High School,PhD)

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